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For the past sixty years, Nigeria has failed to control oil-related pollution. Chronic 
oil spills and devastation of fragile ecosystems have forced inhabitants to live in a 
toxic environment, fuelling grievances and conflict. 
 
This dissertation studies the effectiveness of Nigeria’s legal system to provide 
access to environmental justice (A2EJ) for victims of oil pollution in the Niger 
Delta. The thesis shows that despite Nigeria’s extended period of democratic rule, 
A2EJ remains constrained by historical factors, such as economic motivations of 
past regimes when developing legislation and governance practices. A2EJ also 
remains constrained by modern political and economic factors, such as the 
negative impact of the scale of the oil sector on governance institutions, both in 
effectively carrying out regulatory remits and in making impartial decisions in the 
courts. Some positive developments in A2EJ are identified in Nigerian oil 
pollution-related jurisprudence, but these are overshadowed by procedural and 
jurisdictional constraints facing the majority of potential and actual litigants, as 
evidenced in case law and in survey findings. 
 
This research contributes to the A2EJ literature by developing a theoretical 
framework for assessing A2EJ in resource-dependent contexts. Using a socio-legal 
methodology, the case study applies new data to the interrogation of A2EJ in 
Nigeria’s oil sector. In order to study legal gateways to environmental justice, this 
research focuses on, first, the status quo of oil sector governance in practice, second, 
the legislative and regulatory framework underpinning it, and finally, domestic 
and transnational litigation involving pollution disputes between oil companies 
and communities. The dissertation draws on three original datasets collected 
during fieldwork in Nigeria in 2014: the results of a survey of twenty-seven 
Nigerian legal practitioners, a case law dataset of forty-seven oil company-
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Hear the call of the ravaged land, 
The raucous cry of famished earth 
The dull dirge of poisoned air 
The piteous wail of sludged streams 
Hear, oh, hear! 
Stunted crops fast decay 
Fishes dies and float away 
Butterflies lose wing and fall 
Nature succumbs to th’ecological war 
 




The objective of this dissertation is to assess the effectiveness of legal gateways to 
environmental justice for victims of oil pollution. To do this, I take as my focus the 
West African country of Nigeria, which is well-known for its significant economic 
dependence on oil revenues and the highly localised negative effects of the oil 
sector’s activities in the Niger Delta. The research detailed here builds on the 
tradition of the SOAS Access to Environmental Justice (SOAS/A2EJ) project, and 
makes a new contribution to this tradition by focusing on a case study from Sub-
Saharan Africa (only one out of eleven case studies in the Harding collection 
studies an African country).2 Unlike the studies that comprise the SOAS/A2EJ 
project, this case study moves away from urban areas and into the rivers and 
creeks of an oil-rich region that has long served as an engine for Nigeria’s economic 
growth. 
 
                                               
1 This poem was written by environmental activist and founder of the Movement for the Survival 
of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) Ken Saro Wiwa. He wrote the poem in prison before his execution. 
See: Ken Saro-Wiwa. Silence Would Be Treason: Last Writings of Ken Saro-Wiwa, ed. Ide Corley, 
Helen Fallon, and Laurence Cox (Dakar Senegal, Nairobi: Conseil pour le Developpement de la 
Recherche Economique et Sociale en Afrique, 2013). 




This research employs a socio-legal methodology that interrogates four different 
aspects of legal gateways to environmental justice in Nigeria’s oil sector: (i) oil 
sector governance in practice, (ii) the underlying legislative and regulatory 
framework for the oil sector governance regime, (iii) case law of pollution disputes 
between oil companies and communities, and (iv) the experience of litigation in 
seeking redress for environmental harms. The methods used include key 
informant interviews, a survey, and a systematic case law dataset, all of which 
provide new data points for analysis. 
 
In this Introduction, I outline the aims and parameters of this research while 
providing context and justification for the study itself. I conclude by providing a 
detailed map of the structure and contents of the remainder of the dissertation. 
 
1.2 Aims of the Research 
 
This research project has three aims in studying access to environmental justice 
(A2EJ) in Nigeria’s oil sector. 
 
The first of these aims is to frame the A2EJ landscape in Nigeria within the 
incentive structure of the Rentier State.3 I do this in order to contribute to the 
A2EJ literature by positing how a specific set of social, political and economic 
conditions characteristic of the Rentier State can affect access to environmental 
justice in specific ways.4 This is a key objective of my research because this refines 
and improves upon the way in which A2EJ research is undertaken in resource 
dependent contexts. While Socio-Legal Studies encourages a multi-disciplinary 
                                               
3 In short, a Rentier State is a State that relies on revenue earned from “foreign individuals, 
concerns or governments.” See Hossein Mahdavy, “The Pattern and Problems of Economic 
Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran,” in Studies in the Economic History of the 
Middle East, ed. M.A. Cook. 428-467 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 428. More on 
Rentier States in Chapter 2, Section 2.3. 
4 Harding’s Access to Environmental Justice: A Comparative Study recognises the importance of 
politics in A2EJ, but does not engage with other literatures to explore these dynamics, discussed 
further in Chapter 2. 
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approach, there has not yet been a study that has explicitly applied a Rentier State 
framework to A2EJ. My study contributes, then, to the filling of this lacuna.  
 
The second aim of this research is to build on analysis conducted during military 
rule in Nigeria as a means of understanding how and if the Rentier State is 
evolving its stance toward A2EJ in the oil sector, and, if so, under which conditions. 
The George Frynas study, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, analysed oil 
sector legal and regulatory frameworks as well as oil pollution litigation in Nigeria, 
but his analysis ended before Nigeria entered is longest-ever period of democratic 
rule in 1999.5 No research has since carried out a line of inquiry that employs 
similar research methods as Frynas’ study used.6 This has left a gap in the rigorous 
study of A2EJ in Nigeria’s oil sector since 1999, which my project seeks to engage 
and fill. 
  
My final research objective concerns my use of qualitative and quantitative 
evidence within a clear theoretical framework. More specifically, I aim to mobilise 
a range of data collection techniques in order to make an original contribution to 
the study of A2EJ in Nigeria’s oil sector. The focus on methodology in Chapter 3, 
in particular, aims to develop a framework that can be used for future studies on 
environmental justice in Nigeria and elsewhere. 
 
1.3 Boundaries of the Work 
 
The study is ambitious in that it covers multiple areas of law and governance, both 
on paper and in practice. For the purposes of the study, a set number of parameters 
were considered. 
 
                                               
5 It is important to note that while Frynas also identifies the Rentier State framework as relevant 
to the Nigerian context and highlights some similar dimensions of A2EJ for analysis, his overall 
approach to the study does not acknowledge or reference the relevant access to justice literature, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 2.  
6 Discussed in Chapter 2.  
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Firstly, the study focuses specifically on legal gateways to environmental justice 
in the oil sector in Nigeria, rather than all possible avenues for access to justice 
and types of natural resources. The choice of oil as differentiated from other types 
of resources comes from its unique properties and implications for governance, 
which I discuss further in Chapter 2. As has been done elsewhere,7 this research 
uses the terms “access to environmental justice” and “legal gateways to 
environmental justice” interchangeably.8 I did this to limit the research scope, 
while remaining aware that A2EJ can take non-legal forms, such as community 
mobilisation and other forms of activism.9 
 
Secondly, while the study uses the relevant political economy and political science 
literature as a framing device for understanding how a Rentier State behaves, this 
research project remains a socio-legal study. This means that the degree to which 
political economy research methodologies and analytical tools are employed is 
selective. As a first, original, step in applying Rentier State principles to a socio-
legal analysis of A2EJ, I employed basic quantitative research methods in this 
theory-building study. 
 
Thirdly, the research focuses on the period from 1999-2015. The year 1999 marked 
the transition from military rule to democracy in Nigeria, and the enactment of 
the 1999 Constitution, which is still in force today. The end boundary of the study 
is 2015, which marks the cut off for case law and legislation included in this 
analysis. As significant parts of this thesis address the evolution of legislation and 
                                               
7 Such as Andrew Harding, ed., “Access to Environmental Justice: Some Introductory 
Perspectives,” in Access to Environmental Justice: A Comparative Study (Boston: Brill, 2014), 1-
20.  
8 See Chapter 2, section 2.2 on A2EJ, which discusses definitions, and M.J. Cha and Martin Lau, 
“Introduction to Environmental Justice in the Rural and Natural Resource Context in South 
Asia” in Environmental Justice and Rural Communities: Studies from India and Nepal, eds. 
Patricia Moore and Firuza Pastakia. p. ix-xii. (Bangkok, Thailand and Bland, Switzerland: IUCN, 
2007), https://portals.iucn.org/library/sites/library/files/documents/2007-030.pdf, p.ix.  
9 See M.J. Cha, “Environmental Justice in Rural South Asia: Applying Lessons Learned from the 
United States in Fighting for Indigenous Communities’ Rights and Access to Common 




litigation practice over regime types, a historical approach is taken where 
appropriate. While I draw upon historical accounts to inform my understanding, 
these accounts are not meant to be comprehensive. Specific developments that 
have taken place since 2015 are, however, incorporated where appropriate and 
feasible.  
 
While these are the overarching boundaries of the study, specific limitations of the 
methodology and the methods chosen will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
1.4 Research Context  
 
Now is a particularly important time to study the state of legal gateways to 
environmental justice in Nigeria’s oil sector. International oil prices have been 
depressed since August 2014 and tension in the Niger Delta is rising again.10 With 
less money in government coffers, the Federal Government will have to address 
frustration in the oil producing region more substantively than simply 
compensating restless groups, as has been done in the past.11  
 
According to journalist Sebastian Junger, who has come face-to-face with Niger 
Delta militants, instability in the Niger Delta is not only a threat to Nigeria’s 
                                               
10 “Trouble Brewing in Nigeria Swamps Threatens Economy,” ENCA, 6 August 2017,  
https://www.enca.com/africa/trouble-brewing-in-nigeria-swamps-threatens-economy (accessed 
August 1, 2017); “Central Bank of Nigeria: Crude Oil Price,” 
https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/crudeoil.asp?year=2016 (accessed August 14, 2017); Akin Oyedele, 
“Crude Oil Crashes below $40 per Barrel,” Business Insider, August 21, 2015, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/crude-oil-prices-august-21-2015-8 (accessed August 14, 2017).  
11 “Nigeria: Frustration Grows in Niger Delta,” Stratfor, August 1, 2017, 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/nigeria-frustration-grows-niger-delta  (accessed September 
10, 2017); Omololu Ogunmade, “Nigeria: Pandef, Osinbajo Meet On Niger Delta,” This Day 
(Lagos), August 4, 2017. http://allafrica.com/stories/201708040060.html (accessed August 10, 
2017); “Niger Delta Amnesty Program,” Office of the Special Advisor to the President of Niger 
Delta http://www.osapnd.gov.ng/index/ndap (accessed September 10, 2017); Cheta Nwanze, 
“Niger Delta Amnesty Programme as a Slippery Slope,” Stratfor, July 3, 2017, 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/niger-delta-amnesty-programme-slippery-slope (accessed 
September 10, 2017). 
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young democracy. Instability in Nigeria could also destabilise global energy 
supplies, making countries such as the United States particularly vulnerable.12  
 
Viewed in this way, understanding the ability of legal gateways to deliver 
substantive relief to Niger Delta residents has significant implications as much for 
Nigeria as it does globally. 
 
Shell-BP discovered oil in Nigeria in commercial quantities in 1956 in Bayelsa 
State in the Niger Delta.13 At that time, Nigeria was a British colony of around 41 
million people.14 The country’s main exports were agricultural products, such as 
palm oil and groundnuts.15 Today, Nigeria is home to a population of almost 190 
million people, has the largest economy in Africa, and is one of the largest 
producers of oil in the world.16 The Niger Delta, Nigeria’s oil producing region, is 
home to more than 30 million people, approximately 2 million more people than 
the entire population of neighbouring Ghana.17   
 
                                               
12 Nigeria is the fifth largest supplier of oil to the United States. See Stephanie Hanson “MEND: 
The Niger Delta’s Umbrella Militant Group,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 21, 2007, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mend-niger-deltas-umbrella-militant-group (accessed August 
10, 2017) and Sebastian Junger, “Blood Oil,” Vanity Fair, January 31, 2015, 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2007/02/junger200702 (accessed August 15, 2017).  
13 George Frynas, Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation Between Oil Companies and Village 
Communities (Münster: LIT Verlag Münster, 2000), 9. 
14 “UN data: Total population, both sexes combined (thousands),” United Nations, 2017, 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=nigeria&d=PopDiv&f=variableID%3A12%3BcrID%3A566  
(accessed August 15, 2017).  
15 Adam Robert Green, “Agriculture Is the Future of Nigeria,” Forbes, August 8, 2013, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/skollworldforum/2013/08/08/agriculture-is-the-future-of-nigeria/ 
(accessed September 10, 2017).  
16 “Population, total,” World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=NG&page=2 (accessed August 15, 
2017) and “Country Comparison: Crude Oil-Production,” Central Intelligence Agency 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2241rank.html (accessed 
August 15, 2017).   
17 Alexander Sewell, “About the Niger Delta,” Stakeholder Democracy Network, 




In 2015, Nigeria was producing 2.3 million barrels of oil per day18 and a majority 
of the Federal Government’s revenue was coming from the oil sector.19 In spite of 
these developments, the country has struggled to translate almost sixty years of 
oil production into positive human development outcomes.20 Nigeria suffers from 
some of the worst income inequality in the world, with more than 60% of the 
population living under the poverty line.21 An Oxfam report characterised this 
inequality by noting that “The combined wealth of Nigeria’s five richest men - 
$29.9 billion - could end extreme poverty at a national level.”22 Moreover, according 
to a UNDP Human Development Report, the Niger Delta has been getting poorer 
and this is a problem that cannot simply be solved by closing the income gap. A 
majority of residents in the Niger Delta live in communities of less than 1,000 
people, making it particularly challenging to deliver services and develop the 
infrastructure needed for development.23 
 
Beyond the region’s declining development, oil production has put the Niger 
Delta’s fragile ecosystem, which includes one of the largest mangrove forests in the 
                                               
18 “Nigeria Crude Oil Production by Year (Thousand Barrels per Day),” Mundi Index,  
https://www.indexmundi.com/energy/?country=ng&product=oil&graph=production (accessed 
September 10, 2017), and “Nigeria - International - Analysis - U.S,” Energy Information 
Administration, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=NGA (accessed August 
15, 2017). 
19 Seventy percent of government revenue and almost all of the country’s foreign exchange 
earnings come from oil exports. See “World Economic Outlook: Subdued Demand: Symptoms and 
Remedies,” the International Monetary Fund, Washington, October, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/ (accessed September 10, 2017) and  
“Nigeria Executive Summary.” Export.gov https://www.export.gov/apex/article2?id=Nigeria-
Executive-Summary (accessed August 8, 2017).  
20 “Nigeria,” OPEC, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm (accessed August 15, 
2017). 
21 “National Human Development Report, 2015 - Human Security and Human 
Development in Nigeria,” 
http://www.ng.undp.org/content/nigeria/en/home/library/poverty/national-human-development-
report-2016.html (accessed September 10, 2017).  
22 “Nigeria: extreme inequality in numbers,” Oxfam, https://www.oxfam.org/en/even-it-
nigeria/nigeria-extreme-inequality-numbers (accessed August 15, 2017). 
23 For an in-depth assessment of the complexity of Human Development in the Niger Delta see, 
“Niger Delta Human Development Report,” Abuja: UNDP 2006, 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/nigeria_hdr_report.pdf (accessed August 10, 2017). 
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world, at risk.24 This is causing alarm for those who live in the Niger Delta, who 
struggle to access potable drinking water and uncontaminated fish stocks due to 
the effects that the oil sector has had on the environment. One NGO found that 
“60 percent [of Niger Delta inhabitants] depend directly on the services provided 
by the environment – such as fish and clean drinking water– for their well-
being.”25 A UNDP report states that a majority of Niger Delta residents are 
drinking water from unsafe sources, “including rivers, lakes or ponds, unprotected 
wells and boreholes.”26  
 
An extensive fourteen-month study of Ogoniland conducted by UNEP found, for 
example, that residents of Ogoni, an area of the Niger Delta home to more than 
800,000 people and a historic battleground in the fight for environmental justice, 
are exposed to oil in the air they breathe, the water they drink, and the soil and 
dust that touches their skin.27 In one instance, UNEP found that “community 
members at Nisisioken Ogale are drinking water from wells that is contaminated 
with benzene, a known carcinogen, at levels over 900 times above the World Health 
Organization (WHO) guideline.”28 As I will show in Chapter 6, the damage that oil 
spills cause to farmland, drinking water, and fish stocks have been the subject of 
legal battles between oil companies and communities for decades.  
 
The severe environmental harm caused by oil spills and gas flaring is also a rising 
concern for the international climate change community.29 Because mangroves are 
highly efficient carbon sinks, damage to the Niger Delta’s mangroves not only 
                                               
24 “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland Report,” UNEP. 
http://web.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/where-we-work/nigeria/what-we-do/environmental-
assessment-ogoniland-report (accessed August 9, 2017).  
25 “Conserving wetlands in Nigeria's Niger River Delta,” Wetlands International 
https://www.wetlands.org/casestudy/conserving-and-restoring-wetlands-in-nigerias-niger-river-
delta/ (accessed August 15, 2017).   
26 “Niger Delta Human Development Report,” UNDP, 2006. 
27 “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland Report,” UNEP, 10. 
28 “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland Report,” UNEP, 11. 
29 “Conserving wetlands in Nigeria's Niger River Delta,” Wetlands International and Mark 
Spalding et al., “Science: Mangrove Forests as Incredible Carbon Stores,” Cool Green Science, 
May 24, 2017, https://blog.nature.org/science/2013/10/11/new-science-mangrove-forests-carbon-
store-map/ (accessed August 15, 2017).  
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negatively impacts fish stocks, which use mangroves as breeding grounds, but also 
thwarts efforts to combat climate change.30  
 
The practice of flaring gas, discussed in Chapter 5 and in Appendix I, makes the 
air difficult to breathe and creates severe sound pollution and acid rain, while also 
acting as a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. While gas flaring has 
been on the decline in Nigeria, the country remains the seventh largest gas flarer 
in the world.31 It is estimated that Nigeria’s flaring activities contribute more than 
16 million tonnes of CO2 emissions per year.32 
 
Governance has also been a persistent challenge for Nigeria, and this has 
significant implications for managing the oil sector. Transparency International 
ranks Nigeria 136 out of 176 countries in its Corruption Perceptions Index.33 While 
oil is not the only source of corruption in Nigeria, oil-related scandals are common 
and often uncover the misappropriation of funds at a grand scale. For example, 
before being removed from his position, the former Governor of the Central Bank 
of Nigeria identified USD 20 billion in Nigerian National Petroleum Company 
(NNPC) oil revenue that should have been remitted to the federation account but 
never arrived.34  
                                               
30 James Hutchison et al., “Predicting Global Patterns in Mangrove Forest Biomass,” 
Conservation Letters, September 20, 2013, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/conl.12060/full (accessed August 15, 2017); Spalding et 
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Ogoniland Report,” UNEP. 
31 “Nigeria's Flaring Reduction Target: 2020,” World Bank, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/03/10/nigerias-flaring-reduction-target-2020 
(accessed August 15, 2017). 
32 “Nigerian Gas Flare Tracker,” 2017. 
33 “Nigeria,” Transparency International. https://www.transparency.org/country/NGA (accessed 
August 15, 2017). 
34 See “Nigeria Central Bank Head Lamido Sanusi Ousted,” BBC News, February 20, 2014, sec. 
Africa. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26270561 (accessed September 10, 2017); Tim 
Cocks and Joe Brock, “Special Report: Anatomy of Nigeria’s $20 Billion ‘Leak,’” Reuters, February 
6, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-election-banker-specialreport-
idUSKBN0LA0X820150206 (accessed September 10, 2017); PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Impact of 
Corruption on Nigeria’s Economy,” PwC Nigeria, https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/publications/impact-
of-corruption-on-nigerias-economy.html (accessed September 10, 2017). See also the Ibori case, 
where the former Governor of oil-rich Delta State was convicted of conspiracy to defraud and 




In another, relatively recent case, an oil scandal highlighted how deeply 
entrenched illicit behaviour has become in the highest levels of government and in 
international oil companies. In this case, Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum (the parent 
company of the Nigerian subsidiary SPDC) and ENI (the Italian oil major) were 
implicated in the payment of more than USD 1 billion to a Nigerian oil company, 
Malabu, to acquire a lucrative oil bloc. Documents and recordings make it 
irrefutable that the international oil companies were aware that Malabu was 
owned by then-Oil Minister, Dan Etete.35 In addition to this, a recent investigation 
showed that the Nigerian Attorney General at the time, along with a previous 
Attorney General, were transferred millions of dollars in connection with the 
Malabu transaction.36 While governance and A2EJ challenges amount to more 
than simply corruption, it is important to recognise that such regular and 
systematic corrupt practices in the sector can have a negative effect on public trust 
in the government’s ability to execute its responsibilities.37 
 
The combination of poor governance, severely damaged environment and limited 
financial benefit to residents of the region where oil is extracted, has created a 
dangerous situation, in which conflict has bred.38 Some of this has taken non-
                                               
Corruption Manage to Get into Office Again?” Newsweek, February 1, 2017. 
http://www.newsweek.com/james-ibori-nigerian-politics-corruption-551213 (accessed September 
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36 Gramer, “Leaked Records Show Shell’s Complicity.” 
37 Søren Serritzlew, Kim Mannemar Sønderskov and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, “Do Corruption 
and Social Trust Affect Economic Growth? A Review, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: 
Research and Practice 16, no. 2 (2014) 121-139; 134-135.  
38 While Northern Nigeria is also struggling with conflict, particularly with Boko Haram, here I 
focus on the Niger Delta conflict, as it is immediately relevant to the area of study. There are 
some linkages to the Northern conflict and this research, however, including suggestions that 
there is a relationship between oil exploitation in the Niger Delta and the rise of Boko Haram. 
See Nafeez Ahmed, “Behind the Rise of Boko Haram - Ecological Disaster, Oil Crisis, Spy 
Games.” The Guardian, May 9, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-
insight/2014/may/09/behind-rise-nigeria-boko-haram-climate-disaster-peak-oil-depletion 
(accessed September 10, 2017). There is also oil exploration taking place in Northern Nigeria. See 
Agence France-Presse, “Boko Haram Attack on Nigeria Oil Team ‘Killed More than 50,’” The 
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violent forms, such as the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
(MOSOP), which was founded in 1990 and which gained international attention 
after nine of its leaders, including Ken Saro Wiwa, were hanged by the military 
government for a crime they did not commit.39 Other more recent forms of 
resistance by young and disenfranchised residents of the Niger Delta have taken 
the form of organised, violent attacks in order to advocate for more control over 
the region’s oil reserves. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) has been one of the major militant groups since its emergence in 2006.40 
They have claimed responsibility for kidnappings, pipeline attacks, and are known 
to engage in oil bunkering (the practice of stealing oil from pipelines to sell on the 
black market).41 Their arms are perceived to be more sophisticated than that of 
the Nigerian military combating them. MEND’s actions have been so disruptive 
that oil production was cut by a third for a period.42  
 
This is the context within which this dissertation is situated. While the Nigerian 
government has amassed a great deal of wealth from the oil sector, residents of 
the Niger Delta have grown poorer. Both the homes and livelihoods of residents 
have been negatively affected by oil exploitation, and policies to address their 
concerns have been inadequate.43 Within this sits a legal system comprised of a 
range of tools that could in theory prevent pollution, promote regional 
development, and provide redress to those who have experienced negative impacts 
of oil sector activities in Nigeria. 
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1.5 Thesis Roadmap 
 
This dissertation is broken up into 8 chapters. Chapter 2 develops a theoretical 
framework for the research by reviewing three bodies of literature: the A2EJ 
literature, the Rentier State literature, and the Nigeria-specific research on 
environmental legal challenges in the oil sector. Chapter 3 introduces the 
methodology for the research and discusses the experience of my fieldwork, in 
addition to data collection methods for interviews, a survey, and a case law dataset. 
This Chapter acts as an anchor for the empirical Chapters, in particular Chapters 
5, 6, and 7, where I draw heavily upon original data. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses Nigeria’s oil sector governance framework. It builds upon the 
theoretical scaffolding developed in Chapter 2 by interrogating governance 
arrangements in the sector, as they have an impact on A2EJ. In particular, 
Chapter 4 compares institutional governance design with that of Norway, a 
country that discovered oil around the same time as Nigeria. It then interrogates 
the financial imbalance between actors involved in sector governance, before 
analysing the impact of the “Joint Investigation Visit” - a mechanism for 
determining the cause of oil spills in Nigeria.  
 
Chapter 5 investigates the underpinnings of the governance regime discussed in 
Chapter 4 by interrogating the legal and regulatory framework for the oil sector, 
insofar as it addresses A2EJ. The Chapter does so by reviewing key legislation 
relevant to this research, from colonial era legislation that is still in force today to 
the promulgation of the 1999 Constitution and the new legislation that came 
thereafter. 
 
Chapter 6 moves away from legislation and regulation to litigation, and focuses on 
a systematically collected body of case law that covers environmental disputes 
between oil companies and communities living in the Niger Delta. By undertaking 
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an analysis of oil pollution litigation, the Chapter discusses the viability of public 
interest environmental litigation in the Nigerian context, as well as extra-
territorial litigation abroad. 
 
Chapter 7 puts the case law into further context by using the findings of a repeated 
survey I administered to 27 Nigerian lawyers. The purpose of this Chapter is to 
understand not just the judgements of the courts, but the experience of litigation 
as an integral dimension of the legitimacy of the courts as a legal gateway to 
environmental justice. 
 
Chapter 8 brings these strands together to reinforce the overarching argument of 
the dissertation: that the specific context of oil dependence in Nigeria distorts legal 
gateways to environmental justice in the country’s oil sector. After discussing these 
findings, this final Chapter briefly considers the practical implications of the 











The study of law’s ability to provide mechanisms for protection and redress in a 
particular context requires more than just a thorough reading of legislation, or a 
review of a sample of case law. Rather it necessitates deep consideration of the 
political and economic context within which those laws and courts exist.  The 
theoretical tools for undertaking such study in a complex jurisdiction like Nigeria 
have, however, been lacking. This is not because Nigeria is too complex a context 
to study, rather it is because the literatures required to develop a theoretical basis 
for investigation have not historically borrowed concepts from one another.  
 
In particular, there are three complementary literatures that would benefit from 
each other’s respective strengths in the study of Nigeria’s oil sector and the legal 
system’s ability to provide justice to those vulnerable to oil pollution. This Chapter 
will provide the theoretical framework for this dissertation by identifying gaps in 
these literatures and threading them together. This means synthesising the 
literature on A2EJ, the Rentier State, and Nigerian oil and environmental law.  
 
Providing this framing is fundamental to achieving the first objective of this 
research project: “to frame the A2EJ landscape in Nigeria within the incentive 
structure of the Rentier State.”44 This particular theoretical scaffolding achieves 
more than simply identifying a research gap for this thesis to fill; it also provides 
a future framework for academics and policymakers to consider A2EJ in the 
Nigerian context more accurately and holistically, leading to research and policy 
outcomes that can come closer to addressing the root causes of A2EJ’s challenges 
in the Nigerian context. 
 
                                               
44 See Chapter 1. 
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The following sections will discuss these bodies of literature in more detail. I will 
begin with a review of the A2EJ literature, from its origin in the United States to 
a more globalised conceptualisation of A2EJ in different contexts. Afterward, I will 
provide an overview of the Rentier State literature, highlighting particular socio-
economic conditions within which A2EJ might exist. The final section will cover 
the Nigeria-specific literature. In particular, this final section will discuss the key 
shortcomings of legal research available on Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. This will 
lay the foundation for my research contribution to the field.   
 
2.2 Access to Environmental Justice (A2EJ) 
 
We live in an increasingly complex and interlinked world. Each day, individuals, 
communities, and governments make decisions determining how we consume the 
earth’s finite natural resources. These decisions can affect us directly, but quite 
often have the most direct negative effects on those living far from where 
consumption happens.  This is the challenge of providing access to environmental 
justice in the 21st century.45 These concerns are significantly more acute in the 
Global South, where some populations disproportionately shoulder the bulk of the 
environmental burden for those that have the means (geographic or financial) to 
protect themselves from environmental harms.46  
 
Definitions of A2EJ are varied. It is both an evolving organic movement led by civil 
society actors and an academic subject of inquiry. This sub-field within the broader 
access to justice literature is concerned with procedural mechanisms for 
environmental justice insofar as these are able to deliver substantive justice.47 
According to Cha, “[t]he environmental justice movement is distinctive because it 
                                               
45 More on this in David Schlosberg, “Theorising Environmental Justice: The Expanding Sphere 
of a Discourse.” Environmental Politics 22, no. 1 (2013): 37–55.  
46 J.M. Cha, Increasing Access to Environmental Justice: A Resource Book for Advocacy and Legal 
Literacy in South Asia (Kathmandu, Nepal: International Centre for Integrated Mountain 
Development, 2007). Available at: http://lib.icimod.org/record/22025/files/attachment_135.pdf 
(April 16, 2013). 
47 Andrew Harding, “Access to Environmental Justice: Some Introductory Perspectives” in Access 
to Environmental Justice: A Comparative Study (Boston: BRILL, 2014), 4. 
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looks at cases of environmental harm, not just as a purely environmental concern, 
but also as a civil rights or human rights issue. The idea of environmental justice 
recognises the fact that clean air and water and non-toxic living conditions are 
basic civil rights, not just environmental concerns”.48 These features make A2EJ, 
and the study of it, distinctive from the more traditional environmental movement, 
which historically has been primarily concerned with ecological preservation and 
conservation.49  
 
A2EJ is premised upon the fact that environmental harms are a threat to people 
and communities, and as such, individuals may require legal mechanisms to 
prevent or rectify these harms.50 This research is then appropriately situated 
within the wider A2EJ literature, as it is a study that acknowledges from the 
outset that oil sector activity in the Niger Delta poses environmental threats to 
communities that may be both prevented and redressed through government 
action. The degree to which access to these legal protections and remedies is 
possible is my subject of inquiry. 
 
2.2.1 A2EJ Beginnings, The United States 
  
In the United States, concern for the environment was initially spurred on by a 
host of environmentalists who were primarily invested in conserving and 
protecting nature in its most pristine form.51 This movement was largely led by 
white, upper- and middle-class Americans.52 This changed in the 1980’s, with the 
ushering in of a “multiracial environmental justice movement,” which included 
members of marginalised communities of colour that were being negatively 
                                               
48 Cha, Increasing Access, 5. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Mijin Cha and Martin Lau, “Introduction to Environmental Justice in the Rural and Natural 
Resource Context in South Asia.” In Environmental Justice and Rural Communities: Studies 
from India and Nepal, edited by Patricia Moore and Firuza Pastakia. IUCN, 2007. 
https://portals.iucn.org/library/sites/library/files/documents/2007-030.pdf, ix-xii, ix.  
51 M.J. Cha, “Environmental Justice in Rural South Asia: Applying Lessons Learned from the 
United States in Fight for Indigenous Communities’ Rights and Access to Common Resources.” 




affected by economic development decisions, specifically by urban pollution.53 The 
movement focused on urban communities bearing the brunt of environmental 
harms in the form of waste disposal and industry-related pollution. This served as 
a turning point, forcing United States policymakers to recognise that 
environmental degradation and harm was more than simply an issue for the 
environment itself; it was also an issue for the communities inhabiting those 
environments.54 
 
According to Kameri-Mbote and Cullet, the very crux of the environmental justice 
movement in the United States was, for much of its history, related to race. These 
academics found that the United States’ experience with Environmental Justice 
was preoccupied with “the distribution of environmental benefits and burdens 
across society along the lines of race or colour.”55 However, from the mid-nineties 
this sentiment has changed, both as reflected in new literature on Access to 
Environmental Justice, and in the movement itself.  Walker notes that by 2009, 
the concept of A2EJ in the United States proved to be elastic, incorporating 
broader notions of identity politics beyond race in the decades following the civil 
rights era.56 
 
Legal remedies were a tool used early in the United States movement for A2EJ, 
particularly when race discrimination was central to the movement.57 This 
                                               
53 See Robert D Bullard, “Race and Environmental Justice in the United States.” Yale Journal of 
International Law 18 (1993): 319-334, and Benjamin Chavis Jr., Toxic Wastes and Race in the 
United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of 
Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites (The University of Michigan: Public Data Access, 
1987). 
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/unitedchurchofchrist/legacy_url/13567/toxwrace87.pdf?141
8439935 (accessed 29 June 2017). 
54 For an overview of the evolution of the A2EJ movement in the United States, see 
M.J. Cha, “Environmental Justice in Rural South Asia.” 
55 Patricia Kameri-Mbote and Philippe Cullet, Environmental Justice and Sustainable 
Development: Integrating Local Communities in Environmental Management (Geneva: 
International Environmental Law Research Centre, 1996): 1. 
http://www.ielrc.org/content/w9601.pdf (29 June 2017). 
56 Gordon Walker, “Beyond Distribution and Proximity: Exploring the Multiple Spatialities of 
Environmental Justice.” Antipode 41, no. 4 (2009): 614–636. 
57 Luke Cole, “Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling.” Fordham 
Urban Law Journal 21, no.3 (1993): 523-544.  
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involved using environmental legislation to block discriminatory developments or 
practices by finding fault with procedures, rather than the substance of the activity 
in question. This litigation approach was then followed by a new tactic – using civil 
rights statutes to argue that environmental harms were a form of racial 
discrimination.58 While civil rights suits enjoyed some early successes, a changing 
legal landscape toward a more restrictive interpretation of statutes meant that 
environmental justice advocates in the United States were forced to find 
alternative mechanisms for justice. Members of the A2EJ movement have recently 
begun to either focus on utilising other legal mechanisms, like substantive 
environmental legal instruments, or on mobilising political movements.59  
 
The A2EJ movement is rooted in the tensions between race, power and equity in 
environmental decision-making. While first developed in the United States, this 
research on A2EJ in Nigeria contributes to the further generalisability of these 
tensions in an interconnected world. Racial inequality in environmental 
governance takes on a transnational dimension when considering the ways in 
which primarily European and American companies work, if not collaborate, with 
Nigeria’s governing elite to exploit natural resources of one region of the country 
to the detriment of the poor who live there.60  The racial dimension becomes clear 
when environmental practices by major oil companies are probed: best practice for 
oil operations in Nigeria are not the same as quality or standard of best practice 
for oil operations in the United States, for example.61 Over time, this inequity has 
                                               
58 Cole, “Environmental Justice Litigation”, 530. 
59 Cha, Increasing Access, 193. Cha’s research found that for communities living far from formal 
legal institutions, like courts, law was not the best mechanism for environmental justice. She 
found that community action and mobilisation were often more effective tools for drawing 
attention and demanding action for environmental injustice.   
60 However, it is worth noting that the states of the Niger Delta region are comparatively 
wealthier than states in the impoverished north of Nigeria. This means that while the struggle to 
secure a safe environment puts residents of the Niger Delta in a marginalised position, it does not 
mean that they are the most disenfranchised in the Nigerian context. See: Nigeria Data Portal 
“Nigeria Poverty and Unemployment Maps” Nigeria.OpenDataForAfrica.Org, 
http://nigeria.opendataforafrica.org/ysydsef/nigeria-unemploymnet-and-poverty-maps (accessed 
August 08 2018). 
61 Olubayo Oluduro and Olubisi Friday Oluduro, “Oil Exploitation and Compliance with 
International Environmental Standards: The Case of Double Standards in the Niger Delta of 
Nigeria,” Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization 37 (2015): 67-82. 
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led to conflict in the Niger Delta where companies have used state sanctioned 
violence against residents of the Niger Delta and residents of the region have 
perpetrated violence on the oil companies in protest of their practices in the 
region.62 
 
2.2.2 The Globalisation of A2EJ 
 
While the US movement has focused strongly on the plight of urban populations, 
there is a body of global literature on A2EJ that has developed to suit different 
contexts, from urban centres to rural communities.63 Walker argues that there has 
been horizontal and vertical diffusion of the concept – horizontal referring to A2EJ 
as applied to new jurisdictions with different demands, and vertical referring to 
A2EJ as it incorporates transboundary environmental issues, like climate change, 
which are global challenges and affect some communities disproportionately across 
the world.64 
 
The remainder of this section will focus on the horizontal diffusion of the concept, 
briefly reviewing the SOAS/A2EJ project from the nineties and the published 
research that followed in 2014.65 The primary purpose of this review is to highlight 
that while much progress has been made to contextualise A2EJ and apply it to 
different jurisdictions and circumstances, there still remains a gap in thinking 
about natural resource extraction in its socio-political context, a challenge that 
                                               
62 While ethnic conflict, communities fighting each other based on their ethnic identity, is not a 
prevalent narrative in the oil pollution/A2EJ struggle in Nigeria today, Ako notes that even 
within their own country, Niger Delta communities are often comprised of ethnic minorities,. This 
was a concern raised before independence by the Ijaws of the Niger Delta who were concerned 
about marginalisation in an independent Nigeria; a prescient concern. Rhuks T Ako, “Nigeria’s 
Land Use Act: An Anti-Thesis to Environmental Justice,” Journal of African Law 53, no. 2 (2009), 
300. 
63 See Walker, “Beyond Distribution and Proximity.” 
64 Walker specifically explores South Africa and the UK’s adoption of the A2EJ concept in Gordon 
Walker, “Globalizing Environmental Justice: The Geography and Politics of Frame 
Contextualization and Evolution,” Global Social Policy 9, no. 3 (2009): 355-382. See also JoAnn 
Carmin and Julian Agyeman, eds., Environmental Inequalities Beyond Borders: Local 
Perspectives on Global Injustices (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011). This is an edited volume entirely 
focused on the globalisation of environmental justice.  
65 The focus on the Global South is meant to restrict the scope of the review, while also focusing 
on a body of literature where my own research on Nigeria is situated. 
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does not fit neatly into discussions about A2EJ for rural populations nor for urban 
populations. 
 
2.1.1.1 The SOAS/A2EJ Project 
 
The SOAS/A2EJ project was inspired by Garth and Cappelletti’s Florence project 
on access to justice.66 SOAS/A2EJ researchers focused specifically on access to 
environmental justice in urban settings in the Global South. The project did this 
in a series of studies that investigated the particular mechanisms and obstacles 
that influenced access to environmental justice in some of Asia and one of Africa’s 
most environmentally fraught cities.  
 
The importance of being able to seek equitable and timely legal remedy for 
injustices in a politicised world was of significance to the SOAS/A2EJ project. Their 
case studies were primarily cities in which residents faced forcible removal from 
their homes, or the deleterious effects of water and air pollution from 
industrialisation. In many ways, the cities covered in Malaysia, Pakistan, India, 
Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, China, and Thailand encountered similar challenges to 
those faced by communities in the United States’ inner cities: marginalisation that 
results in forced migration or living in environmentally hazardous conditions.67  
 
An edited volume was published in 2014, born out of the SOAS/A2EJ research 
endeavour. The findings across countries confirmed that “legal gateways to 
environmental justice are largely ineffective”68. The comparative research found 
                                               
66 See Harding, Access to Environmental Justice, ix. The Florence Project was a comparative 
research project that took place over four years in the 1970s by Cappelletti and Garth. It is 
credited with putting forth the tenets of access to justice literature. These features will be 
familiar to any student of access to justice: that justice is harder for some to attain than others, 
and that accessing justice (particularly legal mechanisms) requires institutions that can provide 
equitable access and treatment, so that outcomes are “individually and socially just.” See also 
Bryant Garth and Mauro Cappelletti, “Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide 
Movement to Make Rights Effective,” Articles by Maurer Faculty 1142 (1978): 180 – 292. 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2140&context=facpub  
(accessed April 2, 2013). 




that despite differing contexts, legal remedies in the respective countries shared 
some similarities both in advantages (the ability to receive a binding decision and 
the ability to use legal proceedings as a basis for public information campaigns) 
and in disadvantages – that is, 
  
a general lack of case law (even in the common law jurisdictions); lack 
of standing; delay; prohibitive cost (or risk thereof) due to a lack of 
legal aid and the hazards of litigation; a concentration, in the 
reported cases, on procedure rather than substance; legal doctrinal 
limitations, such those relating to evidence and causation; and 
judicial caution or lack of real independence when faced with 
litigation against public bodies.69 
 
The groundwork set by the SOAS/A2EJ project has created space for this research 
in two ways. Firstly, the unique body of literature provides an opportunity for my 
research to contribute a study from Sub-Saharan Africa to a growing body of 
evidence on A2EJ in the Global South. While the Harding collection is not an 
exhaustive publication in terms of A2EJ research, it does represent a significant 
contribution to the field. However, there is only one study of A2EJ in Africa in the 
collection.70 Secondly, the SOAS/A2EJ project highlights “the connections between 
the legal gateways and the general political and economic environment; the degree 
of democracy and judicial independence; and also the openness and resourcing of 
administrative bodies.”71 This provides an opportunity for this research to explore 
the complex variables that affect A2EJ in the Nigerian context, from resourcing of 
regulators to the influence of broader politics on policymaking. Particularly, 
SOAS/A2EJ’s recurrent theme of “politics” provides an entry-point into a more 
focused examination of how political and economic factors influence A2EJ. 
 
2.1.1.2 The Political Economy of A2EJ 
 
                                               
69 Ibid., 8. 
70 James S. Read “Access to Environmental Justice in Ghana (Accra),” in Access to Environmental 
Justice, Andrew Harding, ed., 21-58.  
71 Harding, Access to Environmental Justice, 10. 
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The A2EJ literature has grown in complexity over time, but has not explicitly 
embraced relevant theoretical frameworks from political economy and political 
science, which would enhance the richness of the work undertaken. While this may 
be a choice, it is, in fact, a missed opportunity. Political science and political 
economy literature have much to offer a researcher concerned with government 
decision-making and behaviour. Political economy in particular, refers to the way 
in which economic incentives can affect political decision-making, and vice versa.72 
As discussed above, the A2EJ literature is concerned with the procedural 
mechanisms for environmental justice and the degree to which these mechanisms 
are able to deliver substantive equity. Taken together, then, the political economy 
of access to environmental justice is the study of the ways in which political and 
economic incentives can enable or constrain a government’s ability to develop and 
use procedural mechanisms for substantive environmental justice outcomes.73  
To some extent, access to justice (A2J) research in the political economy tradition 
is as old as the study of A2J itself. The Florence Project founders Cappelletti and 
Garth acknowledge that a perfect black letter process for accessing justice means 
little in the absence of “political and social reform.”74 These researchers identify a 
flawed assumption by their “access” colleagues “that the legislative creation of a 
right implies a societal commitment to its full enforcement,” instead emphasising 
that the “political reality is much more complicated”.75  
 
                                               
72 In the introduction to Laffont’s work, he chronicles the evolution in thinking around political 
economy, particularly incentives of government. See Jean-Jacques Laffont, “Introduction”, 
Incentives and Political Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1-5. 
73 Laffont argues that regulation must be “delegated to politicians, thereby creating an incentive 
problem when politicians' motivations are to stay in power by pleasing to a certain degree a 
majority of voters rather than to maximize social welfare.” In the case of Nigeria, a majority of 
voters have an incentive for government to continue to extracting oil at any environmental cost, 
because the long term negative effects of pollution in the oil producing regions are only felt by a 
relatively small proportion of the overall population, whereas a majority of the population benefit 
from sector revenues in the form of government services. See Laffront, Incentives and Political 
Economy, 174.  
74 Garth and Capelletti, “Access to Justice”, 289.  
75 Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth. "Foreward: Access to Justice as a Focus of Research." 
(1981). Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 1 (1981): ix-xxvi, xvi. 
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The SOAS/A2EJ study also comes close to discussing the political economy of 
A2EJ, but does not incorporate political economy theories in its work, missing an 
opportunity to further develop hypotheses as to the reasons for certain A2EJ 
mechanisms being more effective than others in a given context.76 In particular, 
Perry-Kessaris’ research on A2EJ in Bangalore identifies that a tension exists 
between the economic interests of the state and its obligation to deliver 
environmental justice.77  
 
Cha finds in her study of Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tract community (CHT) 
that the lack of power of the CHT community vis-à-vis the government’s economic 
incentives to exploit their environment for financial gain was central to the 
struggle for A2EJ. In this, Cha eludes to an important characteristic of natural 
resources and the fight for A2EJ. She writes that natural resource challenges 
“make environmental justice struggles even more difficult.”78 In the case of the 
CHT, this was due to the countervailing interests of indigenous populations who 
use the land and its resources to maintain their way of life, while newcomers to 
the area saw the resources as an economic opportunity to be exploited.79 
 
Perry-Kessaris’ case study on the city of Bangalore asks “To what extent can, did, 
and do Bangaloreans use legal gateways to slow down or reverse the decline – to 
redress the balance between economy and environment?”80 She found their ability 
to do so was limited in part by the tension between the state’s obligation to deliver 
justice and the state’s economic policy that promoted rapid development in 
                                               
76 To account for these barriers, Harding asserts that “environmental justice is a good which can 
only be achieved by a massive feat of political will”. “Political will” remains unexplored in 
Harding’s work. This is an opportunity for this research to add further complexity to the study of 
A2EJ by exploring the political drivers in a given context. See Andrew Harding, ed. Access to 
Environmental Justice: A Comparative Study. (Boston: BRILL, 2014).  
77 While the research acknowledges political and power dynamics that challenge the principles of 
A2EJ, it does so without the vocabulary of well-established research in the political science and 
political economy research. 
78 M.J. Cha, Environmental Justice in Rural South Asia. 
79 Ibid, 193.  
80 Amanda Perry-Kessaris, “Chapter 3: Access to Environmental Justice in India’s Garden City 
(Bangalore),” in Access to Environmental Justice: A Comparative Study, edited by Andrew 
Harding, 59-87. (Boston: BRILL, 2014), 86. 
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Bangalore, often to the detriment of its residents. Perry-Kessaris, along with 
Randeria, begin to build the case for what will be central to this dissertation: the 
claim that states are not passive entities that have forgotten, or were too weak to 
provide A2EJ, but are instead incentivised to ensure that the opposite takes place.  
As Randeria argues:  
 
The state is not merely a victim of the neo-liberal economic 
globalization, since it remains an active agent in transposing it 
nationally and locally… We are faced not by weak, or weakening, 
states but by cunning states, which capitalize on their perceived 
weakness in order to render themselves unaccountable both to their 
citizens and to international institutions.81  
 
The underlying theme of this dissertation is the relationship between access to 
justice and the state’s constraints in providing justice due to its economic 
dependence on oil and, as a result, its relationship with the private sector. The 
natural starting point for such research is joining A2EJ developments with those 
in the political economy canon. As discussed in the below section on the “petro-
state,” there is a unique set of A2EJ challenges for major resource exporters as a 
distinct subset of countries in the Global South.  
2.2.3 A2EJ Summary  
 
The A2EJ literature has moved the discussion about environmental degradation 
from an isolated issue of ecosystems to one that is intimately linked to the well-
being of the humans who inhabit those environments. This shift first began in the 
United States and then globalised, finding a nuanced voice in different contexts, 
from the urban environments in major cities in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
struggling with toxic waste and industrial pollution to the particular challenges of 
the rural context.  
 
In the course of this evolution, studies on A2EJ have increasingly noted that 
political incentives can supersede developments in progressive law-making and 
                                               
81 Randeria cited in Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Global Business, Local Law: The Indian Legal 
System as a Communal Resource in Foreign Investment Relations (London: Ashgate, 2008), 87.  
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litigation for determining outcomes for those seeking environmental justice. This 
growing acknowledgement has both called into question the utility of the law as a 
mechanism for environmental justice and highlighted the need for more explicit 
links in A2EJ research to relevant discussion in the political economy literature. 
 
Now is the right time to bridge this gap, particularly in the context of A2EJ in 
countries where governments are dependent on revenues coming from oil 
production. Schlosberg finds that the field has come a long way in recognising “the 
plurality of environmental (in)justice experiences” and expanding the topical space 
of the EJ frame.82 This project capitalises on the opportunity to fill this research 
lacuna. The following section on the “petro-state” introduces a particular strand of 
this political economy research, which focuses on the effect of the political economy 
of an oil dependent country on A2EJ. 
 
2.3 The Rentier State 
 
Why do some countries rich in natural resources fail to make use of those resources 
for the greater developmental good of their populations? Political scientists and 
economists have asked this question in one form of another since the eighties.83 
Scholars have proposed a range of theories. Some suggest that resource 
dependence harms a country’s macro-economy with a large inflow of foreign 
exchange that makes a country’s other exports less competitive globally.84 Others 
have suggested that resource dependence leads to militancy and conflict in 
resource-rich regions, which stokes instability in a country more broadly.85 I find 
                                               
82 For a more in-depth review of the Environmental Justice movement and the academic work 
surrounding it see Schlosberg, “Theorising environmental justice.”  
83 Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,” 
NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 5398 (1995), http://www.nber.org/papers/w5398.pdf 
(accessed 30 June 2017).  
84 This is called Dutch Disease. For a definition of Dutch Disease, see “Definition of Dutch 
disease” ft.com/Lexicon http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=dutch-disease (accessed August 11, 
2017). 
85 Researchers have also employed a range of sophisticated econometric quantitative analyses to 
test these theories. For a comprehensive review of the resource curse literature, see Michael Ross, 
“The Paradoxical Wealth of Nations,” in The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the 
Development of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).  
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one body of this “resource curse” literature on “Rentier States” and “petro-states” 
to be most compelling as it focuses specifically on the way in which dependence on 
oil can affect the behaviour of state institutions.  
 
The purpose of this section is to consider Rentier State Theory as a framing for 
A2EJ analysis in Nigeria. First, the section will explain what is meant by “rent” 
and “Rentier State Theory”. Then, it will focus on the particular dynamics of oil 




“Rent” is here defined as revenue earned from a good that grossly surpasses the 
cost of production. To provide an everyday example: we may pay “rent” to occupy 
a flat that we do not own for an extended period of time. If we suppose our landlord 
inherited the flat and pays only a small amount for upkeep, then the “rent” 
collected by the landlord has much higher value than the amount of labour 
required by him to maintain the property. In the realm of natural resources, 
political scientists and economists use the term rent to describe the money made 
by governments that have similarly inherited ownership of a country’s subsoil 
assets and reap great financial rewards from selling the right to exploit those 
assets at almost no labour cost to government. 
 
Rent on its own is not necessarily a bad thing. It can cause problems, however, if 
the entity collecting rent is not a person, but a government that is dependent upon 
rent to fill state coffers. These problems are particularly pronounced when rent is 
one of the main sources of income for the state, particularly if only a few are 
employed by the sector. What I have just described is what Beblawi and Luciani 
identify as the conditions under which a state is a “Rentier State”.86 
 
                                               
86 Hazem Beblawi and Luciani Giacomo, eds. The Rentier State (New York, NY: University of 
California Press, 1987). 
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2.3.2 The Special Features of Petroleum Rent 
 
Ross argues that petroleum in particular has special qualities that make rent 
generated unique and a possible challenge for governance.87 Ross proposes “scale, 
source, stability and secrecy” as features of oil rent that are challenging for sector 
governance, particularly in a time when many major producers have nationalised 
oil companies. To begin with, Ross suggests that the sheer scale of oil revenues can 
have perverse effects on governance, like increasing the size of the government 
apparatus, or stoking unrest among citizens who expect to see more material 
benefit from oil production.  
 
Ross argues that the source of the oil revenue, from rents that require little labour 
or domestic inputs, means that governments can easily be disconnected from 
citizen accountability; the challenge is thus maintaining the social contract 
relationship between government and citizenry without taxation.88 Without taxes, 
governments have less accountability to citizens, who in turn expect fewer 
government-provided services. Ross identifies the secrecy of sector activities 
(attributed to the opaque actions of national oil companies largely operating with 
impunity) as an impediment to accountability and prudent financial 
management.89 Finally, Ross suggests resource rents are unique because of their 
lack of stability – serious fluctuations in the oil price and pressure to spend in the 
near term makes it difficult for governments to financially plan for price shocks.90 
 
Karl argues that the “source” dimension of Ross’ argument, particularly how oil 
revenue diminishes an accountability mechanism between government and tax-
paying citizens, is what makes a resource rich country behave like a “petro state”.91  
In such a case, it is not that the government acts with impunity and without an 
                                               
87 Ross, “The Paradoxical Wealth of Nations”, 5.  
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid.,6 
90 Ibid.  
91 Terry Lynn Karl, “Ensuring Fairness: The Case for a Transparent Fiscal Social Contract,” in 
Escaping the Resource Curse, eds., Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 262. 
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accountability mechanism, rather it is no longer the citizens for whom the state 
needs to perform. Thus, the national oil company and the private sector hold the 
accountability relationships, as they are the primary revenue providers. This 
creates a vicious cycle, potentially causing the state to shirk other responsibilities, 
making decisions based primarily on securing further rents, and therefore 
perpetuates a political cycle that focuses on securing access to these excess funds.92  
 
The “petro-state” framing provides a fusion of the political, the economic, and the 
psycho-social. As such, it provides a useful platform from which to understand how 
such a government might manipulate its own institutions beyond, or shy of, their 
prescribed duty.  Karl attributes some of this institutional manipulation to 
governments’ need to centralise power, decision-making, and revenue 
management in order to engage with commercial partners.93  However, what 
begins as necessity for sector development can morph into dependence. These 
required preconditions for large scale development leave behind “a legacy of overly-
centralized political power, strong networks of complicity between public and 
private sector actors, highly uneven mineral-based development subsidized by oil 
rents and the replacement of domestic tax revenues and other sources of earned 
income by petrodollars”.94 As Karl argues, “In effect, this alters the frameworks for 
decision-making in a manner that further encourages and reinforces these initial 
patterns, producing a vicious cycle of negative development outcomes.”95 This 
phenomenon is useful for considering the Nigerian context where historical 
patterns of dependence may be causing continued perverse decision-making, 
                                               
92 Matthew Gray, “A Theory of Late Rentierism" in the Arab States of the Gulf,” Occasional Paper 
no. 7  (Centre for International and Regional Studies Georgetown University, School of Foreign 
Service in Qatar, 2011), 1.   
93 Terry Lynn Karl, “The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty,” Journal 
of International Affairs 53, no. 1 (1999): 31-48; 34.  
94 Ibid. 
95 Karl rejects the common notion that perverse outcomes from oil exploitation are due to lacking 
capacity of the state, rather he asserts that it is precisely because of the political urgency of short-
term planning that state leaders shirk the formulation of long term development trajectories. See 
Karl, “Ensuring Fairness,” 262; Nazeem Barma, Kai Kaiser, Tuan Minh Le, and Lorena Viñuela, 
Rents to Riches?: The Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development (Washington: 
World Bank Group, 2011), 100. This is similar to the “cunning state” concept discussed by 
Randeria. See Randeria, “Glocalization of Law”, 305–328.  
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despite a democratic governance regime and shared understanding that 
development challenges persist due to oil dependence. 
 
2.4 Nigerian Law and Oil Literature   
 
There is a rich tradition of studying the Nigerian oil and gas sector.96 A majority 
of the literature between the 1960s and 1990s focused on the technical and 
economic aspects of the industry and its effect on the broader Nigerian economy.97 
Toward the end of this period, political analyses emerged that questioned how oil 
and politics in the post-colonial federal state interacted; interrogation of the legal 
and regulatory framework became a subset of these questions.98 George Frynas’ 
study, in particular, has proven to be a defining work for the Nigeria literature on 
disputes between oil companies and communities. The first part of this section 
focuses on Frynas’ work and discusses its shortcomings. The subsequent section 
then explores research produced after Frynas’ study. The section concludes by 
identifying a gap in the Nigerian environmental law literature that this thesis will 
fill. 
 
2.4.1 The Frynas Study 
 
In March 1998, Frynas administered a survey to Nigerian legal practitioners about 
the oil industry and the relationship between oil companies and communities 
affected by the petroleum sector. The survey was one component of the doctoral 
research Frynas was conducting at the time, which would go on to be published in 
2002 as a book entitled Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation Between Oil 
Companies and Village Communities.99 This work has informed my approach to 
this dissertation, both in building on Frynas’ research’s strengths and addressing 
its shortcomings.100 This section will outline the key features of his work and then 
                                               
96 Frynas provides a detailed account of the oil and gas sector literature from the late 1960s to the 
late 1990s in Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 3. 
97 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 3-6. 
98 Ibid., 3. 
99 Ibid., 100-148. 
100 The research was undertaken at the beginning of Frynas’ career as an academic concerned 
with business studies, particularly corporate social responsibility, international business, and 
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highlight its limitations, which this research will address almost two decades since 
the publication of Frynas’ book.  
 
Frynas’ research identified a gap in the literature on the role of the legal system 
as an intermediary between oil interests and community interests. The author had 
three aims with his research agenda:101 1. To study litigation between multi-
national corporations and communities in oil producing areas in order to better 
understand the nature of conflict in the Niger Delta, 2. To give “a detailed analysis 
of the nature of legal disputes between oil companies and village communities in 
Nigeria, given the dynamic processes of legal change in a developing society,” and 
3. To “make a contribution to the research and the debate on the role of 
multinational companies in developing countries and on the day-to-day operations 
of African legal systems.”  
 
In order to achieve these objectives, Frynas analysed 68 court cases involving 
disputes between communities and oil companies, in addition to analysing the 
results of a survey of more than 150 Nigerian lawyers.102 He undertakes these 
empirical exercises and provides a historical analysis (pre-colonial, colonial and 
post-colonial) of the Nigerian legal system, including oil law and environmental 
law, while drawing attention to the role of customary law in some oil-related cases 
(e.g. in delineating ownership of land), as well as  the court system more 
broadly).103  
 
                                               
strategic management. At time of writing, Frynas was a Professor of Corporate Social 
Responsibility at Middlesex University. See “Professor George Frynas” 
http://www.mdx.ac.uk/about-us/our-people/staff-directory/profile/frynas-george (accessed July 26, 
2017). 
101 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 2. 
102 Frynas uses the case law to track changing attitudes toward compensation and the amount 
that should be dispensed. He also assesses the degrees to which different tort and defence tactics 
are successful for litigants. 
103 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 100-148 and 182-224. Frynas also conducted interviews, but does not 
discuss this as a methodological feature of his work, nor does he explain how he chose his 
interview subjects or how he conducted those interviews. 
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His analysis finds that up until the dawn of the Obasanjo administration, there 
was empirical evidence to support the notion that Nigeria favours the oil industry 
in its policymaking. More specifically, he finds: 
 
1. Plaintiffs face significant barriers in accessing courts, 
2. Legal practitioners tend to regard courts as biased in favour of oil companies, 
3. And there is bias present in Nigeria's statute law in favour of oil companies.104 
 
In Irou v. Shell BP105, one of the most overt cases of the judiciary choosing 
economic priorities over the health and safety of communities, Frynas finds that, 
“the judge refused to grant an injunction in favour of the plaintiff whose land, fish 
pond, and creek had been polluted by the activities of the defendant because in his 
opinion, nothing should be done to disturb the operation of trade (i.e. mineral oil), 
which is the main source of Nigeria's revenue”.106 
 
Frynas’ work is significant for this research for three reasons: 1. the frame of 
analysis takes place just before a major regime change in Nigeria – the dawn of 
the Fourth Republic –and thus provides an account of military-era aspects of the 
legal system, as it relates oil pollution redress, 2. it is a unique example of rigorous 
research methodologies being applied to the question of company-community 
relations in dealing with oil spill disputes, with a present, but lesser emphasis on 
the role of the Nigerian state in that process, and 3. the data collected and analysed 
by Frynas provides the opportunity for historical study of A2EJ in Nigeria’s oil 
sector. 
 
2.4.1.1 Shortcomings of the Frynas study 
 
While not in the same academic field, Frynas collected the kind of data and asked 
similar questions to those concerned with A2EJ research. His work sets a high 
                                               
104 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 224.  




standard for research into the interaction between oil companies and communities 
when dealing with oil pollution in Nigeria. He proves that it is possible to apply 
rigorous methodologies to challenging and complex questions and provides an 
important and comprehensive baseline of case law, historical analysis, and survey 
work from which this research and other projects have benefitted immensely.  
 
However, there are limitations to Frynas’ work for the study of A2EJ. This section 
will highlight the conceptual gaps in Frynas’ research, particularly with regards 
to its paucity of theoretical framing. The methodological shortcomings of his work 
will be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3.   
 
Frynas demonstrates a strong command of the Nigeria-specific literature in the 
area of oil pollution regulation and litigation, but fails to demonstrate a broader 
command of theoretical work related to socio-legal studies and A2EJ; both are 
concepts that he draws upon superficially. In particular, he makes cursory mention 
of his research being socio-legal, but then does not elaborate further or reference 
any literature in that field. This implies that he is using this term divorced from 
the literature that has so shaped it.107 Further, despite an extensive discussion on 
access to courts, Frynas does not address the issue of access to justice, nor the 
A2EJ literature that was already developed when he was working on this topic. 
Doing so would have improved his ability to contextualise survey findings.108 The 
implication of omitting these rich bodies of literature lies mainly in the limited 
ability of the research to contribute to the development of theory in the future.109 
Increased awareness and use of these theoretical frameworks would have also 
provided a stronger basis for explaining the findings of his quantitative studies. 
 
                                               
107 Roger Cotterrell defines the term “socio-legal” in Roger Cotterrell, “Why must legal ideas be 
interpreted sociologically?” Journal of Law and Society, 25 no. 2 (1998):171-192.  
108 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 100-107.  
109 Some of this literature existed at the time of Frynas’ research, but other projects were being 
developed in tandem, and so it is possible that he was not privy to relevant work. 
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In addition to the limited and superficial use of available theoretical frameworks, 
Frynas frames his research as studying the conflict between oil companies and 
communities.110 This emphasis on companies and communities implicitly focuses 
on a dyadic relationship between the two.111 In reality this relationship is more 
usefully portrayed as triadic, as the state should be included in these interactions 
as a distinct player with agency. Frynas discusses the state and its potential bias 
in favour of oil company preferences, but he does not engage with the fact that the 
state can act as an equal agent with an agenda in disputes that may arise in 
future.112  
 
The limitations of Frynas’ research are rectified in this dissertation, which focuses 
not on oil company behaviour, but on state conduct in the context of oil sector 
development. This is an important but subtle distinction that enables me to 
consider the way the state operates, moving my study away for corporate 
behaviour to instead investigate the ways in which the state might struggle to 
create an enabling environment for A2EJ. The importance of understanding state 
behaviour is more obvious in A2EJ literature where there is a keen interest in 
reform and channels available for disenfranchised groups to seek redress for 
environmental harm. 
 
One clear illustration of Frynas’ limited portrayal of state agency is his discussion 
of joint venture agreements and the impact they have on state conduct.113 While 
he does recognise the state’s significant commercial stake in the industry through 
joint venture arrangements, he does not hold the state responsible for the negative 
impact on communities that oil operations can cause.114 Frynas’ argument is that 
                                               
110 This focus on conflict was likely informed by the current events unfolding during Frynas’ 
period of analysis, particularly the MOSOP struggle for recognition in the Niger Delta and the 
execution of environmental activist Ken Saro Wiwa. See Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 1. 
111  Ibid., 3.  
112 It is understandable that Frynas would try to isolate this relationship given his interest in 
Corporate Social Responsibility, however, this oversimplification does not serve the purpose of 
understanding the dynamics and incentives of actors involved in oil pollution disputes. 
113 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 57. 
114 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 8. 
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if the foreign company is the operator of an oil exploration or production project, 
they will be the ones named in a court case, and so become the focus of inquiry.115 
He also suggests that regulation has failed to affect the oil sector due to the 
intertwined regulatory roles that the Nigerian National Petroleum Company 
(NNPC) and the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) have played 
historically.116  
 
While both his statements regarding regulation and joint ventures are not wrong 
per se, they are incomplete and depict the state as reactionary and weak. As a 
means of addressing this, I draw on the A2EJ literature to make the claim that 
the Nigerian state must be understood as an actor that makes choices based on its 
own agenda.117 I illustrate this specifically through interviews and survey findings 
where respondents provide evidence of a state that makes sub-optimal choices for 
citizens in favour of continued revenue-capture.118 
 
While simplifying the role of the state in one respect, Frynas does seek to highlight 
the complexity of the state apparatus elsewhere in his study, particularly in his 
critique of work by Omoweh. Frynas suggests that Omoweh’s research has been 
compromised by his own Marxist perspective of the relationship between 
colonialism and economic underdevelopment in the Niger Delta region, which 
positions oil companies as immediately at fault before presenting any supporting 
evidence.119 As a way of responding, Frynas suggests that different parts of the 
state apparatus, like the judiciary, have their own internal dynamics that can 
                                               
115 Chapter 4 will discuss in further detail why the State’s commercial participation in the sector 
is an important contributor to poor governance. 
116 Ibid., 29. 
117 This is in line with the work of Randeria, which investigates what she terms “a cunning state”. 
See “Glocalization of Law”, 306. See also Karl’s “Perils of the Petro-State,” in which he identifies a 
“Petro-State” – a state that is not weak, but rather empowered to make self-interested choices in 
policy and law. 
118  My argument thus follows Karl’s research into petro-state behaviour in “Perils of the Petro-
State.”  
119 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 5.  
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prevail.120 The assertion made by Frynas is not incorrect in that different parts of 
the state apparatus do indeed have their own internal dynamics.  
 
However, Frynas does not discuss the relative power of those institutions; while 
the judiciary may have its own dynamics, it does not operate autonomously from 
the rest of government, which Frynas’ own work later shows. This assertion by 
Frynas that heterogeneity of institutions within the state apparatus is significant 
enough to have a substantive effect on the institution’s overall performance 
reflects a departure from Rentier State literature. While the judiciary may have 
its own dynamics, it is still situated within an incentive structure built around oil 
dependence. 
 
This dissertation builds on Frynas’ work to ensure sufficient continuity for 
historical study, but it also improves upon his research, particularly as it relates 
to the theoretical underpinnings of his study. My project seeks to reframe Frynas’ 
inquiry in order to focus on state agency, oil dependence and the effects on A2EJ 
in the Nigerian context. 
 
2.4.1.2 Developments Since Frynas’ Research 
 
It has been 17 years since the publishing of Frynas’ analysis, and much has 
changed in Nigeria, in the environmental justice movement and in global oil 
markets during this period. His work covers a period dominated by military rule 
in Nigeria, with only the beginnings of democracy emerging in the final stage of 
his work. Since the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, Nigeria has established an 
environmental policy and a constitution that affords rights to citizens, and has had 
peaceful democratic elections and transitions of power.121 Since that time, the 
increased volatility of global oil prices has threatened the stability of economies 
like Nigeria’s, which is dependent on oil revenue. 
                                               
120 Ibid. 




During Frynas’ period of research, a global movement was gaining momentum for 
more democratic and inclusive environmental decision-making and governance 
standards. This first started with the Rio Declaration, particularly Principle 10, 
which outlined that states should have clear mechanisms for public participation 
in environmental decision-making and the provision of access to environmental 
information. 122 Nigeria is a signatory to this non-binding declaration.  
 
However, it was not until just after Frynas’ period of analysis, that the first 
agreement was signed that would codify these commitments in law. The United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s (UNECE) Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, more commonly known as the Aarhus Convention, came 
into force in Europe with 47 signatories across Europe in 2001. The Aarhus 
Convention confers a series of environmental rights onto citizens that signatory 
states have been responsible for codifying in domestic law.  
 
While the Convention only binds countries in the European Union and UNECE 
member states, it has had a far reaching impact on international norms and 
standards for public participation in environmental decision-making, including 
influencing some actors outside of signatory countries.123 For example, Etemire 
highlights that the Aarhus Convention has been persuasive in jurisprudence in 
non-signatory states such as Mauritius and Brazil. He notes that while not legally 
enforceable in Nigeria, Nigerian activists have used expectations and obligations 
under the Aarhus convention as a framework for campaigning.124  
                                               
122 United Nations Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (13 June 1992), 31 I.L.M. 
874 (1992).  
123 Uzuazo Etemire, Law and Practice on Public Participation in Environmental Matters: The 
Nigerian Example in Transnational Comparative Perspective (Oxon: Routledge, 2016). 
124 Ibid. While there is no clear link made between the relatively recent Freedom of Information 
Act 2011 in Nigeria and the Aarhus Convention, Etemire argues that, despite substantial flaws, 
access to environmental information provisions are on the path to being more expected in the 





In addition to the Aarhus Convention, the Climate Justice movement and 
discourse has risen in prominence since the time of Frynas’ research. Climate 
Justice is concerned with the material, negative, impact of climate change on 
marginalised and disadvantaged communities who are not responsible for 
creating the conditions for climate change, yet disproportionately suffer its 
consequences.125 The Climate Justice movement has been present in both 
national and international arena, urging governments, communities and citizens 
to work toward accountability mechanisms for addressing climate change in an 
equitable way.126  
 
In this context, Nigeria is an interesting case. It is both a contributor to climate 
change through detrimental practices such as gas flaring and oil production more 
broadly, but its citizens also disproportionately suffer from wealthier countries’ 
consumption of oil. Sea level rise in the Niger Delta and severe droughts in 
northern Nigeria are products of climate change that negatively affect the poor, 
while energy consumption in Nigeria remains low.127  
 
The main global forum where these discussions are taking place is under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, first during the Kyoto 
Protocol discussions in the 1990s and more recently during the negotiations of the 
Paris Agreement in 2015.128 The Paris Agreement has been a global rallying cry 
                                               
125 Jethro Pettit. “Climate Justice: A New Social Movement for Atmospheric Rights.” IDS 
Bulletin, 35: 102-106, 
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/8533/IDSB_35_3_10.1111-
j.1759-5436.2004.tb00142.x.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed July 9, 2018), and Paul Chatterton, 
Featherstone, David and Routledge, Paul. “Articulating Climate Justice in Copenhagen: 
Antagonism, the Commons, and Solidarity.” Antipode, 45 (2013): 602-620. 
126 Jethro Pettit. “Climate Justice: A New Social Movement for Atmospheric Rights.” 
127 Peter Akpodiogagaa and Ovuyovwiroye Odjugo “General Overview of Climate Change Impacts 
in Nigeria,” Journal of Human Ecology, 29:1 (2010): 47-55. 
128 The Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997 and entered into force in 2005 “is an international 
agreement linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which 
commits its Parties by setting internationally binding emission reduction targets.” The Paris 
Agreement builds on the Kyoto Protocol by bringing developing countries into the discussion 
more prominently, “for the first time brings all nations into a common cause to undertake 
ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects, with enhanced support to 
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for nations’ collective responsibility to curb climate change and has received a high 
degree of visibility in the international cooperation agenda. Nigeria currently has 
committed under the Paris Agreement to curb polluting activities, such as ending 
gas flaring, achieving 13 GW of off grid solar capability, and improving energy 
efficiency by 30 percent by 2030.129 These measures and others included in 
Nigeria’s Paris Agreement commitments are meant to take place between 2015 
and 2030 and highlight how, despite being a poor country in terms of human 
development indicators, the country is expected to reduce emissions. This added 
dimension to the global environmental debate, and Nigeria’s engagement in that 
discussion, may have an impact on the country’s future response to areas of 
environmental concern, though early indications for swift action as a result of 
these commitments have not been limited.130 
 
Changes to the context, global movements and developments in research 
methodologies have not, however, been fully reflected in recent related academic 
literature.131 In the wake of Frynas’ research, there has been a growing body of 
academic inquiry into Nigeria as a case study on environmental law in the context 
of oil sector activity. Unfortunately, this research corpus does not significantly 
                                               
assist developing countries to do so. As such, it charts a new course in the global climate effort.” 
See: United Nations Climate Change, “KP Introduction,” UNFCCC.int. 
https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol (accessed 08 August 2018). and United Nations 
Climate Change “The Paris Agreement,” UNFCCC.int, https://unfccc.int/process-and-
meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement (accessed August 08 2018). 
129 “Nigeria's Intended Nationally Determined Contribution.” Report. Federal Ministry of 
Environment, Federal Government of Nigeria. October 27, 2015. 
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Nigeria First/Executive 
Summary_Nigerian INDC_271115.pdf (Accessed July 09, 2018). 
130 While material developments to date have been limited, the government of Nigeria did 
establish a Department of Climate Change in 2011 in order to ensure its compliance with the 
UNFCCC. Upgrading the previously named ‘Special Climate Change Unit’ to a full department 
may be an indication that this topic holds increasing political importance. See the Department’s 
website at: http://climatechange.gov.ng/about-us/department-of-climate-change/.   
131 Omeje’s work relies heavily on Frynas’ research to consolidate the theory that Nigeria’s 
designation as a Rentier State has meant that the government has manipulated legal 
frameworks in line with its own economic incentives. His study does not employ any original data 
to further make this case, nor does it propose a link to the existing research on A2EJ, still 
presenting a gap to be filled by this research. See Kenneth Omeje, “The Rentier State: Oil-related 




advance our knowledge of A2EJ in the Nigerian oil sector. There has not yet been 
research relating to oil pollution redress in the Nigerian context as thorough in its 
approach as Frynas’ work, nor has there been research that convincingly exhibits 
a command of the related theoretical literature.132 While there have been studies 
conducted on the legal frameworks for environmental justice and protection since 
Frynas’ research, few have collected new data or employed rigorous investigative 
methodologies to advance the current view on A2EJ in Nigeria.133 Instead, there 
has been one approach to research, which lays out the existing laws and conducts 
a doctrinal critique, rarely yielding new findings or perspectives.134 
 
This dissertation does not intend to disprove the broad consensus of this body of 
literature; indeed the findings in this study broadly support the consensus that 
                                               
132 This assertion is made after using multiple systematic database searches. Specifically, I used 
Boolean searches in Google Scholar and HeinOnline to assess search returns for: Nigeria AND oil 
AND law and assessed the 200 most relevant search returns from each. In order to ensure that 
this was not a search anomaly, I then I also followed the citation listings for Frynas’ key works to 
see what has since followed his research. 
133 For example, Stephenson and Schweitzer apply a theoretical model to the challenges of 
accessing environmental justice in the Delta, but do not develop any analytical framework for 
fully appreciating the political economic complexity of the context, suggesting the government 
might somehow “develop and sustain the political wherewithal to establish different rules.” See 
Max Stephenson Jr. and Lisa A. Schweitzer, “Learning from the Quest for Environmental Justice 
in the Niger River Delta,” in Environmental Inequalities Beyond Borders: Local Perspectives on 
Global Injustices, eds., JoAnn Carmin and Julian Agyeman (Cambridge MIT Press, 2011), 45-66.  
134 The lack of original data, theoretical framing, or clear methodology may be due to the fact that 
many of these journal articles and research briefs focus on providing prescriptive measures for 
improving Nigeria’s governance regime, rather than focusing on rigorous methodologies. For 
example, see: Hekeem Ijaiya and O.T. Joseph, “Rethinking Environmental Law Enforcement in 
Nigeria,” Beijing Law Review 5, no. 4 (2014): 306-321; Chilenye Nwapi, “A Legislative Proposal 
for Public Participation in Oil and Gas Decision-Making in Nigeria”, Journal of African Law 54, 
no. 2 (2010): 184-211; Nelson E Ojukwu-Ogba, “Legislating Development in Nigeria's Oil-
Producing Region: The N.D.D.C. Act Seven Years on”, African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 17, no. 1 (2011): 136-149; Gozie Ogbodo, “Environmental Protection in Nigeria: 
Two Decades after the Koko Incident”, Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 15, 
no. 1 (2009): 1-18; Eghosa Osa Ekhator, “Public Regulation of the Oil and Gas Industry in 
Nigeria: An Evaluation,” Survey of International & Comparative Law 21, no.1 (2016): 43-91; 
Allan Ingelson and Chilenye Nwapi, “Environmental Impact Assessment Process for Oil, Gas and 
Mining Projects in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis”, Law, Environment and Development Journal 10, 
no. 1 (2014): 1-22; Evaristus Oshionebo, “Transnational Corporations, Civil Society Organisations 
and Social Accountability in Nigeria's Oil and Gas Industry,” African Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 15, no. 1 (2007): 107-129; Olubayo Oluduro, “Environmental Rights: A 
Case Study of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”, Malawi Law Journal 4, 
no. 2 (2010): 255 – 27; Adebola Ogunba, “An Appraisal of the Evolution of Environmental 
Legislation in Nigeria, Vermont Law Review 40 (2016): 673-694.   
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domestic approaches to environmental governance in the oil and gas sector in 
Nigeria are inadequate for providing access to justice. The research does, however, 
identify an opportunity for a unique contribution to the field by providing a sound 
theoretical framework and nuance and granularity to the debate since the Fourth 






This Chapter examined the three key bodies of literature related to this research, 
namely the evolution of the A2EJ literature, the Rentier State literature, and the 
Nigerian environmental and oil law literature, with a particular focus on Frynas’ 
research. Through this review, I have established that my research project will 
provide a contribution to knowledge production within the A2EJ literature and the 
Nigerian environmental law literature.  
 
The A2EJ and Rentier State research, viewed together, pave a way forward for a 
specific kind of political economy of access to environmental justice. This research 
provides a strong theoretical basis for study of the ways in which political and 
economic incentives can enable or constrain a government’s ability to develop and 
use procedural mechanisms for substantive environmental justice outcomes. 
According to Cotterell, there is precedent for taking such an approach. He argues 
that “a sociological perspective is thus not exclusive of or separate from the 
perspectives offered by [other disciplines, such as economics]”.135 This research will 
build on the developments made by A2EJ scholars, such as Perry-Kessaris, 
Bedner, and Harding, who have identified politics and economic development as 
constraints to A2EJ, and employ a theoretical framework which explicitly 
incorporates political economy theory into research design. 
                                               
135 Cotterrell states that “it is now evident that legal ideas can be understood as the outcome of 
historical, cultural, political or professional conditions which sociological studies are able to 




This Chapter has also shown that Frynas’ research has been formative for this 
thesis, but argues that his study is not without its shortcomings. My study builds 
on Frynas’ research by collecting similar data points in order to draw some 
conclusions about change over time. The dissertation also builds on Frynas’ work 
theoretically, but provides a more concrete framework for research on disputes 
that take place between companies and communities in the context of state 
dependence on oil revenue. This is a significant contribution that enables this 
research to move from purely an empirical exercise to a holistic academic project 
that can inform future studies on access to environmental justice in the context of 
a dominant oil sector. 
 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation will expand upon, and further develop, 
these points. Chapter 3 on methods will address the critique that research on A2EJ 
in Nigeria has lacked a methodological framework and original data collection 
since Frynas’ work. Chapter 4, on oil sector governance, particularly the section on 
“Joint Investigation Visits,” will further explore the Rentier State and its effect on 
A2EJ. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will use the “political economy of A2EJ” framing to 
investigate the development of legislation, case law on oil spill disputes, and 








The previous Chapter reviewed the bodies of literature that inform the theoretical 
framework for this study. I showed that building a socio-legal theoretical 
framework by joining research from the fields of political economy and A2EJ 
provides a valuable foundation for this dissertation’s focus on the effect of oil 
dependence on A2EJ in Nigeria’s oil sector. I also indicated that while this project 
builds on the important work of George Frynas, it also addresses shortcomings in 
his theoretical framework. Finally, I made the claim that my research makes a 
novel contribution to the literature by identifying a gap in contemporary empirical 
research on A2EJ in Nigeria’s oil sector. 
 
This Chapter takes the theoretical framing provided by Chapter 2 and develops a 
plan for its mobilisation using empirics – that is to say, this project’s methodology. 
The methodology for this dissertation is socio-legal in nature. It employs a case 
study and uses a mixed methods approach to data collection and analysis. This 
means that my research focuses on legal institutions’ treatment of pollution in the 
oil and gas sector in Nigeria by collecting a range of data in order to understand 
how different factors influence A2EJ for those affected by oil industry pollution. 
This range of data includes talking to practitioners at the front lines of oil pollution 
law-making and litigation in key informant interviews, collecting views from a 
wider group of lawyers through a survey, and collating and analysing case law that 
captures litigation dynamics among adjudicators, companies and communities in 
oil pollution disputes.136 
                                               
136 A note on referencing throughout this thesis: The Law Pavilion electronic law reports are used 
for a majority of case law citations. As a result, page or paragraph numbers are not available. For 
the citation of legislation, I have accessed legislation through the International Centre for 
Nigerian Law’s compilation of the laws of the Federation of Nigeria. See “Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria,” http://nigeria-law.org/Legislation/LFN/LFNMainPage.htm (accessed September 1, 
2017). Some Nigerian government institutions refer to the ICNL website for a comprehensive 
collection of legislation, and so to the best of my knowledge, legislation presented in this thesis is 
up to date. Interviews that I conducted are cited throughout this text anonymously using their 
interview code and date of interview. Survey respondents are referred to by the timecode from 
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Section 3.2 will discuss my choice of case study as socio-legal method. Section 3.3 
will reflect on the experience and value of doing fieldwork in Nigeria. Section 3.4 
will focus on the types of data collected – survey responses, interviews, and case 
law – and the approach taken in my analysis of that data. In the data section, I 
will outline how Frynas’ methodological approach informed this research, 
particularly my use of a repeated survey. This discussion of the methodology is 
crucial as a means of providing context to my findings and their limitations. The 
presentation of the methodology is also important in order to address one of the 
gaps in the literature to date, identified in Chapter 2: namely, that fact that there 
is a lack of clear methodological approach or rigour to research concerning A2EJ 
in Nigeria’s oil sector. 
 
3.2 Case Study As Method 
 
My chosen methodology provides a unique opportunity to explore a specific set of 
economic, political, and social variables that have a bearing on access to 
environmental justice in Nigeria. This section discusses the choice for the case 
study methodological approach.137 First, I will map out the methodological options 
that were taken into consideration for this research. The remainder of the section 
will then focus on the selected methodology. 
 
3.2.1 Weighing Up Methodological Approaches 
 
When initially considering how to approach my research question and broader 
research objectives, I surveyed a range of methodological approaches.138 Given a 
trend in legal research to employ quantitative studies, I first considered whether 
                                               
their survey submission, a unique and anonymous identifier. Finally, this thesis uses the Chicago 
style for citation, which means at first reference, a citation will cite full details of a source. At 
second citation, it will provide an abbreviated citation, which can otherwise be cross-checked with 
the bibliography. 
137 The case study as method is explored in Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, “Qualitative Case 
Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers,” The Qualitative 
Report 13, no. 4 (2008): 544-559.  
138 Many of these methodologies are explored in Wing Hong Chui and Mike McConville, eds., 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 
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such an approach might be applicable to my research question.139 A quantitative 
approach could have involved a cross-country study using an index of variables, 
for example, which might proxy “gateways to environmental justice,” and which 
could then be set against a country’s dependence on natural resource revenues in 
a regression.140  Doing so, however, would only capture a moment in time at best. 
At worst, the variables comprising the index would fail to capture the phenomena 
in question, meaning that results would not accurately reflect the context. Another 
option was to focus only on Nigeria, and do a quantitative analysis of the quantum 
of compensation awarded to victims of oil pollution.141 Such an approach would 
allow for historical study over time, but such a study would only investigate one 
very specific dimension of A2EJ in the context of the oil sector, and would not take 
into account the many other ways in which A2EJ might be achieved or denied.  For 
these reasons, I deemed the quantitative approach to be inappropriate.142 
 
I also considered a traditional approach commonly taken in legal research; a 
doctrinal methodology.143 Historically, this has been the preferred method of 
scholars working on legal issues relating to oil pollution and oil sector governance 
more broadly in Nigeria.144 This type of research tends to be compelling to some 
researchers because it can be conducted from anywhere. Desk-based research also 
does not necessarily require access to influential actors. At the same time, it 
provides an indisputable account of an event that has been written down. 
                                               
139 For a discussion of trends in quantitative legal scholarship, see Wing Hong Chui, 
“Quantitative Legal Research,” in Research Methods for Law, eds., Wing Hing Chui and Mike 
McConville (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).  
140 For example, Brunnschweiler and Bulte test a common hypothesis about the relationship 
between war and natural resource dependence by running three different regressions on a 
dataset. See Christa N. Brunnschweiler and Erwin H. Bulte, “Natural resources and violent 
conflict: resource abundance, dependence, and the onset of civil wars,” Oxford Economic Papers 
61, no. 4 (2009): 651 – 674.  
141 This was one approach used by Frynas. See Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 182. 
142 Ruling out purely quantitative methodology was also supported by Frynas’ own research, 
which used quantitative methods alongside other data collection techniques. 
143 For more on the doctrinal method, and indeed how it can be considered an empirical method in 
and of itself if reframed, see Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, “Qualitative Legal Research,” in 
Research Methods for Law, eds., Wing Hong Chui and Mike McConville (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007).  
144 See Chapter 2. 
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Referring to doctrinal analysis, Posner writes that “’[t]his branch of legal 
scholarship is largely autonomous; that is, its practitioners do not have to know 
any other field of learning in order to contribute to it.”145Cotterrell, one of the 
founders of modern socio-legal studies, argues that this autonomy is an inherently 
limiting approach to understanding how law is influenced by the world in which it 
lives and vice versa.146 In light of this, Cotterrell suggests that “[a] sociological 
perspective on legal ideas is necessary to recognise and analyse the intellectual 
and moral power of law in this respect. To interpret legal ideas without 
recognising, through sociological insight, this dimension of them would be to 
understand them inadequately.”147 It is precisely for this reason that I concluded 
that doctrinal analysis alone would be insufficient for this research. 
 
3.2.2 Case study: The Preferred Choice 
 
Case study as method has, rather unfairly, faced critique for its perceived 
shortcomings in scientific rigour.148 However, using a case study as the central 
focal point of research is an important tool for exploring complex phenomena, and 
can lead to new areas of research in its own right, as well as corroborating or 
challenging pre-existing hypotheses formed by other researchers149 One possible 
criticism of case study research is that it may not have external validity, meaning 
that conclusions drawn from the research cannot be applied elsewhere. In response 
to this, I argue that gaining a deeper understanding of a phenomenon, as it occurs 
in a specific context, is important and valuable in its own right and can act as a 
contribution toward the refining and development of theory.150 This is particularly 
                                               
145 Richard A. Posner, “The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship,” Yale Law Journal 1113, no. 
90 (1980): 1113-113; 1114.  
146 Cotterrell, “Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically?,” 182. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Specifically, its limited scope and hence difficulty for making generalisations and its perceived 
bias toward telling the researcher what they already believe to be true. See Flyvberg for more on 
these critiques and a thorough defence of the case study as method. Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five 
Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research,” Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 2 (2006): 219-245.  
149 Ibid. 
150 The same could also be said of heavily quantitative, but popular, social science methods, such 
as randomised control trials. 
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significant for my research, as it takes as its “case” the context of Nigeria, a country 
of almost 190 million people.  
 
By using case study as method – including the use of a survey and key informant 
interviews – my study takes an empirical approach to a theoretical question.151 
Doing so allows me to answer socio-legal questions that are practical (how does the 
Nigerian federal, democratic government use and shape the legal system with 
respect to the oil sector) as well as critical (does the Rentier State obfuscate access 
to justice by perpetuating its own interests above that of its citizenry?). 
 
Baxter and Jack note that it is not an exception, but rather quite common for case 
studies to employ a range of data sources, including quantitative survey data, to 
triangulate understandings from any one source, and to gain a more 
comprehensive grasp of complex phenomena.152 In the case study approach, 
analysis of these various sources is holistic. In this sense, my project follows the 
approach of these researchers, who argue that “each data source is one piece of the 
“puzzle,” with each piece contributing to the researcher’s understanding of the 
whole phenomenon.”153 
 
Frynas’ research expanded the parameters of what was possible for my research 
to achieve. While not asking the exact same research questions, Frynas’ use of a 
survey allows for this research to take a historical approach to interrogating the 
change in A2EJ over time in Nigeria. This has enabled me to build on his work, 
rather than focus on an isolated moment in history.154 There are some drawbacks 
to using a survey designed by someone else for a different purpose, but Friedman 
notes that having the opportunity to have baseline data from “which to measure 
                                               
151 Baxter and Jack argue that “[r]igorous qualitative case studies afford researchers 
opportunities to explore or describe a phenomenon in context using a variety of data sources”. See 
Baxter and Jack, “Qualitative Case Study Methodology,” 544-559.  
152 Baxter and Jack, “Qualitative Case Study Methodology,” 544-559.  
153 Ibid, 554. 
154 Lawrence M. Friedman, “Opening the Time Capsule: A Progress Report on Studies of Courts 
over Time,” Law & Society Review 24, no. 2 (1990): 229-240; 229.  
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and monitor what is happening in our own turbulent times” outweighs the 
deficiencies that such studies might have.155  
 
3.3 The Fieldwork Experience 
 
The use of fieldwork as part of the methodology was both necessary and 
informative. Undertaking fieldwork allowed me to access documents, like case law 
and certain regulations, which would not have been possible to retrieve remotely. 
Fieldwork also provided an opportunity for me to immerse myself in the wider 
context of the research, an occasion that would have not been paralleled by only 
reading the Nigeria literature.156 For example, simply visiting the office of the 
national oil company and then the next day visiting the oil spills regulator allowed 
me to observe the sheer scale and centrality of the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Company (NNPC) complex in contrast to the relative obscurity and disrepair of 
the small National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) offices.157 
The resulting data collected added an additional level of scrutiny often absent in 
other studies on the topic, which primarily rely on doctrinal analysis.158  
 
The main period of fieldwork took place over 9 weeks in July, August, and 
September of 2014 in Abuja.159 The following section will cover some of the key 
features of my fieldwork.  
                                               
155 Friedman, “Opening the Time Capsule,” 240.  
156 SOAS/A2EJ scholars such as Lau, Cha, and Perry-Kessaris conducted fieldwork without 
undertaking participant-observation. Further, McConville highlights the value of fieldwork in 
Mike McConville, “Development of Empirical Techniques and Theory,” in Research Methods for 
Law, eds., Wing Hing Chui and Mike McConville (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).  
157 Gupta and Ferguson argue that “[f]ieldwork's stress on taken-for-granted social routines, 
informal knowledge, and embodied practices can yield understanding that cannot be obtained 
either through standardised social science research methods (e.g. surveys) or through 
decontextualised reading of cultural products (e.g. text-based criticism).” Quoted in Regina 
Sheyvens and Donovan Storey, eds., “Introduction,” Development Fieldwork: A Practical 
Guide (London: SAGE Publications, 2003). See also Dan Brockington and Sian Sullivan, “Chapter 
4: Qualitative Research,” Development Fieldwork: A Practical Guide (London: SAGE Publications, 
2003).  
158 For more on the choice to employ an empirical methodology and the importance of detailing 
that methodology honestly and openly, see McConville “Development of Empirical Techniques.”  
159 This period was also supplemented by other visits over the course of four years. While these 
other visits were primarily work related, rather than research related, they provided additional 




3.3.1 Choice of City 
 
I selected Abuja as my site of study for both research and logistical reasons. The 
city is both the seat of the Federal Government and an environment stable enough 
to allow for independent research conducted by a foreign woman. Abuja is the 
Federal Capital of Nigeria and is home to the Supreme Court, the seat of the 
Executive, the headquarters for most regulatory bodies, and the seat of the 
National Assembly – the country’s legislature. It is a place where politics is the 
main business in town, and where key decisions about governance, including oil 
and gas sector governance, are made.160  
 
Other possible cities to base my fieldwork would have been Port Harcourt, the 
capital of Rivers State and a hub for environmental litigation relating to oil spills; 
or Lagos, the commercial centre of Nigeria, which also serves as the country’s 
centre for arbitration and is home to the country’s major law firms. Frynas’ 
fieldwork focused on the Niger Delta itself and Lagos.161  While Port Harcourt is a 
central site for oil pollution litigation, and much closer to the physical location of 
where oil spills and other forms of oil-related environmental degradation take 
place, basing the research there may have introduced a state-centric bias, given 
that the focus of my research is primarily the Federal Government’s behaviour. 
Another complication was that I would have faced limited mobility in Port 
Harcourt, due to security concerns. Lagos would have been a useful place to be 
based had my research focused primarily on private sector actors, but the city is 
less convincing as a hub for research concerned with the Federal Government and 
the “Rentier State”, and thus not entirely suited to my purposes.162 
 
                                               
160 The National Assembly, the legislative branch of government, is based in Abuja, as is the 
Presidency. Abuja is also the headquarters of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company and 
NOSDRA. 
161 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 103. 
162 For a history of Abuja as Nigeria’s capital, see Jonathan Moore “The Political History of 
Nigeria's New Capital” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 Cambridge 
University Press (Mar., 1984), pp. 167-175.  
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As outlined above, basing the fieldwork in Abuja had considerable advantages, but 
it also introduced its own biases. The main bias was that since the research was 
primarily conducted in Abuja, I was not receiving a first-hand account of 
challenges for redress from victims of oil pollution. Rather, I was receiving 
mediated accounts through legal counsel. In order to address this possible bias, I 
referred to studies, particularly the UNEP Ogoniland report, which explored the 
negative effects of oil pollution on oil communities through first-hand accounts of 
victims.163 I also mitigated this bias by conducting phone and in-person interviews 
with people who live and work in affected areas in order to gain their insights in 
the absence of visiting myself. 
 
3.3.2 Sites of Inquiry  
 
Within Abuja, I spent time in the office of an oil sector governance reform 
programme funded by an international donor organisation as well as a commercial 
law firm that works in the oil and gas sector. These spaces provided an opportunity 
to ground both myself and my research, particularly in the early days of fieldwork 
when the research landscape was still coming into focus.164 I decided upon these 
sites due to the ease of access that was provided to me by gatekeepers from both 
institutions, as well as their relevance to the work; both institutions offered 
substantive, relevant data points for my research.165 Below, I describe these sites 
of inquiry and how they contributed to this research study. 
 
                                               
163 See “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland,” Nairobi: United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2011. http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/05_ch05_UNEP_OEA.pdf 
(accessed August 1, 2017). 
164 Taylor, Bogdan, and DeVault refer to this process as “selecting settings.”  See Steven Taylor, 
Robert Bogdan and Marjorie DeVault, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods, 4th edition 
(New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 40.  
165 Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods, 53 and 68. 




I spent at least the first part of every weekday for almost nine weeks in the donor 
programme office.166 The programme was staffed by Nigerian professionals with 
deep knowledge of the sector, some of whom were trained lawyers. The staff 
members were generally perceived by others as apolitical experts, rather than 
activists or politicians by those working in the sector. This helped immensely in 
developing networks within the field. Their insights were also useful in testing 
assumptions and emerging narratives throughout the data collection period. 
 
Approximately four hours of every week day for a month was dedicated to working 
from a commercial law firm office in Abuja. The law firm was valuable for its 
substantial law report library, without which comprehensive case law research 
would have been difficult. The law firm library also provided access to the staff 
that worked at the firm, particularly one senior partner, who shared his knowledge 
with me. The informal conversations held in the law firm proved to be a useful 
testing ground for trends and hypotheses that emerged as my research developed. 
 
In addition to these primary sites of inquiry, I spent time in a range of government 
and commercial institutions when conducting interviews and while gathering 
documents and data. Through referrals from the law firm and the donor 
programme, I was able to gain unique access to places such as the National Oil 
Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company (NNPC), and the National Assembly (NASS). Visiting these 
institutions was influential in shaping views about the relative prominence of 
various institutions. It was also valuable to see first-hand some of the concrete 
challenges facing lawyers both in and out of government, such as unreliable 
electricity.  
 
                                               
166 For information on the Facility for Oil Sector Transparency (FOSTER), see: “Facility for Oil 
Sector Transparency”, http://www.opml.co.uk/projects/facility-oil-sector-transparency-and-reform-
nigeria-foster (accessed August 22, 2017). 
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When visiting NOSDRA, it immediately became clear that the institution was not 
within the inner circle of decision-making.167 The NOSDRA building was 
physically located significantly further away from key government institutions in 
the city (about 16 kilometres away from the Presidential Villa), and the building 
was in disrepair. In contrast, NNPC occupies a large complex of buildings, around 
the corner from the Central Bank and nearby the Ministry of Finance. 
 
3.1.1 Identity Matters 
 
In conducting socio-legal research, it is imperative that the researcher recognise 
their own position within the field of study.168 Negotiating rapport with interview 
subjects and respondents proved easier in some settings and difficult in others due 
to the fact that I was a white American woman.169 Over the course of fieldwork 
preparation, the nine weeks in-country, and the weeks following fieldwork, I had 
the opportunity to meet and discuss Nigeria’s oil sector with renowned experts in 
the field. In speaking informally to actors working in the oil sector in Nigeria, it 
became apparent that this level of access was in part afforded me due to the fact 
that I was coming from a London-based University, and the fact that I was 
American.170  
                                               
167 There is a body of research in the architecture and neuroscience literatures that speaks to the 
effect a building’s appearance and construction can have on those who use the building. There 
has been work specifically done on courthouses and how their design can affect users’ 
relationship with the rule of law more broadly. While there has not been a study of government 
buildings relative to each other in Nigeria, other studies suggest that there may be a relationship 
between how a building looks and where it is located and how it is perceived. See Karen Levy, 
Fred Kent, and Cynthia Nikitin, “Reinventing the Courthouse,” Project for Public Space,  
https://www.pps.org/reference/courts-in-a-new-paradigm-of-place/ (accessed August 9, 2017); 
Judith Resnik and Dennis E. Curtis, “Representing Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to 
Twenty-First-Century Courthouses,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 151, no. 2 
(2007): 139-183, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/69 and Diana Budds, “The Subtle 
Way Government Architecture Shapes Governments Themselves,” Co.Design, Sept 19, 2016,  
 https://www.fastcodesign.com/3063810/the-subtle-way-government-architecture-shapes-
governments-themselves (accessed August 9, 2017).  
168 For an in-depth discussion of the challenges of fieldwork for foreign researchers, see George 
Meszaros, “Researching the Landless Movement in Brazil,” in Research Methods for Law, eds., 
Wing Hong Chui and Mike McConville (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 
169 Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods, 60.  
170 This was mentioned explicitly by interview subjects and other contacts in the field as I tried to 




There were also some other ways in which my identity likely shaped the way I was 
received in Abuja. Being a student, a foreigner, and having a target population of 
interviewees comprised of professionals, meant that those being interviewed and 
surveyed felt comfortable taking a professorial and candid tone with me when 
discussing the subject matter, thus allowing for frank discussions and exploration 
of sometimes sensitive issues. A vast majority of those interviewed or contacted to 
help with this research had university degrees and were open to sharing their 
views with someone they viewed to be a collegiate counterpart in a different 
setting.  Being a student, rather than a journalist or business person, for example, 
meant people were more forthcoming with their insights and time. 
 
3.3.3 Challenges of Fieldwork 
 
Data collection in the field was more challenging than expected. There were 
general challenges that were anticipated, relating to the context, and challenges 
presented specifically by my research topic (oil in Nigeria) being an inevitably 
contentious issue. There were also external difficulties that could not have been 
anticipated when preparing for fieldwork and research design.  A series of 
unexpected events – an Ebola outbreak in the region, a terrorist attack, and a 
judiciary strike – necessitated that I be resourceful and flexible with modalities for 
data collection and be prepared to limit the scope of research to what would be 
possible under the given circumstances. While this limited scope introduced new 
biases into the research, these obstacles also played an important part in shaping 
the way in which I understood the context and its research limitations, particularly 
as an outsider. Below, I outline the main challenges I encountered while in Abuja. 
 
  
                                               
I am American and studying in the UK in all introductory contact with practitioners, as they 
would look on me more favourably.  
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3.3.3.1    Security and Public Health 
 
There were a variety of ways in which security concerns affected my research. 
Particularly, one terrorist attack in central Abuja before the start of fieldwork, and 
ongoing instability in the Niger Delta meant that my travel was at times 
restricted.171 For example, weeks before leaving to travel to Abuja, Boko Haram 
attacked a shopping mall in the centre of Abuja, known for its popularity with both 
Nigerians and foreigners.172 This was considered to be an anomaly by Abuja 
residents; however, patterns of socialising outside of work were affected, which in 
turn curtailed my opportunities to socialise informally with key informants and 
others working in the sector.173  
 
Beyond the threat of Boko Haram in Abuja, there was the additional issue of 
continued trepidation about foreign travellers going to the Niger Delta.174 Given 
concerns by the Foreign Commonwealth Office and the US State department, my 
security advisors and academic advisors felt it would be irresponsible for me, as a 
young woman, to travel to the Niger Delta alone, even briefly, to conduct 
interviews with legal practitioners.175 As stated earlier, given my dissertation’s 
primary interest in Federal Government behaviour, this restriction was more of 
an unfortunate inconvenience rather than a serious limitation for the research. 
 
Beyond security considerations, there were other challenges during my period of 
fieldwork. Firstly, the fieldwork period coincided with West Africa’s Ebola 
                                               
171 I benefitted from security guidance and advice provided by my employer’s security team. 
Oxford Policy Management assumed duty of care during this period and I ensured I followed all 
stringent protocols. 
172 See “Nigeria: Abuja bomb blast in Wuse district kills 21,” BBC News, June 25, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28019433 (accessed August 9, 2017).  
173 This is a sentiment that was expressed by acquaintances and colleagues in informal 
discussion: more people were staying home at night instead of going out to socialise. 
174 The U.S. State Department states that “[m]ilitant groups have destroyed oil production 
infrastructure in Bayelsa and Delta states.  U.S. citizens are advised to avoid the areas of these 
states where these incidents have occurred.” See “Nigeria Travel Warning,” US Department of 
State, April 5, 2015, https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/nigeria-travel-
warning.html (accessed August 9, 2017). 
175 I did reach Port Harcourt in June 2015 for two days with FOSTER, but was unable to conduct 
research while there.  
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outbreak, particularly in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. This was for the most 
part not a challenge for Nigeria; however, the country did have a brief Ebola scare 
that began less than a month into my fieldwork.176 At the time, it was not clear to 
what extent the virus might spread. The Ebola threat further restricted my 
movement due to uncertainty about the scale of the outbreak for weeks after.177 
 
3.3.3.2 Judiciary Strike 
 
Finally, and perhaps most directly affecting the research, there was a judiciary 
strike for the duration of my fieldwork.178 The primary issue for the judiciary, and 
reason for the strike, concerned the way in which the judiciary is financed in the 
Federal structure. The judiciary felt that they were too reliant on the executive 
branch for funding, and this created an environment where they could be more 
susceptible to influence by the executive in decision-making.  
 
The complaints raised by the judiciary provide an interesting insight into the 
relationship between the executive and the judiciary, but also posed practical 
challenges for research. The strike meant that judges were very hard to reach, and 
some had left the country for parts of the strike period. The strike also affected 
courthouses, which weren’t operating at full capacity. This made acquiring 
assistance from clerks, even with references from Nigerian practitioners, difficult. 
The strike thus affected the research in a very material way: I was not able to 
interview any judges for the research, nor was I able to use the courts as a source 
of research material. Survey responses, secondary literature and interviews with 
lawyers provided a proxy for this perspective, but cannot fully account for the 
                                               
176 See the Centre for Disease Control’s account here: “Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak — Nigeria, 
July–September 2014,” https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6339a5.htm (accessed 
October 3, 2014). 
177 “WHO declares end of Ebola outbreak in Nigeria,” World Health Organization, October 20, 
2014, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/nigeria-ends-ebola/en/ (accessed 
October 25, 2014). 
178 Sani Tukur “Nigeria court workers begin nationwide strike,” Premium Times, July 11, 2014, 
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/164735-nigeria-court-workers-begin-nationwide-
strike.html (accessed August 9, 2017).  
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absence of this important viewpoint from the research. Any future research on this 




Despite the challenges discussed above, I was able to collect three types of new 
data, all of which are unique contributions to the field of studies on environmental 
justice in Nigeria. In this section, I first discuss my survey and how it was 
administered, as well as details about the survey population and my approach to 
analysis.180 Next, I detail how interviews were conducted and how these are used 
throughout the dissertation.181 Finally, I outline my approach to systematic case 





Using a survey for this research allowed the opportunity to collect a range of views 
from a specific population – lawyers practicing in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria 
– in a systematic way. More specifically, using a survey modelled from Frynas’ 
1998’s questionnaire provided a rare occasion for the use of a repeated survey to 
gauge current attitudes relative to past attitudes toward A2EJ in Nigeria’s oil 
sector. While there would have been advantages to designing a bespoke survey 
specifically for this research topic, the opportunity to use an existing dataset to 
develop and test hypotheses over time was deemed to be more important, both for 
this research and for future work in this area.182 This section will discuss the 
                                               
179 There were also more minor challenges, like not being able to attend the annual Nigerian Bar 
Association conference, and the upcoming presidential election, which limited access to some 
politicians. The Nigerian Bar Association Conference was held from the 24th-29th August 2014, 
see: “Nigerian Bar Association 54th Annual General Conference,” Nigeria Bar, 
http://www.nigeriabar.com/2014/08/nigerian-bar-association-54th-annual-general-
conference#.WHTwLBsrLb0 (accessed August 29, 2014).   
180 The survey population was entirely anonymised and no personal information was retained. 
181 The thesis does not include any personal information about key informants, and transcripts 
were saved with anonymising codes so as to protect participants’ identity. 
182 Friedman encourages developing datasets that can be reproduced for study over a long period 
of time, despite imperfections. See Friedman, “Opening the Time Capsule,” 229-240.  
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survey and how it was used. Throughout this section, I will highlight how my 
approach to the survey differed or converged with Frynas’ approach and explain 
the logic behind those decisions. 
 
3.4.1.1 Survey Purpose 
 
In this research, I used a systematic set of responses from the survey in order to 
address key questions related to A2EJ in the oil and gas sector. I did this to achieve 
a range of objectives: 
 
a) to gain an understanding of practitioners’ perceptions of legal institutions, 
and barriers to those institutions in Nigeria (courts and laws); 
b) to highlight where there are differences in what is perceived as the status 
quo for access to justice in Nigeria more broadly, and in A2EJ the oil sector 
specifically;  
c) to explore if there are inherent biases held by a range of stakeholders 
involved in oil pollution litigation that could affect the outcome; and, 
d) to see if attitudes on these issues has evolved since the late 1990s.183 
 
The survey results can only provide a partial view of the A2EJ landscape for 
victims of oil pollution in Nigeria, but when used in conjunction with other data, 
such as case law and key informant interviews, these results can be employed to 
test hypotheses empirically. 
 
3.4.1.2    Survey Design 
 
Design choices for this survey were limited due to the decision to use Frynas’ 
questionnaire as a starting point. As stated earlier, using Frynas’ questionnaire 
                                               
183 Frynas wanted to use his survey to “illustrate the incentives and disincentives of the legal 
process, which can either encourage or discourage litigants from engaging in litigation.” In 
addition, Frynas sought to test if the “formal legal system is biased against oil companies or 
village communities.” Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 100.  
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as a baseline has considerable advantages for historical study, despite being 
limiting in other respects, such as the scope of inquiry. 
 
In the original survey, Frynas asked 26 multiple choice questions and provided 
four opportunities for additional information.184  As an updated version of Frynas’ 
survey, my 2014 survey asks respondents 38 multiple-choice questions and 
provides six short answer sections.185 Questions were rephrased or added in order 
to ensure anonymity of respondents, provide further clarity, make language more 
neutral, or to further probe findings from the 1998 survey. 
 
The first grouping of questions in both surveys sketch the background of the 
respondents and include questions relating to their level of experience, as well as 
their educational and professional background. This introductory grouping of 
questions contextualises survey respondents as a sample, and elucidates potential 
inherent biases.  
 
The second grouping of questions focuses on the practice of oil pollution litigation 
in Nigeria, particularly tort. The findings from these questions, discussed in depth 
in Chapter 7, provide insight into the practice of litigation, and form a core 
component of the dissertation’s evidence on the experience of accessing gateways 
to environmental justice in practice in Nigeria.  
 
The third and final section of the survey relates to oil sector and environmental 
legislation meant to govern oil sector activity, particularly oil spills. The findings 
from these questions form a core part of the research’s analysis of the legal 
framework, discussed in Chapter 5, particularly understanding the degree to 
which legislative instruments effectively achieve their stated aims, and provide 
mechanisms for redress. 
 
                                               
184 Ibid., 242. 
185 See Appendix II for full the survey administered in 2014. 
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One of the survey’s strengths is the wide scope of issues it covers, straddling 
regulatory frameworks and the court system. The wide scope did, however, also 
pose some challenges for respondents who specialise in litigation. Some trial 
lawyers, who were well versed in environmental tort litigation, found it difficult to 
respond to detailed questions about the legislative framework.186 This is an 
interesting finding of the survey process, largely based on informal feedback from 
respondents. This finding raises questions about the role of legislation in 
environmental protection and redress, discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 
6.  
 
3.4.1.3 Survey Administration 
 
The format of the 2014 survey also builds on Frynas’ experience. It was clear from 
the outset that I would not be able to exactly replicate Frynas’ approach to survey 
administration. This was due to the fact that Frynas’ respondents participated 
anonymously and so would be impossible to trace for longitudinal study.187Another 
reason for this was that Frynas hand-delivered his questionnaire, in conjunction 
with a Nigerian researcher, to practitioners in Port Harcourt and Lagos – cities 
deemed unfeasible for my research for reasons discussed earlier in this Chapter. 
This section considers how survey administration differed from Frynas’ approach, 
particularly with the introduction of online survey technology and online lawyer 




                                               
186 One respondent explicitly described this as a frustration when filling out the comments section 
in the survey. 
187 This is a repeated survey rather than a longitudinal survey. Longitudinal studies follow the 
same exact respondents over time, administering the same survey questions. The approach used 
here uses broadly the same questions with the same kind of population (i.e. lawyers in Nigeria), 
but does not revisit the exact same respondents. For a definition, see “Glossary of Statistical 
Terms,” OECD, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3829 (accessed July 10, 2017).  
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3.4.1.3.1 Sampling Strategy 
 
The target population for Frynas’ survey was commercial lawyers. In order to 
repeat his survey, I used the same target population, and focused specifically on 
lawyers that had experience in both the oil sector and with environmental 
issues.188 Based on Frynas’ recommendations in personal communication with me, 
I attempted to randomise the process by which I identified a sample of the 
population for the survey.189 Random sampling is considered preferable to 
purposeful sampling by quantitative researchers because it improves replicability 
of studies and robustness of results.190 As will be described below, my sample was 
not entirely randomised, but it did make improvements on Frynas’ sampling 
strategy.  
 
Instead of using Frynas’ referral approach to sampling, my target population was 
identified largely through two online law directories (HG.org and the Legal 500) 
and by contacting the Nigerian Bar Association branch offices, particularly those 
in Lagos, Abuja, and all of the oil producing southern states.191 These lawyer 
directories and associations were comprised of firms and individuals who self-
identified their specialisations, which accordingly meant that there was a higher 
likelihood that those contacted had first-hand experience in environmental law 
and oil and gas law.192 In a few instances, personal contacts and snowball 
                                               
188 Like Frynas, I weighed the possibility of surveying potential litigants. However, lawyers’ 
expertise, somewhat uniform training, and professional standing mean that the types of 
information that can be gleaned from lawyers provides a valuable dataset when studying A2EJ. 
Given the potential sensitivity of some of the types of questions asked, lawyers also serve as a 
more responsible and ethical sample pool, as they are able to answer questions from their 
professional experience, which further anonymises the experiences of their clients. See Frynas, 
Oil in Nigeria, 101-102.   
189 In personal communication via e-mail in June 2014, Frynas noted that he would have 
preferred using a randomised sample instead of the convenience sampling method employed in 
order to further increase methodological rigour in his research. 
190 Frynas made this point in personal communication with me. 
191 See: “Legal 500,” http://www.legal500.com/c/nigeria (accessed August 9, 2017); “HG.Org,” 
https://www.hg.org/firms-nigeria.html (accessed August 9, 2017); and “Nigerian Bar Association,” 
http://www.nigerianbar.org.ng/ (accessed August 9, 2017).  
192 There was a slight bias toward firms that were responsive to e-mail inquiries regarding the 
survey. However, I had assistance from a junior lawyer at a Nigerian law firm who followed up 
with firms via phone that had been contacted. 
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referencing were used to target experienced practitioners. This hybrid approach 
resulted in contacting a semi-random list of 160 lawyers. My sample size was 
smaller than Frynas’, but all of the responses I received were from practitioners 
with first-hand oil sector experience. In comparison Frynas found that about 83% 
of his respondents had actual oil industry experience.193  
 
The drawback of my experimental approach to sampling was a lower response rate. 
My sampling yielded a 17% response rate (27 total responses). While the sample 
is relatively small, the profile of my respondents confirms that targeting was 
successful in getting responses from experts in the field, whose perceptions and 
opinions are a product of specialised work experience. Having a completely random 
sample may have provided a higher certainty that sampling could be replicated in 
future surveys, but would not necessarily have served to improve my 
understanding of A2EJ through experienced practitioners. 
 
3.4.1.3.2 Administration Approach 
 
How a survey is administered has a bearing on the quality of the results.  Given 
the limitations of the technology of the time, Frynas’ survey was necessarily 
administered in person and with paper surveys. This meant he had little ability to 
ensure that respondents answered all of the questions provided. He also had a 
limited amount of time in which surveys could be left with practitioners to be filled 
out. To address the challenges he faced, I chose to use an electronic survey format, 
which allowed me to reach a wider audience in relevant locations (all oil producing 
states, Abuja and Lagos) and use a format that required that respondents answer 
all of the survey questions.  
 
                                               
193 The names of the lawyers targeted for Frynas’ sample were from a list provided by Nigerian 
colleagues who knew that these lawyers had worked specifically on oil-related issues. This means 
that Frynas’ sample was not randomised, but Frynas has noted that the approach led to higher 
quality answers by weeding out lawyers who may not know anything about the industry. Frynas, 
Oil in Nigeria, 101-102.   
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While addressing problems identified by Frynas, these changes had some negative 
consequences for survey responses. Firstly, the electronic nature of the survey, 
which was emailed to recipients, required respondents to be familiar and 
comfortable with using the Internet – something that may have limited my sample 
to younger lawyers. To limit this effect as much as possible, a Nigerian associate 
lawyer followed up by contacting firms by phone and additional personalised e-
mail, which stipulated that a paper survey was available as an option. Secondly, 
the mandatory answering requirement function on the survey was not entirely 
understood by all respondents – though it was explained in the introductory text 
of the survey. This led to a decrease in response numbers, as some respondents 
who did not understand the instructions could not successfully submit their 
incomplete surveys. 
 
The methods used for both sample identification and administration were an 
improvement in terms of random sampling from Frynas’ research, but response 
rates were lower. Given the significant gains on access to a target population, more 
could be done to ensure that the population responds in the future. In future, it 
would, for example, be useful to: 
 
a) ensure that respondents have easy access to paper copies of the survey: 
while this was offered in e-mail communication, more could be done to 
ensure that respondents who may be uncomfortable with an online survey 
have access to an alternative. 
b) increase face-to-face contact with prospective respondents: cold calling and 
e-mailing without face-to-face visits decreased accountability for 
respondents to return the survey. While there were a range of factors 
limiting my ability to meet with firms in person, future survey 
dissemination could work with local researchers from the outset to ensure 
more in-person contact with respondents.  
c) use a new survey platform that makes requirements for submitting the form 
more clear: the Google survey platform did not clearly explain to 
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respondents why their survey was incomplete, leading some to either get 
frustrated and end the survey or close the survey without realising that it 




Thus far, I have discussed the design of my survey and its format. Here, I will 
outline the profile of the sample I targeted. The 2014 survey sample resembles that 
of Frynas’ 1998 survey. This similarity between our respective surveys is useful 
for considering change in attitudes over time; it is more credible to compare similar 
samples rather than ones with dramatically different demographic profiles. 
 
Based on their professional experience, my survey respondents were well placed 
to provide perspectives on oil pollution litigation. All responses to the survey were 
from lawyers and 63% of respondents have acted as counsel for an oil company, 
subsidiary or contractor, while 59% have acted as counsel against an oil company, 
subsidiary or contractor.194 Many lawyers responded that they have worked on 
both sides of these cases, causing an overlap in my respondent pool and making it 
less feasible to disaggregate along the lines of “environmental lawyers” and “oil 
industry lawyers.” Allowing lawyers to self-identify in this way means that my 
sample is nuanced in a different way from Frynas’, where lawyers were either 
labelled “industry” or “community” practitioners.195 Looking at the sample as a 
whole, instead of disaggregating further, allows me to focus on more high level 
conclusions, rather than potentially imposing a nuance to sub-groups of the survey 
that may be superficial.  
 
My sample was comprised of mainly early and mid-career lawyers. About 60% of 
lawyers were called to the bar after 1999. On average, Frynas’ respondents had 
                                               
194 In the 2014 Sample, a majority of respondents were men (81%), and a small minority were 
women. This is similar to Frynas’ sample where the sample was 80% men. 
195 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 242. 
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been members of the bar for about 11 years.196  Participants in my survey had 
typically been members of the bar for approximately 13 years (See Table 1).197 This 
bias toward younger respondents might affect perceptions of certain types of 
policies, as a majority of respondents came to the bar after an increase in 
government policymaking on environmental issues.198 
 
There are likely a few reasons why a high number of responses came from younger 
lawyers. Firstly, senior lawyers were more willing to meet face-to-face for in-depth 
interviews rather than fill out the survey. This could either be due to their 
unfamiliarity with online surveys or the fact that in-person interviews may be 
perceived as more respectful of status and hierarchy. The bias toward younger 
respondents could also be a strategic choice on the part of firms, who may have 
delegated the task to younger lawyers because it made economic sense from an 
opportunity cost perspective: more senior lawyers can bill more for their time, and 
so it would be uneconomical to have them focus on such a non-fee earning task. 
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3.4.1.4.1 Educational Background 
 
My 2014 survey inquired about the educational background of the sample. Forty 
percent of respondents completed their higher education in Nigeria only, while 
44% received one degree in Nigeria (primarily a first degree) and their second 
                                               
196 Ibid., 105. 
197 I did not ask respondents their birth year in order to add an additional layer of anonymity to 
the survey.  
198 See Chapter 5, Section 5.8. 
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degree abroad, most often in the UK. Three of the survey respondents received 
all of their higher education outside of Nigeria. Of the 85% of respondents who 
attended at least one university in Nigeria, all of them had one or more degrees 
from a university in the South of the country. Further, half of those attended at 
least one university in an oil producing state. This diversity of higher education 
shows that a majority of the sample has had experience outside of Nigeria and so 
perceptions of the Nigerian legal system may be coloured by exposure to other 
jurisdictions, potentially making respondents more critical of the Nigerian legal 
system. 
 
Respondents were also asked a series of questions about the courses that they took 
throughout their higher education. A majority of respondents, 67%, had taken at 
least one module on Environmental Law. About half of respondents had taken 
modules on oil and gas law. About the same proportion (50%) had taken a module 
on human rights law. Eighty five percent of respondents had taken at least one 
module on Investment or Commercial law. This mix of experience with 
environmental law and commercial law proved useful in covering a range of 
dynamics that are explored in the survey – from exploring possible oil company 
bias in the courts to perceived adequacy of oil pollution compensation awarded. 
 
3.4.1.5 Approach to Analysis 
 
Analysis of the majority of the survey was straightforward. Google’s survey 
platform used for the administration of the survey has an automatic calculation 
function, which I used to calculate results to most questions, eliminating 
opportunity for human-introduced error.199 Long form answers were analysed by 
grouping responses into categories to identify themes.   
 
Survey findings are used primarily in two chapters of this dissertation – Chapter 
5 on Statute Law and Chapter 7 on Litigation in Practice. Chapter 5 covers the 
                                               
199 See “View and export results,” Google Surveys Help, 
https://support.google.com/360suite/surveys/answer/2449690?hl=en (accessed August 9, 2017). 
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legal and regulatory framework for oil and gas exploitation in Nigeria, particularly 
as it pertains to oil pollution. The key source material for the Chapter is the law 
itself. However, as is pointed out in Chapter 5, working with source material 
without the historical or current context simply results in doctrinal analysis, which 
I deemed insufficient as an approach to socio-legal research. In Chapter 5, the 
survey plays an important role: to juxtapose what is written on paper with the 
perceptions of those who interact with these legal instruments on a professional 
basis. In Chapter 7, the survey results serve as the core source material, shaping 
the narrative around the experience of litigation in practice. In both chapters, 




My survey allows me to gauge how much things have actually changed since the 
turn of the millennium and provides a snapshot of practitioners’ perceptions on a 
range of questions related to A2EJ in the oil and gas sector in 2014. This data set 
was administered using a new electronic survey and received a 17% response rate. 
The survey was necessarily built on Frynas’ work, but has some distinctive 
features in terms of identifying target populations. It also features some deviations 
from the original 1998 survey, and the survey administration itself. The resulting 
respondent population that I received was mainly male, educated both in Nigeria 
and abroad, with a majority of the sample having experience in environmental law, 
oil and gas law, as well as working with oil companies, and oil producing 




My survey is a valuable dataset for investigating gateways to environmental 
justice in the oil sector in Nigeria. The findings from the survey can, however, only 
answer my research questions in light of the nature of the sample and the 
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limitations of quantitative surveying.200  In order to account for this gap in my 
findings, I also conducted interviews with 21 key informants from the period of 
June 2014 to January 2015. These key informants provide a unique perspective, 
due to both their seniority, and different experiences with oil litigation and sector 
governance frameworks.201 This section will outline who was interviewed, how 
interviews were conducted, how data was stored, what the sample of interview 
subjects looked like, and how interview data was analysed.  
 
3.4.2.1  The Sample 
 
Sampling for interviews was very different from the sampling of the survey. 
Instead of striving for a wide and randomised scope of a specific population, 
interview sampling focused more on ensuring representation from different 
institutions and individuals involved in oil sector governance. Interview subjects 
from the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency, the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company, the Ministry of Justice, the judiciary, the National Assembly, 
and the Department of Petroleum Resources were all key institutions that I sought 
to target within government. Outside of government, well-known academics, 
activists, and private sector legal practitioners were targeted for extended 
discussions about access to environmental justice. I made contact with identified 
institutions primarily through snowballing, and through a network of Nigerian 
professionals working in the oil and gas sector who were familiar with my research 
and willing to provide introductions. This approach of asking for introductions 
rather than cold-calling target populations yielded strong results.202 Only the 
Judiciary and DPR did not respond to requests for interviews. 
 
The interview sample was successful in securing a diversity of viewpoints. Six 
informants currently hold jobs working for Government institutions, four are 
                                               
200 See Sam Sieber, “The Integration of Fieldwork and Survey Methods,” American Journal of 
Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973): 1335–1359.   
201  See Taylor et al for information on in-depth interviewing in qualitative research. Taylor, 
Bogdan and DeVault, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods, 105.  
202 Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods, 107.  
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primarily activists (with an additional two other professionals also working as 
activists in addition to their primary jobs). One respondent currently works for a 
donor-funded development programme concerned with security in the Niger Delta, 
and three others are employed as academics in the fields of oil, gas, and 
environment in Nigeria. Eight respondents work in the private practice.203  
 
Most respondents felt comfortable responding with their personal perspective on 
the sector, and providing specific insight based on work experience. This meant 
that views expressed may be divergent from the institutions that were 
represented. I also generally observed that the more senior the interview subject, 
the more comfortable they were voicing views that may dissent from the 
organisation they work for.  
 
3.4.2.2 Interview Format and Approach 
 
Interviews took place primarily in interviewees’ place of work, with a few choosing 
to meet elsewhere or to talk over the phone. Having the opportunity to visit their 
place of work was valuable because it enabled me to further contextualise the 
world in which they live, while also helping put interview subjects at ease.  
 
The interview format was largely open-ended with key themes proposed and 
discussed with informants using an interview guide. These key themes were 
broadly the same as the survey questionnaire. The open-ended format allowed 
discussions to be driven by the informants themselves, all experts in their fields, 




                                               
203 The interview subjects were primarily male, with the exception of one woman. A majority of 
interviews took place in-person, while some took place over the phone. Ten of the key informants 
are based in Abuja, seven are based in Port Harcourt, three are based in Lagos, and one is based 
in the UK. 
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3.4.2.3 Data Collection and Storage 
 
This section briefly discusses how I collected, transcribed, and stored this 
interview data. This is an important component of an ethical interview procedure. 
Employing a secure data storage system and anonymising protocol also helped to 
gain the trust of my key informants.204  
 
Depending on interviewee verbal consent, conversations were recorded on a digital 
voice recorder. Eighteen of the 21 key informants consented to recorded interviews 
on the condition of anonymity.205 Once recordings were imported, each interview 
subject was assigned a code, the key for which was kept separate from the 
interviews themselves, adding an additional layer of anonymity and data 
protection for key informants.206 The purpose of transcription was to allow myself 
to engage more closely with the data, while also ensuring that note-taking during 
interviews was not biased by pre-determined objectives.  
 
3.4.2.4 Method of Analysis  
 
The main function of this interview data in the present research is to triangulate 
findings from survey, case law, and legislative analysis.207 As such, interview 
transcripts were coded, and then used throughout this dissertation to illustrate 
corroboration or divergence of opinion within and among data sources.  
 
There were broad themes I was hoping to better understand through the 
perspectives of respondents, but I allowed topics to emerge from the interview 
subjects themselves rather than having a strict set of pre-determined questions. I 
                                               
204 “Data Storage and Data Security,” The Ethics Guidebook, 
http://www.ethicsguidebook.ac.uk/Data-storage-and-data-security-30 (accessed July 31, 2017).  
205 Taylor, Bogdan, and Devault, “Recording Interviews,” in Introduction to Qualitative Research 
Methods, 127.  
206 On anonymising data sources, see “Anonymising your data,” The Ethics Guidebook, 
http://www.ethicsguidebook.ac.uk/Anonymising-your-data-309 (accessed July 31, 2017). 
207 While key informant interviews were used primarily as a tool for triangulation for this 
research, there are ample opportunities to use the data collected in the future for further focused 
study on the transcripts. On triangulation, see Taylor, Bogdan, and Devault, Introduction to 
Qualitative Research Methods, 94. 
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also used these interviews as an opportunity to gain clarity from practitioners and 
experts if there were phenomena that I was struggling to understand. Some 
common themes emerged as the research progressed, such as perceptions of the 
State as an actor in the sector, the way law is made or prevented from being 
changed, and how court cases may or may not be delayed or manipulated due to 
various tactics employed by oil companies and communities.  
 
Keeping these themes in mind, I read through the interview transcripts verbatim 
three times.208 In this first reading, I simply read through all of the materials, 
while not taking any notes. I took notes during the second reading on what stood 
out to me as themes and lines of argument that either adhered to or contradicted 
information coming from secondary research, survey data, and the case law.209 
During this second round, I began to highlight and apply a first round of general 
codes to the transcripts, such as the actors being discussed, or themes, like 
“corruption” or “colonial rule.”  
 
The third and final round of reading occurred after grouping quotes with similar 
themes and actors together to see if a narrative was emerging from the 
respondents. The final reading was more focused on selected quotations and 
intended to make some preliminary findings about key themes relating to 
gateways to environmental justice in an oil dependent context. These preliminary 
findings were later paired with survey findings, legislation, and case law on the 
same topics to see if views conformed, complemented, or dissented from one 
another. Since these initial readings, the transcripts have been revisited 
throughout the analysis of other components of the research to see if my reading 
of interviews changed based on further findings from other data sources. 
 
                                               
208 Taylor, Bogdan, and Devault, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods, 162.  
209 For a detailed discussion of the multiple steps of analysing interview data, see Kathleen W. 
Piercy, “Analysis of semi-structured interview data,” Utah State University 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7a7b/b02a0a81d1698084d608d0af0558fb54120c.pdf (accessed 





These interviews provide a nuanced view of the challenges of providing access to 
environmental justice over Nigeria’s history, particularly in the past fifteen years. 
The dataset includes insights from some of Nigeria’s main oil and gas institutions 
and individuals, and contributes to the claim made by this research: that the 
justice sector in Nigeria is complex and that justice is limited by a system that is 
shaped by the country’s reliance on oil as main source of revenue.  
 
3.4.3 Case law 
 
In researching legal gateways to environmental justice, perceptions of how the 
system works are evidenced by surveys and interviews. A formalised manifestation 
of the outcomes of that system is illustrated by case law. Regarding environmental 
harms in Nigeria, case law is a key source of data that documents how events have 
occurred based on judges’ interpretation of the law and litigants’ strategies for 
going to court.  
 
This research draws on the past 15 years of oil pollution litigation, as documented 
in law reports, to better understand how a key legal gateway to environmental 
justice in Nigeria functions. A review of case law, focusing on tort claims in 
particular, is important for the discussion of gateways to environmental justice for 
those negatively affected by Nigeria’s oil sector. This is because tort litigation is 
one of the most popular legal gateways used in Nigeria to seek A2EJ for oil 
pollution. This section will first explain how case law was collected. Then I will 
outline how data was organised for analysis. Finally, I will detail the limitations 
of the law-report-focused approach. 
 
3.4.3.1 Case Law Collection 
 
It is not a straightforward task for a researcher to go about systematically 
collecting Nigerian case law. This is particularly true given the country’s culture 
of unconditional appeal, making only appellate decisions relevant for making 
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assertions about precedent. As such, focusing on both Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeals decisions was a necessary choice for the research, both in order to account 
for the prevalence of appeal, and because appellate decisions are easier to access 
due to a range of law reports. This section explains the process for collecting case 
law. 
 
First, I made a clear set of inclusion and exclusion criteria for identifying relevant 
case law in law reports. The first sift of cases included those that involved oil 
companies and communities. These were established by identifying cases in which 
NNPC, international oil companies, or well-known subcontractors were named, 
along with an individual opposing litigant. The second sift of cases excluded all 
cases that did not involve some form of environmental harm. 
 
I applied these criteria to both paper copies of law reports and electronic law 
reports to compile the dataset of disputes between oil companies and communities. 
First, I accessed law reports that were housed in a commercial law firm in Abuja. 
I accessed these reports over the course of one month. Nigeria Weekly Law Reports 
(NWLR), Nigeria Monthly Law Reports (NMLR), and All Federation Weekly Law 
Reports (All FWLR) were the primary sources for data collection. Then, I used Law 
Pavilion to ensure my search was as exhaustive as possible. Law Pavilion’s 
electronic law reports keep track of Court of Appeals and Supreme Court decisions 
in full, claiming to have the “Largest collection of Judgments of the Supreme Court 
(from 1970 till date) and Court of Appeal (from 2007 till date) in Nigeria – Over 
9,000 cases”.210 This resource provided an invaluable quality assurance tool for my 
manual review of cases and also gave me access to digital versions of judge’s 
decisions, which enabled me to verify judgments and details of cases that otherwise 
would have been impossible without visiting Nigeria for a second round of 
fieldwork. Finally, Law Pavilion is updated regularly and has consequently 
                                               
210 Law Pavilion, http://lawpavilionplus.com/reports.html (accessed June 10, 2017).  
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allowed me to make the case law as up-to-date as possible as decisions come down, 
ending in 2015.211  
 
A first filter of these sources resulted in 133 cases where a company and an 
individual were named as parties to the case. However, upon second sift, only 
approximately 35% of these cases involved a dispute related to an environmental 
harm caused by oil industry activity.212 The forty seven cases that suited my search 
criteria primarily involved Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (60%).213 
Two thirds of cases were related to large scale oil spills and the damage to land 
caused, as well as the loss of livelihoods caused by depletion of fish stocks and 
arable farming land.  
 
 
3.4.3.2 Methods of Analysis 
 
There were a number of questions that only a systematic review of the case law 
could answer. In order to organise the cases in a way that would allow for such 
analysis, both as individual cases and as a group, all case law was entered into a 
database. The fields in the database contained basic information, such as the name 
of the case, the litigants involved, the year it was filed and a short summary of 
notable points from the judgement. Additional fields included: 
 
 the cause of the damage;  
 which original court it was filed in (State or Federal High Court); 
 what year was it originally filed; 
 which tort was used; 
 which party won the High Court case;  
                                               
211 For example, in 2015, the Supreme Court upheld a community’s claims for compensation and 
rendered the oil company appeal as being without merit. See SPDC v. Anaro & Ors. (2015) 
LPELR-24750(SC).  
212 The remaining cases were primarily employment disputes between companies and employees 
as well as individual contractor disputes.  
213 Frynas posits that it is not necessarily that Shell is acting in a particularly abhorrent way or 
more so than other oil companies might. Rather it is because Shell was the first corporation in 
the country to exploit oil resources, and so they have a higher proportion of onshore licenses. 
Thus, they face the burden of dealing more with human populations than other concessions, such 
as those offshore. Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 12. 
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 whether or not the cases were decided on a point of jurisdiction or another 
defence; and 
 the year of the appellate judgement.  
 
 
In combination, all this information provided a unique opportunity to ask 
questions of all of the cases as a whole. Through a simple search function, the 
database allowed for cases to be grouped either by the tort used by communities or 
by the defences used by companies. By interrogating the case law in this way, 
Chapter 6 is able to make a novel intervention in the Nigeria-specific research on 
oil company-community legal disputes. 
 
3.4.3.3 Limitations  
 
There are advantages to approaching case law analysis through law reports, such 
as bringing focus to unique or precedential judgements. This approach, however, 
also introduces notable limitations when researching the nature of oil pollution 
litigation in Nigeria.214 Firstly, I assume that the case selection vastly under-
represents the number of oil pollution cases that are actually filed in trial courts. 
For example, Frynas notes that from 1981-1986, Shell was involved in 24 
compensation cases related to oil spills. By 1998 Shell was reporting involvement 
in more than 500 compensation cases, 350 of which were related specifically to oil 
spills.215 While up-to-date figures are not available for numbers of recent cases, it 
is reasonable to assume that this number has only increased with time as oil 
installations have further aged and are more susceptible to spills and litigants 
have been exposed to more information about undertaking litigation. Secondly, the 
law reports used only provide full appellate judgements, constraining my ability 
to analyse trial court judgements and approaches by litigants. While these may 
have been shortcomings for providing a comprehensive view of the case law, law 
reports provided a systematic approach to building a dataset that can assist in 
                                               
214 Lee Epstein and Gary King, “The Rules of Inference.” University of Chicago Law Review 69, 
no. 1 (2002):106-108.  
215 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 182.  
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Despite challenges in data collection, the case law collected represents a unique 
effort to collect a large sample of oil pollution cases since 1998 – an accomplishment 
in and of itself. A search of printed and online law reports identified forty seven 
cases involved oil companies and communities where the point of dispute was an 
environmental harm. A majority of cases involved Shell and large scale oil spills 
were the most common cause for dispute. The case law will provide a useful 
foundation for discussions about the use of litigation as a viable gateway to 




This Chapter discussed in detail this dissertation’s methodology.216 The project is 
framed using the case study as method, an approach that allows for a context-
specific interrogation of the research question. In order to collect necessary data to 
achieve this, I conducted fieldwork in Abuja. However, fieldwork was not without 
its challenges. Limited ability to travel to the Niger Delta due to security concerns 
and an Ebola scare, a Boko Haram attack in the capital around the time of 
research, as well as a judiciary strike lasting the duration of fieldwork, meant that 
access to some key actors and institutions was limited.   
 
I developed three novel sets of data to interrogate the nature of legal gateways to 
environmental justice in the oil sector in Nigeria. The survey offered a significant 
occasion to follow up on Frynas’ survey, while introducing some survey innovations 
that made the survey more widely accessible to practitioners across the country 
and also ensured that sample selection was more randomised. The profile of the 
                                               
216 The approach, as much as possible, has developed methods that can be replicated by 
researchers in the future working on this area in Nigeria. 
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candidates, younger lawyers, mostly male, who have represented both companies 
and communities, was similar to that of Frynas’, providing a credible comparison 
for analysis. The interviews I conducted allowed for nuanced insights from a range 
of institutions involved in oil pollution redress in Nigeria – from the national oil 
company to the environmental regulator responsible for oil spill clean-up to the 
Ministry of Justice, responsible for drafting legislation in this area. The case law 
dataset provided a comprehensive picture of reported case law on oil pollution 
since 1999.   
 
Despite some limitations, the methodology and the data I collected to support it, 
present one of the most rigorous studies of access to environmental justice in the 
era of the Fourth Republic in Nigeria. Moving forward into subsequent chapters, 
the survey, interviews, and case law will build an evidence-based investigation 
into the viability of gateways to environmental justice in Nigeria’s oil sector, while 
simultaneously analysing how those gateways may have been shaped by their 










Governance of the oil sector has a direct effect on A2EJ for victims of oil pollution. 
This is because A2EJ is not simply concerned with a series of laws and court 
rulings, but rather with the ways in which rules are made and applied, as well as 
who has the opportunity to contribute to and shape that process.217 As such, this 
Chapter analyses the actors involved in sector governance and the ways in which 
environmental governance is applied in practice. 
  
This Chapter will first discuss the general tenets of oil sector governance (Section 
4.2) and introduce the key institutions in Nigeria that are responsible for 
governing the sector. In this section, I also introduce the Norwegian approach to 
oil sector governance as a comparator to the Nigerian system, both in terms of 
institutional design and the outcomes produced. Section 4.3 discusses the scale of 
financial resources available to government institutions and the private sector in 
Nigeria in order to contextualise how access to finance to fulfil an institution’s 
mandate can impact power relationships among actors. The purpose of 
highlighting the scale of finances is to ensure that A2EJ is being sufficiently 
considered within the Rentier State context, discussed in Chapter 2. Section 4.4 
then focuses on one particular dimension of oil sector governance, oil spill 
response. I focus on oil spill response because of its particular significance to A2EJ 
in a context where oil spills are frequent and poorly addressed. This section again 
juxtaposes the Nigerian approach to oil spill response with that of Norway, and 
hones in on Nigeria’s “joint investigation visit” mechanism, a particular aspect of 




                                               





There are a series of primary functions that governments perform in managing 
their oil sectors, although the manner in which these functions are organised 
varies greatly. According to Lahn, et al,  
 
Petroleum sector governance refers to the system for making and 
implementing decisions concerning the exploitation of a nation’s oil 
and gas resources. It includes the structural and hierarchical 
organization of the sector, its decision-making and communication 
processes, the policies and objectives governing its activities and the 
regulation of those activities.218   
 
In practice this means that government institutions hold a multiplicity of roles, 
often as commercial operators, policy agenda-setters, regulators, revenue 
collectors and revenue distributors. Where one such function ends and another 
begins can be difficult to ascertain if distinctive institutional mandates and 
controls are not clear.219  
 
International Financial Institutions, International NGOs, and policy practitioners 
have taken a normative view of what “good governance” looks like, often providing 
recommendations for changes to governance structures without delving into a 
context’s idiosyncrasies.220 This has meant that governments reforming their 
approach to sector governance are balancing local needs that are context-specific, 
while responding at the same time to external demands for specific types of 
reforms. As such, this trade-off can result in sub-optimal governance 
                                               
218 Keith Myers and Glada Lahn et al, “Good Governance of the National Petroleum Sector,” 
Chatham House, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20Environmen
t%20and%20Development/ggdoc0407.pdf (accessed July 17, 2017), 5.  
219 Michael Ross, “Nigeria’s Oil Sector and the Poor,” DFID Paper. May 23, 2003, 
https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/other/NigeriaOil.pdf (accessed August 9, 
2017).  
220 For example, see Valerie Marcel, ed., “Guidelines for Good Governance in Emerging Oil and 
Gas Producers,” Chatham House. June 2015, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150624Guideline
sGoodGovernanceMarcel.pdf (accessed August 9, 2017). 
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arrangements.221  While the specific institutions and processes should be context 
specific, the ultimate objective of effective sector governance should be maximising 
benefit from oil reserves, while minimising negative effects of extraction. 
 
4.2.1 The Norwegian Model  
 
Norway’s governance regime is deemed a model for effective sector governance 
practice. The country discovered oil in the North Sea in 1960, and by the 1970s 
had refined a governance model that is still used today.222 Norway’s governance 
model is comprised of three key institutions, each with clear mandates: 1) a state 
owned oil company to carry out commercial participation in the sector (Statoil), 2) 
a Ministry responsible for developing policy and strategy related to sector 
development and then distributing licenses to commercial actors to implement 
those plans (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy) and 3) a regulating and advisory 
agency (the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) responsible for compiling data 
related to Norway’s oil reserves, setting regulations, providing advice, and 
collecting fees.223  
 
This governance model has contributed to the success of the Norwegian economy 
and has ultimately resulted in positive human development outcomes for Norway’s 
citizens. Norway was ranked first in the 2014 Human Development Index, which 
measures a country’s “achievement in key dimensions of human development: a 
long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and hav[ing] a decent standard of 
                                               
221 Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock argue that international development interventions have 
failed at building institutional capacity by influencing institutions in developing countries to 
adopt institutions designed to look like a post-industrial economy ideal, despite the lacking 
historical context. This is also similar to the debate in socio-legal studies about the pitfalls of 
legal transplants. See Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock, “Escaping Capability 
Traps Through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA),” World Development 51 (November 
2013): 234–244; and Pierre Legrand, “The Impossibility of Legal Transplants,” Maastricht 
Journal of European & Comparative Law 2, no. 111 (1997): 111-124. 
222 Mark Thurber, David Hults and Patrick Heller, “The Limits of Institutional Design in Oil 
Sector Governance: Exporting the ‘Norwegian Model’,” Paper presented at the ISA International 
Convention, New Orleans, LA, 18 February 2010, 
http://pesd.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Thurber_Hults_and_Heller_ISA2010_paper_14Feb1




living.”224 Norway is also ranked first in the 2013 Resource Governance Index, 
which measures the “quality of governance” in oil, gas, and mining sectors in top 
producers globally.225 In addition to this, Norway is ranked fifth in the 2015 
Corruption Perceptions Index, a measure of perceived public sector corruption 
globally.226  Finally, Norway ranks 33rd in the 2014 Economic Complexity Index, 
which measures the quality of a country’s economy in terms of diversification and 
complexity.227 These rankings are a significant achievement in light of the 
obstacles identified in the literature for governance of oil-rich countries.228 
 
It is important to note, however, that Norway did not begin with a blank canvas 
when it devised its model for oil sector governance. The country already had 
experience with governing other sectors that shared similar characteristics, such 
as minerals and water.229 Norway was also relatively wealthy as it had a mature 
economy at the time it discovered oil, allowing it to continue with other successful 
sectors while managing concerns about developing a diverse economy in the face 
of a dominant oil sector.230  Significant, too, is that Norway had a high level of 
institutional capacity within a well-formed civil service sector and a competitive 
democracy to ensure that its mandates would be carried out. Ultimately, such 
characteristics ensured that government and the private sector were both held 
accountable.231    
 
                                               
224 “Table 1: Human Development Index and its components,” United Nations Development 
Programme. http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI (accessed March 10, 2017). 
225 Much of the metrics for this Index are based on the Norwegian experience, so it makes sense 
that they should perform so well. 
226  “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,” Transparency International. 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 (accessed March 10, 2017). 
227 “Country Rankings 2014,” The Atlas of Economic Complexity. 
http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings/ (accessed March 10, 2017). 
228 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3 on the “Rentier State.”  
229 Thurber, Hults and Heller, “The Limits of Institutional Design,” 17. 
230 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3. Also, Thurber, Hults and Heller, “The Limits of Institutional 
Design,” 15. 
231 Ibid. Norway’s oil governance regime was actually designed by an Iraqi petroleum geologist. 
Also see Justin Fox, “How socialized health care made Norway an oil power,” Business Time, 
August 31, 2009. http://business.time.com/2009/08/31/how-socialized-health-care-made-norway-
an-oil-power/ (accessed March 10, 2017). 
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Many other countries have taken a three-institution approach to resource 
governance, like Norway, but in the absence of the unique characteristics that have 
made Norway such a success.232 In a study on the Norwegian model of oil 
governance, Thurber, Hults, and Heller found that the tripartite governance 
structure (policy institutions, regulation, and commercial enterprise) could be 
disastrous without the right pre-conditions.233 For example, if a country lacks the 
necessary capacity across government to fulfil and protect its mandates, its 
administration runs the risk of dispersing expertise thinly across institutions, 
thereby making all of the institutions ineffective in a field that requires a high 
concentration of technical proficiency.234 In these instances, Thurber, Hults and 
Heller suggest consolidating limited government knowledge about the oil sector in 
one institution and instead holding one core institution responsible for a wider 
range of functions.235  
 
Nigeria was one of the countries that Thurber, Hults, and Heller compared to 
Norway in their research. These researchers found that the pre-conditions for 
Nigerian oil sector governance differed greatly from Norway’s existing structure, 
yet Nigeria established a similar institutional design.236 In the next section, I will 
discuss what adopting a Norwegian-like governance model has meant for Nigeria. 
 
4.2.2 Nigerian Governance Institutions 
 
Nigeria discovered oil in commercial quantities in 1956, around the same time as 
Norway. However, unlike Norway’s aforementioned governance structure, which 
was developed and consolidated by the 1970s, Nigeria continues to experiment 
                                               
232 Thurber, Hults and Heller, “The Limits of Institutional Design,” 15. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid, 6. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Thurber, Hults and Heller, “The Limits of Institutional Design,” 15.  
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with its approach to oil governance, while underlying practices remain the same.237 
According to Thurber et al, 
 
Foreign oil companies control all operations, revenue flows to the 
Federal Government, and there are few independent regulatory 
checks on the sector. These basic realities have remained unchanged 
through numerous political realignments, including three transitions 
from civilian to military rule and three transitions back again. The 
basic structure of the industry has remained constant even in the face 
of numerous efforts to “reform” the oil sector.238 
 
In Nigeria, sector governance is designed to be divided into institutions with 
regulatory functions, commercial functions and policy functions. However, there is 
considerable de facto and de jure overlap of the institutions’ responsibilities. The 
national oil company, NNPC, is comprised of no fewer than thirteen subsidiary 
companies and at many times in history has also been home to the industry’s 
regulatory authority.239 In addition, NNPC is a joint venture partner with 
international companies exploring and producing oil in Nigeria.240 These 
agreements account for 97% of oil extracted in Nigeria.241  
 
Beyond NNPC, there is also the Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), 
responsible for policy development, and the Department of Petroleum Resources 
(DPR), which regulates sector actors.242 Both DPR and NNPC sit under the MPR 
                                               
237 Mark Thurber, David Hults, and Patrick Heller, “Exporting the “Norwegian Model”: The effect 
of administrative design on oil sector performance,” Energy Policy 39, no. 9 (September 2011): 
5366–5378.  
238 Mark Thurber, Ifeyinwa Emelife, and Patrick Heller, “NNPC and Nigeria’s Oil Patronage 
Ecosystem,” Working Paper No. 95. (Stanford: Program on Energy and Sustainable Development) 
https://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/WP_95 (accessed March 10, 2017), 7. 
239 “About the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation,” NNPC Group.  
 http://www.nnpcgroup.com/AboutNNPC/CorporateInfo.aspx (December 7, 2016).  NNPC is a 
statutory body under the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act 1977 (Cap. 320 Laws of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990). 
240 “Joint Venture Operations,” NNPC Group. 
 http://www.nnpcgroup.com/nnpcbusiness/upstreamventures.aspx (December 7, 2016).   
241 “Oil and gas: Major industry policies – joint ventures,” Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Commission. http://www.nipc.gov.ng/venture.html (December 7, 2016). 
242 State leaders often put themselves in charge of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources in 
Nigeria, including at time of writing, where President Buhari remains Minister. He has 
deputised day-to-day functions to Emmaneul Ibe Kachikwu, the Managing Director of NNPC. 
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as parastatal institutions.243 The National Oil and Spill Detection and Response 
Agency (NOSDRA), within the Ministry of Environment (MEnv), is another oil 
sector regulatory agency mainly responsible for regulating response to oil spills.  
 
 
Figure 1: MPR and MEnv provide the policy direction for the institutions that sit 
under them. NOSDRA and DPR are meant to regulate the 
international oil companies (“IOCs”) and the national oil company, 
NNPC. 
 
In Nigeria, there are several key differences from the Norwegian experience that 
are indicative of the country’s struggle to benefit from its oil reserves. In 
comparison to Norway’s top ranking in the Human Development Index, Nigeria 
only ranked 152 out of 188 in 2014.244 On the 2013 Resource Governance Index, 
while Norway was ranked number one, Nigeria was ranked fortieth out of the fifty 
eight countries measured. For reporting practices, Nigeria “received a score of ‘0’ 
for environmental and social impact assessments” on the Resource Governance 
Index.245  While Norway’s approach to economic diversification meant that it 
ranked thirty third out of 124 on the Economic Complexity Index in 2014, Nigeria’s 
substantial reliance on the oil sector for government revenue meant that the 
country ranked second to last, 123 out of 124.246 
                                               
243 “Harnessing Mineral Resources in Nigeria,” Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
http://petroleumresources.gov.ng/ (accessed July 24, 2017). 
244 “Table 1: Human Development Index and its components,” United Nations Development 
Programme.  
245 Norway received a perfect score. See “Oil, Gas and Mining for Development,” Natural Resource 
Governance Institute (accessed August 9, 2017).  
246“Country Rankings 2014,” The Atlas of Economic Complexity.  
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On the Corruption Perceptions Index (“CPI”), Nigeria ranks near the bottom, at 
136 out of 167.247 The country’s poor performance on the CPI underscores the fact 
that the government faces challenges in government accountability. This statistic 
is particularly worrying, when viewed alongside Thurber, Hults, and Heller’s 
argument that strong government accountability for malpractice is a necessary 
precondition for good sector governance. This has also been corroborated in a range 
of key informant interviews with sector practitioners, which are drawn upon 
throughout this thesis. 
 
The remainder of this section will analyse in further detail the three governance 
functions (policymaking, regulating, and commercial activity) most relevant to the 
remainder of this thesis. Where relevant, I will incorporate literature from other 
researchers who have conducted in-depth research on the institutions responsible 
for these functions. 
 
4.2.2.1 Government as a Commercial Actor 
 
It is not uncommon for governments to hold a commercial stake in their oil 
sectors.248 This has been particularly true since the 1970s, when a number of 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries nationalised 
their oil sectors.249 However, Nigeria’s approach to state participation in 
commercial activities has been problematic. From a purely commercial 
perspective, NNPC has failed to finance their obligations for pipeline and 
equipment repairs, future capital investment projects, and clean up for operational 
oil spills.250 In any other circumstance, foreign oil companies would find NNPC’s 
debts untenable as a business partner. As of June 2016, the company was USD 7 
                                               
247 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,” Transparency International.  
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 (March 10, 2017). 
248 “Parliamentary Briefing,” State Participation in Oil, Gas and Mining. January 2015.  
 http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_StateParticipation_20150311.pdf 
(accessed March 10, 2017).  
249 Ibid.  
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billion in debt to its joint venture partners.251  From a governance perspective, 
Nwokeji finds that NNPC plays both a commercial actor and is a key player in the 
“state administration” of the oil sector, including regulating its own activities with 
multi-national oil companies, even if informally.252 Mahdavi’s comparative 
analysis of oil governance regimes in countries with state-owned enterprises 
emphasises the challenges of corruption in this quasi-regulatory role.253 By 
analysing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) court in the United States, as 
well as NNPC board appointments, Mahdavi finds significant evidence to suggest 
Nigeria’s national oil company and its oil governance regime are highly susceptible 
to corruption.254  
 
Poor commercial performance coupled with an informal regulatory mandate has 
translated into poor environmental performance. The combination of low company 
funds due to mismanagement and a reputation for corrupt practices means that 
there is little incentive for NNPC to operate using international best practice in 
areas such as oil pipeline maintenance or oil spill clean-up.255  
 
This was outlined by one of my interview subjects, who described the Government’s 
attitude to addressing the environment when considering oil sector operations. 
This interviewee suggests that the state’s ownership of oil reserves and its 
                                               
251 Oscarline Onwuemenyi, “Nigeria owes oil joint venture partners $7bn – NAPIMS,” Sweet 
Crude Reports. June 1, 2016. http://sweetcrudereports.com/2016/06/01/nigeria-owes-oil-joint-
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mandate to exploit those reserves, along with commercial partners, led to the 
Nigerian government adopting a culture of extraction early on. 256 According to this 
interview subject, 
 
Government was interested in the resource, to own it, and to make 
money out of it. So it thought, this is a business we can go into.  And 
so since it became a partner in the business, not [just] a policymaker 
and taking taxes, the joint partners like Shell, everybody, would say 
‘Ok we have this rubbish that we need to clean up. We are in this 
business together we have to do it together, and government will 
come and say ‘how much will it cost us to do this?’ and they will say 
millions of dollars and they will say ‘oh forget it, forget it. It is our 
land. Let it stay there, let’s continue with the business.257   
 
This is not to say that all commercial actors have an incentive to enable the 
persistence of pollution, though this may be the case for some actors within NNPC. 
An NNPC lawyer, in another interview, confirmed much of the external criticism 
of the state owned enterprise’s behaviour. This lawyer said that “we haven’t been 
fantastic anyways. People have complained that the foreign companies are 
sometimes better than us in a way that pollution is treated, which is really, really 
shameful.”258  
 
Both the A2EJ literature and first-hand accounts from actors within the Nigerian 
government’s apparatus have concluded that NNPC has failed to be an effective 
commercial actor in the oil sector. Poor performance is rooted both in the 
institution’s central role in large scale corrupt practices, and that NNPC lacks the 
technical competence required to carry out basic commercial functions.259 This 
poor performance prevents the national oil company from protecting the 
environment and people living in oil producing areas. 
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4.2.2.2 Government as A Policymaker 
 
Thurber et al find that when oil was first discovered in 1956, it was not in 
commercial quantities large enough to factor into Nigerian political life. However, 
by 1966, six years after Nigeria’s independence, revenues began to play a role in 
political discourse and have an impact on policy decisions.260 In 1969, the 
Petroleum Act required companies to have a Nigerian entity in order to hold an oil 
license in the country. In 1971, the Government set up the NNOC, NNPC’s 
predecessor, and joined OPEC.261 At the time, OPEC was encouraging its member 
states to establish firm control over their states’ oil resources.262 By the early 70s, 
global oil prices had quadrupled, which put petroleum at the centre of political 
discussions and bargaining, a position that oil has continued to hold ever since.263  
 
Nigerian oil policy of the 70s and 80s was driven by a desire to attract major 
international investment into the country while maintaining control over its 
assets.264 Key policy tenets included the use of incentives to keep investors 
interested in the country’s oil sector, while simultaneously holding a share of oil 
assets back from foreign investors.265 The incentives provided at the time — from 
tax holidays and capital cost write offs in the 70s, to MoUs in the 80s in order to 
ensure minimum tax burden for investors – had a lasting effect on government oil 
revenues. This in turn has directly impacted the amount of revenue available for 
providing basic service delivery to the Nigerian people, as well as the government’s 
investment in environmental regulation.266  
 
  
                                               
260 Ibid., 9. 
261 Ibid. 
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4.2.2.3 Government as a Regulator 
 
Historically, as a regulator, the Nigerian government has not had sufficient 
distance from commercial operators, partly due to NNPC’s competing quasi-
regulatory and commercial functions, discussed above.267 The government has also 
not allocated the necessary funding or human capital to effectively govern a 
technically complex and highly lucrative oil sector.268 One key informant said that  
 
You can see that government placed itself in a hard place where it 
cannot hold the operator responsible. If government was just taking 
taxes and royalties from them, they could have said you must deal 
with it, it is your mess. The spiller pays. But it can’t because it has 
made itself an operator by default. It is hard to police oneself. That 
self-regulatory culture is not in ours.269 
 
Thurber, Hults, and Heller also argue that there is no real incentive for the 
Nigerian elite to create a truly independent regulator, as they benefit from high 
levels of patronage from oil revenues.270 This complicated relationship between 
regulation and commerce has been further exacerbated by overlapping 
institutional mandates, which have resulted in contestation between key 
institutions tasked to protect the environment from oil sector operations. The 
following sections concerning environmental governance in the sector will focus on 
DPR and NOSDRA, the two main institutions responsible for environmental 
protection and clean-up in the oil sector. 
 
  
                                               
267 See Section 4.2.2.4.1 on DPR below.  
268 A hydrocarbon sector regulator is an institution, or set of institutions, which: 
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4.2.2.3.1 Department of Petroleum Resources  
 
DPR sits under the Ministry of Petroleum Resources and is characterised as “the 
technical Department of the Ministry that regulates and monitors activities of the 
oil and gas industry.”271 The DPR’s chief function is to ensure that oil companies 
comply with laws, regulations, and guidelines for industry activity, including 
ensuring that health, safety, and environmental standards meet international best 
practice. Their remit includes reviewing environmental impact assessments for 
petroleum-related projects and oil spills response.272  
 
DPR has a reputation for understanding the technical intricacies of sector 
operations well.273 However, it is also known for being a heavily compromised 
regulator, with a revolving door of staff moving between the private and public 
sectors.274 One key informant detailed that “people move around. Today the person 
is in NNPC, tomorrow is DPR, and tomorrow it’s Chevron, like myself (laughs 
loudly). So it’s a clock.”275 The former Minister of Petroleum, Diezani Alison-
Madueke, is a key example of this compromised legitimacy. According to a key 
informant,  
 
She is still considered in Shell as a shadow director so…they like 
what she’s doing, create the, you know, impression that we are 
working on it but she knows it’s just a rocking chair no motion, no 
movement just motion and so that is where we are with it.276  
 
As elucidated above, the constant shifting of personnel among institutions, even if 
no wrongdoing is found, can compromise the legitimacy of the regulator. A key 
informant described this as follows:  
                                               
271 Ogunba Olusegun, “EIA systems in Nigeria: evolution, current practice and shortcomings,” 
 Environmental Impact Assessment Review 24, no. 6 (August 2004): 643–660. 
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273 Interview A1L5, August 16, 2014. 
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 So you have DPR, which is the one that comes closest to doing what I 
think we need in the process, but DPR is understaffed. And in my 
view rather too close to the oil industry. You know it’s a very strong 
relationship, because they are dealing with each other all the time, 
and rather it is almost inevitable...they have this cosy way of 
resolving issues, so that frustrates the people who are at receiving 
end of the pollution.277 
 
 
4.2.2.3.2 National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency 
 
NOSDRA is the regulatory body tasked specifically with oil spill mitigation, 
response and clean-up.278 The agency was created in 2006 to establish an 
institution that would be accountable for the implementation of the National Oil 
Spill Contingency Plan, under the Federal Ministry of Environment, Housing, and 
Urban Development.279  NOSDRA is unique in that it is primarily concerned with 
environmental protection within the oil sector (See Chapter 5).280 
 
NOSDRA’s status as a specialised agency charged with detecting and responding 
to oil spills has meant little in practice to oil sector actors.281 Both its status as a 
new organisation and as an industry outsider has meant that the agency has had 
little space to fulfil its purpose, often being blocked by DPR. One informant 
suggests that the establishment of NOSDRA was only ever intended to be a signal 
to the international community that Nigeria was addressing its serious oil spill 
crisis, but there was little motivation to give the organisation any real authority:  
 
[Government] said, ok ok, let’s [create NOSDRA] but let us mind that 
this is government business. And so when NOSDRA was set up in the 
first instance in 2006, it was just basically to find a way to explain to 
                                               
277 A1L5 Interview, August 12, 2014. 
278 National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) (Establishment) Act (Cap. 157 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2006). 
279 Uchenna Jerome Orji, “An appraisal of the legal frameworks for the control of environmental 
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the international bodies that yeah we are doing something about [oil 
spills]…however, that agency had no teeth. Could not bite. Cannot 
even enforce anything.282  
 
4.2.2.3.3 The Overlap 
 
NOSDRA and DPR may have complementary skills and agenda, but these 
institutions do not work well together, in part due to their implicitly overlapping 
remits. Both institutions have within their mandate the authority to regulate the 
oil sector’s treatment of the environment. For example, Section 6(1)a of the 
NOSDRA Act states that the agency is “responsible for surveillance and [to] ensure 
compliance with all existing environmental legislation and the detection of oil 
spills in the petroleum sector.” A further Section 6(2) empowers the Agency to 
collect fines if oil company operators do not report spills to the agency within 24 
hours. DPR states that it is responsible for “[s]upervising all Petroleum Industry 
operations being carried out under licences and leases in the country,” as well as 
“ensuring that Health Safety & Environment regulations conform with national 
and international best oil field practice.” The DPR is also required to “ensure 
timely and accurate payments of Rents, Royalties and other revenues due to 
government.”283 Given that the NOSDRA Act is the most recent piece of legislation 
dealing with oil spill management in Nigeria, there may be an expectation that 
this was a de facto repeal of the DPR’s oil spill management duties. However, 
without explicit de jure stipulations to that effect, neither institution intends to be 
deferential to the other. 
 
The overlap among competing organisations has resulted in a situation where  
commercial oil sector operators  are unsure which obligations they are required to 
meet – and this ultimately increases the cost of doing business while also 
compromising sector governance. As one interview subject said:  
 
                                               
282 Interview A1G5, July 23, 2014. 
283 See: “What we do” Department of Petroleum Resources. https://dpr.gov.ng/index/functions-of-
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[t]he main issues is the multiplicity of agencies doesn’t help 
effectiveness, I don’t think. So operators are faced with a number of 
contradictory inconsistent requirements. So you can see how the 
agencies have evolved and that each one does have something to do 
with pollution. But it isn’t helpful to have so many agencies we have 
more agencies that are not sufficiently resourced all over the place.284   
 
Similarly, one NOSDRA employee noted that actors are often required to fill out 
double the paperwork to have one issue resolved within the Government system. 
This key informant noted that the overlap and lack of cooperation among agencies 
has grown into an acrimonious relationship over time. According to him,  
 
at a point it was becoming an unhealthy rivalry which ordinarily 
shouldn’t be. We at a time tried to settle it at the ministerial level – 
maybe the ministers could meet and resolve it – tell, I mean politely 
tell, the DPR to relax about anything environment, forward to 
Ministry of Environment or to NOSDRA. We tried to organise that 
meeting in 2007.285  
 
At the time of interview (in August 2014), this meeting had still not taken place, 
allowing a stalemate to continue, whereby NOSDRA is enforcing its legal mandate 
to manage oil spills and enforce oil sector legislation, while DPR continues to do 
much the same without substantive cooperation.  
 
4.1.1.1.1 Summary  
 
A review of Nigerian governance institutions responsible for commercial activity, 
environmental regulation, and industry policymaking shows that these 
institutions are not operating in a way that effectively governs the sector. “Conflict 
of interest” emerges as the key theme of this review; government actors move in 
and out of commercial and regulatory functions, while others jockey for relevance 
and position when met with overlapping regulatory remits. Across institutions, the 
government’s financial interest in the sector’s commercial performance means 
there are few incentives to encourage regulators to fulfil their roles legitimately, 
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as any punitive costs will not just fall to private sector companies, but also to the 
government itself. The next section will explore the financial flows of revenue in 
further detail, illustrating the way in which governance arrangements can be 
undermined by resource allocation. 
 
4.3 Revenue Flow and Scale 
 
Underpinning these governance arrangements are the financial resources that 
enable these institutions to do their jobs. This financing comes from the federal 
budget, which is primarily funded by oil revenues.286 This section briefly outlines 
how revenues flow within the Federal Government and then compares this to the 
scale of financial resources available to private sector operators. The data from 
this section is drawn from the federal budgets, Nigeria Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (NEITI) audits, and oil company annual earnings reports. 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the scale of an institution’s finances 
can have a proportionate impact on its influence in sector governance. Indeed, the 
scale of oil companies’ resources vastly overshadow those of DPR and NOSDRA 
and has a large impact on the power dynamic among those institutions. 
 
As a starting point, Nigeria’s Federal Government is the sole owner of the country’s 
resources, including petroleum deposits.287 The revenues generated from the oil 
sector is significant, accounting for more than 65% of government funds.288 This 
money comes from the collection of bonuses, royalties, rents and NNPC profits and 
enters the Federal Government’s consolidated account.289 In the period between 
2009 and 2011, the Nigerian government received approximately USD 143.5 
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billion in oil-related tax, revenue, and royalties.290  The money that accrues in the 
Federation Account is distributed across levels of government, based on an 
appropriations proposal that is approved by the National Assembly.291 As per a 
2010 analysis, almost half of total revenue was allocated to the Federal 
Government, more than 26% to states, and 20% to local government councils with 
an additional 4% assigned to centrally-located special funds, such as the National 
Judicial Council.292  
 
The revenue allocated to the Federal Government is then disbursed across a range 
of institutions, including the line ministries. These ministries, and their subsidiary 
departments and agencies are responsible for fulfilling a range of mandates, from 
devising policies and implementing health and education services, to shaping oil 
sector policy and regulating sector activities. With all governments, each ministry 
fights to secure as many resources as possible from a finite pool of funds. The 
ability to successfully lobby government for desired funds can be an indication of 
the importance of a ministry and its power relative to other institutions. 
 
In 2013, the Federal Ministry of Environment, which is responsible for all 
environmental policy, regulation and enforcement of environmental protection in 
the country, ranked 23rd in budget allocation (more than USD 150 million) out of 
41 ministries. In the same period, the Ministry of Petroleum Resources was ranked 
15th (more than USD 375 million).293 Of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
                                               
290 “Financial Flows Reconciliation Report: 2009 – 2011 Oil & Gas Audit,” Nigeria Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative.  
291 S. 162(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, defines the Federation 
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budget, more than 50% went to funding the regulator, DPR. Of the Ministry of 
Environment’s budget, which is almost a third of the size of the Petroleum 
Ministry, about 10% of its budget went to funding NOSDRA. The severely limited 
pool of resources available to NOSDRA versus DPR in part explains why NOSDRA, 
an organisation with a specific mandate to respond to oil spills, struggles to fulfil 
its responsibilities.  
 
While the Ministry of Petroleum Resources’ budget is significant, particularly 
relative to the Ministry of Environment, the policymaking and regulatory 
institution is dwarfed by the scale of private industry resources.294 For example, 
the total 2013 Federal budget for Nigeria was about USD 31 billion.295 In the same 
year, Royal Dutch Shell’s total income before tax (profit after all other deductions 
for capital expenditure, purchases, research and development expenses, 
administrative expenses, etc.) was more than USD 33 billion.296 Chevron’s net 
                                               
294 NNPC is in a unique position in that it is a parastatal that receives funding from the Nigerian 
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income for the same year was more than USD 21 billion.297 ExxonMobil’s income 
in 2013 was USD 32 billion.298  
 
In total, the top three multi-nationals operating in Nigeria had access to almost 
three times the amount of money that was needed to fund the entire Nigerian 
government budget. Above, I argued that NOSDRA struggles to fulfil its mandate 
in the face of DPR’s significant financial resources. It then follows here that oil 
companies, given that their resources dwarf both DPR and NOSDRA funding 
combined, have even more of influence than both institutions on how oil spill 
response takes place. 
 
4.4 Oil Spill Response and the Joint Investigation Visit 
 
The preceding sections discussed Nigeria’s oil sector governance regime, 
particularly as it relates to the environment. In addition, the section compared 
financial flows within and outside of government in order to understand the 
resources available to key actors in fulfilling regulatory mandates. This section 
considers how these governance arrangements and the private sector’s 
disproportionately vast resources can negatively affect A2EJ directly through oil 
spill response, particularly, the “Joint Investigation Visit” (JIV). The first section 
will describe Norway’s oil spill response regime as a comparator, followed by a high 
level description of Nigerian oil spills response regime. The section thereafter will 
then focus on the JIV and outline the reasons for its significance, followed by a 
critique of the JIV. The final section will discuss how flaws in the oil spill response 
system can have a lasting negative impact on A2EJ in the Nigerian legal system. 
 
  
                                               
297 “Chevron Corporation 2013 Annual Report,” Chevron. https://www.chevron.com/-
/media/chevron/shared/documents/Chevron2013AnnualReport.pdf (accessed August 9, 2017), 4. 
298 “Annual 2013 Report Summary,” ExxonMobil.  
http://cdn.exxonmobil.com/~/media/Global/Files/Summary-Annual-
Report/2013_ExxonMobil_Summary_Annual_Report.pdf (accessed March 10, 2017). 
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4.4.1 The Norwegian Experience 
 
The government of Norway and the private companies operating there have a 
clearly articulated strategy for responding to a range of oil spill scenarios.299 There 
are three key agencies involved in oil spill response under the Norwegian regime, 
with a range of others concerned with support functions. The Norwegian 
Environmental Agency (Klif) approves plans for oil spill response when oil 
companies submit plans to develop oil deposits.300 The Petroleum Safety Authority 
(PSA) oversees oil production and exploration facilities to ensure operational 
compliance.301 The Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) is responsible for 
ensuring an appropriate response from all parties in the event of an oil spill 
emergency.302  
 
In practice, NCA’s responsibilities are shared with oil companies if a spill is caused 
by one of their oil installations.303 All of these institutions undertake annual drills 
to ensure their equipment and procedures are up to the task of responding to oil 
spills under a range of circumstances.304 Following the multiple day drill, where 
oil is actually spilled into the water, these institutions publish a report.305 
 
Critically, and contrary to the Nigerian case, Norway’s Pollution Control Act 
clearly states that the “polluter pays principle” is in force.306 This means that 
regardless of the cause, the owner of an asset is strictly liable for any pollution 
                                               
299 See Kristian Bergaplaas and Christian Eriksen, “Industrial Opportunities in Oil Spill 
Response in Norway: An Analysis of the Technological Innovation System of Oil Spill Response.” 
Master’s Thesis. (Trondheim: Norwegian university of Science and Technology, 2012). 
https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/266241 (accessed March 1, 2017).  
300 “Norwegian Environment Agency,” Miljodirektoratet. http://www.miljodirektoratet.no/no/Om-
Miljodirektoratet/Norwegian-Environment-Agency/ (accessed August 9, 2017). 
301 “RNNP Summary Report.” Petroleum Safety Authority Norway. 
http://www.ptil.no/?lang=en_US (accessed March 10, 2017).  
302 Bergaplass and Eriksen, “Industrial Opportunities in Oil Spill Response in Norway,” 32.   
303 Ibid., 35.  
304 Erin Blakemore, “Every year, Norway hosts an Oil Clean Up Drill,” Smithsonianmag. 19 June, 
2015. http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/every-year-norway-hosts-oil-cleanup-drill-
180955650/ (accessed March 10, 2017). 
305 Ibid. 
306 Bergaplass and Eriksen, “Industrial Opportunities in Oil Spill Response in Norway,” 12.   
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caused by its oil installations or ships.307 While this principle seems to make the 
cost of doing business higher in Norway, it also sets the correct incentives in place 
for proactive oil spill response planning and collaboration among the public and 
private sectors in emergency situations. 
 
The industry body, Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies 
(NOFO), ensures appropriate clean-up by operators and compliance with 
government regulations. This private institution is always on call and provides a 
range of support depending on the nature of the spill and the operators’ capability 
to respond. Outside government itself, “NOFO maintains the largest 
nongovernmental stockpiles of oil-spill response equipment in Norway.”308  
 
While this system works for Norway, where oil production takes place offshore in 
the North Sea, it is difficult to say whether it can be replicated elsewhere.309 Indeed 
in the Nigerian context, where the major oil production is occurring onshore and 
in close proximity to local communities, it may be necessary to have more robust 
measures to ensure the appropriate precautions are taken.  
 
4.4.2 Nigeria’s Oil Spill Response Regime 
 
Nigeria’s oil spill response regime comprises a mixture of public and private sector 
institutions as well. NOSDRA is legislated as the first port of call for oil companies 
who identify an oil spill; it is also, depending on scale of the spill, responsible for 
leading response coordination.310 However, as per the discussion in Section 4.2.2.4 
above, DPR shares this role with NOSDRA, invoking its Environmental 
Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) as 
                                               
307 Bergaplass and Eriksen, “Industrial Opportunities in Oil Spill Response in Norway,” 13.  
308 Ibid., 27. 
309 Statoil maps show the concentration of drilling activities offshore. See “Where we are,” Statoil. 
https://www.statoil.com/en/where-we-are/norway.html (accessed March 10, 2017). 
310 National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) (Establishment) Act (Cap. 157 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2006). See their website at: National Oil Spills Detection and 
Response Agency, http://nosdra.gov.ng/ (accessed September 9, 2017). 
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the governing framework for oil spill response.311 EGASPIN is a guideline that sets 
out a range of directives for oil spill detection and response that pre-dates 
NOSDRA.312 In addition to these key public sector actors, Clean Nigeria Associates 
is a private sector industry body founded in 1981 that supports its members in 
fulfilling their clean-up responsibilities.313 Similar to the relationship between 
NOFO and oil companies in Norway, oil companies operating in Nigeria also play 
a major role in responding to oil spills.314  
 
As the above description of institutions suggests, the chain of command for 
responding to oil spills has not been clear cut. The moment a spill is detected, the 
operator is technically required to inform both NOSDRA and DPR. Section 6(b) of 
the NOSDRA Act states that the Agency shall “receive reports of oil spillages and 
co-ordinate oil spill response activities throughout Nigeria.” The DPR’s EGASPIN 
guidelines also state the Department will be notified within 24 hours of a spill.315 
Evidence suggests, however, NOSDRA struggles to fulfil its responsibilities. A 
report by one watchdog group working in conjunction with NOSDRA found that 
the required forms that outline the details of an oil spill are rarely submitted on 
time, while less than 50% of these reports make it to submission at all.316  This 
type of dysfunction was also highlighted in the UNEP Environmental Assessment 
of Ogoniland, which found that “[w]hile a National Oil Spill Contingency Plan 
exists in Ogoniland and NOSDRA has a clear legislative role, the situation on-the-
                                               
311 “Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria,” 
Environmental Studies Unit, Department of Petroleum Resources. 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/233481740/The-Environmental-Guidelines-and-Standards-for-the-
Petroleum-Industry-in-Nigeria-EGASPIN-2002 (accessed August 9, 2017). 
312 Ibid. 
313 Clean Nigeria Associates, http://cleannigeria.org/ (accessed August 9, 2017).  
314 For example, see SPDC’s oil spill response here: “Oil Spill Data” Shell Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria Limited, 
 http://www.shell.com.ng/sustainability/environment/oil-spills.html (accessed September 1, 2017). 
315 DPR also requires this. See Paragraph 5.1.1 of “Environmental Guidelines and Standards for 
the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria.” 
316 “Improving Oil Spill Response in Nigeria,” Stakeholder Democracy Network.  
http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Improving-Oil-Spill-Response-
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ground indicates that spills are not being dealt with in an adequate or timely 
manner.”317  
 
Regardless of which agency is leading efforts, the oil spill response regime in 
Nigeria places the onus on the industry to 1) provide the necessary equipment to 
respond to an oil spill, 2) respond in the event of an oil spill emergency, and 3) 
report on it. According to International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation 
(ITOPF), a global industry not-for-profit, “Nigeria relies on oil pollution clean-up 
resources provided by the oil industry and very little is maintained in government 
hands.”318 While this may be an efficient way to delegate responsibility, 
particularly when government financial resources are limited for stockpiling spill 
response equipment, it worsens an imbalance of power and information 
asymmetry between parties. Polluters are expected to both identify spills and clean 
them up, with little meaningful oversight of this process on the part of the 
government.   
 
In addition to the limited involvement in clean-up, the Nigerian government 
knows very little about the extent to which companies actually clean up oil spills. 
NOSDRA requires companies to fill out “Form C” once an oil spill has been 
addressed by the company involved.319 In theory, these forms would provide the 
Agency with a comprehensive view of oil spill clean-up activities and the extent to 
which the environment has been restored. However, a review of NOSDRA 
paperwork conducted in conjunction with an industry watchdog group found that 
NOSDRA only received this form 12% of the time between January 2010 and 
                                               
317 UNEP, “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland.”  
318 “Nigeria,” The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited.  
 http://www.itopf.com/knowledge-resources/countries-regions/countries/nigeria/ (accessed August 
9, 2017).  
319 “Improving Oil Spill Response in Nigeria.” Stakeholder Democracy Network.  
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August 2015.320 This means that the clean-up and remediation efforts for 5,600 oil 
spills went unreported in that period.321 
 
4.1.1.2 The Joint Investigation Visit 
 
As part of the fraught process outlined above, Nigerian regulations require a multi-
stakeholder Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to embark on a Joint Investigation 
Visit (JIV) to the site of a spill to determine the cause and scope of the accident. 
These teams are comprised of members of state and federal government 
environmental agencies, international oil companies, NNPC, NOSDRA, DPR, and 
the communities affected.322 All stakeholders gather at the site of the spill and 
assess damage, sometimes taking photographs of the spill site. Once the team has 
visited and assessed the cause and scope of damage, all parties sign the field 
report, which then becomes the document of record.  
 
JIVs are an important process in determining the cause and scope of oil spills. 323  
They are meant to serve as a participatory mechanism that facilitates a consensus 
view of the oil spill cause, which acts as a basis for determining compensation. The 
most recent iteration of the mechanism was born out of an industry regulation 
from NOSDRA in 2011.324  
 
Although JIVs are not a formal “legal” process, they are nevertheless a critical 
mechanism for A2EJ. If the JIT finds an oil spill to be caused by operational 
                                               
320 See “Improving Oil Spill Response in Nigeria.” A contrasting narrative is offered by Shell, who 
argue that “[a]fter completion of the clean-up and where necessary the remediation, close-out 
inspection and certification is carried out by the relevant Government regulators. The entire spill 
response process is governed by performance standards, as prescribed by Nigerian Law, in 
particular as defined in the DPR’s Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum 
Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) of 2002 and NOSDRA Act 2006.” See “Oil Spill Data,” Shell.   
http://www.shell.com.ng/sustainability/environment/oil-spills.html (accessed August 9, 2017).  
321 “Improving Oil Spill Response in Nigeria.” Stakeholder Democracy Network, 16. 
322 See Amnesty International, “Bad Information: Oil Spill Investigations in the Niger Delta,” 
Amnesty International Report. (London: Amnesty International Publications, 2013), 13. 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/afr440282013en.pdf (accessed March 10, 2017). 
323 See “Improving Oil Spill Response in Nigeria,” Stakeholder Democracy Network.  
324 Akpofure Rim-Rukeh, “Oil Spill Management in Nigeria: SWOT Analysis of the Joint 
Investigation Visit (JIV) Process,” Journal of Environmental Protection 6 (2015): 259-271, 261.  
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failure, the oil company will be liable to pay for damages and clean-up. However, 
if it is found to be caused by sabotage, it is unlikely the community will receive any 
compensation from the oil companies and may have a difficult time securing a 
thorough clean-up of the affected area.325 If the JIV report underestimates the 
extent of oil spill damage, even if it holds companies directly responsible, the 
amount of compensation available to communities may be severely diminished. At 
present, JIV reports are increasingly attributing spills to sabotage and oil theft, 
but there seems to be little evidence in these reports beyond oil company narratives 
to substantiate claims.326 As a result, and unlike Norway where the “polluter pays” 
principle is in force, the impact on communities’ ability to secure compensation is 
actively under threat.327  
 
4.1.1.3 Flaws of the JIV System 
 
While the JIV process appears to be a potentially progressive tool for coming to a 
consensus on the cause of oil spills, there has been severe scepticism of the process 
in practice.328 Its critics argue that given the influence and financial resources 
available to oil company operators, it is impossible for all members of a JIT to have 
an equal voice in JIV practice.329 An Amnesty International report found that “[i]n 
most cases the oil company has substantial influence in determining the cause of 
a spill, even when a regulatory representative is present. This is partly due to the 
fact that the company has the technical expertise and neither the regulators nor 
the communities have the means to challenge their assessment.”330 While 
conducting research for their report on JIVs, Amnesty International witnessed the 
                                               
325 In the best of circumstances, communities have a representative, who holds legitimacy within 
the community, attend these visits. In the worst of circumstances, these representatives are 
selected by the oil company and may not have any formal role or legitimacy within the 
community. These representatives are almost always men. See “Towards Improving the Joint 
Investigation Visit Following Oil Spills in Nigeria,” Stakeholder Democracy.  
http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/JIV.pdf (accessed March 10, 
2017) and “Bad Information: Oil Spill Investigations in the Niger Delta.” 
326 “Bad Information: Oil Spill Investigations in the Niger Delta,” 5. 
327 For an extensive analysis of the JIV process, see Ibid., 8.  
328 Rim-Rukeh, “Oil Spill Management in Nigeria,” 261. 
329 Ibid., 263. 
330 “Bad Information: Oil Spill Investigations in the Niger Delta,” 15.  
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control that the companies have over the process: one Amnesty International 
member reported that “a representative of NOSDRA received a text message from 
Nigerian Agip Oil Company, a major onshore operator, alerting them to a spill and 
providing information on when the investigation trip would take place.”331  
 
The Amnesty research also found that once at the site, oil companies are in charge 
of filling out the spill report form that is then signed by the rest of the group.332 
One key informant agreed with this description. He said that “the point about the 
attribution of oil spills is that the oil companies have all the power in their hands. 
They host the field trips, the NNPC guys are along for the ride, and the Shell guys 
are literally the ones that fill out the paper work. And everyone else just signs. 
There have been the most blatant cases of the field people re-labelling stuff.”333 
 
There is no uniform way for assessing the cause of oil spill damage, and thus no 
way to quality-assure the process. According to an analysis by Rim-Rukeh, 
different oil companies employ various methods for determining the cause of a 
spill.334 For example, Nigeria Agip Oil Company uses visual observation and the 
use of Ultrasonic Thickness Measurements, which can help assess how much 
corrosion the pipeline has experienced. On the other hand, Shell and Total rely on 
visual observation alone, using pre-determined indicators, such as disturbance of 
the soil or the characteristics of the leaking point.335 There is also no standard 
procedure for how the volume of oil spilled is determined, with teams relying on 
observations of the area covered by the spill and a calculation of the depth of the 
spill and the type of soil on which the oil has spread, which can indicate how deeply 
the oil may have travelled back into the ground.336 This inaccuracy and 
inconsistency in the JIV process leaves room for manipulation of the outcome. 
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In some instances, oil companies will go to great lengths to avoid having 
“operational failure” as the final written assessment of a JIV. The reason for 
avoiding this assessment is to shield themselves from any serious threat of liability 
in a court of law. In the case of the Batan oil spill at a Shell installation in 2002, 
two days before the JIV had taken place, Shell had already written to the Governor 
of Delta State to inform him that the cause of the spill had been sabotage.337 When 
the JIV did take place days later, a professional diver was deployed to assess the 
cause of the spill by swimming the twelve feet below the water to the spill site. He 
found loose nuts and bolts consistent with operational failure. In a video recording 
of the JIV, Amnesty International reports that the diver is seen sharing his 
conclusion with the convened group, and the representative from Shell, supported 
by DPR, is seen trying to persuade the rest of the group not to document the spill 
as having been caused by operational failure.338 Despite the attempted persuasion, 
the group agreed to document the spill as operational failure. The following day, 
the community received the following written correspondence from Shell: 
 
Our representatives have narrated to us the gruesome ordeal, duress 
and manhandling to which they were subjected by people of your 
community, including some members of its executive committee, in 
the process of carrying out the Joint Investigation and writing the 
Joint Investigation Report…Consequently, Shell hereby repudiates 
the purported Joint Investigation Report….in which our 
representatives were coerced into taking the cause of the incident as 
being production equipment failure, instead of an act of third party 
interference, sabotage, which it clearly was. The inspection report of 
the diver who inspected the leak point leaves no reasonable person in 
doubt that the leakage occurred due to unauthorized tampering, by 
unknown persons, with two nuts and bolts on the flange of the 
manifold. In fact, we have reasonable ground to suspect that some 
members of your community might be the culprits, and this suspicion 
has been reported to the appropriate authorities for the necessary 
action. We trust that you will prevail on the members of your 
community to respect the rule of law in order to prevent further 
strains on our usually cordial relationship.339 
                                               
337 “Bad Information: Oil Spill Investigations in the Niger Delta,” 19. 
338 Ibid.  




Despite video evidence to the contrary, coupled with an investigation by a local 
NGO, which provided further evidence that the spill was likely caused by 
operational failure, Shell never admitted to any wrongdoing, nor did they admit to 
the fact that the spill was actually caused by their own operational failure.340 
However, as a concession, Shell did offer the community USD 100,000 as a 
“development package”, which they ultimately accepted.341 
 
Amnesty International found that beyond the imbalance of power at the actual site 
visit, oil companies have been successful at manipulating the narrative of oil spill 
visits ex post facto. Amnesty argued that: 
the forms that Shell puts on its website are not the forms that are 
completed and signed in the field. Shell was initially reluctant to 
admit this was the case; however, the forms are extremely neat and 
include multiple calculations and drawings that would be very 
difficult to carry out in field conditions in the Niger Delta. After 
pressing Shell Nigeria’s Managing Director, Mr. Mutiu Sunmonu, on 
this issue, he confirmed that there are two forms, and stated that “the 
most important data is filled in in the field.” The reason for two forms 
is to ensure the one put on the website is legible. Amnesty 
International asked Shell if we could see the JIV forms that 
communities sign in the field but Shell refuses to share these 
forms.342 
 
Many have taken this flawed system as a starting point for reform.343 However, 
these critics have failed to identify a fundamental flaw in this model: the fact that 
the communities themselves are expected to fight for their own rights to 
independent assessment of oil spills. While I do not dispute that it is necessary for 
all interested parties to visit the oil spill site to assess the extent and cause of 
damage, I do dispute the fact that actors without any formal training in oil spills 
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Response in Nigeria” and Rim-Rukeh, “Oil Spill Management in Nigeria.” All provide suggestions 




or oil pipeline engineering should be involved in the process. At present, instead of 
engaging a team of independent professionals to carry out this task, JIVs bring 
together a range of actors who are not necessarily qualified to assess oil spills, and 
who have little incentive to agree with each other on the outcome of an 
investigation. 
 
4.1.1.4 JIVs and the Courts 
 
In this theoretically participatory process, oil companies, often with NNPC as the 
joint venture partner, are responsible for alerting authorities to an oil spill. These 
companies determine the method for assessing the cause and scope of spill, fill out 
the paperwork at the site, and subsequently publish the findings.344 This level of 
control over the process has a very real impact for A2EJ, particularly when a 
dispute arises.345 
 
In both Oguru & Efanga v. RDS and SPDC, and Barizaa Manson Tete Dooh 
v. RDS & SPDC, two cases heard in the Dutch Courts in 2011, communities 
refused to sign the JIV report, disagreeing with the oil companies’ assertions that 
the cause of oil spills was sabotage. Despite the communities’ refusal to sign, the 
JIV report was still submitted in court as evidence of a legitimate account of the 
spill, and was subsequently used by the judge to rule against the communities.346 
 
As a mechanism for sector governance, JIVs should in theory act as a gateway to 
environmental justice, but extensive research by oil sector experts and watchdog 
groups have persuasively argued that the status quo does not provide a meaningful 
mechanism for oversight, essentially allowing oil companies to determine their 
own liability with no recourse for the affected communities.   
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This chapter has discussed why Nigeria’s current governance regime is leading to 
perverse outcomes for A2EJ. This was evidenced by comparing Norwegian 
institutional design to that of Nigeria. Both countries discovered oil around the 
same time, and have employed similar institutional arrangements to govern the 
sector. However, due to the historical institutional environment and the 
capabilities of the civil service, the countries’ outcomes have been starkly different. 
These differences were highlighted by the degree to which Nigerian regulators are 
constrained due to government’s commercial participation, and the way revenues 
flow from oil ventures into state coffers. The difference in the countries’ approaches 
to governance were also highlighted in oil spill response regimes; in Norway, the 
government has invested heavily in being able to act as a credible leader of oil spill 
response efforts, while in Nigeria this effort has been outsourced to the private 
sector, ultimately disenfranchising regulators. 
 
This Chapter also showed how obstacles to environmental justice are built into the 
very governance structures of the sector, and are exacerbated by the financial 
resources available to sector actors. The JIV is an important example of how a 
process purportedly designed to enfranchise communities, actually marginalises 
them. From the moment an oil spill takes place through to when a judge makes a 
decision on clean-up and compensation based on JIV report findings, oil companies 
have the advantage in shaping the oil spill liability narrative.  
 
In reviewing this flawed oil spill response mechanism, this Chapter also called into 
question the validity of using a participatory process to assess the cause and scale 
of oil spills altogether. While other critiques have highlighted areas for 
improvement – such as giving more financial resources to regulators to lead JIVs, 
or training participants to be more educated on the issues raised – I argued that 
regardless of improvements, the process will always be inherently flawed. All 
actors involved have incentives to disagree with each other and very few reasons 
to draw conclusions based on fact. From an A2EJ perspective, this tool as currently 
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The previous Chapter outlined the way in which the oil sector in Nigeria is 
currently governed. It detailed a range of challenges for A2EJ within that 
governance regime, particularly the imbalance in power and financial resources of 
key actors, and the inadequacy of JIVs for providing A2EJ for victims of oil 
pollution. This Chapter will review the major pieces of legislation that have shaped 
the current status quo in sector governance. In this Chapter, I analyse key features 
of legislation and any challenges they present for providing gateways to 
environmental justice. The Chapter takes a historical approach, emphasising that 
when a law is developed can be as important as what it says.347 This framing 
presents the legislation chronologically, in order to appreciate how the historical 
context has shaped these different pieces of legislation.  
 
The Chapter will also incorporate survey respondents’ perceptions of many of the 
statutes and their efficacy, both in terms of fulfilling their stated purpose and for 
providing mechanisms for redress.348 By combining the doctrinal, historical, and 
socio-legal approaches to interrogating the body of legislation I am able to add 
nuance to recent research in this field.349 This combined approach probes the 
efficacy of these laws in practice rather than simply the quality of the drafting. In 
undertaking this approach, I acknowledge that not all laws will have the same 
                                               
347 Anderson sees colonial institutions as a key determinant of how power was exercised by 
independent states immediately following independence. Colonial leaders left behind 
constitutions that did not at all match the kind of centralised leadership that citizens had 
experienced under colonial rule, thus creating a situation where leaders following independence 
returned to power structures they recognised. In the case of Nigeria, that meant setting aside the 
constitution and focusing on centralising power and limiting individual rights.  See Michael R. 
Anderson, “Access to justice and legal process: making legal institutions responsive to poor people 
in LDCs,” IDS Working Paper 178 (February 2003): i-30; 12. 
https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp178.pdf (accessed August 1, 2017).   
348 While some discussion around the survey methodology will take place within this Chapter, see 
Chapter 3 on Methodology for an extensive discussion of the Survey. 
349 Frynas does this to great effect. However, he was not able to benefit from a historical baseline 
and so can only make limited assertions about change over time.  
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level of impact on A2EJ. Thus, some pieces of legislation require a more in-depth 
analysis than others in order to remain focused on the topic of legislation’s role as 
a tool for A2EJ in the Nigerian oil sector. 
 
First, the Chapter will provide an overview on law-making procedures in Nigeria. 
Then Section 5.2 will outline all of the laws included in this overview and will 
provide some overarching historical context. The subsequent sections (5.3-5.13) 
will be dedicated to the different pieces of legislation. Within each legislation 
section, key provisions of the law will be described, the historical context provided, 
and where available, survey findings will be analysed. I will conclude by 
commenting on what this collective body of legislation means for A2EJ in Nigeria’s 
oil sector. My analysis of these laws is not meant to be exhaustive, rather the 
purpose here is to focus on provisions that may enable or inhibit A2EJ in the 
Nigerian oil industry. 
 
5.1 A Brief Review of Law-Making in Nigeria 
 
This section will review the way in which law is made in Nigeria. First, it considers 
how law was developed and enacted before the Fourth Republic. It does so in order 
to appreciate that a majority of Nigeria’s most influential legal instruments for the 
oil sector, including the Constitution, were drafted and enacted by undemocratic 
regimes. Then, the section focuses on law-making in the Fourth Republic, 
primarily based on what is laid out in the Constitution of 1999.  
 
5.1.1 Law-Making in Nigeria Before 1999 
 
Many of Nigeria’s laws currently in force were drafted and enacted under military 
rule in the form of decrees and later adopted by the 1999 Constitution. These laws 
“are treated by the Constitution as existing laws and deemed to have been made 
by the appropriate legislative body with competence to do so under the 1999 
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Nigerian Constitution.”350 Such an approach provides a degree of continuity and 
certainty for private citizens, companies and foreign investors. However, this 
wholesale adoption of laws from the country’s military past presents a 
fundamental challenge to modern constitutionalism. A democracy cannot adopt 
military era laws without allowing for the remnants of military dictatorship under 
which those laws were drafted to seep into modern implementation.  
 
Law-making under military rule in Nigeria was guided by Decree No. 1 of 1966.351 
This Decree outlined how law-making occurs under a military regime: primarily 
through a simple process, which requires no consultative or representative 
deliberation. The Decree empowers the Federal Military Government and 
Regional Military Government to make laws. To enact a law, Section 4(1) 
stipulates simply that decrees should be signed by the head of the Government. 
Once decrees have been signed, they are in force, and the government can choose 
to advertise them wherever they deem appropriate. In this way, decrees have been 
drafted with little accountability or redress for citizens and yet have severe 
consequences. Section 6 of the 1966 Decree states that: “No question as to the 
validity of this or any other Decree or of any Edict shall be entertained by any 
court of law in Nigeria.”352 
 
Key laws relevant to this research were initially formulated under these conditions 
as decrees, including the Oil Pipelines Act353, the Petroleum Act354, and the Land 
                                               
350 See “Guide to Nigerian Legal Information,” Hauser Global Law School Program, 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Nigeria1.html (accessed August 10, 2017). 
351 Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 1 of 1966. 
352 Constitution (Basic Provision) Decree No. 32 of 1975 and Decree No. 1 of 1983 built on this 
process by further consolidating the power of the head of the military government to legislate. 
First, this was done by requiring Governors to seek approval before legislating on the state level. 
Ultimately, this was done by prohibiting them to do so altogether. Carl Levan covers the 
historical structure of Nigerian policymaking in Dictators and Democracy in 
African Development: The Political Economy of Good Governance in Nigeria (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
353 Then, Decree No. 31 of 1956, now Oil Pipelines Act 1956 (Cap 07 Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria 2004). 




Use Act.355 As shown in subsequent sections, these laws were drafted when Nigeria 
was in its infancy as a sovereign country. During this time, economic development 
was prioritised by policymakers at the cost of anything else.356 To wholesale adopt 
laws made under that context, lawmakers at the dawn of the Fourth Republic were 
de facto choosing to adopt the same priorities as their military predecessors. This 
decision was to be to the detriment of any later attempts to improve A2EJ for 
residents of the Niger Delta through new legislation. 
 
5.1.2 Law-Making in the Fourth Republic 
 
Nigeria’s current government structure is comprised of three branches of 
government that provide checks and balances.357 In this system, law-making 
happens in the legislature.358 Enforcement of those laws happens via the executive, 
and review of those laws takes place in the judiciary. The law-making procedure 
is of particular relevance to this research, as all post-1999 legislation relating to 
the oil and gas sector must undergo this process. Section 39 in the Part I Schedule 
II of the Constitution states that “Mines, minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, 
geological surveys, and natural gas,” be legislated exclusively by the federal 
legislature.359 
 
The Nigerian federal legislature – the National Assembly – is bicameral with a 
House and a Senate.360 The Senate contains three members from each state and 
one from Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory.361 The House is representative of 
the Nigerian population and currently has 360 members.362 Section 58 of the 
                                               
355 Then, Decree No. 6 of 1978, now Land Use Act 1978 (Cap L4 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
2004). 
356 Thurber, Emelife, and Heller, “NNPC and Nigeria’s Oil Patronage Ecosystem,” 9-13. 
357 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 
358 For a comparative account of legislatures see Peter Ademu Anyebe, “Rules and Procedures 
Governing Legislative Process in Nigeria,” Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization 48 (2016): 
71-83. 
359 S.39, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Second Schedule]. 
360 S.47, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap. V]. 
361 S.48, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap. V]. 
362 “National Assembly | Federal Republic of Nigeria.” http://www.nassnig.org/page/about-the-
house (accessed August 3, 2017). 
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Constitution gives the National Assembly’s powers to make laws. Bills can 
originate in either house of the National Assembly, and once passed in the house 
in which it was proposed, move to the other house for approval. After being passed 
in both houses, a bill goes to the President for approval. Should the President not 
approve the bill, it can still be passed with two thirds majority vote in both houses 
of the Assembly.363 While the process is more democratic than legislating by 
decree, it also takes much longer to accomplish reform in such a setting; for 
example, the Petroleum Industry Bill, a large sector governance reform bill, has 
been stalled for more than decade due to the politics involved in consensus 
building.364 
 
5.2 Body of Laws for Analysis 
 
The historical context of law-making is an important lens for analysing 
legislation’s role in A2EJ for residents of the Niger Delta. This section will outline 
which laws have been selected for analysis and discuss how that analysis will be 
approached. 
 
5.2.1 Statute Selection 
 
Statutes were selected for analysis after a review of the sector’s statutory 
framework.365 Frynas’ survey included the review of five pieces of key legislation: 
the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) Act, the 
Land Use Act, the Petroleum Act, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency 
Act, and the Associated Gas Re-injection (AGRA) Act. Two of the laws Frynas 
analysed in 1998 (the OMPADEC Act and the FEPA Act) have since been repealed 
                                               
363 S.58, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, [Cap. V]. For more on legislative 
procedures, see “Federal Republic of Nigeria National Assembly,” 
http://www.nassnig.org/page/the-legislative-process (accessed August 10, 2017).  
364 Part of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) has been passed by the Senate but is stalled in the 
House (as of September 2017). See PM News. “NASS tasked on passage of other segments of 
PIGB before December.” July 26, 2017, https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2017/07/26/nass-tasked-
passage-segments-pigb/ (August 10, 2017). 
365 The review involved drawing on Frynas’ analysis, a further scan of secondary literature, and 
discussions with practitioners in the field. 
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and replaced with new legislation, which I review instead. I expand Frynas’ 
analysis to include eleven laws in total, including the Nigerian Constitution, which 
did not yet exist when he conducted his research.366  
 
Table 2, below, chronologically lists the legislation chosen for analysis and 
highlights the era and the head of state in power when it was passed. As is shown, 
the Fourth Republic ushered in legislation meant to improve oil spill clean-up and 
Niger Delta development. However, a majority of the sector’s governing legislation 




For each piece of legislation analysed, my research interrogates what the law does 
and does not say with respect to redress for victims of environmental harms. I also 
consider: 
 the social, economic, and political context of the time,  
 whose interests the law serves,  
 whether legal practitioners think it does what it is meant to do effectively, 
and  
 whether they think it provides mechanisms for redress.  
 
I developed these questions in order to understand, beyond a doctrinal 
interpretation, what legislation is able or unable to do for those seeking 
environmental justice.367 In most cases, this means that I interrogate whether or 
not the law provides remedy for environmental harms. However, for some 
legislation, A2EJ is conceived in a broader sense, from preventing environmental 
harms in the first place (like the NOSDRA Act and the EIA Act) to ensuring that 
                                               
366 Initially, the research also included the Hydrocarbons Oil Refineries Act and the National 
Investment Promotion Commission Act, but found it more effective to focus on core pieces of 
legislation rather than those at the periphery without a clear role to play in providing prevention 
or redress for environmental damage caused by industry activity. 
367 In 1964, Chambliss already noted the importance of understanding the genesis and use of 
legislation as shaped by its social context. See William J. Chambliss, “A Sociological Analysis of 
the Law of Vagrancy.” Social Problems 12, no. 1 (1964): 67–77.  
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residents of oil-producing regions benefit proportionately to the burden laid upon 
them by oil exploitation (such as the NDDC Act). 
Table 2: Selected legislation for analysis 
Law Year Era 
Oil Pipelines Act 1956 British Rule 
Oil in Navigable Waters 
Act 
1968 Military – Gowon 
Petroleum Act 1969 Military – Gowon 
AGRA 1978 Military – 
Obasanjo 
Land Use Act 1978 Military- Obasanjo 
Harmful Waste Act 1988 Military- 
Babangida 
EIA Act 1992 Military- 
Babangida 
Constitution 1999 Military - 
Abubakar 
The Fourth Republic 1999  
NDDC Act 2000 Fourth Republic – 
Obasanjo 
NOSDRA Act 2006 Fourth Republic - 
Obasanjo  
  NESREA Act 2007 Fourth Republic –
Obasanjo 
 
To place legislation in its historical context, the Chapter draws on secondary 
literature, doctrinal analysis, news articles, key informant interviews, and survey 
findings. Survey respondents were asked whether a) the legislation achieves its 
stated aims and b) provides sufficient mechanisms for redress.368 Asking if the 
                                               
368 This was a departure from Frynas’ approach, which simply asked to what extent “legislation 
has been effectively enforced.” Despite the modification in wording, it is reasonable to assume 
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laws achieve their stated aims allows us to understand whether the respondents 
feel the law is an effective legal instrument. Enquiring if the law provides 
sufficient mechanisms for redress allows us to better comprehend the laws’ ability 
to provide a gateway to environmental justice.369  
 
This section has framed the eleven laws that will be analysed in the remainder of 
the Chapter by presenting the paradox that lies at the heart of Nigerian 
legislation. This paradox is found in the fact that Nigeria’s democratic law is 
expected to provide better A2EJ, but it is limited in its ability to do so because it 
is circumscribed by military era law that remains in force even in Nigeria’s 
current, democratic era.  
 
5.3 The Oil Pipelines Act 1956 
 
Nigeria is home to thousands of kilometres of oil pipelines.370 These pipelines span 
the country and are concentrated in the Niger Delta region, running through 
extensive tracts of land that cut through nearby communities living in the area.371 
In some places, these pipelines sit above ground, susceptible to the elements and 
to human interference. The pipelines are often the first site of environmental 
harms; when oil spills, it most often comes from an oil pipeline.372 The pipelines 
have also long been a staging ground for the big debates in Nigeria’s oil sector 
governance; they are the sites around which stories of activism, vandalism, and 
                                               
that “effectively enforced” and “achieving stated aims” can be considered comparable. Frynas, Oil 
in Nigeria, 244. 
369 Further, splitting the questions also allows the respondents to answer the first question based 
on their implicit biases (e.g. they may consider a law to be effective if it enables industry activity, 
even if at the cost of oil communities).   
370  The Bodo Community and Ors. v. SPDC [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC): 3. and “The World 
Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2117.html (accessed August 10, 2017). 
371 See “Nigeria Gas and Oil Map,” http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/nigeria_gas_1979.jpg 
Accessed via “Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection,” University of Texas Libraries, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/nigeria.html (accessed August 10, 2017). 
372 This is true of cases analysed for this dissertation. A majority of oil spill cases originated with 
an oil pipeline, according to the case law dataset used in Chapter 6. 
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company neglect are told.373 This section will review the Oil Pipelines Act which 
governs the construction and maintenance of oil pipelines. 
 
The Oil Pipelines Act (OPA) precedes Nigerian independence, having been brought 
into force in October 1956 under British Rule. In January 1956, Shell had 
discovered the first commercially viable quantities of oil in colonial Nigeria, a time 
when the country’s economy was not yet dependent on oil exports.374 The OPA was 
developed to regulate the process of granting licenses for the installation and 
maintenance of oil pipelines. The OPA is a key piece of legislation in the body of 
laws that address oil pollution and details how victims of environmental harms 
caused by industry activity might seek redress. Unlike other colonial era 
legislation governing the sector (such as the Mineral Ordinance discussed in 
section 5.5), the OPA was formally incorporated into Nigeria’s regulatory 
framework after independence.375 
 
There are thirty four sections in the OPA, primarily concerned with the process of 
licensing the installation of oil pipelines.376 Of those sections, sixteen include 
provisions for rights of individuals living near pipelines, particularly land-
owners.377 In the OPA, oil company operators must seek permission and provide a 
minimum of fourteen days’ notice before an intended visit to land or buildings that 
belong to, or are occupied by, private individuals.378 The same clause also provides 
                                               
373 For example, see Kenneth Omeje, “The state, conflict & evolving politics in the Niger Delta, 
Nigeria,” Review of African Political Economy 31, no. 101 (2004): 425-440; “Nigeria's Criminal 
Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen Oil,” Chatham House, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/194254 (accessed August 10, 2017) and 
Ken Wiwa, “Finally, it seems as if Ken Saro-Wiwa, my father, my not have died in vain,” The 
Guardian, Nov 10, 2015,  https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/10/ken-saro-
wiwa-father-nigeria-ogoniland-oil-pollution (August 10, 2017).  
374 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 9. 
375 S.315(1), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, [Cap VIII]. 
376 Excluding definitions and titles. 
377 This is a high number of protective provisions for those negatively affected by sector activity, 
particularly in a piece of legislation that is meant to serve a primarily commercial objective. This 
assertion is based on a rough comparison of number of provisions for redress in other legislation 
analysed in this Chapter.  
378 S.6(1), Oil Pipelines Act 1956 (Cap 07 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004).  
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for compensation for any damaged caused to land, property, or cash crops by oil 
pipelines. 379 
 
The OPA lays out a clear process for advertising proposed pipeline routes. It also 
details how objections to these pipeline routes can be filed.380 Advertising the 
pipeline routes must be done in not just the State Gazette, but also in local 
newspapers and other media that are likely to target individuals in the 
communities that will ultimately be affected by pipeline construction.  The OPA 
states that “the Minister may specify such numbers of copies of such notice as the 
minister may require for distribution to the occupiers or owners of land in the areas 
so affected who might not otherwise become aware of such notice.”381 In contrast, 
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Act from 1992 provides that the 
public will be given the opportunity to comment on assessments filed with the 
Ministry of Environment, but offers no clarification on how the Ministry will 
inform the public that the studies have been completed and are available for 
review.382 The process for filing objections to oil pipeline development under the 
Oil Pipelines Act includes the ability to file written and verbal objections, making 
the process potentially more accessible to persons who are illiterate.383 
 
5.3.1 Compensation Under the OPA 
 
The OPA also includes comprehensive guidelines for paying compensation to 
victims of oil spills.384 The compensation scheme that is set out pertains not only 
to landowners, but also to those who have an “interest in land”. For individuals to 
receive compensation, they need to be: 
                                               
379 S.6, Oil Pipelines Act 1956. 
380 S.8, Oil Pipelines Act 1956. 
381 S.8(2)(d), Oil Pipelines Act 1956. 
382 Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992 S.7 (CAP. E12 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
2004). 
383 S.9(1), Oil Pipelines Act 1956. Verbal complaints may theoretically ensure that filing 
objections is easier for the illiterate, however the process of filing a verbal objection could also be 
susceptible to intimidation, because verbal complaints must be filed in person. 
384 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 95. The Petroleum Act, discussed in the following section, lays out a 
compensation framework in its regulations. 
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 “injuriously affected by the exercise of the rights conferred by the licence,” 
 “suffering damage by reason of any neglect on the part of the holder or his 
agents, servants or workmen to protect, maintain or repair any work 
structure or thing executed under the licence,” and 
 “suffering damage (other than on account of his own default or on account 
of the malicious act of a third person) as a consequence of any breakage of 
or leakage from the pipeline or an ancillary installation, for any such 
damage not otherwise made good.”385  
 
These rights to compensation provide a rather broad scope of individuals who may 
seek compensation from a company operating oil pipelines. The compensation 
scheme provided by the OPA addresses many legal issues that have since appeared 
in tort cases relating to oil pollution disputes, such as liberalising interpretations 
of locus standi to include suing in a representative capacity. For example, in 
Section 21, the OPA states that: 
 
Where the interests injuriously affected are those of a local 
community, the court may order the compensation to be paid to any 
chief, headman or member of that community on behalf of such 
community or that it be paid in accordance with a scheme of 
distribution approved by the court or that it be paid into a fund to be 
administered by a person approved by the court on trust for 
application to the general, social or educational benefit and 
advancement of that community or any section thereof.386 
 
In the event of a dispute, the OPA stipulates that grievances should be dealt with 
by the Magistrate courts and State High Courts.387  
 
                                               
385 S.5, Oil Pipelines Act 1956. 
386 S.21, Oil Pipelines Act 1956. 
387 This provision would later come into conflict with the 1999 Constitutional provision that all 
cases related to oil and gas must be heard by Federal courts, see Section 5.10.  
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The Act also makes clear that even if a claimant has been paid by an oil company 
in an out-of-court settlement, they are still able to take the oil company to court 
for further compensation. When hearing such disputes, courts are instructed to: 
 
award such compensation as it considers just in respect of any 
damage done to any buildings, lion crops or profitable trees by the 
holder of the permit in the exercise of his rights thereunder and in 
addition may award such sum in respect of disturbance (if any) as it 
may consider just.388  
 
 
According to the OPA, compensation is to be calculated by taking the difference of 
the value of the land or other damaged property before the incident and the value 
after the incident.389 Frynas notes that the compensation rates provided for by the 
government regime are significantly lower than what the industry itself deems as 
reasonable compensation for damages to private property.390  
 
The legislation also introduces a provision that protects oil companies from 
liability in the event of “a malicious act of a third person.”391 Provisions that 
remove corporate liability for third party vandalism can have an outsized negative 
effect on oil spill redress. This is due to the fact that it is often difficult to determine 
the cause of pipeline spills and because oil companies have historically controlled 
the process of determining the cause of spills, as shown in Chapter 4.392 
 
As Frynas’ analysis of compensation rates shows, gauging the OPA’s ability to 
provide sufficient mechanisms for redress requires not simply  an understanding 
of the legislation, but also the broader legal context. This is made evident when 
                                               
388 S.20, Oil Pipelines Act 1956. 
389 S.20(3), Oil Pipelines Act 1956. 
390 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 96. See also S.32, Oil Pipelines Act 1956. The Act, in its final clause, 
sets out clearly that there will be criminal consequences for bodies corporate and their employees, 
making both company and individual liable for wrong doing under the Act. This type of clause is 
not seen in other sector legislation and provides an indication that the legislation attempts to 
leave few with immunity in the event of misconduct. 
391 S.5(c), Oil Pipelines Act 1956. 
392 See Chapter 4, Section 4.4. 
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comparing two interpretations of the quality of the OPA for Nigerians seeking 
redress. Below, I first discuss a British judge’s interpretation of the OPA, to 
illustrate how analysis can be skewed without context, and then will contrast that 
view with survey findings from 27 Nigerian lawyers. 
 
In a preliminary judgment of the Bodo Community v. SPDC extra-territorial 
case heard in the UK in 2014, Judge Akenhead at the Technology and Construction 
Court in London heavily relied on the OPA in his initial reasoning. In the case, a 
Niger Delta community sued Shell in UK Courts for damages following two large 
oil spills that ruined the livelihoods of community members, who are primarily 
farmers and fishermen.393 The British judge weighed the statute alongside 
Nigerian tort case law to determine the best mechanism for determining liability 
and the amount of any compensation to be paid.394 In his reading of the OPA, Judge 
Akenhead argued that the legislation provides 
 
a broad largely causation based compensation scheme, specific 
procedures relating to compensation such as were not available 
elsewhere at the time and procedures at the end of the licence…the 
oil business was undoubtedly anticipated in 1956 to be of massive 
potential strategic and commercial importance to the country and it 
is reasonable to assume that the legislature felt that it needed to get 
effective procedures and mechanisms into place even before the oil 
business had really been fully proved to be the enormous business it 
became.395  
 
Judge Akenhead felt so strongly that the OPA was sufficient to provide means for 
redress for victims of oil pollution that he claimed that tort law should not be used 
in Nigeria in compensation cases relating to oil spills altogether. He deemed the 
OPA to be more “generous” to victims than common law remedies.396 The Judge’s 
                                               
393 John Vidal, “Shell announces £55m payout for Nigeria oil spills,” The Guardian, Jan 7, 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jan/07/shell-announces-55m-payout-for-nigeria-
oil-spills (accessed August 10, 2017).  
394 The Bodo Community and Ors. v. SPDC [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC) 28,29. 
395 Ibid. 
396 Ibid., (64). 
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analysis shows that, if reading the law out of context, the OPA may be applied to 
give reasonable gateways to environmental justice.   
 
However, what is missing from the analysis of a foreign expert is an appreciation 
for how the broader context shapes legal practice within Nigeria. The OPA may 
technically be a prevailing and comprehensive framework for determining 
compensation, but its ambiguity on third party vandalism and a broader cultural 
preference toward tort litigation, in part because compensation rates can actually 
be higher in tort, means the legislation does not have the impact anticipated by 
Justice Akenhead.397  
 
Nigerian survey respondents were less optimistic about the legislation’s 
effectiveness in practice. This is likely due to their familiarity with Nigerian legal 
culture and the broader political challenges of the oil sector. When surveyed in 
2014, only 30% of respondents felt the piece of legislation fully, or somewhat, 
achieves its stated aims.398 Importantly, only 18% of respondents believe that it 
provides sufficient or partial mechanisms for redress. This means that despite 
progressive provisions for compensation, the OPA’s other mechanisms that curb 
access to justice weighed more heavily on the Nigerian respondents’ assessment of 
the law’s effectiveness and reach. 
 
OPA Summary 
The Oil Pipelines Act is one of the most progressive pieces of legislation in terms 
of making provisions for gateways to environmental justice for victims of oil 
pollution. It is also the oldest of Nigeria’s oil sector laws, pre-dating the country’s 
independence. This presents a challenge to the notion that Nigerian 
environmental law is actually improving governance of the oil sector over time 
with the introduction of new frameworks for sector governance in the democratic 
era. Further, while one Judge in the UK interpreted the OPA as a sufficient 
                                               
397 See Chapter 6, Section 6.5.1 for more on the Nigerian preference for tort litigation. 
398 Frynas did not include the OPA in his survey. 
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mechanism for redress, a majority of Nigerian lawyers who responded to my 
survey believed the law did not provide sufficient pathways to redress for victims 
of oil pollution. This law, in particular, highlights the importance of coupling a 
doctrinal approach with a socio-legal approach. Divorced of its context and history, 
the OPA may be seen as a legitimate tool for A2EJ. However, considering the law 
in its broader context quickly reveals that the progressive nature of drafted 
provisions are functionally irrelevant if unused by litigants and the courts. 
 
5.4 The Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968 
 
The Oil in Navigable Waters Act (ONWA), 1968, was brought into force in order to 
implement the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea 
by Oil.399 The ONWA legislates against the dumping of hydrocarbon products – 
crude oil, fuel, lubricating oil, diesel, etc. – into waterways. The International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil was agreed to in 
London in 1954, before Nigerian independence. Nigeria made the international 
convention domestic law eight years after independence through ONWA. At the 
time of signing, most of Nigeria’s oil operations were onshore and largely 
dominated by Shell.400 ONWA is technical in nature, focusing primarily on the 
functions of oil barges and the way in which the activities of oil barges should be 
performed in order to prevent oil pollution.  
 
ONWA provides a framework for preventing pollution in Nigerian territorial 
waters, but it also provides numerous defences that make it hard to conceive how 
any suit brought against a polluter under ONWA would be successful. Defences 
include accidental dumping caused by vessel damage and subsequent leakage, as 
well dumping in order to protect the vessel or on-board cargo.  
 
                                               
399 Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968 (Cap 06 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004); Orji, “An 
appraisal of the legal frameworks,” 328. 
400 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 12. 
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The ONWA Act also gives the Minister sweeping discretion for exemptions.401 
Furthermore, the Act exempts Government vessels from being subject to the 
Convention’s stipulations.402 These provisions grant the government the license to 
decide, potentially arbitrarily, to whom this law applies and to whom it does not. 
This level of discretion also opens up opportunities for abusive, corrupt practices 
and preferential treatment based on what the government perceives to be optimal 
for the economy.403 
 
Should a party be found to be in breach of the Act, criminal proceedings against 
the party can only be taken forward “by or with the Attorney General.”404 This 
means that without the Attorney General’s action, individual citizens are not able 
to seek recourse against polluters through ONWA.405 Should the Attorney General 
decide to take the case forward and a fine is levied upon the polluter, it is not 
specified that the fine would be remitted to parties who were adversely affected by 
the oil spill, or used to clean up the oil spill.406  
 
Vesting this responsibility to sue in the Attorney General is problematic if the 
interests of the State – the Attorney General’s employer – differ from the interests 
of communities negatively affected by oil pollution. The potential failings of this 
approach are put in stark relief when considering that ONWA was signed into 
force amidst the Biafran War, a civil war fought between the central government 
and part of the Niger Delta, partially over control of oil production.407 
 
                                               
401 S.15, Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968. 
402 S.16, Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968. 
403 In 2015, Flag Officer Commanding, Central Naval Command, Rear Admiral Apochi Suleiman 
appealed to Navy personnel to take their jobs seriously and avoid aiding and abetting corrupt 
practices with respect to large scale oil theft. See “Oil theft: Navy boss warns commanders 
against corruption,” Sweet Crude Reports, http://sweetcrudereports.com/2015/09/16/oil-theft-navy-
boss-warns-commanders-against-corruption/ (accessed September 25, 2015).  
404 S.12, Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968.  
405 Orji, “An appraisal of the legal frameworks,” 329.  
406 S.12, Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968. 
407 Cyril Obi, “Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-related 
Conflict,” Africa Development XXXIV, no. 2 (2009): 103–128; 115.  
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In my 2014 survey, many respondents echo concerns about the legislation’s utility. 
A large majority of respondents, approximately 75%, view the Act as only 
minimally achieving, or not achieving its aims at all. In addition to this, 
respondents view the Act’s mechanisms for redress as similarly disappointing; only 
15% of respondents state that ONWA provides sufficient or minimally sufficient 
mechanisms for redress. These results suggest that the law is not seen as a credible 
tool to regulate sector activities. 
 
ONWA Summary 
Those negatively affected by oil spills in waterways are communities and 
individuals who rely on clean water and the fragile ecosystems supported by that 
clean water for their livelihoods, such as fishing and farming. This rarely-cited law 
does little in practice to provide gateways to justice for these groups. It also 
provides little material protection or redress for the natural environment it is 
meant to protect. This law has its roots in an international convention rather than 
in domestic policymaking. This background suggests that without a domestic 
imperative to meaningfully precipitate change, it is unlikely that such a law would 
be successful given prevailing incentives of the political elite to focus on economic 
growth, often at the expense of environmental protection. 
 
5.5 Petroleum Act 1969 
 
The Petroleum Act 1969 is the overarching piece of legislation governing Nigeria’s 
oil sector. It sets up the institutional structure for sector governance, focusing 
heavily on building an enabling environment for the private sector. This Act 
precedes the Constitution in its assertion that all oil in Nigeria is the sole property 
of the Federal Government.408 It is an act that seeks to “provide for the exploration 
of petroleum from the territorial waters and the continental shelf of Nigeria and 
to vest the ownership of, and all onshore and off-shore revenue from petroleum 
                                               
408 S.1, Petroleum Act 1969 (Cap P10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004). 
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resources derivable therefrom, in the Federal Government and for all other 
matters incidental thereto.”409 
 
The Petroleum Act repealed the Mineral Oil Ordinance introduced by the British 
Colonial government.410 While much of the legislation looks similar to its 
predecessor, the Petroleum Act was developed at a very different moment in West 
African history. The law was drafted when newly independent Nigeria was 
operating under the Gowon military regime and struggling to quell the secessionist 
movement in Biafra, and as a consequence, was looking to reinvigorate the 
country’s economy.411 Gowon’s vision for economic growth included indigenising 
key sectors, like oil and gas, which had been primarily dominated by foreign 
interests. 412 This meant that while processes remained similar to the colonial era 
for granting and revoking licenses to operators, the duration of time for such 
licenses was cut almost in half (from 30 or 40 years to 20).413  
 
Gowon’s economic vision also meant that in the trade-off between fast and 
profitable business and responsible sector development, environmental protection 
was not a policy priority. One key informant shared a narrative about the mind-
set around the Petroleum Act at the time of its development. According to this 
informant,  
 
[w]hen it became law, finally, what we now call the Petroleum Act of 
1969…essentially, nobody was thinking environment. Everyone was 
thinking the resource. How do we get it out? How do we make money 
out of it?414  
 
The Act itself is a short piece of legislation, just seven pages long, with more than 
one hundred pages of accompanying regulations. The Petroleum Act stipulates 
                                               
409 Petroleum Act 1969 (Cap P10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004). 
410 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 81.  
411 Fiona C. Beveridge, “Taking control of foreign investment: a case study of indigenisation in 
Nigeria,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 40, no. 2 (1991): 302-333. 
412 Beveridge, “Taking Control of foreign investment,” 307.  
413 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 81.  
414 Interview A1G4, July 18, 2014. 
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that the Minister is given the power to suspend operations “which in his opinion 
are not being conducted in accordance with good oil field practice.415” What “good 
practices” are, however, not explicitly outlined in the primary Act or in its 
Regulations. Beyond the vague reference above, environmental protections are not 
explicitly provided for in the primary legislation governing the sector.  
 
The First Schedule of the Petroleum Act also includes provisions that may make 
companies liable to pay fair and adequate compensation to those who own or lease 
land that has been disturbed by company activity.416 Despite these provisions for 
compensation, Frynas’ research found that levels of compensation under the 
Drilling and Production Regulations do not reflect market rates for goods.417 In 
order to make this case, Frynas showed how an industry group, the Oil Producers 
Trade Section, regularly released guidelines on pricing that surpassed the official 
guidelines.418 These higher rates indicate that oil companies have some incentive 
to pay compensation to communities to avoid conflict. However, Frynas found that 
these company rates were still inadequate compared to actual market rates.419 
Having a compensation framework that even oil companies undermine may have 
weakened the Petroleum Act’s Regulations as a legitimate mechanism for redress. 
 
Further elaborations on environmental protection and compensation for damage 
to individuals’ property in light of industry activity are enshrined in the Petroleum 
Act’s regulations, though lingering questions of enforcement remain. The 
Petroleum Regulations420 state that no petroleum should be released “or allowed 
to escape” into the water surrounding the port or into drains connected to sewers, 
                                               
415 S.8(d), Petroleum Act 1969. 
416 Judge Akenhead in the Technology and Construction Court points out that the Petroleum Act 
calls for ‘fair and adequate’ compensation compared to the OPA provision for “just” compensation, 
but it is not clear which is substantively better for communities. The Bodo Community and 
Ors. v. SPDC [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC) [66]. 
417 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 96.  
418 Ibid. 
419 Ibid. Frynas looked at a World Bank assessment of crop prices and compared this assessment 
to prices outlined by oil companies and the government guidelines. 
420 S.9, Petroleum Regulations 1967. 
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but no further elaboration is given with respect to providing ways of ensuring that 
this is monitored, and no detail is given about punitive and restorative measures 
in the event of misconduct.421  
 
The Petroleum Act’s (Drilling and Production) Regulations, includes provisions 
that outline companies’ responsibilities toward communities. In particular, Section 
17 prevents companies from undertaking activities on land declared to be sacred, 
under cultivation, part of a village, or a public space without permission from the 
Minister. Sections 21 and 23 stipulate that licensees will be liable to pay 
compensation for cutting down productive trees or infringing on fishing rights. 
Finally, Section 25 requires companies to use up-to-date equipment to prevent oil 
pollution, but no other directive is given in the event of an accident except for one 
sentence which states that “where any such pollution has occurred, [the company] 
shall take prompt steps to control, and if possible, end it.”422 
 
While provisions of the Petroleum Act’s (Drilling and Production) Regulations 
afford some protections and mechanisms for relief, they also introduce ambiguity 
on communities’ ability to be their own advocates in the event of disagreements.  
The way in which the Regulations are written suggests that: 423 
 
a) Companies are meant to monitor their own use of local water consumption, so 
as to ensure there is still water for local communities to use;424 
b) Companies with licenses are allowed to enter public and private property so long 
as they have written permission from the Minister (not the communities 
themselves);425 
                                               
421 S.13 and S.67, Petroleum Regulations 1967. S.104 is a catch-all clause that allows for a licence 
to be revoked in the event that a license holder has infringed upon any of the conditions of the 
licence or of the Regulations, but provides no further indication of how accidents caused by 
license holders will be addressed.  
422 S.25, Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969. 
423 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969. 
424 S. 15(1)(c), Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969.  
425 S. 17(1)(b,c), Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969.  
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c) To access private land, companies can pay the land owner fair and adequate 
compensation, as deemed appropriate by the Minister, but it is not explained how 
compensation may be calculated;426 and  
d) In the event of a dispute, the money to be paid to a private individual can be 
transferred directly to a State authority without clear indication of what happens 
to aggrieved landowners.427 
 
The Petroleum Act was assessed both in Frynas’ 1998 survey and my own. This 
provides a unique opportunity to ask what has changed in legal practitioners’ 
views since 1998. Both surveys show that legal practitioners (60% in 1998 and 50% 
in 2014) believe this law somewhat achieves its stated aims.428 Frynas 
hypothesised that the Petroleum Act was favourably reviewed because of its focus 
on commercial issues of interest to the private sector, rather than other pieces of 
legislation that may be more empowering for communities in oil producing areas, 
such as the Associated Gas-Reinjection Act or the Federal Environmental 
Protection Agency Act.429 This may remain the case.430 As will be shown in the 
remainder of this Chapter, laws that provide significant protections for 
communities, or create systems for oil spill clean-up are perceived to be less 
effective by survey respondents than commercially focused legislation. 
 
5.5.1 Petroleum Act summary 
 
For communities living in areas where oil production is taking place, the change 
from being colonial subjects to independent citizens brought little change in terms 
of mechanisms for environmental justice.431 The Petroleum Act does little to 
protect citizens from oil pollution due to the degree to which the act allows 
government to abdicate its regulatory responsibility towards the oil companies. In 
other cases of ministerial discretion to protect the environment, the Petroleum Act 
                                               
426 S. 17(1)(c)(ii), Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969. 
427 S.17(2), Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969. 
428 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 142. “Don’t know” responses excluded.  
429 Ibid. 
430 Ibid., 143. 
431 Ibid., 82. 
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plays a proactive role in curbing communities’ gateways to environmental justice 
by creating vague regulatory provisions that may be susceptible to abuse.432  
 
In contrast to other pieces of industry legislation, the Petroleum Act’s deficiencies 
are well-recognised by activists and lawmakers.433 In response to the Act’s 
inadequacies, there have been attempts to pass versions of a “Petroleum Industry 
Bill” (PIB), an omnibus piece of legislation, for more than 12 years.434 Drafts of the 
PIB have been longer than 200 pages, clearly indicating that much has changed in 
both the sector and in the Government’s mentality toward the oil industry since 
the original legislation was enacted in the late 1960s. 
 
5.6 Land Use Act 1978 
 
The Land Use Act of 1978, then a military decree, introduced a drastic re-
imagining of property rights in Nigeria by nationalising all land under government 
ownership.435 The primary purpose of the Act was to put Nigerian land into the 
trust of Governors presiding over the States. This was done at a time when the 
government was trying to push forward a development agenda that required 
investors having easier, more affordable, access to land.436 This decree subverted 
an array of customary land tenure systems in place across the country and has had 
                                               
432 Ibid. Similar to the OPA, the Petroleum Act has provisions discouraging communities from 
protesting oil company operations with fines and imprisonment (GBP 100 or six months in prison, 
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Industry-Governance-Bill-2017.pdf (accessed September 1, 2017). 
435 Land Use Act 1978 (Cap L4 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004). 
Also see Ehi Oshio, “The Indigenous Land Tenure and Nationalization of Land in Nigeria,” 
Boston College Third World Law Journal 10, no. 1 (1990): 43-62.  
436 Kekong Bisong, Restorative Justice for Niger Delta (Antwerpen: Maklu Publishers, 2009).  
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a lasting effect on communities’ ability to secure land rights as well as fair 
compensation for expropriation of land by government.437  
 
Provisions of the Land Use Act dictate the transfer of land rights to Governors to 
be “held in trust and administered for the use and common benefit of all 
Nigerians.”438 It also establishes that State bodies – Land Use and Allocation 
Committees – are to handle the relocation of displaced persons, disputes, and land 
allocation. Inhabitants of land, in the new system constituted by the Act, are no 
longer owners of their land; rather they have a “right of occupancy.”439  
 
The Act also clearly sets out instances where the Government may revoke a right 
to occupancy. The list of instances is heavily dominated by “overriding public 
interest,” where oil and gas exploitation features prominently.440 Section 29 
includes a provision for compensation for those occupying land that has been 
revoked for oil exploitation. The section stipulates that compensation can be 
payable to:  
 
(a) to the community; or  
(b) to the chief or leader of the community to be disposed of by him for 
the benefit of the community in accordance with the applicable 
customary law; or 
(c) into some fund specified by the Governor for the purpose of being 
utilized or applied for the benefit of the community.441 
 
The right to occupancy conferred on a land holder, either formally in urban settings 
or through customary practice in rural settings, affords the occupier the right to 
use the land and make improvements upon it. This means that so long as an 
individual or community has the right to occupancy, they are entitled to the right 
                                               
437 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 77.  
438 S.1, Land Use Act 1978. 
439 S.5, Land Use Act 1978. Frynas notes (p.79) that despite de jure changes to Nigeria’s land 
tenure regime, many rural communities have continued with traditional customary land 
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of free enjoyment of the land and compensation for any damage that may be caused 
to their improvements upon it through negligence or misconduct of others. The Act 
is less favourable in the event of expropriation, whereby fair compensation is not 
guaranteed, nor is redress easily possible. This means that so long as an individual 
or community retains the right to occupy land, the Land Use Act has not materially 
affected their ability to use the most common torts employed in oil pollution claims 
to seek damages.442  
 
The Act’s change to land ownership affected how oil companies operated in the 
Niger Delta. Before the Land Use Act of 1978, oil companies were required, 
through the Petroleum Act, to formally obtain a license and pay rent to the 
Government, while also working with communities to agree on prices for 
purchasing, either through rent or lease, land from which to launch their 
operations to explore for and extract oil.443 With the promulgation of the Land Use 
Act, the government could more easily seize land deemed to be in the public 
interest without providing adequate compensation.  
 
Despite the powers afforded to land holders in the Oil Pipelines Act (see Section 
5.3), the Land Use Act created a new negotiation dynamic which explicitly 
excluded communities. Companies were to now negotiate with State Governors on 
behalf of their citizens.444 This fundamental change in the way in which oil 
operations were negotiated in oil producing areas fuelled the beginnings of 
regional discontent and early signs that access to environmental justice in the age 
of oil exploitation would not be guaranteed.445 According to Ako, “the Act 
legitimized the appropriation of land in the [Niger Delta].”446  
                                               
442 As will be seen in Chapter 6, Section 6.5, the use of nuisance may be the only tort affected by 
the way in which the Land Use Act is drafted, though even that assertion is not well tested in the 
case law. 
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444 S.12, Land Use Act 1978. 
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When the Land Use Act was first drafted, it was a military decree under the 
Obasanjo administration. At the time, Major General Obasanjo was preparing the 
country for democratic transition to the short-lived Second Republic.447 During this 
period in Nigeria’s history, environmental justice was not yet in the national 
consciousness. Rather, government was still focused on how to economically thrive 
as an independent state.448 Government officials in the early 1970s cited the 
difficulty in acquiring land for development projects as a hindrance to national 
development.449 There were legal mechanisms available to expropriate land, but 
government officials complained that it was too expensive to either expropriate or 
for developers to rent directly, particularly in urban centres.450 In response, a Land 
Use Panel was tasked with investigating the land tenure systems across the 
country and provide recommendations on ways to consolidate the range of regimes 
in place.451  
 
A majority report that came out of the Panel advised government against 
nationalising land. However, a minority endorsed the idea, citing the land tenure 
system used by some states in the north of the country as precedent.452 The 
minority report was chosen and has ever since dictated the way in which land is 
allocated in Nigeria. Ako suggests the decision to use the minority report was 
politically and financially motivated. He argues that “A salient inference that may 
be drawn from the adoption of the minority report to nationalize land tenure as 
practised in northern Nigeria is that it would benefit the major ethnic groups that 
controlled the nation’s political power.”453 Shortly after its dissemination as a 
Decree, the Act was annexed to the 1979 Constitution and subsequently the 1999 
Constitution without consultation.454 
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Frynas’ respondents in the late nineties reported that the Land Use Act was the 
most enforced piece of legislation relating to the oil sector.455 The 2014 survey 
respondents also found the Land Use Act to be effective relative to other 
legislation; 54% stated that the legislation somewhat achieved its stated aims. A 
possible reason for this is that the legislation, similar to the Petroleum Act, had 
been shaped to suit corporate interests, making it in the government and the 
private sector’s interest to see that its provisions are enforced. This explanation is 
given further credence by the fact that a combined 63% of respondents in 2014 
found that the Act was “minimally sufficient” or “insufficient” in providing 
mechanisms for redress, meaning that almost as many respondents think it is 
effective as those that do not think the Act provides mechanisms for redress. 
 
The Land Use Act has had a severe impact on the way in which land tenure is 
secured and expropriation is compensated for in Nigeria. It has removed certainty 
and security from communities that have long held customary land rights in 
situations where community priorities conflict with those of government or large 
oil companies. However, the Land Use Act has not had a dramatic impact on the 
use of environmental torts in the event of pollution or other oil industry related 
harms. In the cases studied in Chapter 6, the Land Use Act was never cited as a 
reason for a tort claim being invalid. This is due to the fact that with rights to 
occupancy, which supplanted previous ownerships structures, have come rights to 
seek damages for improvements upon the land that may have been harmed by oil 
sector activity. In a majority of cases researched, damages sought by communities 
were tied to specific assets on the land, such as crops, fisheries, and/or buildings, 
rather than the land itself. 
 
5.6.1 Land Use Act summary  
 
In Nigeria, the Land Use Act provides certainty to investors, subverting informal 
                                               
455 Thirty four percent stated it was effectively enforced and 50% stated it was partially enforced. 
See Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 142.  
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land tenure regimes. In the process, communities are bypassed entirely.456 The 
Land Use Act raises concerns for communities who have historically inhabited 
areas on or near oil deposits and the security of their historic tenure. Ako has gone 
so far to say that the Act is “antithetical to environmental justice,” particularly for 
those who live in the Niger Delta.457 While the Act has proven detrimental for 
inhabitants of the oil producing region to assert their land rights in some ways, it 
has largely left intact access to remedies available under the law of tort, as is 
shown in the analysis of the case law concerned with damage caused by oil 
pollution: in none of the reported judgments were communities denied the right to 
sue for damages to their assets on the basis of any infirmity in their title to or 
ownership of land. As such, the Land Use Act of 1978 is one of the most significant 
challenges for inhabitants of the Delta seeking justice for expropriation of their 
land for use in oil sector activities and other activities, but it has had little impact 
for victims of oil pollution seeking damages for environmental torts.458  
 
5.7 The Associated Gas-Reinjection Act of 1979 
 
The Associated Gas Re-injection Act of 1979 (AGRA) is the key piece of legislation 
that addresses an oil industry-specific pollution challenge, gas flaring.459 The Act 
is meant to curb the toxic and hazardous practice of gas flaring by setting out a 
framework indicating how associated gas should be used, along with punitive 
measures for oil field operators that do not follow these practices.460 Unlike other 
pieces of legislation governing the sector in Nigeria, the sole purpose of the AGRA 
is to provide some environmental relief from one of the most hazardous practices 
in the sector. 
 
                                               
456See: “The Financial Risks of Insecure Land Tenure,” The Munden Project, 
http://rightsandresources.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/doc_5715.pdf  (accessed July 27, 2017); 
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459 Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979 (Cap A25 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004). 
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When the Act passed in 1979, it included a target – by January 1984, there would 
no more gas flaring in Nigeria. The initial penalty for non-compliance with the 
deadline was the forfeiture of concessions where flaring took place.461 It was not 
long, however, before the Federal Government realised that their extreme 
approach to curbing flaring would fail. Factors contributing to AGRA’s failure may 
have been due to the fact that the measures were so severe that oil companies 
rejected them as illegitimate, or because AGRA allows for generous ministerial 
exemptions for flaring.462 
 
In 1985, with the initial deadline to cease all flaring passed, the Minister of 
Petroleum introduced regulations to make the legislation more effective, such as 
financial penalties for gas flaring past the legislated stop date.463 The focus on 
reforms has, until recently, been on punitive measures, rather than providing 
incentives to change behaviour.464 Because the scale of the sector is so vast, and 
fines are so small in comparison, the gas flaring reduction reform agenda has 
struggled to resonate with the oil industry.465 This is most clearly evidenced by the 
fact that even though flaring fines are considered to be affordable by oil companies, 
the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), has made a decision to stop 
collecting what is owed to them altogether.466 Recently, the head of DPR said that 
AGRA had not achieved much and the regulator was now working on finding new 
ways to incentivise companies to stop flaring, primarily through creating a 
commercially viable domestic market for gas.467 
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While the legislation is admirable in it aspirations to reduce flaring significantly, 
it has failed to do so in practice. Nearly two thirds of Frynas’ respondents found 
AGRA to be a failure, with just 35% believing that the legislation was even 
partially being enforced.468 My 2014 survey found that respondents’ views of AGRA 
were also negative; they were significantly more critical than the respondents of 
15 years ago. In 2014, in line with popular criticism of the legislation today, no 
survey respondents believed that the Act achieves its aims.469 Respondents were 
similarly critical of the legislation’s provision for redress mechanisms, with 56% 
reporting that the law’s redress mechanisms were insufficient.  
 
5.7.1 AGRA Summary 
 
Thirty years after its introduction, AGRA remains a failure, primarily due to 
misaligned incentives. As cited in a 2009 report, no flaring sites have ever been 
closed since the introduction of the AGRA.470 The penalties on flaring companies 
were never high enough to deter the practice. Rather perversely, the legislation 
has put a reasonable price tag on flaring, as fines are much more reasonable than 
the cost of retrofitting old installations with new equipment to use the gas in other 
ways.471 Even in the event of being fined, the Department of Petroleum Resources 
has decided to no longer collect fines altogether in an effort to attract further 
investment to the sector. 472 
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In spite of legislation, some industry experts believe that the attitude toward 
flaring may be changing due to more conducive commercial conditions for 
producing gas for domestic use.473 One key informant, a commercial lawyer 
specialising in Nigeria’s gas sector, told me that he believed that providing 
incentives for the sector and requiring all new operators to have an integrated oil 
and gas field development plan is the most promising way forward to curb flaring, 
rather than having punitive measures in place that are meant to punish oil sector 
actors for misconduct. This informant described this course of action as follows: 
“Of course, we still have a long way to go, but at least now more than ever we have 
a better combination of initiatives to actually address gas flaring beyond just 
mandating that flares go down.”474  
 
5.8 The Harmful Waste Act 1988 
 
The Harmful Waste Act of 1988 is described as “An Act to prohibit the carrying, 
depositing and dumping of harmful waste on any land, territorial waters and 
matters relating thereto.”475 While there could theoretically be applications of the 
law to the oil sector, it was drafted as a direct response to the Koko spill, where an 
Italian company dumped barrels of toxic waste into a port in Nigeria.476  
 
The Koko incident came at a time when European and American standards for 
dumping toxic waste were becoming stricter and more expensive to abide by 
domestically. To save money, Global North companies began brokering deals with 
countries in West Africa to dump toxic waste there.477 The spill in Koko, an area 
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in the Niger Delta, caused public outrage in Nigeria. A foreign company had 
abused its position to purposely pollute and the government of the Babangida 
military regime, initially complicit in the toxic waste dumping, was forced to 
respond.478  
 
The incident resulted in the drafting of Nigeria’s first comprehensive 
environmental policy, as well as the Harmful Waste (Criminal Provisions) Act.479 
While there were significant oil spills occurring in similar areas during the 
timeframe, the Koko waste dumping occurrence provided an unexpected impetus 
to revisit scarce environmental regulation in the country.  
 
The incident’s disconnect to the oil industry was both a blessing and a curse for 
environmental policy moving forward. As a blessing, it forced government to 
formalise their approach to environmental regulation for the first time. They did 
this quickly for two reasons:  a) there was public pressure to respond to the Koko 
spill and b) the Act did not take direct aim at oil companies, a group that generally 
does not shy from voicing opposition to legislation meant to regulate their 
activity.480 However, without the oil industry explicitly named in the legislation, it 
is unclear whether the oil industry ever felt pressure to comply with the Act’s 
provisions. 
 
The drafters of the Act took the Koko incident seriously. The Act clearly states that 
diplomatic immunities would not extend to anyone connected with a harmful waste 
dumping crime.481 The Act also provides for life imprisonment for anyone found to 
be guilty of committing a dumping crime.482 Beyond punishment for individuals, 
the Act emphasises that body corporates, whether by consent or neglect, can also 
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be found guilty of a crime under the Act.483 While the punishment for offenders is 
strict, the law does not provide a framework for compensation to any victims of 
harmful waste dumping, nor does it indicate how harmful waste pollution would 
be cleaned up. 
 
Respondents have not looked favourably on this Act both in terms of effectiveness 
and in terms of providing mechanisms for redress. Only 4% of my survey 
respondents felt that the law achieves its stated aims.484 Sixty three percent found 
that the law provided only minimally sufficient or insufficient mechanisms for 
redress. 
 
5.8.1 Harmful Waste Act summary 
 
The Act is a case study in how government may use the swift enactment of 
legislation as a political tool to quell public outrage, yet there may be little interest 
in enforcing legislation after the fact. Despite its potential to act as mechanism to 
prevent pollution, the Harmful Waste Ac fails to enforce provisions for 
environmental protection or provide gateways to environmental justice.  
 
5.9 Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992 
 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) has been an important tool for 
environmental governance since their first introduction in the United States in the 
late sixties under the US Federal National Environmental Policy Act.485 EIA, in 
all its forms across a wide range of jurisdictions, is meant to ensure that the public 
have an opportunity to comment on planned projects that might impact on the 
environment. It is also meant to ensure that policy-makers have the necessary 
evidence available to make decisions regarding these projects.486 Despite the many 
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forms that EIAs may take, at their core they are a tool “to secure participation, 
encourage information exchange, foster partnerships, and joint responsibility;” 
environmental governance in line with the principles of participation articulated 
in both the Rio Declaration and the Aarhus Convention.487 
 
Despite EIAs’ often clear procedures for gathering evidence, collecting public 
opinion, and making detailed arrangements for environmental mitigation, the 
actual decision-making around proposed new projects is a larger process fraught 
with complexity. According to Holder and McGillivray, examining the use and 
effectiveness of EIAs, often the planning of projects is a process where the social, 
legal, scientific, economic  and political are all vying for pride of place in decision-
makers’ minds.488 In the struggle for prominence, concerns about environmental 
impact itself often loose out to more pressing concerns.489 While environmental 
impact assessment can change decision-makers’ minds regarding a given project, 
EIAs were never intended to derail development or the execution of large projects. 
Rather, its framers intended for the environmental management tool to provide a 
process for awareness-raising and consultation with affected populations, while 
also ensuring full information at the time a decision was taken and sufficient 
mitigation measures were developed before potentially detrimental projects 
commenced.490 
 
In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, Kakonge shows that EIA practice is varied, 
ranging from the complex and transparent (in jurisdictions such as the Seychelles) 
to basic and opaque (such as in Botswana and Angola). In other countries in the 
region, EIA processes are deemed incomplete or reserved for only certain sectors 
                                               
487 Holder and McGillivray, “Taking Stock,” in Taking Stock, 5. 
488 Ibid. 
489 Ibid, 15.  
490 In fact, ‘empirical evidence from the UK in the mid-1990s suggests that ‘EIA was not 
determinative, but gave planners added confidence that their consideration of the proposals was 
sufficiently well informed.’Carys Jones et al, “Environmental Assessment: Dominant or 
Dormant?” in Taking Stock, 31.  
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(such as Nigeria, Tanzania, and Mali).491 Kakonge’s review paints a region with 
poor environmental management practices, which in many cases start at the EIA 
stage of project development. In addition to the challenges presented by Holder, 
McGillvary and others, Kakonge identifies a range of Sub Saharan Africa-specific 
obstacles to EIA’s being used as a tool for public participation and for decision-
making by government officials. Specifically, he notes that governments’ prior 
relationships with companies seeking project approval, poor capacity to scrutinise 
EIAs prepared by those companies, and poor consultation practices are all 
contributing factors to poor use and enforcement of EIA findings in the region.492 
 
Nigeria’s EIA Act was introduced in the early 1990s and legislates that all projects 
that will likely have a significant impact on the environment must first conduct an 
environmental impact assessment and have their project approved.493 According 
to the Act, these assessments are meant to provide evidence on the potential 
impacts of proposed activities before a decision is made by government 
authorities.494  
 
This Act should be particularly important for the oil sector in Nigeria, where 
activity takes place in close proximity to communities that may be directly affected 
by the nature of a given project.495 The remainder of this section will analyse the 
features of the legislation as they pertain to oil and gas sector development, and 
then discuss the barriers to its use as a tool for environmental justice. While my 
                                               
491 John O. Kakonge, “Environmental Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa: Environmental Impact 
Assessment at the Crossroads.” Working paper no. 9. School of Forestry and Environmental 
Studies, Yale University. (2006) Yale Publishing Services Center, 10-11.  
492 Ibid, 16-17. 
493 Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992 (CAP. E12 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
2004). Kakonge notes that Nigeria’s EIA Law 1992 was in part a response to Agenda 21 and the 
Rio Declaration “Environmental Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa”, 7. 
494 S.1(a), Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992; Stephen Jay, Carys Jones, , Paul Slinn, 
Christopher Wood,” Environmental impact assessment: Retrospect and prospect,” Environmental 
Impact Assessment Review 27, no. 4 (2007): 287-300.  
495 The Act includes a Schedule of activities that require a mandatory EIA. The list includes 
projects that are significant in terms of their potential impact on both the environment and the 
communities that depend on it for their livelihoods and health. Section 12 of the Schedule 
includes Petroleum activities, including oil and gas field development, pipeline construction, oil 
processing and storage, and oil refining. 
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analysis finds that there are deficiencies in the legislation, it also recognises that 
some of these challenges are not unique to the Nigerian context and are indeed 
challenges faced by EIAs across the world.496 
 
The enactment of the legislation in 1992 means that all oil and gas projects after 
this period have been required to submit a mandatory study report, and face public 
scrutiny.497 The Act provides for a formalised and open EIA process that allows for 
interested parties to request the report, and ensures that National Environmental 
Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (formerly the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency) publishes the report in a way that targets 
people who may be interested in its findings.498 The process also requires a level of 
public participation at the decision-making stage, though Ingelson and Nwapi 
identify a range of constraints to public concerns meaningfully informing the 
outcome of an EIA process in Nigeria.499 
 
Ingelson and Nwapi have noted that overlapping institutional arrangements for 
governance have complicated the EIA process by introducing a tension between 
the Ministry of Environment and DPR. Both institutions claim responsibility for 
reviewing and approving EIAs related to oil sector activity, and so industry actors 
are left trying to appease both institutions ahead of starting new projects.500 
 
                                               
496 For in-depth analysis of the EIA Act, see Ingelson and Nwapi. “Environmental Impact 
Assessment Process for Oil, Gas and Mining Projects in Nigeria.”  Also see Holder and 
McGillivray, Taking Stock. 
497 S.23, Schedule(12), Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992. 
498 S.9, S.25(1) stipulates the same requirement specifically for “mandatory study reports,” which 
include EIA’s related to the oil sector. 
499 Ingelson and Nwapi. “Environmental Impact Assessment Process for Oil, Gas and Mining 
Projects in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis,” 17. 
500 Ibid., 20. 
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Figure 2: A stylised account of the EIA process, according to the EIA Act501 
 
 
The Act includes punitive measures for those that do not conduct, and have 
approved, an EIA before beginning an activity that requires one.502 There are also 
penalties for not fully complying with the findings of the report. However, the 
penalties for not completing an EIA are small (between approximately USD 400 
and USD 6,000) when compared with the potential money to be made on a 
controversial project.503  
 
In the event that a party finds fault with the way in which an EIA has been 
conducted or any other matter related to the provisions of the EIA Act, they may 
seek a judicial review under Section 57 of the Act. S.57, headed ‘Defect in form or 
technical irregularity,’ provides for judicial review in connection with anything 
done under the Act  unless the grounds for review are solely based on a technical 
irregularity.504 Presently, while there is scope for judicial review in the Nigerian 
context, the mechanism under section 57 has not as yet been successfully used to 
challenge administrative decisions related to EIA processes. 
 
In the use of penalties for non-compliance - rather than the provision of injunctive 
relief or revoking permits - , Nigerian law diverges, and could learn, from the 
approach taken in the UK. 505 In the UK, for example, if a company does not comply 
with the EIA process, the project would not be allowed to proceed, and any other 
                                               
501 Illustrated based on description from Ingelson and Nwapi, “Environmental Impact 
Assessment Process.” 
502 S.62, Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992. 
503 Orji, “An appraisal of the legal frameworks,” 336. 
504 S.57, Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992. 
505 Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017, No. 571 
















permissions given associated with the project may be invalidated.506 In the 
Nigerian context, invalidating any permission given without a prior EIA would 
provide a stronger remedy than the one currently available, especially if coupled 
with a more effective judicial review mechanism. 507  
 
While the Act technically advances the state’s ability to anticipate and mitigate 
the environmental impact of a project, evidence suggests that it often fails to 
enforce the requirement for an EIA to be carried out.508 This was clearly the case 
in Douglas v. SPDC, where the claimant, a prominent activist for A2EJ in the 
Niger Delta, had his case against Shell, the Attorney General of Nigeria, and 
NNPC struck out by the trial court for lack of standing. Douglas had requested 
that Shell (SPDC) comply with the EIA Act before moving forward with a planned 
liquefied natural gas project. The refusal of Douglas’ locus standi was consistent 
with the courts’ pattern of restrictive reading of provisions for standing.509 
Etemire’s in-depth analysis of the Act highlights the statutory challenges that 
would arise in court for a private individual who wants to bring a claim against a 
company due to non-compliance with an EIA. 510 He also notes that EIA-related 
claims are precluded from the services offered by Nigeria’s legal aid service, one of 
the tools a disenfranchised individual would otherwise have available in the case 
of  an expensive and lengthy legal undertaking.511  
 
                                               
506 Ibid. 
507 While the above may provide a practicable solution for addressing EIA non-compliance from a 
European or American perspective, a locally driven solution may require further nuance. Carys, 
et al emphasise that “Local context is very important in determining how improvements in EA 
effectiveness can be achieved.” Jones et al in Taking Stock, Holder and McGillivray eds., 39. 
508 Ibid. For more, see Etemire’s extensive critique of the EIA Act, as compared to international 
standards in the 1998 Aarhus Convention. Uzuazo Etemire, Law and Practice on Public 
Participation in Environmental Matters: The Nigerian Example in Transnational Comparative 
Perspective (Oxon: Routledge, 2016). See also Ingelson and Nwapi, “Environmental Impact 
Assessment Process.” 
509 Douglas later appealed this decision. His case was ultimately remitted back to the High Court 
to be heard again. See Section 6.4.2.1 for more on this case. 




The Douglas v. SPDC case highlights a persistent challenge with EIAs, both in 
the Nigerian context, but also more broadly. The international community and a 
wide range of sovereign governments have determined that EIAs should be an 
important part of considering any project that could alter the natural environment. 
There is, however, limited evidence to suggest EIAs actually sway decision-makers 
or businesses to execute projects differently.512 In Nigeria, only 27% of survey 
respondents believe the EIA Act somewhat achieves its stated aims, while a 
similar amount believes it provides somewhat sufficient mechanisms for redress. 
This is consistent with research conducted in the 1990s in the UK that suggests 
decision-makers did not rely on EIAs to ultimately take decisions regarding 
proposed projects.513 
 
Historical factors have likely contributed to the ineffectiveness of the EIA Act to 
date. It was enacted in 1992, four years after the Koko dumping incident, discussed 
above.514 However, as discussed in section 5.8 on the Harmful Waste Act, the Koko 
incident incited a political response rather than a substantive legal response. Not 
long after the EIA Act’s enactment, General Abacha came into power and 
commanded the country in a top-down, dictatorial governance regime that saw the 
hanging of environmental activists, including Ken Saro Wiwa, in 1995.515 While 
the EIA Act was still technically in force during this time, it is unlikely that EIA 
report findings, if conducted at all, were challenged. 
 
5.9.1 EIA Act Summary 
 
On paper, the EIA Act opened a gateway for public participation in oil production 
activities more than ever before. It compelled companies and the government to 
                                               
512 Jay et al, “Environmental impact assessment,” 290, 291.  
513 Jones et al in Taking Stock, Holder and McGillivray eds., 31. 
514 The Act also came into force six years before the Aarhus Convention (Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters). The Convention significantly changed the international view of community agency in 
decision-making. “The Aarhus Convention,” The European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/ (accessed August 10, 2017).  
515 “The Death of Ken Saro-Wiwa,” Arts Activism Education Research, 
http://platformlondon.org/background/the-death-of-ken-saro-wiwa/ (accessed August 10, 2017). 
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consider the effects of development activities on the environment and communities 
living nearby, and to publish those findings. In order for the EIA Act to be effective, 
it would require Ministries of Petroleum and Environment to be proactive in 
scrutinising EIAs and ensure that there are sufficient and enforceable punitive 
measures in the event of non-compliance. The historical imperative for economic 
development in Nigeria has meant that this proactive role has often been 
unfulfilled, or in the event of an EIA being conducted, decision-makers have 
prioritised other factors, such as political and economic drivers to make their 
decision. According to the global research on EIAs, discussed above, this 
prioritisation is not uncommon when policymakers face competing political and 
economic demands in decision-making. 
 
5.10 The 1999 Constitution 
 
The 1999 Constitution represents an important fault line for analysis. With the 
promulgation of the 1999 Constitution, Nigeria entered its longest democratic era 
since independence. The Constitution itself, however, shares similarities with 
previous iterations, all of which were developed by non-democratic regimes 
(colonial or military) and had, in part, been suspended during periods of military 
rule.516 Like its predecessors, the 1999 Constitution has proven to be more of a 
compromise with previous regimes rather than a contract between government 
and its citizens.517 Nigerian academic Ebeku says of the 1999 Constitution: “[it] 
was not made by the people as it proclaims, but created by a military dictatorship 
with the collaboration of some political elites.”518 
                                               
516 The 1960 Constitution from Independence, and the Constitution of the First Republic of 
Nigeria in 1963 both employed the Westminster Model of governance. The 1979 Constitution was 
a turning point, where the Legislative and Executive were separated, modelled after the United 
States branches of government, including a bicameral legislature. The “Executive Presidency” 
was seen as more palatable to military leadership than the Westminster preference for a Prime 
Minister. James S. Read, “Nigeria's New Constitution for 1992: The Third Republic,” Journal of 
African Law 35 (1991): 174-193. 
517 Tunde I Ogowewo, “Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 Is Imperative for 
the Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy.” Journal of African Law 44, no. 2 (October 2000): 135–66. 
518 Kaniye S. A. Ebeku, “Making a Democratic and Legitimate Constitution in Nigeria: Lessons 




Never has a constitution in Nigeria been born of, or enacted by, the people.519 This 
is clear as Ogowewo outlines the iterations of the Nigerian Constitution from 1914 
to 1999.520  From 1914 to 1960 the British Government drafted constitutions to 
govern Nigeria, then a British colony. With the exception of the 1951 MacPherson 
Constitution, all of the constitutions drafted during this period were done so 
without consultation of Nigerian citizens.521 The 1963 Constitution of the First 
Republic of Nigeria was decided in one day by a few powerful men.522 While it 
represented an opportunity to create a constitution born out of a consultative 
process, the 1963 Constitution simply adopted the imperial version that came 
before it, incorporating minor edits to account for the country’s independence.523  
 
In 1966, Nigeria experienced its first military coup, which suspended the 
Constitution for thirteen years.524 A new Constitution, created in 1979, ushered in 
Nigeria’s second democratic republic and provided hope that the country’s 
leadership might take a constituent-led approach to constitutionalism. The 1979 
Constitution is regarded as the most consultative Constitution in the country’s 
history, with most of the technical input and drafting proffered by a well-regarded 
group of experts.525 However, as Ogowewo notes, “[t]he process by which a 
Constitution is fashioned is determinative of the contents of that Constitution.”526  
Thus, in spite of the broadly representative consultation and expert drafting of the 
                                               
519  Ogowewo, “Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 Is Imperative for the 
Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy,” 135–66. 
520 Ibid.  
521 Ibid. 
522 Ibid. 
523 Ibid.  
524 Ibid.  
525 Almost fifty experts were selected as part of a drafting committee, who then presented the 
Constitutional draft to a constituent assembly comprised of more than 200 elected members that 
were broadly representative of the country’s regional diversity, including some military 
representation. See Ogowewo, “Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 Is 
Imperative for the Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy,” 140 and Shola Omotola, “Elections and 
Democratic Transition in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic,” African Affairs 109, no. 437 
(October 1, 2010): 535–53.  
526 Ogowewo, “Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 Is Imperative for the 
Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy,” 138.  
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Constitution, the military government still had final review and input on the 
document before it was enacted.527 This resulted in the addition of some sections 
that were not vetted by the expert committee or approved by the representative, 
elected, constituent assembly. One such amendment was the codifying in the 
Constitution the validity of the Land Use Act. As I have shown in Section 5.6, the 
Land Use Act is seen as one of the most detrimental pieces of legislation in Nigeria 
for access to environmental justice for those living in the Niger Delta.528 
 
In 1983, the Constitution of 1979 was suspended by a coup, led by current Nigerian 
President Buhari, then Major General of the Nigerian military. On and off from 
1983 until the June 1998, the 1979 Constitution remained partially in force, with 
the suspension of its supremacy clause.529 This partial enforcement left the 
judiciary intact, but unable to fulfill its mandate as an independent arbiter of 
disputes. The judiciary was further sidelined by parallel military tribunals set up 
to address cases considered to be contentious by the military regime.530  
 
On the 9th of June 1998, General Abubakar repealed the 1979 Constitution and 
introduced the 1999 Constitution – an even less consultative document. The 1999 
Constitution purportedly only updated the 1979 Constitution to reflect the current 
Nigerian context. Ogowewo notes, however, that if this were indeed the case, 
military leadership would have simply amended the 1979 Constitution, rather 
than establishing a new governance regime that clears them of any culpability in 
overthrowing the previous democratic regime.531 The following section will discuss 
two particular dimensions of the 1999 Constitution and how the constitution-
making process created the pre-conditions for a deficient founding document. 
 
                                               
527 Read, “The New Constitution of Nigeria,” 146.  
528 Ogowewo, “Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 Is Imperative for the 
Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy,” 140.  
529 Ibid., 141.  
530 Okechukwu Oko, “Lawyers in Chains: Restrictions on Human Rights Advocacy under 
Nigeria’s Military Regimes,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 10 (1997): 257–90; 267-275.  
531 Ogowewo, “Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 Is Imperative for the 
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5.10.1 Chapter II and Chapter IV – An Evolution of Principles and Rights 
 
Here, I discuss the main Chapters relevant to the present research. In particular, 
I cover Chapter II (Fundamental Objectives and directive Principles of State 
Policy) and Chapter IV (Fundamental Rights).532 As much of the 1999 Constitution 
is based on the 1979 Constitution, discussed above, both are referenced here. 
 
Fundamental Rights were first enshrined in Nigerian law at independence, with 
the 1960 and then the 1963 Constitutions. According to Akpan, the inclusion of the 
rights provisions in the first instance stemmed from recommendations by the 
Willink Commission, a British Colonial Administration response to concerns from 
minority groups in Nigeria about their rights following independence.533  
 
The 1979 and the 1999 Constitutions also included these fundamental rights in 
Chapter IV, which provide for all of the rights enshrined in the European 
Convention on Human Rights.534 The rights covered by this Chapter also closely 
mirror those of the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights, which 
Nigeria ratified in July 1993. (See Figure 3).535 Section 46 of the 1999 Constitution, 
like Section 42 of the 1979 Constitution, make these rights justiciable in State 
High Courts. 
                                               
532 Chapter I covers general provisions, including the supremacy clause (Section 1), Chapter III 
covers citizenship, Chapter V covers the legislature, and Chapter VI covers the Executive, 
Chapter VII covers the judiciary. A discussion about the set up and jurisdiction of the judiciary is 
found in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
533 See Moses E Akpan, “The 1979 Nigerian Constitution and Human Rights,” Universal Human 
Rights 2, no. 2 (1980): 23–41; 27, 28.  
534  Read, “The New Constitution of Nigeria,” 148.   
535 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” United Nations Human Rights Office of 
the High Commissioner, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx  




Figure 3: Rights provided for in Chapter IV, 1999 Constitution 
 
 
Particularly relevant to A2EJ, Chapter IV on Fundamental Rights of the 
Constitution (both in 1979 and in 1999) also states that the Federal Government 
owns Nigeria’s oil, gas and minerals. Both Constitutions outline that  
 
All minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in under or upon any land 
in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the 
Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of 
the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be 
prescribed by the National Assembly.536  
 
The purpose of this provision within the Chapter on Fundamental Rights is to limit 
personal rights related to occupying land in the event of necessary expropriation 
for the purposes of accessing the government’s mineral reserves. In such instances, 
Chapter IV affords the right to compensation for lost land, and the right to have 
the quantum of compensation decided by the appropriate court of law.537 As will 
be shown in Chapter 6, making use of this provision has been complicated by 
changing jurisdiction for oil gas and minerals issues, outlined most recently in 
Chapter VII of the 1999 Constitution.538 
 
                                               
536 S.44(3), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, and S.40(3) of the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. 
537 S.40(1)(a),(b), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 [Cap IV]. 
538 S.251(1)n, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap VII].  
 
 Right to life 
 Right to dignity of human persons 
 Right to personal liberty 
 Right to fair hearing 
 Right to private and family life 
 Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
 Right to freedom of expression and the press 
 Right to peaceful assembly and association 
 Right to freedom of movement 
 Right to freedom from discrimination 
 Right to acquire and own immovable property 
 Right to compensation in the event of compulsory acquisition of property 
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In addition to Fundamental Rights, the drafting committee of the 1979 
Constitution thought it prudent to incorporate guiding directives and principles 
into the new Constitution. This was intended to set the tone that constitutions are 
more concerned with mutual obligations and duties rather than simply a 
conference of power on elected officials.539 These principles are enshrined in 
Chapter II, which focuses on Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of 
State Policy.540 Chapter II of the 1979 Constitution included commitments to 
principles of democracy and social justice,541 unity and national integration free 
from discrimination542, balanced economic development543, and equality,544 
including in access to quality education.545 Further augmenting these principles in 
1983, Nigeria ratified the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, which 
includes the provision “All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development.”546 
 
Both the 1979 provisions for fundamental objectives and state principles, as well 
as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, were incorporated into 
Chapter II of the 1999 Constitution.  For the first time in Nigeria’s history, there 
was a constitutional provision on the environment. Section 20 stipulates that, “The 
State shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water, air and 
land, forest and wild life of Nigeria.” In line with the 1979 Constitution, Chapter 
II provisions are non-justiciable, per Section 6(6)c of the 1999 Constitution. 
 
                                               
539 Obinna Okere, “Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy under the 
Nigerian Constitution,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 32, no. 1 (1983): 214–
28; 214; and Read, The New Constitution of Nigeria,” 136.  
540 Nigeria ratified both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights just five months before the repressive 
regime of military leader Sani Abacha began in July of 1993. “OHCHR,” Nigeria Homepage, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AfricaRegion/Pages/NGIndex.aspx (accessed August 2, 2017).   
541 S.14, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, [Cap II].  
542 Ibid., S.15. 
543 Ibid., S.16. 
544 Ibid., S.17. 
545 Ibid., S.18. 
546 Art.24, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 
1983 (Cap A 9 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004). 
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To date in Nigeria, non-justiciable truly means that Chapter II principles and 
directives cannot be used as the basis for a suit in a court of law. The 1981 case of 
Okogie v. Attorney General for Lagos State547 is still precedential in 
determining that Chapter II of the Constitution should be read as a moral guiding 
policy and not as a Chapter that can be adjudicated in a court of law.548 In this 
case, the provisions in Chapter II of the Constitution were seen as adversarial to 
those justiciable rights afforded in Chapter IV of the Constitution. The Okogie 
judgement justifies the court’s stance by citing early Indian jurisprudence on 
similar subject matter, in particular the case of Madras v. Champakam 
Dorairajan.549 In this suit, the Supreme Court of India prioritised individual 
rights over the rights of a group.550 As I will illustrate in Chapter 6, this is 
significant because India drastically changed its approach to interpreting 
Directives of State Policy in the early 1980s, elevating them to be justiciable by 
linking them to Fundamental Rights.551 In the case of environmental issues, the 
Indian courts have linked Article 48A in the Constitution on protecting the 
environment to the right to life, justiciable under Part III’s Fundamental Rights.552 
What the Okogie case highlights is that, while Indian jurisprudence has developed 
over the last three decades, present-day Nigeria maintains a restrictive 
interpretation of its constitutional objectives and principles. 
 
In 2009, then Chief Justice of Nigeria Idris Legbo Kutigi introduced the 
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement) Procedures (hereafter FREP).553 Unlike 
previous iterations of these procedures, the 2009 FREP introduced concepts that 
                                               
547 Okogie v. Attorney General for Lagos State (1981) INCLR 218. 
548 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap II]. See Okere, “Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy under the Nigerian Constitution,” 226.   
549 Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan AIR 1951 SC 226. 
550 Okere, “Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy under the Nigerian 
Constitution,” 226.   
551 Emeka Polycarp Amechi, “Litigating Right to Healthy Environment in Nigeria: An 
Examination of the Impacts of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, in 
Ensuring Access to Justice for Victims of Environmental Degradation.” Law, Environment and 
Development Journal 6 (2010): [xxxvii]-334, 326. 
552 See Chapter 6, Section 6.4. 
553 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap IV]. 
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are similar to approaches taken by the Indian Supreme Court in pursuit of public 
interest litigation (See Chapter 6 for more). In particular the 2009 FREP 
liberalises standing for cases related to a breach of fundamental rights, as outlined 
in Chapter IV of the Constitution. This was a clear departure from the 1979 rules, 
which stated that only individuals whose rights have been directly breached would 
have standing to sue.554 The 2009 FREP, Section 3(e), directs that: 
The Court shall encourage and welcome public interest litigations in 
the human rights field and no human rights case may be dismissed 
or struck out for want of locus standi. In particular, human rights 
activists, advocates, or groups as well as any non-governmental 
organisations, may institute human rights application on behalf of 
any potential applicant. In human rights litigation, the applicant 
may include any of the following:  
 
(i) Anyone acting in his own interest;  
(ii) Anyone acting on behalf of another person;  
(iii) Anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of a group 
or class of persons; 
(iv) Anyone acting in the public interest, and  
(v) Association acting in the interest of its members or other 
individuals or groups.555 
 
 
As discussed more fully in Chapter 6, restrictions to standing is one of two barriers 
in public interest environmental litigation in Nigeria. The 2009 FREP bolsters the 
notion that there is scope for public interest litigation in Nigeria. However, this is 
constrained in the case of environmental litigation, where the courts continue to 
interpret breaches of environmental rights as non-justiciable. 
 
5.10.2 Constitution Summary 
 
The development and enactment of the 1999 Constitution at the dawn of the 
Fourth Republic was not an exercise in modern constitutionalism. While the 
current constitution has inherited the provisions of the 1979 Constitution, seen by 
                                               
554 Onakoya Olusegun, “Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009: A Paradigm 
Shift in Human Rights Protection in Nigeria,” US-China Law Review 10 (2013): 494–509, 502. 
555 S.3(e), Fundamental Rights (Enforcement) Procedures 2009. 
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many to be the most consultative constitution in the country’s history, it also 
inherited that document’s flaws. The result of this is that provisions such as the 
detrimental Land Use Act, forced into the 1979 Constitution by military 
leadership, remains enshrined in the Constitution, making it difficult to amend or 
repeal.  
 
The one nominally positive development in the Constitution is its incorporation of 
Chapter II, Section 20 on the right to a healthy environment. Despite this 
inclusion, Nigerian jurisprudence continues to interpret Chapter II of the 
Constitution as non-justiciable in a court of law, despite developments in India, a 
jurisdiction drawn on in the past by Nigerian jurists.   This means that Section 20 
is of little use to those seeking redress from the constitution for environmental 
harms until jurisprudence develops. 
 
5.11 The Niger Delta Development Commission Act 2000 
 
The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Act of 2000 repeals the Oil, 
Mineral Producing Areas Commission Decree (OMPADEC) 1998 and establishes 
 
a new Commission with a re-organised management and 
administrative structure for more effectiveness; and for the use of the 
sums received from the allocation of the Federation Account for 
tackling ecological problems which arise from the exploration of oil 
minerals in the Niger-Delta area and for connected purposes.556  
 
The NDDC was established not long after the Fourth Republic and represents a 
fresh start for the Niger Delta development vision. Unlike other legislation that 
focuses on redress for environmental harms, the NDDC Act ensures that 
communities in oil producing regions are positively affected by the revenue 
generated from oil industry activity. In this section, I will discuss the NDDC Act, 
                                               
556 Niger-Delta Development Commission (Establishment) Act 2000 (Cap N86 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 2004).  
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map out the purpose that it serves, and consider how this compares to past 
attempts to promote regional development.  
 
The Niger Delta has an estimated population of 30 million people, about 20% of 
the country’s entire populace.557 This oil producing region also has a history of 
violence and youth unrest often linked to oil production. Non-violent forms of 
resistance began as early as the 1970s and have increased since democracy in 
1999.558 At the beginning of his presidency, President Obasanjo sought to quell the 
Niger Delta security crisis through improved economic and development 
opportunities in the region.559 The NDDC was seen as the institution that would 
lead these regional development efforts in the Fourth Republic.560 
 
Obasanjo’s interest in setting up the NDDC was not unique. Historically, the 
government has responded to the region’s instability by earmarking funds and 
housing them in an institution dedicated to the region’s development. Table 3 
below illustrates the institutions that have been responsible for the region’s 
development since independence. Using the Human Development Index as a 
measure, these institutions have been unsuccessful in promoting development in 
the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta’s development remains stunted relative to other 
regions with similar levels of oil reserves globally, such as Venezuela and 
Indonesia, though funds toward addressing the problem in Nigeria have increased 
substantially over time.561 
 
                                               
557 Based on the 2006 Census, with a total population at 140 million for 2006. “Regional 
Inequality and the Niger Delta,” Overseas Development Institute, 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3383.pdf (accessed 
August 1, 2017).  
558 Annegret Mähler, “Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil-
Violence Link in the Niger Delta,” GIGA Working Paper no. 120, German Institute of Global and 
Area Studies, January 1, 2010. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1541940 (accessed August 1, 
2017).  
559  “The Death of Ken Saro-Wiwa,” Arts Activism Education Research. 
560 Kenneth Omeje, “The state, conflict & evolving politics in the Niger Delta, Nigeria.”  
561 “Regional Inequality and the Niger Delta,” Overseas Development Institute, 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3383.pdf (accessed 
August 10, 2017).   
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The Act gave NDDC a broad mandate. It is responsible for developing policies and 
guidelines for the Niger Delta development, covering everything from 
infrastructure, education, health, urban development, water supply, power and 
more.562 In addition to developing these plans, the NDDC is expected to implement 
these projects. Particularly relevant to A2EJ in the oil sector, the NDDC is also 
meant to:  
 
a) assess and report on all CSR projects from oil companies in the Delta; 
 
b) tackle ecological and environmental problems that arise from the 
exploration of oil mineral in the Niger-Delta area and advise the 
Federal Government and the member States on the prevention and 
control of oil spillages, gas flaring and environmental pollution; and 
 
c) liaise with the various oil mineral and gas prospecting and producing 
companies on all matters of pollution prevention and control.563 
 
Table 3: Institutions responsible for Nigeria Delta development and their 
financing models 
Institution Year Resources allocated 
The Niger Delta Development 
Board (NDDB)  
1960 N/A 
Presidential Task Force (1.5%) 1980 1.5% Oil revenue 
OMPADEC – 1992 (3%) 1992 3% Oil revenue 
NDDC 2000 15% of states’ allocation from 
derivation payments, 3% of oil 
companies’ total budgets, 50% of 
the Ecological Fund Allocations 
due to states, among other 
revenue streams.)564 
 
In addition to the NDDC, in 2008 Nigerian President Yar’Adua established a new 
Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, under which the NDDC would sit. The remit of the 
                                               
562 S.7(1)(b), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap I]. 
563 S.7 (g,h,i), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap I]. 
564 S.14(2)(a) Niger-Delta Development Commission (Establishment) Act 2000. 
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new parent institution is very similar to that of the NDDC and it is not 
immediately clear how they differ operationally. Budgetary allocations for the two 
institutions highlight their vast overlap. The federal budget for the Ministry was 
almost USD 560 million in 2014, more than USD 300 million of which went to the 
NDDC itself.565 More than USD 245 million of NDDC’s budget was allocated to 
paying the salaries and wages of its personnel, leaving USD 55 million to 
implement development projects across the region.566  
 
This budgeting behaviour is consistent with literature on clientelism and public 
sector employment.567 Robinson and Verdier find that providing public sector jobs 
is a legitimate way of securing votes from a specific body of constituents (versus 
more “traditional” forms of bribery, such as exchanging cash for votes). Robinson 
and Verdier argue that “the appeal of offers of employment in the bureaucracy is 
precisely that a job is a credible, selective, and reversible method of redistribution, 
which ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular 
politician.”568 This is particularly salient in the Niger Delta region, which is an 
important region for the Federal Government to secure support and manage 
regional instability, given the region’s economic significance to the country more 
broadly.569 
 
The broader Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs had a budget of USD 235 million to 
implement large programmes across the Niger Delta to help mitigate the negative 
effects of oil production, while also building infrastructure and service delivery to 
                                               
565 “2014 Federal Government of Nigeria Budget Proposal,” Federal Government of Nigeria, 
http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/pdfs/2014_budget_proposals/38.%20Summary_Niger%20Delta.pdf  
(accessed August 10, 2017).  
566 Ibid.  
567 James A. Robinson, “The Political Economy of Clientelism,” The Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics 115, no. 2 (2013): 260-291. 
568 Robinson, “The Political Economy of Clientelism,” 260-291.  
569 Ibid., 261. See also: “Managing Government Compensation and Employment: Institutions, 
Policies, and Reform Challenges” International Monetary Fund 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2016/040816a.pd (accessed August 1, 2017). The author 
does not have specific statistics on number of Niger Delta residents employed. 
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improve the overall economic development of the region.570 The 2014 Ministry of 
Niger Delta Affairs Budget outlines around 200 projects that the Ministry and the 
NDDC planned to undertake in the following year.571 Only five of these projects 
involved work relating to the oil sector, and just one concerned the clean-up of 
areas impacted by an oil spill.572 The remaining projects primarily focused on road 
construction, land reclamation, and other infrastructure and construction projects.  
 
An in-depth assessment of the impact of the NDDC found that the institution has 
not had enough of an impact on poverty, considering the financial resources 
available to it and compared with what is allocated to other regions in the 
country.573 The Human Development Index finds: 
 
that poverty reduction progress has been slow, particularly given the 
Niger Delta’s substantial natural resource endowments and 
additional Federal Government resources…according to UNDP, the 
worsening of the [Human Development Index] has been more acute 
for the Niger Delta states than for the rest of Nigeria.574  
 
Respondents in my 2014 survey agree that the institution is not working: only one 
fifth of survey respondents believed that the NDDC Act achieves or somewhat 
achieves its stated aims. 
 
Poor performance could be caused by a range of factors, but in addition to 
clientelism causing a bloated wage bill, there is also mounting evidence to suggest 
                                               
570 Personal correspondence with public financial management experts Nicholas Travis and 
Albert Pijuan suggests that there is not an optimal ratio between capital expenditure and 
salaries across all ministries. However the particular context of a given ministry should be taken 
into account. For instance, a Health Ministry charged with delivering health services will have a 
high percentage of budget going to salaries because the Ministry is responsible for paying health 
workers’ salaries. The same would be true of education. Extrapolating this logic, it then becomes 
apparent that a ministry and commission charged with undertaking regional development 
projects should likely have a higher percentage of overall budget going to investing in 
development projects rather than paying people’s salaries. 
571 Author’s own calculations based 2014 budget proposal. “2014 Federal Government of Nigeria 
Budget Proposal,” Federal Government of Nigeria. 
572 Ibid.  
573 “Regional Inequality and the Niger Delta,” Overseas Development Institute. 
574 Ibid.  
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that while NDDC is still the statutory body responsible for Niger Delta 
development, it is a co-opted institution plagued by the corruption and 
misappropriation associated with its predecessors.575 For example, the Oil Mineral 
Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), the NDDC’s predecessor, 
was largely seen as a failure due to corruption.576 Two of the organisation’s leaders 
were removed from office on charges of embezzling or otherwise misappropriating 
hundreds of millions of dollars during their tenure.577 One of those leaders, Eric 
Opia, was removed from his position in 1998 after he could not account for USD 
80 million of OMPADEC funds, while some estimate that during his time at the 
organisation, he embezzled up to USD 200 million in development funds.578  
 
5.11.1 NDDC Act Summary 
 
The NDDC Act, much like its predecessors, did not create an institution that 
improves development outcomes in the Niger Delta. Instead, it created an 
institution that has been used to more deeply entrench a system of clientelism. 
Similar to other legislation assessed in this Chapter, such as the NESREA Act, 
discussed in Section 5.13, the NDDC Act was enacted in order to start over after 
its predecessor had failed. However as this section has shown, starting over with 
                                               
575 The OMPADEC Act No.23 of 1992, the NDDC Act’s predecessor, did not perform well under 
Frynas’ survey in the late nineties, with only 3.3% reporting that the law was effectively 
enforced. Julia Hanson, “Corruption and the NDDC,” The Nation, August 31, 2015, 
http://thenationonlineng.net/corruption-and-nddc/ (accessed August 10, 2017); Chika Ebuzor, 
“Militants accuse NDDC officials of corruption,” Pulse, January 28, 2017, 
http://pulse.ng/local/niger-delta-militants-accuse-nddc-officials-of-corruption-id6130155.html 
(accessed August 10, 2017); Samson Atekojo Usman, “Senate angry as NDDC shuns corruption 
investigation panel,” Daily Post, October 26, 2016, http://dailypost.ng/2016/10/26/senate-angry-
nddc-shuns-corruption-investigation%E2%80%8E-panel/ (accessed August 10, 2017); Destiny 
Ugorji, “Niger Delta youths allege massive corruption in NDDC,” News Express, February 08 
2017, http://www.newsexpressngr.com/news/34303-Niger-Delta-youths-allege-massive-
corruption-in-NDDC (accessed August 10, 2017); and “Regional Inequality and the Niger Delta,” 
Overseas Development Institute. 
576Akeem Ayofe Akinwale, Re-Engineering the NDDC’s Master Plan: An Analytical Approach,” 
Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 11, no.2 (2009): 142-159; 146.   
577 Ibid, 145.  
578 J. Shola Omotola, “From the OMPADEC to the NDDC: An Assessment of State Responses to 




a new name does not erase the historical and political economic factors that 
ultimately lead to an institution’s failure. 
 
5.12 NOSDRA Act of 2006 
 
This section will discuss the Act that established the National Oil Spills Detection 
and Response Agency, the government institution tasked with addressing the 
mitigation and clean-up of these spills.579 In the period between January 2006 and 
the end of December 2015, Nigeria experienced more than 10,000 oil spills.580 
These spills ranged in size, severity and cause – including everything from small 
spills caused by equipment failure or local actors’ efforts to siphon oil directly from 
the pipeline, to large spills equivalent to the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf 
of Mexico caused by ageing equipment, corroded pipelines and large-scale pipeline 
theft. Figure 4 depicts the oil spills that occurred in the Niger Delta in 2013.581 
These spills have had a direct impact on the health and livelihoods of communities 
living in and nearby damaged and polluted areas.582  
 
  
                                               
579 See: Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.4.3. 
580 “Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor,” https://oilspillmonitor.ng/#/23011.PPMC/KAD/HSE/OSR/14/56  
(accessed, April 6, 2016).   
581 Ibid.  
582 UNEP, “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland,” 183. 
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Figure 4: A map showing oil spills in 2013, mainly concentrated in the Niger Delta 
region. Red spills are classified as caused by third party interference, black oil 
spills are classified as oil company operational spills, and purple are spills that 




The NOSDRA Act of 2006 is the key piece of the legislation that governs the 
preparing for and responding to oil spills. The Act was enacted in 2006 to establish 
an agency that would be responsible for the implementation of the National Oil 
Spill Contingency Plan.584 The NOSC is part of Nigeria’s obligation under the 
“International Convention on oil pollution preparedness, response and 
cooperation, 1990.”585 The international agreement followed a string of serious oil 
                                               
583 “Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor,” https://oilspillmonitor.ng/#/52400.NPDC/HSE/EMA/001/16 
(accessed 1 October 2015).  
584 Orji, “An appraisal of the legal frameworks for the control of environmental pollution in 
Nigeria,” 337; and “NOSDRA”, Federal Ministry of the Environment, 
http://environment.gov.ng/nosdra.html (August 10, 2017).  
585 “International Convention on oil pollution preparedness, response and cooperation”, London, 
30 November 1990, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1891, No. 32194, 78. Available from: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201891/volume-1891-I-32194-English.pdf  
(accessed August 10, 2017). 
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spills globally in the preceding decades – the Torrey Canyon spill off the coast of 
the UK in 1967, the Amoco Cadiz Spill off the coast of France in 1977, and the 
Exxon Valdez spill off the coast of Alaska in 1989.586 It aimed to compel countries 
and oil shipping companies to be more prepared for oil spills.587  
 
The NOSDRA Act lays out the Agency’s primary objective; to ensure “a safe, 
timely, effective and appropriate response to major or disastrous oil pollution.”588 
This includes identifying areas at risk for spills and prioritising current areas for 
clean-up, as well as acting as a liaison between Nigeria and international experts 
in an effort to clean up oil spills. The Act outlines a range of functions, all of which 
involve ensuring that the Nigerian government and operators are well prepared to 
respond to oil spills, and that they do so in a coordinated fashion.589 
 
As a primary function of the law, the Act explains how NOSDRA should respond 
in the event of a major oil spill, including Schedules that outline the way in which 
the Agency should work with other public and private bodies in its efforts to 
respond to emergency oil spill situations. 590 
 
In addition to its oil spill preparation and response duties, NOSDRA is responsible 
for levying fines on oil companies who fail to report oil spills to the agency 
                                               
586 Ashok Mahapatra, “International Convention on Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Cooperation,” International Oil Spills Conference, 1995, 
http://www.ioscproceedings.org/doi/pdf/10.7901/2169-3358-1995-1-775 (accessed August 2, 2017).  
587 Ibid. The international agreement was written in a way so as to avoid imposing legal 
liabilities; this was seen at the time as a key factor in the convention’s ability to appeal to private 
sector to ensure enforcement. 
588 S.5, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap I].  
589 S.7, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap VII]. See Chapter 4, Section 
4.2.2, for more on NOSDRA’s functions and the overlap with DPR.  
590 Schedule Two of the Act lays out a detailed plan for how NOSDRA will work with other 
ministries and government agencies to respond to major oil spills. The list includes thirteen 
ministries and other institutions, including an industry trade group, the Oil Producers Trade 
Section. Notably missing, is the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. Despite having a member on 
NOSDRA’s board, the Ministry is not involved in NOSDRA’s plans for Oil Spill Response. It 
should be noted that while created before NOSDRA was established, technically DPR’s own oil 
spill response guidelines do not include the Ministry of Environment.  See Chapter 4, Section 
4.2.2 for more on the overlap and tension between NOSDRA and DPR. 
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expediently.591 The fines for not reporting the spill are a little over USD 3,000 a 
day, while fines for failure to clean up the spill will cost approximately USD 6,000 
a day.592 Both are relatively inexpensive fines when considered in tandem with 
how much an oil operator in the Niger Delta make in profit per day.593   
 











As shown in Chapter 4, there are serious limitations to NOSDRA’s ability to fulfil 
its oil spill response mandate. There are financial pressures on the organisation, 
which is not well-resourced relative to other institutions or to the tasks required 
of them.594 There are also political and territorial limitations to what NOSDRA 
can achieve given its limited ability to exert influence on key decision-makers.595 
While not a shortcoming of the legislation, these financial and political pressures 
create barriers to environmental protection for communities in oil producing areas. 
 
The flaws of the current NOSDRA Act have not escaped proactive policymakers. 
As of 2014, there was an aggressive amendment circulating in the National 
Assembly that would introduce significantly more stringent guidelines for 
                                               
591 S. 6(2), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap I]. 
592 Orji, “An appraisal of the legal frameworks for the control of environmental pollution in 
Nigeria,” 337.  
593 See Section 4.3 on scale of revenue of oil companies vis a vis government. 
594 See Chapter 4, Section 4.4. 
595 Ibid. 
According to the legislation, NOSDRA response to an oil spill should include: 
 
a) In the event of a major spill, in collaboration with other agencies, co-opt, 
undertake, supervise all provisions of Second Schedule 
b) Assess extent of damage to the environment – based on what was there before 
c) Post spill impact assessment to determine long-term effects 
d) Advise government on health effects of people to ensure remedial action  
e) Assist in mediation between polluter and community 
f) Monitor Response efforts 
g) Assess oil spill damage 
h) Approve requests to use dispersants by companies 
i) Ensure protection of sensitive areas  
j) Monitor clean up 
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improving oil spill response, with accompanying steep penalties for non-
compliance.596 One lawyer involved in drafting the Amendment said:  
 
Now you will notice that the penalties are onerous [in the draft 
amendment]. Let’s face it, but it’s intentional because you know what, 
if you make the penalties weak they will still say ‘no this is terrible, 
we can’t do this, this is…bring it down, bring it down’, so we make it 
as high as possible so that when you now concede, the point you now 
concede is the same point that would have shocked them in the first 
place.597   
 
Even with their bargaining approach, lawmakers know that passing the 
Amendment bill will be a struggle. One interviewee cites regional dynamics, 
entrenched interests and longstanding relationships between the political elite 
and the private oil sector actors as major constraints to more progressive 
legislation. He informed me that  
 
A lot of people who have got interest in the oil industry don’t want 
[the NOSDRA Amendment]. Secondly, is the paradigm of proximity -
- those close to the challenge and feel it support the bill, those who 
are far away from it feel, ‘what is my own with it if they want to die 
drinking oil water? That’s their business.’598 
 
Despite actions taken by policymakers to “give teeth” to the legislation, survey 
responses and key informant interviews suggest that NOSDRA will need more 
than simply the power  to levy punitive measures against oil companies; it requires 
legitimacy.  
 
Not one survey respondent in 2014 felt that the NOSDRA Act fully achieved its 
stated aims. Fifty-four percent of respondents believe it only minimally achieves 
its aims.599 Respondents had a similar view of its ability to provide sufficient 
                                               
596 Interview A1G4, July 18, 2014. 
597 Ibid. 
598 Ibid. 
599 An additional 22% believe it does not at all achieve its stated aims. Percentages taken after 
removing “I don’t know” responses from results.  
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redress mechanisms. Various interviews with actors in and outside of government 
provide further insight into why the NOSDRA Act is considered by the majority of 
people to be a failure. In some interviews, NOSDRA was referred to as “aggressive” 
or a group of “rascals,” for trying to enforce their mandate, but also as “not having 
[enough] industry expertise” to do the job properly.600 This, then, appears to be 
more of a problem of reputation than anything substantively related to their remit.  
 
5.12.1 NOSDRA Act Summary 
 
Despite the powers conferred upon it by the Act, NOSDRA has struggled to act as 
a gateway to environmental justice for those living in the environment it is 
legislated to protect. This is, however, more a problem of politics, funding, and the 
territorial nature of government agencies, than a lack of motivation by the 
institution itself to do its job or the drafting of the legislation. While better 
legislation has been viewed by some lawmakers as the way to provide A2EJ in the 
case of oil pollution, the effectiveness of the NOSDRA Act suggests that barriers 
to oil spill response are comprised of political and economic disincentives rather 
than legal provisions.  
 
5.13 NESREA Act 2007 
 
The NESREA Act established the Nigerian Environmental Standards and 
Regulations Agency and confers upon it 
 
Responsibility for the protection and development of the 
environment, biodiversity conservation and sustainable development 
of Nigeria's natural resources in general and environmental 
technology, including coordination and liaison with relevant 
stakeholders within and outside Nigeria on matters of enforcement 
of environmental standards, regulations, rules, laws, policies and 
guidelines.601 
 
                                               
600 Interview A1L5, August 12, 2014. Interview A1G5, July 23, 2014. 
601 S.2, National Environmental Standards and Regulations, Enforcement Agency 
(Establishment) Act, 2007. 
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It has been heralded by some as a watershed moment for environmental legislation 
in Nigeria.602 Ladan, for example, was optimistic about what the NESREA Act 
meant for environmental governance. He wrote that the law represented a “new 
dawn” for environmental governance in Nigeria, particularly for compliance and 
enforcement.603 Ajai offered a less sanguine view of the NESREA Act’s ability to 
affect change. While acknowledging the aspirations of the Act, he noted that 
“Implementing [the NESREA Act] in an environment of national politics and 
diverse and competing interest groups within a federal system is bound to be 
herculean.”604 
 
The NESREA Act is a successor to the FEPA Act, which was considered “the most 
important piece of environmental legislation in Nigeria” in the late 1980s and 
1990s.605 The institution was the first of its kind in Nigeria. Before the FEPA Act 
passed in 1988, there had been no government entity responsible for ensuring that 
the environment was protected.606  
 
As with other legislation discussed in this Chapter, FEPA was created following 
the toxic waste dumping scandal in Koko.607 The legislation had some novel 
features, including the establishment of mobile courts to process environmental 
violations in remote parts of the country, and it outlined a specific coordination 
role with the Department of Petroleum Resources in the event of oil and gas-
                                               
602 The Senate President at the time said that the Act ensured that Nigeria was following 
international treaties for environmental protection, helping to balance effects of economic 
development. See Ojeifo, Sufuyan. “Nigeria: Senate Proposes Environmental Regulatory Agency,” 
This Day (Lagos), May 15, 2007. 
http://allafrica.com.ezproxy.soas.ac.uk/stories/200705150089.html (accessed September 1, 2017).  
603 Muhammed Tawfiq Ladan, “Review of NESREA Act 2007 and Regulations 2009-2011: A New 
Dawn in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in Nigeria”, Environment and 
Development Journal 8, no. 1 (2012): 116 – 140.  
604 Olawale Ajai, “Balancing of interests in environmental law in Nigeria,” in The Balancing of 
Interests in Environmental Law in Africa, eds. Michael Faure and Willemien du Plessis, 379-411. 
(Pretoria: Pulp, 2011), 389.  
605 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 84.  
606 Ibid. 
607 Ogbodo, “Environmental Protection in Nigeria.” 
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related pollution.608 Frynas asserted that the creation of FEPA showed an 
increased awareness of, and interest in, environmental challenges in Nigeria.609 
 
While Frynas was somewhat optimistic, the FEPA Act was considered to have 
some limitations for environmental protection. For example, FEPA might have 
been allowed to carry out its remit as environmental regulator in the oil sector, but 
the Ministry of Petroleum Resources sat on FEPA’s governing board.610 Frynas 
also found that the institution had little influence in the oil sector and struggled 
to fulfil its mandate.611 This is similar to the phenomena I observed with NOSDRA. 
 
The NESREA Act of 2007612 repealed the FEPA Act, and created a new 
environmental agency under the Federal Ministry of Environment. Its enactment 
introduced even more uncertainty into the legal landscape for environmental 
protection in the face of oil industry activity. NESREA is responsible for enforcing 
all environmental laws and regulations in Nigeria.613 Critically, however, 
oversight of the oil and gas sector is excluded from many of its core functions, 
unlike the broader remit of FEPA. Section 7 of the NESREA Act stipulates that 
the Agency is responsible for the functions outlined in Table 4. There are thirteen 
provisions in Section 7 that detail the responsibilities of the Agency. Five of these 
provisions have been clearly marked as excluding NESREA’s involvement in the 
oil and gas sector. Confusingly, one provision, Section 7(a), clearly includes oil and 
gas sector activities in its remit, to the contradiction of other parts of the law. 
 
Since the oil and gas sector is included in the Act on an ad hoc basis, it is unclear 
where NESREA’s remit substantively begins and ends with respect to oil and gas 
                                               
608 Ibid., 13.  
609 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 84.  
610 Ibid.,85. 
611 Ibid.,70.  
612 For a comprehensive review of the NESREA Act and accompanying regulations, see Ladan, 
“Review of NESREA Act 2007 and Regulations 2009-2011,”116-140.  
613 Including international treaties concerning oil pollution. See National Environmental 
Standards and Regulations, Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act, 2007, S.7(d) and Ladan, 
“Review of NESREA Act 2007 and Regulations 2009-2011,” 123.  
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sector activities and how this interacts with other institutions with specialised 
regulatory remits, such as DPR and NOSDRA. For example, Section 7(c) charges 
NESREA with enforcing international agreements in the oil and gas sector, while 
Section 7(h) prevents NESREA from monitoring compliance of regulations 
pertaining to “noise, air, land, seas, oceans and other water bodies” in the oil and 
gas sector.614 As has been seen in previous sections of this Chapter, there are at 
least two pieces of oil sector legislation that are founded on international 
agreements, yet also pertain to bodies of water (Oil in Navigable Waters Act and 
NOSDRA Act). It is unclear in such circumstances whether NESREA would be 
involved or recuse itself. 
 
The Act also stipulates that the Agency does not have the power to investigate oil 
spills nor can it recommend “proposals for the evolution and review of existing 
guidelines, regulations and standards on environment” in the oil and gas sector.615 
In total, “oil” is mentioned seventeen times in the legislation, and fourteen of those 
mentions are explicitly for the purpose of removing NESREA’s mandate from 
sector environmental regulation activities. 
 
One key informant in Government conjectured that NESREA’s clear exclusion of 
the oil and gas sector could have been the result of pressure by DPR, the main 
industry regulator, to prevent any interference with its mandate. He informed me 
that, 
 
[W]hen the NESREA Act was being enacted, it specifically excludes 
deregulating the oil and gas industry…I want to assume that, that 
was done simply you know…it is a fallout of the territorial 
madness…I’m sure that those who must have advocated or fought for 
its exclusion most likely would be DPR and they don’t want any form 
of interference and what is the national [interest].616 
                                               
614 Ladan has also noted this contradiction within Section 7 of the Act. See Ladan, “Review of 
NESREA Act 2007 and Regulations 2009-2011.” 
615 S.8 (g)(k), National Environmental Standards and Regulations, Enforcement Agency 
(Establishment) Act, 2007.  




The NESREA Act is not considered an overwhelming success or failure relative to 
other pieces of legislation analysed in this Chapter. One third of survey 
respondents believe the NESREA Act has achieved or somewhat achieved its 
stated aims. However, these survey responses can be misleading, as they do not 
specifically ask about the Act’s effectiveness in environmental regulation of the oil 
sector.617 Given the high instance of oil and gas sector exclusion in the legislation, 
it would be likely that the Act would not be deemed effective in regulating the oil 
and gas sector’s environmental impact. 
  
                                               





Table 4: NESREA Functions 
Section 7 Functions of the Agency 
a) enforce compliance with laws, guidelines, policies and standards on 
environmental matters; 
b) coordinate and liaise with stakeholders, within and outside Nigeria, on 
matters of environmental standards, regulations and enforcement; 
c) enforce compliance with the provisions of international 
agreements, protocols, conventions and treaties on the environment, 
including climate change, biodiversity, conservation, desertification, 
forestry, oil and gas, chemicals, hazardous wastes, ozone depletion, 
marine and wild life, pollution, sanitation and such other environmental 
agreements as may from time to time come into force ; 
d) enforce compliance with policies, standards, legislation and guidelines 
on water quality, environmental health and sanitation, including pollution 
abatement ; 
e) enforce compliance with guidelines and legislations on sustainable 
management of the ecosystem, biodiversity conservation and the 
development of Nigeria's natural resources; 
f) enforce compliance with any legislation on sound chemical management, 
safe use of pesticides and disposal of spent packages thereof; 
g) enforce compliance with regulations on the importation, exportation, 
production, distribution, storage, sale, use, handling and disposal of 
hazardous chemicals and waste other than in the oil and gas sector; 
h) enforce through compliance monitoring, the environmental regulations and 
standards on noise, air, land, seas, oceans and other water bodies other 
than in the oil and gas sector; 
i) ensure that environmental projects funded by donor organizations and 
external support agencies adhered to regulations in environmental safety 
and 
protection; 
j) enforce environmental control measures through registration, licensing 
and permitting systems other than in the oil and gas sector; 
k) conduct environmental audit and establish data bank on regulatory and 
enforcement mechanisms of environmental standards other than in the 
oil and gas sector; 
l) create public awareness and provide environmental education on 
sustainable environmental management, promote private sector 
compliance with environmental regulations other than in the oil and 
gas sector and publish general scientific or other data resulting from the 
performance of its functions; 
m) carry out such activities as are necessary or expedient for the performance 
of its functions. 
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5.13.1 NESREA Act Summary 
 
The NESREA Act is a regressive piece of legislation for protecting the environment 
from oil sector activity. The drafters of this law intended for NESREA to be 
excluded from core environmental regulation functions in the oil and gas sector. 
The purpose of including the Act in this analysis of statute law is more to highlight 
how it is irrelevant to A2EJ in the oil sector, despite what might be expected of an 
overarching environmental protection institution. NESREA has been stripped of 
any ability to monitor, develop, or enforce environmental policies in the oil sector. 
This is a departure from the legislative provisions of its predecessor, FEPA. This 
omission leaves the sector with two institutions – Department of Petroleum 




This Chapter reviewed 11 laws that underpin environmental governance for 
Nigeria’s oil sector. In doing so, I discussed a series of findings. Doctrinal, along 
with historical and socio-legal methods were used to create a comprehensive 
assessment of the framework’s strengths and shortcomings. Few laws were 
deemed effective, in terms of achieving their own stated objectives or in providing 
mechanisms for redress by survey respondents. What my analysis found is a clear 
divide in perceived quality between legislation catered toward oil industry and 
government objectives and those laws, which are framed as a means for protecting 
the environment from oil sector activity, such as the ONWA, AGRA, EIA, and the 
1999 Constitution itself.  
 
My investigation of individual laws produced some common themes: 
 
1) Fines and penalties imposed in legislation are either too low to modify 
behaviour, or too severe to be enforced (e.g. AGRA and NOSDRA); 
2) In the course of repealing and adding legislation over the years, core 
functions have never been appropriately realigned with new institutional 
structures, leaving some responsibilities without clear lines of 
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accountability, while others find overlap in many institutions, creating a 
culture of competition and confusion (e.g. NOSDRA and NESREA); 
3) Commercially-focused legislation, may be regarded as more effective than 
other legislation, but there are few opportunities to leverage these laws to 
the benefit of citizens negatively affected by sector activity (e.g. OPA); 
4) Repealing a failing law and replacing it with a new one, particularly those 
that establish institutions, is not a solution to fixing underlying political 
challenges as to why institutions fail in the first place (e.g. NESREA and 
NDDC); and 
5) Legislation derived from international treaty obligations struggle to be 
relevant or effective in the domestic context (e.g. NOSDRA and ONWA). 
 
The development of a governance framework over multiple regime types, which 
date back to colonial rule, presents particular challenges for the framework’s 
ability to provide A2EJ in present-day Nigeria. This is evident in the analysis of 
the evolution of Nigeria’s Constitution, which is itself a non-consultative document 
that houses military era provisions, such as the legitimisation of the Land Use Act. 
 
This dissonance comes from an incompatibility with the historical contexts under 
which laws were drafted. Some laws were written during a time where oil was not 
yet the mainstay of the economy, while others were written explicitly to bolster the 
extractive economy. Some laws were responses to domestic and international 
political pressure. Some laws were introduced as part of a policy framework 
introduced with the dawn of the Fourth Republic. However, these fault lines in the 
legal landscape and maintenance of the status quo are not accidental. This 
dissonance is a rational choice made by a Rentier State that controls and relies 
upon the country’s natural resources to function. What is clear from this analysis 
is that, despite the current democratic regime, the state continues to prioritise 
commercial gain for the Federal Government over justice for a relatively small 
fraction of the total Nigerian population.618 
 
                                               
618 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3 on the Rentier State for more. 
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This Chapter has illustrated that current legislation does not provide meaningful 
mechanisms for redress in the Nigerian context. However, this does not mean that 
citizens are not accessing the legal system in their search for environmental 
justice; rather these findings show that statute law is rarely their entry point for 
airing their grievances in court. The poor quality and lack of legitimacy of statute 
law has thus resulted in a de facto preference for the use of tort law in oil pollution 
disputes.619 In this context, the following Chapter will explore the use of tort as the 
primary mechanism for redress in oil pollution litigation between oil companies 
and communities. 
                                               
619 In a 2014 UK court case, The Bodo Community and Ors. v. SPDC [2014] EWHC 1973 









This Chapter analyses case law with the aim of better understanding the degree 
to which the courts serve as a legitimate gateway for justice for victims of oil-
related environmental harms. The Chapter closely attends to strategies used by 
litigants to seek redress, and by oil companies defending suits against them. 
Analysis of litigation here will be restricted to cases that are concerned with 
environmental harms caused by petroleum exploration and extraction, with 
particular emphasis on cases since 1999, the dawn of the Fourth Republic.  
 
By way of introduction, this Chapter will first describe the current composition of 
the Nigerian judiciary. It will then discuss its evolution over time, beginning with 
pre-colonial dispute resolution mechanisms. Section 6.3 will then provide the 
methodology for the case law analysis. This section will also provide relevant 
descriptive statistics from the case law dataset as a whole.  
 
The Chapter will then provide an analysis of the case law, as grouped by relevant 
themes. I will do this first by addressing public interest litigation, in Section 6.4, a 
tool popularised in other jurisdictions, such as India, but which is broadly absent 
in the Nigerian context. The Chapter will then move on to discuss more traditional 
tort litigation in Section 6.5 by beginning with a brief discussion of the reasons 
why tort has become a preferred litigation strategy in Nigeria. Following on from 
this, I analyse case law that involves the three most common torts used by 
communities in bringing claims against oil companies. After understanding the 
tactics of those seeking redress, I analyse oil company litigation strategies, 
emphasising the jurisdiction defence. Finally, in Section 6.6, I discuss the 
challenges related to the emergent use of extra-territorial litigation for seeking 





6.2 The Judiciary 
As this is a socio-legal dissertation, understanding how the courts are arranged 
and the way in which they came to exist in their current state is an integral part 
of the analysis of the case law itself.620  
6.2.1 The Judiciary, As Provided for in the 1999 Constitution 
 
The Nigerian judiciary in the Fourth Republic is comprised of federal and state 
courts whose jurisdictions are outlined in the 1999 Constitution.621 State and 
Federal courts have jurisdiction based on a mix of geography and subject matter. 
There are four categories of trial courts (High Courts, Industrial Courts, 
Customary courts, and Sharia Courts) and two levels of appellate courts. The 
Supreme Court lies at the apex of the Nigerian court system.622 In addition to the 
Supreme Court’s apex appellate function, it also has original jurisdiction over 
disputes between the Federal Government and a State, as well as disputes between 
States.623 The Supreme Court consists of a Chief Justice, appointed by the 
president following a recommendation for the National Judicial Council, and up to 
twenty additional Supreme Court Justices.624  
 
                                               
620 Cotterrell notes that “The political power of the state which guarantees the decisions of certain 
official legal interpreters, puts an end to argument, determines which interpretive concepts 
prevail, asserts favoured normative judgments as superior to all competing ones, and guarantees 
normative closure by the threat of official coercion.” See Cotterrell, “Why must legal ideas be 
interpreted sociologically?” 181.  
621 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap.VII].  
622 See Figure 7.  
623 S.232(2) The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap.VII]. 
624 The NJC is a constitutional body, which has the key function of “insulat[ing] the Judiciary 
from the whims and caprices of the Executive; hence guarantee the independence of this Arm of 
Government, which is a sine qua non for any democratic Government.” See “National Judicial 
Council Profile,” National Judicial Council, http://www.njcgov.org/aboutus/aboutusprofile  
(accessed August 22, 2017). For a range of examples of how the NJC performed its job in 
disciplining justices, see Okechukwu Oko, “Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis 
of the Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 
31, no. 1 (2005): 10-82.  
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Figure 6: Illustration based on 1999 Constitution 
 
 
The Court of Appeals is the appellate body directly below the Supreme Court and 
consists of a President of the Court of Appeal, also appointed by the President 
following a recommendation from the National Judicial Council. There are up to 
forty-nine additional Court of Appeal Justices, including three who are experienced 
in Islamic Law and three who are experienced in Customary Law.  
 
Under the Court of Appeals, there is a layer of High Courts. These courts deal with 
Federal and State issues, as well as issues pertaining to the Federal Capital 
Territory and relating to appeals from lower Sharia and customary courts. The 
Federal High Courts hold original jurisdiction for a range of economic issues of 
national interest outlined in the Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. Areas 
covered exclusively by federal courts that are relevant to this research include: 
 oil and minerals,  
 taxation,  
 customs,  
 banking,  
 companies,  
 intellectual property,  
 admiralty, and  
 trade.625  
                                               
625 Before 1993, State High Courts were the first port of call for oil-related disputes. See Frynas, 
Oil in Nigeria, 93. See also Section 6.5.2.1 for more on Jurisdiction. Trade matters, and all civil 
matters related to employment, labour, and “industrial relations” became the exclusive 
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The Sharia and Customary Courts of Appeal are primarily reserved for matters of 
appeal in personal and family law disputes.626  The Federal Capital Territory High 
Court and the State High Courts thus have original jurisdiction to “hear and 
determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, 
power, duty, liability privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear 
and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, 
forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any 
person.”627 Below the State High Courts, the first port of call for a range of legal 
issues primarily relating to family law and personal law may be Magistrate or 
District Courts, Sharia or Customary Courts, depending on the issue and the 
preference of the litigants.628  
 
6.2.2 Evolution of the Courts 
 
The current structure of the judiciary is conditioned by the history of dispute 
resolution in Nigeria. According to Aka, the evolution of the judiciary in Nigeria 
falls into three stages: Pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial.629 Each of these 
three stages has left a lasting impact on the way in which the judiciary is 
structured and behaves in its present form. As Aka points out, the judiciary served 
different functions at each point in history. Since democratic Nigeria has only 
existed for an extended period from 1999, social justice simply was not a primary 
objective of the courts until very recently in Nigeria’s history.630 
 
In the pre-colonial era, the modern day conception of a unified independent Nigeria 
did not exist. Aka focuses his analysis during this period instead on the judicial 
systems of the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani tribes – the three major tribes that 
occupy Nigeria today.631 Each system’s construct of a judiciary differed, but all 
                                               
jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court in 2010 with the introduction of a constitutional 
amendment. See “Jurisdiction and Power,” National Industrial Court of Nigeria 
http://nicn.gov.ng/jurisdiction-and-power (accessed September 2, 2017). 
626 S.272, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap VII].  
627 Ibid., S.257(1) and S.272(1). 
628 Yemisi Dina, John Akintayo & Funke Ekundayo, “Guide to Nigerian Legal Information,” 
GlobaLex, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Nigeria.html (accessed August 4, 2017).  
629 Philip C. Aka, “Judicial Independence under Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Problems and 
Prospects,” California Western International Law Journal 45 (2015): 1–78; 19-25. 
630 Aka, “Judicial Independence under Nigeria’s Fourth Republic,” 24. 
631 Ibid., 20.  
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were tools for “social control geared toward dispute reconciliation and maintaining 
peace, order, and stability in the community.”632 For the Igbos, elders performed 
the judicial function by applying customary law in Council.633  In the case of the 
Yoruba tribe, it was the job of the traditional leader, the Oba, to apply customary 
law in the councils.634 For the Hausa-Fulani, Islamic law was administered by 
Emirs with the support of Islamic law experts.635 
 
The colonial period formalised the courts into a unified structure, first with 
separate courts in northern and southern Nigeria, followed by a period of 
consolidation in 1914, “where the judicial structure consisted, in order from lowest 
to highest tribunal: native courts, provincial courts, the Supreme Court, and the 
West African Court of Appeal.”636 Aka characterises the colonial era judiciary as 
“an executive tool”637 that served a similar control function to pre-colonial courts. 
However, instead of focusing on internal dynamics and ensuring stability, 
Nigeria’s colonial judiciary was focused on ensuring access to economic 
opportunities for Britain.638 As such, Aka notes that the judiciary during this time 
had no social justice imperative.  
 
The post-colonial period can be broken into periods of military and democratic rule, 
both of which illustrate different conceptions of the judicial function. As might be 
expected during periods of military rule, “military dictators disbanded the 
legislature and ruled by military decrees, as well as suspended many sections of 
the constitution, including those dealing with fundamental freedoms.”639 In 
addition to suspending parts of the constitution, military rulers instituted military 
tribunals, stripping the judiciary of some of its core functions.640 Aka notes that 
during this period the courts were used in a similar way as they were during the 
colonial period: to consolidate executive power.  
                                               
632 Aka, “Judicial Independence under Nigeria’s Fourth Republic,” 24. 
633 Ibid., 20-21. 
634 Ibid. 
635 Ibid. 
636 Ibid., 22. 
637 Ibid., 21. 
638 Ibid., 21-22. 
639 Ibid., 24.  
640 Ibid.  
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Nigeria has experienced two judiciary cultures in periods of democracy. The first 
brief period was modelled after the British (1960-1966), during which there was a 
preference for the primacy of the legislature as is the case in the British 
tradition.641 In later democratic periods, the judiciary was based on the American 
presidential system (1979-1983, then 1999-present).642 Aka argues that it is under 
the American judiciary model that Nigeria’s courts could have scope for judicial 
independence.643 This is because the presidential system features more of an 
explicit role for the judiciary to undertake judicial review, rather than the 
parliamentary system, where there is less of a tradition of “judge made law.”644 
 
The evolution of Nigeria’s courts is a useful starting point for analysis of the case 
law in this Chapter and for putting into context the survey responses that will 
follow in Chapter 7. Firstly, it must be noted that it is only in recent history that 
Nigeria’s courts have been constructed to enable judicial independence. Secondly, 
present day courts carry with them a heavy history of the legal culture that came 
before them, when judiciaries did not prioritise social justice, and when courts were 
seen as a natural extension of executive power. In this context, it is more tenuous 
for a relatively young democratic judiciary to function in a way that may look 
familiar to those who hail from jurisdictions where there is a long tradition of 
judicial independence.  
 
6.3 Methodology, Case Law Profile and Trends 
 
In this section, I provide a brief discussion of methodology for the Chapter, and 
then present an overview of the body of case law that will be analysed. I also 
provide some high-level findings about recent reported case law on oil pollution.645 
                                               
641 Ibid., 24-25.  
642 Ibid., 24-25. 
643 Ibid.  
644 Ibid. 
645 These “macro findings” should be read with awareness of the implicit biases of the sample (See 
Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3 on Methodology), primarily that these are only cases that have appeared 
in Law Reports or academic literature on the subject and as such may have an implicit reporting 
bias. The cases are also at different stages of the judicial process, with only a few cited decisions 
from trial courts and most at different appellate courts. Given a culture of appeal in Nigeria, it is 
not to be assumed that a decision is final unless it is a decision of the Supreme Court. 
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These findings from a systematically collected sample constitute a unique 




This Chapter takes as its foundation original data collected on litigation between 
oil companies and communities between 1999 and 2015. In addition to the domestic 
case law, I include a selection of cases from other jurisdictions where extra-
territorial litigation is used for Nigerian oil pollution cases. This section will briefly 
review how domestic case law was collected and analysed. A more thorough 




Collecting a specific sample of case law required that I identify the types of cases 
that would provide data to help answer my one of my key research questions: how 
effective are courts in acting as a gateway to environmental justice for victims of 
environmental harms in Nigeria? Answering this question requires that I draw on 
data from cases where oil companies and communities are in dispute over 
environmental harms. Research in the past has looked at some such cases, but in 
order for the case selection process to be more rigorous and substantial, my project 
develops a more systematic approach to identifying case law – by applying 
inclusion and exclusion criteria to available law reports. 646  
 
There are two primary sources of law reports that I used to create the dataset of 
cases.647 The first is a collection of law reports from 1999-2012, which were housed 
in a library at a commercial law firm in Abuja – these law reports are actively used 
by litigators in their case law research. The second source was an online database 
that covered cases from 1999 to 2015, Law Pavilion.648 The same inclusion and 
exclusion criteria were applied to both sources. For cases to be included in my 
analysis, they needed to meet the criteria of being between an oil company and an 
                                               
646 See Gilbert Kodilinye, Nigerian Law of Torts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1982) for a non-
systematic case law selection. 
647 See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2 for more information about how the law reports were accessed.  
648 Law Pavilion, http://lawpavilionplus.com/reports.html (accessed June 10, 2017). 
195 
 
individual and/or community between 1999 and 2015.649 This original sift resulted 
in 133 reported cases that involved an oil company in a dispute with an individual 
or a group of individuals. I then excluded cases that did not concern some type of 
pollution, alteration of the natural environment, or otherwise environmental 
harm. For example, I would include a case if it involved Shell and Individual X, 
but then exclude a case if Individual X was filing a suit for an employment 
dispute.650 On the other hand, I would include a suit involving Elf and Individual 
Y because it involved damage to Individual Y’s farming land due to an oil spill. 
After I had excluded non-pollution disputes, the search returned forty-eight 




Once cases were collected, I input key information of each case into a spreadsheet 
that organised significant points of information, such as which companies were 
being sued, and on which legal grounds they were being sued. I also organised 
cases based on what grounds appellate judges were making decisions, which 
parties were successful at which level of the court system, and when cases where 
being filed and  ultimately decided. This approach allowed me to analyse cases at 
the aggregate level in order to identify trends in reported case law. The approach 
also provided me with a mechanism to focus my analysis on the individual level, 
such as organising cases by which torts were used.  
 
While this approach ensured that I had a comprehensive sample for analysis, it 
also presented a bias toward reported case law, which by its very nature focuses 
on precedential or novel judgements. In light of this, it is reasonable to assume 
that this research only covers a fraction of litigation relating to oil pollution in 
Nigeria. There may be a broader approach to judicial decision-making at the trial 
court level not captured, given my focus on appellate courts and final judgements. 
With this limitation in mind, the next section will discuss the aggregate trends 
identified by the research. 
                                               
649 Oil companies were identified by searching for NNPC, as well as major international oil 
companies known to have oil blocs in Nigeria, such as Shell, AGIP, Elf, Chevron, etc. 




6.3.2 Case Sample – Trends 
 
As mentioned above, the methodology enables me to identify some useful findings 
by looking at the cases on the aggregate level. This section will discuss some of 
these aggregate findings, which shed light on which companies are most often 
named in reported case law (6.3.2.1), the amount of time it takes for cases to make 
it through the appellate system (6.3.2.2), and the success rate of communities at 
different levels of the court system (6.3.2.3). The findings discussed below were 
gleaned specifically from analysing the case law as it is written.651  
 
6.3.2.1 Who is Being Sued and Why? 
 
A majority of the reported case law available from 1999-2015 involved Shell as 
named tortfeasor.652 While Shell is named in a vast majority of cases, it may not 
necessarily mean that they are somehow more at fault, or are conducting their oil 
operations in a more risky fashion than other oil majors operating in Nigeria. 
Indeed, Shell’s prevalence in oil pollution litigation may instead be explained by 
their long history of oil exploitation in Nigeria.653 As the first major oil company to 
exploit oil reserves in commercial quantities, a majority of the onshore concessions 
in the country belong to Shell.654 Onshore oil exploitation by its very definition 
comes closer to the everyday lives and economic activities of local communities, 
where offshore spills may have a more disparate negative effect on communities. 
 
                                               
651 Chapter 7 will discuss the litigation experience in a broader sense by using results of a survey 
conducted in 2014; Chapter 7 will also cover issues such as barriers to filing claims and provide 
further understanding to drivers of court delays. 
652 Figure 8 shows that more than 50% of cases involved Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary, SPDC. 





Figure 7: Shell 52%, 10.5% NNPC. 10.5% Mobil. 6.25% Chevron. 6.25% Agip. 8.25% 
Seismic Companies. 6.25% Other (Total, Gulf, etc.). 
 
More than half of the cases in my 1999-2015 Dataset were related to large scale oil 
spills. This Dataset shows that a) the inclusion and exclusion criteria outlined in 
the methodology worked well to identify cases relating to oil pollution and b) that 
communities in oil affected regions are using the courts to seek redress. The 
remedies sought in these oil spill cases were primarily related to the damage 
caused to communities’ and individuals’ land, in particular the loss of livelihoods 
caused by depletion of fish stocks and arable farming land.  The remaining half of 
reported cases covered a range of issues, including damage caused to land as a 
result of oil company operations, as well as damage caused by seismic activities 




Analysis of the Dataset also indicates severe court delay.655 Addressing cases in a 
timely manner is a cornerstone of modern conceptions of access to justice. Lord 
Bingham felt the concept to be so self-explanatory that, in outlining the tenets of 
rule of law, he simply said, “that [the Rule of Law] should also be available without 
excessive delay is so obvious as to make any elaboration unnecessary.”656 Heise 
                                               
655 See Chapter 7, Section 7.2 for more on delay.  
656 Lord Bingham, “The Rule of Law,” The Cambridge Law Journal 66, no. 1 (2007): 67–85.  
Shell NNPC Mobil Chevron Agip Seismic Companies Other
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notes that delays not only inhibit justice from being served, but also “erode public 
confidence in the civil justice system, disappoint and frustrate those seeking 
compensation through the legal system, and generate benefits for those with the 
financial ability to withstand delays or otherwise benefit from them.”657 The 
Nigerian Constitution itself recognises the importance of a timely trial, enshrining 
within the Constitution an obligation of the judiciary to provide a judgement 
within 90 days of “the conclusion of evidence and final address.”658 
 
My analysis of oil-related litigation in Nigeria found that an average of ten years 
passed from the time a case is filed in a trial court to when a final judgement is 
received in an appellate court.659 The date of the trial court filing was often not 
readily available in the dataset of reported cases, but a conservative estimate, 
based on data available, would be that it might take three to four years for a case 
to be heard in the trial court.660 According to the Dataset that I collected, once an 
oil pollution case has been filed with the Court of Appeals, litigants experienced an 
average of 3.7 years wait for a decision between the time of filing in the appellate 
court and the judgement.661 For a further appeal to the Supreme Court, an average 
                                               
657 Michael Heise, “Justice Delayed: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time,” Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 50, no.4 (2000): 813-850; 814-815.    
658 S.294(1), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [Cap VII]. For more, see: 
Nwauche, E. S. “An Appraisal of the Constitutional Provision for the Delivery of Judgments in 
Nigeria,” Commonwealth Law Bulletin 27, no. 2 (2001): 1278–90; 1279.  
659 Onyema places this estimate between five and twenty years. See Emilia Onyema, “The Multi-
door Court House (MDC) Scheme in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Lagos MDC,” Apogee Journal of 
Business, Property & Constitutional Law 2, no. 7 (2012): 96-130.  
660 Data is based on what trial dates could be found in my sample, as averaged, and then 
triangulated with broader research. I could not identify accurate statistics on the total number of 
relevant suits that were filed at the trial stage, so used broader literature on the justice sector to 
corroborate findings. For example, see “Assessment of Justice System Integrity and Capacity in 
three Nigerian States,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/Justice_Sector_Assessment_2004.pdf (accessed 
August 1, 2017); John Agbonika and Alewo Musa, “Delay in the Administration of Criminal 
Justice in Nigeria: Issues from a Nigerian Viewpoint,” Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization 
26, no. 0 (2014): 130–38 and Obiokoye Onyinye Iruoma, “Eradicating delay in the administration 
of justice in African Courts: A comparative analysis of South African and Nigerian Courts,” LLM 
Dissertation, the University of Pretoria, South Africa, 31 October 2005, 41.  
661 These are my calculations based on calculating time between judgements for each case at each 
level of the court system and then averaging all of them. This calculation is confirmed by other 
studies as well. See Peter A. Anyebe, “Towards Fast Tracking Justice Delivery in Civil 
Proceedings in Nigeria,” in Judicial Reform and Transformation in Nigeria, eds. Epiphany 
Azinge, Dakas C. J. Dakas, 136-169 (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2012), 
http://www.nials-nigeria.org/journals/Peter%20Anyebe-%20Towards%20Fast%20Tracking.pdf 
(accessed August 1, 2017).  
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of 4.3 years passed between filing and judgement. This means that most litigants 
were waiting an average of eight years simply to resolve a complete appeal process. 
From a comparative perspective, Nigeria’s delays in civil proceedings are poor, 
even when compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries and to other lower-
middle income countries.662 
 
While Chapter 7 will discuss some of the key drivers of delay in the context of the 
“litigation experience,” it is prudent to discuss here the culture of appeal in 
Nigerian litigation. This is of particular relevance to the case law discussed in this 
Chapter due to the fact that all cases discussed are appellate decisions. Nigeria 
has a universal right to appeal enshrined within the Constitution that drives delay 
and congestion in the courts.663 One study found that in 2000/2001, 504 appeals 
cases were lodged with the Supreme Court.664 Of those filed, 275 received opinions 
by the court, compared with the average of 80 – 90 cases that receive attention 
from the U.S. Supreme Court annually.665  
 
This right to appeal stems from Section 241 of the 1999 Constitution, which 
provides for the right to appeal, even if that appeal is frivolous in nature.666  Of 
particular significance to establishing a universal right to appeal is section 
241(1)a, which states that a litigant has a right to appeal “Final decisions in any 
                                               
662 On the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, Nigeria scored lower than the regional 
average for Sub-Saharan Africa, and lower than the average for other lower-middle income 
countries. See “Rule of Law Index,” World Justice Project, 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/RoLI_Final-Digital_0.pdf (August 1, 
2017).  
663 Ogowewo, Tunde I. “Self-Inflicted Constraints on Judicial Government in Nigeria.” Journal of 
African Law 49, no. 1 (April 2005): 39–53, 46. 
664 Ibid., 40. 
665 Ibid., 39. Also see “The Justice’s Caseload,” Supreme Court of the United States 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx  (accessed August 22, 2017). Based on 
published Supreme Court judgements from the Center of the Nigerian Judicature, the Supreme 
Court’s caseload has fluctuated, from high points, such as more than 300 cases in 2001 to historic 
lows, such as 8 cases in 2011. See for all Supreme Court judgements “2016 Judgements of the 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,” Center for the Nigerian Judicature, 
http://www.lawnigeria.com/FEDERATION-JUDGMENTS.html (accessed August 1, 2017). 
666 In addition to the drafting of S.241, a possible contributing factor to this culture of appeal is 
the way in which Nigerian lawyers become Senior Advocates of Nigeria (SAN), roughly equivalent 
in status to a Queen’s Counsel in the UK. In order to gain SAN status, a lawyer must fit a 
number of criteria, including having tried 8 cases at the High Court, 6 at the Court of Appeal, and 
3 at the Supreme Court. This designation incentivizes lawyers to push cases to the Supreme 
Court, and thus has an adverse effect on the efficiency of the courts. See Ogowewo “Self-Inflicted 
Constraints on Judicial Government in Nigeria,” 46. 
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civil or criminal proceedings before the Federal High Court or a High Court sitting 
at first instance.” This means that the only true restriction to appeal would be if 
an appellant was filing suit on anything other than a final decision, for example if 
a litigant appealed a preliminary judgement. Section 241(1)b states that appeals 
can be heard based on “questions of law alone,” but it is not an overriding 
requirement of all appeals.667 The result of such drafting is that appellate courts 
are required to hear cases as a matter of constitutional right, even if there is no 
question of law raised. This creates a straightforward mechanism to delay final 
judgements in cases, a tactic which is always advantageous to the party that has 
the most to lose financially from the suit.668  
 
One key informant described the universal right as follows: 
 
So court number one throws it out, fine, you can appeal to court 
number two, court number two throws it out, you go over to the 
Supreme Court. Seven to ten years have passed because of the 
congestion of the court...not only are appeals a right, the court has to 
hear it. Therefore the courts are congested because many of them lack 
in any merit, but it’s a right.669   
 
The frivolity of some of these appeals can be egregious. One senior legal 
practitioner cited a case he worked on where a community’s filing was severely 
delayed due to the fact that the court paperwork was filed against “Shell Petroleum 
Development Company” rather than “The Shell Petroleum Development Company 
of Nigeria.”  The lawyer calls the tactic of filing such a paltry objection “legal 
filibustering.”670 Six months after filing the objection, the community was asked to 
amend their paperwork to correct the clerical error. By that point, the community 
was confused, alienated from the legal system and asked the lawyer to remove 
their claim from court.  A year later, the community informed their former counsel 
that they had received payment for the pollution caused in their community, 
without continuing with their claim. The lawyer recounts:  
                                               
667 PH1L3 adds that the Rules of Court grant lower courts the right to give leave of court for 
appeals where a question of fact is being appealed versus questions of law, which do not require 
such a leave of court. Interview PH1L3, June 29, 2017. 
668 Chapter 7’s Sections on Delay and Enforcement discuss this further. 





They told me “we’ve gotten paid”. I said “how?” [The community said] 
“We just got our youths to go and block the location and seize their 
stuff and they came and negotiated with us and we got paid.”671 
 
This section has discussed the scope of delay in Nigeria’s courts.672 From filing a 
suit to receiving a final judgement, a claimant can expect to undergo an average of 
ten years of legal proceedings before they receive a final decision. As expedient 
judgements are a cornerstone of access to justice and the rule of law, this lengthy 
time frame to resolve disputes is an entrenched barrier to environmental justice. 
These delays have real implications for the lives of people who have suffered from 
oil pollution. From further deteriorating health or continued loss of livelihood from 
polluted farmland, delays in judgements almost exclusively serve as a beneficial 
mechanism for oil companies in suits where communities are seeking damages. 
 
6.3.2.3 Bias of Decisions 
 
Investigating bias in court judgements simply by analysing the case law is a 
fraught exercise.673 Larkins cautions against assessing bias by counting how many 
times a court judged in favour of a particular litigant or against another. Larkins 
notes that judging a court as lacking bias simply because it grants judgements 
evenly across litigant groups does not mean that both parties are always equally 
legally right.674 Keeping this in mind, Chapter 7 provides a more nuanced 
discussion of bias of decisions based on perceptions of legal practitioners that 
regularly interact with the courts. While the nuance provided in Chapter 7 helps 
to determine bias more definitively, this section will briefly discuss how each level 
of the courts in my dataset decided cases, either in favour of oil companies or 
communities. This information is useful to dispel assumptions about the way in 
which courts decide cases (particularly, to show that oil communities do win in 
court sometimes, but that the level of the court matters). 
                                               
671 Interview A1L2–PH, January 12, 2015. 
672 See Chapter 7, Section 7.2 for more on delay across the litigation cycle. 
673 See Christopher M Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and 
Conceptual Analysis,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 44, no. 4 (1996): 605–26.  




Of the cases I analysed, a majority of trial judges ruled in favour of parties harmed 
by oil industry activity. This could be for a variety of reasons. It could be that the 
cases are simply clear instances of a valid legal claim filed for egregious conduct 
on the part of the oil company. There has also been the suggestion that lower courts 
are putting a larger emphasis on the substantive case rather than procedural 
bottlenecks that have historically hindered these cases moving forward in the 
courts.675 Finally, it may be that there is a cultural, age, or educational difference 
at various levels of the court, meaning that justices could approach the same 
material differently.  
 
At the Court of Appeals level, 55% of the cases analysed were decided in favour of 
oil companies.676 This slight gap widens dramatically at the Supreme Court level, 
however. Seventy two percent of cases can be classified as clear wins for oil 
companies in the Supreme Court, versus less than a third for communities. It could 
be that oil companies simply have more cogent legal claims a majority of the time, 
and so make it through a successful appeals process based on the merits of their 
claims. Alternatively, it could be due to the fact that the culture within the 
Supreme Court is one that takes a more technicality-driven approach than the 
lower courts, which oil companies could exploit. Finally, this could be the case 
because Supreme Court justices are more sympathetic to oil company interests 
than in the trial courts due to reasons such as the economic influence of oil revenue 
or extrajudicial pressure imposed on judges at the final stage of the appeals 
process. These hypotheses will be explored in more detail in Chapter 7, where 
survey findings suggest there is a real bias in the courts in favour of oil companies.  
                                               
675 Assertions came from Interviews A1G1 and A1G2, July 14, 2014. This could be due to the 
Federal High Court Rules, which place an emphasis on doing substantive justice. See Nigeria 
Fed. High Court CPR 2009.  
676 In the instances where communities won a favourable judgement, a victory might be that their 
case is remitted back to a lower court to be heard again, or in some instances they won the appeal 
outright, which still leaves them with uncertainty at the Supreme Court hearing. In the instances 
where a company wins a favourable judgement in the Court of Appeal, a “win” is getting the suit 
thrown out by the judge altogether, a somewhat common outcome. This means that the Court of 
Appeal, as an institution, can do little to provide substantive redress for victims of oil pollution. 
Remitting cases back to a lower court introduces further uncertainty of when the case may be 
definitively resolved and provides no assurances that the next suit will have a positive outcome. A 






This section provided an overarching framing for the analysis that will follow. Of 
the forty-eight cases analysed, Shell is the most named oil company in disputes. 
The section also found that while more than half of cases are concerned specifically 
with oil spills, there is still a large group of cases where claimants filed disputes 
over other negative environmental externalities of sector activity, such as seismic 
activities. This significant group of cases suggests that in reviewing and reforming 
future gateways to environmental justice in the oil and gas sector, considerations 
must be made for environmental damage beyond oil spills. 
 
I also made use of anecdotal assertions by key informants and literature in order 
to show that judgements are substantially delayed. Based on analysis of the Court 
of Appeal, Supreme Court, and some high court cases, along with the literature, 
the modest estimate is an average of 10 years to receive a final judgement in a 
case. As I will show in Chapter 7, this figure may be broadly consistent with the 
severity of delays across the Nigerian legal system, but the tactics used to delay 
may differ. Finally, this section highlighted that some litigants fare better at 
different levels of the court system. The following section will discuss one 
particular type of lawsuit that was broadly absent from the dataset: public interest 
environmental litigation. 
 
6.4 Public Interest Environmental Litigation 
 
In some regions of the Global South, Public Interest Environmental Litigation 
(hereafter PIEL) is considered an important gateway to environmental justice.677 
The litigation strategy involves an individual or group that may or may not be 
directly affected by a certain environmental harm instituting a legal action in the 
public interest.678 PIEL suits can cover a range of environmental issues – from 
                                               
677 See Razzaque for her seminal work on PIEL in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Jona 
Razzaque, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004). 
678 Michael G Faure and A.V. Raja, “Effectiveness of Environmental Public Interest Litigation in 




ensuring that certain economic activity does not pose a threat to citizens’ health to 
ensuring that activities such as mining or quarrying do not negatively affect the 
“ecological balance” of a particular ecosystem.679 PIEL has been used effectively in 
India to hold government to account and to provide protection to society’s most 
vulnerable citizens.680  
 
Razzaque notes that PIEL has a range of benefits in the contexts she studies 
(India, Pakistan and Bangladesh), which share similarities to Nigeria.681 Razzaque 
notes that PIEL is an effective tool because governments face constraints that 
make the enforcement of environmental regulations challenging. In particular she 
argues that “insufficient funds, inadequate staff, and lack of expertise” in 
government regulators make PIEL an attractive alternative for seeking 
environmental protection in the public interest.682 Further, Razzaque notes that 
“agencies may be unwilling to bring actions against violators due to political 
pressure or the agencies themselves are promoting the activity that they should be 
regulating.”683 In these cases, PIEL serves as a tool for citizen-initiated action, 
which can help to overcome government apathy.684  Chapter 4 of this dissertation 
illustrated that these constraints – insufficient funds, expertise, and political 
motivation – apply not only to countries in South Asia, but also to the Nigerian 
context.  
 
One of the starkest observations that emerged in reviewing my Dataset was that 
there is a lack of PIEL in the Nigerian context. This is particularly striking given 
the considerable benefits of PIEL found in India, where the country’s constitutional 
framework shares similar approaches to Nigeria in conferring rights on citizens.685 
                                               
679 Razzaque, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, 48. 
680 Faure and Raja, “Effectiveness of Environmental Public Interest Litigation in India,” 248. 
681 Razzaque, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, 11. 
Cha also makes the point that PIEL can be used when environmental laws are ineffectively 
enforced. See Cha, “Applying Lessons Learned from the United States,” 202. 
682 Ibid., 11. 
683 Ibid.  
684 Ibid. 
685 See Emmanuel E. Okon, “The Environmental Perspective in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.” 
Environmental Law Review 5, no. 4 (December 1, 2003): 256–78; Read, “The New Constitution” 
and Okere, “Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy under the Nigerian 
Constitution.”   
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In order to better understand this dearth of PIEL in Nigeria, I will briefly compare 
the Nigerian and Indian approaches to interpreting their respective constitutions’ 
provisions for fundamental rights and fundamental objectives and directive 
principles.686 I will also note each jurisdiction’s approach to standing, a liberal 
interpretation of which is a key precondition to successful PIEL.687 Then, in 6.4.2, 
the section will discuss three cases in Nigeria where PIEL was attempted in 
relation to oil sector activity. As the literature on Indian public interest litigation 
is extensive, this section intends only to be illustrative, rather than 
comprehensive.688 
 
6.4.1 Enabling An Environment For PIEL: India and Nigeria 
 
Since the 1980s, India has been a leader in Public Interest Environmental 
Litigation in the Global South and has introduced a range of innovations for 
expanding access to courts for cases in the public interest.689 In this section I draw 
attention to two innovations in Indian law which have been instrumental in 
developing a tradition of public interest environmental litigation. These two 
innovations – liberalising standing and introducing a new interpretation of the 
fundamental right to life – are useful comparators to the Nigerian context, where 
the pre-conditions for innovation are similar, and yet the judiciaries have chosen 
different paths with respect to public interest environmental litigation. 
 
In the late 1970s, India began to liberalise standing. Before this, the Indian courts 
employed a restrictive interpretation of standing, which required a litigant to have 
direct interest in a case in order to file a valid claim.690 However, this began to 
                                               
686 More on the Nigerian Constitution and its approach to rights is discussed in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.10. 
687 Jamie Cassels, “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the 
Impossible?” The American Journal of Comparative Law 37, no. 3 (1989): 495–519; 498. 
688 For more on PIEL in India see, Razzaque, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh and Perry-Kessaris, “Global Business, Local Law: The Indian Legal 
System as a Communal Resource in Foreign Investment Relations.”  
689 See Geetanjoy Sahu, “Implications of Indian Supreme Court’s Innovations for Environmental 
Jurisprudence”, Law, Environment and Development Journal 4, no. 1 (2008): 1-19; 1.  
690 See Sahu, “Implications of Indian Supreme Court’s Innovations for Environmental 
Jurisprudence”, 5; and Cassels, “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: 
Attempting the Impossible?,”498-499. 
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change in 1976 with Maharaj Singh v. Uttar Pradesh.691 The Supreme Court 
found that standing needed to be interpreted in a way that was sensitive to 
community, rather than purely individual interests.692 Almost three decades after 
India, Nigerian courts similarly expanded their interpretation of standing, noting 
that it is acceptable for a member of a community to sue in a representative 
capacity in order to address community interest in environmental harms.693  
 
However, this is where their jurisdictions’ interpretive similarities end. Where 
Nigeria has relaxed standing slightly, India has continued to broaden the scope of 
standing for public interest cases. By 1982, Chief Justice Bhagwati consolidated a 
developing view of liberalised standing by stating in SP Gupta v. Union of India 
that:  
 
Where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a 
determinate class of persons ... and such a person or determinate class 
of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially 
or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the court 
for relief, any member of the public can maintain an application for 
appropriate direction...694 
 
The expansion of standing, along with other developments discussed below, led to 
a now entrenched tradition of public interest environmental litigation with a range 
of actors filing cases in Indian courts for the public good. Sahu finds that “out of 
104 environmental cases from 1980-2000 in the Supreme Court of India, 54 were 
filed by individuals who were not directly the affected parties and 28 were filed by 
NGOs on behalf of the affected parties.”695  
 
More than three decades after the Indian judiciary was laying the groundwork for 
an expansive interpretation of standing, the Nigerian judiciary still viewed public 
                                               
691 Maharaj Singh v. Uttar Pradesh 1976 AIR 2602. 
692 Cited in Cassels, “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the 
Impossible?,”498.  
693 See SPDC v. Tiebo & Ors. (2005) LPELR-3203(SC) and SPDC v. Edamkue & Ors. (2009) 
LPELR-3048(SC) discussed later in this chapter. 
694 Quoted in Cassels, “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the 
Impossible?,” 499.  




interest groups as distinct from communities, treating them with hostility. In the 
case of Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v. NNPC, discussed below, a judge went 
so far as to call a watchdog NGO a “faceless busybody.”696 Without the first 
necessary step toward liberalising standing to allow for NGOs and unaffiliated 
individuals to file suits, it would be difficult for other innovations in interpretation 
to improve the avenues for public interest environmental litigation in Nigeria.697 
 
For PIEL to develop in India, the Supreme Court also had to find grounds to make 
a breach of the right to a healthy environment justiciable.698 Like Nigeria’s 
Chapter II Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles, the Indian 
Constitution’s Directive Principles of State Policy are not written as justiciable.699 
Article 37 of the Constitution of India states that the directive principles “shall not 
be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless 
fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State 
to apply these principles in making laws.”700 This is the section of the Indian 
constitution that contains Section 48(a), which stipulates that “The State shall 
endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests 
and wild life of the country.”701  
 
Initially, Indian courts interpreted this to mean that these directives of state policy 
could not be justiciable, viewing them as adversarial to individual rights.702 
However, by the early 1980s, Indian courts were finding ways to make these 
directives justiciable in a court of law by linking them to Fundamental Rights. In 
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi in 1981 
and Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation in 1985, the Supreme 
                                               
696 Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2013) 
LPELR-20075(CA).  
697 As noted in Chapter 5, The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement) Procedures 2009 have begun to 
liberalise standing for cases related to fundamental rights, as outlined in Chapter IV of the 
Nigerian Constitution, however this development is moot for environmental cases, which 
currently are not interpreted as fitting under Chapter IV’s S.33 on the right to life. 
698Rhuks Temitope, “The Judicial Recognition and Enforcement of the Right to Environment: 
Differing Perspectives from Nigeria and India,” NUJS Law Review 3 (2010): 423–46; 440. 
699 Part IV, the Constitution of India 1950. 
700 Art.37, the Constitution of India 1950.   
701 This was first introduced in a constitutional amendment in 1976. 
702 See Okere, “Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy under the 
Nigerian Constitution,” 224-225; and Okon, “Fundamental Objectives,” 271. 
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Court of India asserted that infringements on one’s right to livelihood and right to 
dignity were tantamount to breaching an individual’s right to life.703 In 1991 in 
Subhash Kumar v. State Of Bihar & Ors. the Supreme Court asserted that 
there is a justiciable right to live free from pollution as part of the Article 21 
justiciable right to life.704 This line of jurisprudence created a complementary 
relationship between rights and principles and built on previous developments in 




While this new cannon of case law was developing rapidly in India, Nigerian 
precedent remained, and continues to remain, much more stringent in its approach 
to constitutional interpretation. This analysis shows that there remains a 
reluctance by the Nigerian courts to liberalise standing and interpret the 
Constitution’s Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles in a way that 
would allow for the right to a healthy environment to be justiciable.  
 
6.4.2.1 Oronto Douglas v. SPDC 
 
Oronto Douglas spent a majority of his career fighting government institutions for 
better oil sector governance.706  Douglas was one of the lawyers on Ken Saro Wiwa’s 
defence team ahead of the Niger Delta activist’s execution in 1995.707 In the case 
                                               
703 Art. 21, the Constitution of India 1950. Cited in Cassels, “Judicial Activism and Public Interest 
Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?” 503.  
704 Subhash Kumar v. State Of Bihar And Ors. 1991 AIR 420, 1991 SCR (1) 5. See John Lee, 
“The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law,” Columbia Journal of 
Environmental Law 25 (2000): 283–346; 290. 
705 India is now further developing its stance toward PIEL with the introduction of the National 
Green Tribunal. See Rosencranz and Sahu; and Gill for more on India’s National Green Tribunal. 
Armin Rosencranz and Geetanjoy Sahu. “Assessing the National Green Tribunal after Four 
Years, “Journal of Indian Law and Society 5 (2014): 191–200. See also Gitanjali Nain Gill, “The 
National Green Tribunal of India: A Sustainable Future through the Principles of International 
Environmental Law,” Environmental Law Review 16, no. 3 (2014): 183–202 and Sudha Shrotria, 
“Environmental Justice: Is the National Green Tribunal of India Effective?,” Environmental Law 
Review 17, no. 3 (2015): 169–88. 
706 Before he passed away, Oronto Douglas was acting as special advisor to the former President 
Goodluck Jonathan. See Musikilu Mojeed, “President Jonathan’s top aide, Oronto Douglas, is 
dead,” Premium Times, April 9, 2015 http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/180816-president-
jonathans-top-aide-oronto-douglas-is-dead.html (August 1, 2017).  
707 Ibid.  
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of Douglas v. SPDC & Ors708, Douglas filed suit against Shell, NNPC, Nigerian 
LNG Ltd, Mobil and the Attorney General of Nigeria for not adhering to the 
provisions of the Environmental Impact Assessment Decree No.86 of 1992 when 
developing a new liquefied natural gas project. 
 
Douglas asked the Federal High Court for an injunction on the new LNG project 
until an up-to-standard EIA was produced. SPDC argued that Douglas had no 
standing to file the suit in the first place, despite being a member of one of the 
communities affected by the new LNG project. The trial judge agreed with the oil 
companies named in the suit and struck out Douglas’ case, which he went on to 
appeal.709 In his judgement, the trial judge noted that Douglas’ filing was 
“confused,” and that “[t]he action is frivolous and the plaintiff a busy body [who] 
should not be allowed to bring the court into contempt and ridicule.”710 
 
In his judgement, Court of Appeal Justice Musdapher ruled that the trial judge did 
not have sufficient information from the respondents at the time of their objection 
to throw out Douglas’ suit based on standing, nor on any other grounds.711 Justice 
Musdapher remitted Douglas’ case back to the Federal High Court to be heard 
anew by a different justice. However, by the time the appellate court delivered its 
decision, the LNG project in question had been completed and thus the retrial 
never went ahead.712  
 
The case was a disappointment for advancing PIEL in the Nigerian context, 
particularly on the point of liberalising standing. In making his judgement, Court 
of Appeals Justice Musdapher clarified his interpretation of standing, which 
maintained a restrictive interpretation. He argued that “for a plaintiff to establish 
his locus standi in an action for declaratory order he must prove that his legal right 
or interest which he seeks to protect is not a right common to the community at 
                                               




712 Rhuks Temitope, “The Judicial Recognition and Enforcement of the Right to Environment: 
Differing Perspectives from Nigeria and India.” NUJS Law Review 3 (2010): 423–46; 439. 
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large, unless he can show that he suffered damages more than any person.”713 
While this judgement did not require Justice Musdapher to assess Douglas’ 
standing specifically, with such a restrictive interpretation it is unlikely that 
Douglas’ case would have been successful.  
 
6.4.2.2  Gbemre v. SPDC 
 
One Federal High Court case has become commonplace in the literature on judicial 
activism and access to environmental justice in Nigeria, despite both the judge and 
the case facing serious challenges later on.714 In the case of Gbemre v. SPDC & 
Ors715, Gbemre sued Shell for gas flaring persistently in his community.716 
According to the Gbemre judgement, flaring:  
a. Poisons and pollutes the environment as it leads to the emission of 
carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas; the flares contain a cocktail 
of toxins that affect their heath, lives and livelihood. 
b. Exposes them to an increased risk of premature death, respiratory 
illness, asthma and cancer. 
c. Contributes to adverse climate change as it emits carbon dioxide and 
methane which causes warming of the environment, pollutes their food 
and water. 
d. Causes painful breathing chronic bronchitis, decreased lung 
function and death. 
e. Reduces crop production and adversely impacts on their food 
security. 
f. Causes acid rain, their corrugated house roofs are corroded by the 
composition of the rain that falls as a result of gas flaring saying that 
the primary causes of acid rain are emissions of sulphur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides which combine with atmospheric moisture to form 
sulphuric moisture to form sulphuric acid and nitric acid respectively. 
The acidic rain consequently acidifies their lakes and streams arid 
damages their vegetation.717 
 
 
                                               
713 Douglas v. SPDC & Ors. (1998) LPELR-6457(CA). 
714 For example, see Amechi, “Litigating Right to Healthy Environment in Nigeria,” 320; 
Temitope, “The Judicial Recognition and Enforcement of the Right to Environment;” and David R 
Boyd, “The Implicit Constitutional Right to Live in a Healthy Environment,” Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law 20, no. 2 (2011): 171–79; 176.  
715 Gbemre v. SPDC and Ors. (Unreported) Suit FHC/B/CS/53/05 on 14th November 2005. 
716 In Nigeria, flaring is still a persistent challenge, with ineffective statutory remedies to curb 
the practice. See Chapter 5, Section 5.7. 
717 Gbemre v. SPDC and Ors. (Unreported) Suit FHC/B/CS/53/05 on 14th November 2005. 
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Gbemre used both the Nigerian Constitution and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights to file suit against SPDC for infringing on the Iwherekan 
Community’s right to life and a clean environment due to persistent and illegal 
flaring near the community.718 The rights-based claim was a rare departure from 
the tradition of using tort law to seek redress.719 
 
The allegations were damning. From the respondents flaring without licenses, to 
the fact that there was never an EIA conducted on the activity, there was strong 
evidence to support a case that communities were suffering from the practice.720 
Throughout the proceedings, the first and second respondents (SPDC and NNPC) 
submitted an affidavit that directly opposed every paragraph in Gbemre’s affidavit 
and employed countless tactics to delay court proceedings.721  
 
Despite delays, Federal High Court Justice Nwokorie submitted a judgement that 
upheld the claim that this instance of flaring, illegal under the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Act and The Gas Re-Injection Act, did infringe on the 
community’s fundamental rights, as outlined in Chapter IV of the Nigerian 
Constitution.722 Justice Nwokorie also declared that parts of the Gas Re-Injection 
Act were unconstitutional because they were infringing on citizens’ right to life, 
similar to the line of reasoning taken in Indian PIEL jurisprudence that linked a 
right to environment (non-justiciable) to the right to life (justiciable).723 As a 
remedy, the Justice called for an injunction on flaring activity. The Judge did not 
award any compensation or damages to the community; rather he ordered that 
Shell and NNPC cease gas flaring and that the National Assembly introduce 
amendments to legislation that aided in the unconstitutional practice of flaring. 
 
                                               
718  Ibid. 
719 There is at least one other case that tried to use a rights-based claim in a flaring suit against 
oil companies in Nigeria, but it was dismissed on grounds of insufficient standing of a community 
to sue. See “Gas flaring lawsuit (re oil companies in Nigeria),” Business and Human Rights 
Resource Center, https://business-humanrights.org/en/gas-flaring-lawsuit-re-oil-companies-in-
nigeria (accessed September 1, 2017). 
720 Gbemre v. SPDC & Ors. (Unreported) Suit FHC/B/CS/53/05 on 14th November 2005. 
721 See “Gas flaring lawsuit (re oil companies in Nigeria).” 
722  Gbemre v. SPDC & Ors. (Unreported) Suit FHC/B/CS/53/05 on 14th November 2005. 




At the time of Orji’s analysis in 2005, this decision seemed to be a promising 
example of judicial activism.724 However, it was not long before the seemingly 
progressive judgment was made that Justice Nwokorie was removed from the case 
and moved from his Benin State post to the far north in Katsina State.725 This 
irregularity, in addition to the numerous delays by the respondent and the failure 
to comply with the ruling,726 came under the scrutiny of civil society actors, who 
suggested that political interference was to blame: according to a lawyer at Climate 
Justice, “the fact that the judge has been removed from the case, transferred to the 
north of the country, and [considering that] there have been problems with the 
court file for a second time, suggests a degree of interference in the judicial system 
which is unacceptable in a purported democracy acting under the rule of law”.727  
 
The case is still cited today as a progressive step forward for PIEL in Nigeria. The 
circumstances around the case suggest otherwise, however; the way in which 
academics and practitioners’ cling to the Gbemre decision shows how scarce this 
kind of progressive decision-making is in the Nigerian judiciary. Justice 
Nwokorie’s judgement was indeed progressive and activist; he attempted to 
challenge a major oil company, legislation and the behaviour of a branch of 
government. The deterioration of his career after the fact and general disregard 
for the judgement illustrates how stoking tensions with the Executive and the 
Legislature leave the judiciary vulnerable to external actors and personal 
persecution. 
 
6.4.2.3 Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v. NNPC 
 
Around the same time that Justice Nwokorie was giving his landmark decision in 
the Gbemre gas flaring case, another Justice made the decision that an NGO did 
not have standing in a suit against NNPC. The Lagos-based NGO, Centre for Oil 
Pollution Watch, was suing NNPC for a 2003 oil spill attributed to a corroded oil 
                                               
724 Orji, “An Appraisal of the Legal Frameworks for the Control of Environmental Pollution in 
Nigeria,” 333.  
725 “Shell Fails to Obey Court Order to Stop Nigeria Flaring, Again,” The Climate Law Database, 






pipeline.728 The NGO was asking for the “reinstatement, restoration, remediation 
of the impaired and/or contaminated environment.”729 NNPC challenged the 
NGO’s standing to institute the action in the first place and the trial judge upheld 
the objection. The Centre for Oil Pollution Watch appealed the trial court’s decision 
and in 2013 the Justice of the Court of Appeal agreed that the NGO did not have 
the standing to institute an action, upholding the lower court’s decision to throw 
the case out. 
 
Upon first glance, this decision may be interpreted as another judge being too 
literal and technical in his interpretation of the law. A more in-depth reading of 
the judge’s decision, however, shows that Justice Augie was making an explicit 
choice to keep the public interest litigation gateway closed for communities seeking 
redress for oil pollution. This does not mean that Justice Augie may not have 
wanted to open this legal gateway, but she acknowledged that Nigeria’s legal 
system has not “evolved” to that point.  
 
In her judgement, Justice Augie said that: 
 
The position of the law may have changed [in the UK] to cloak 
"pressure groups, NGOs and public spirited taxpayers" with locus 
standi to maintain an action for public interest, as argued by the 
Appellant, but that is in other countries, not Nigeria...The truth of 
the matter is that there is a remarkable divergence in the 
jurisprudence of locus standi in jurisdictions like England; India; 
Australia, etc., and the Nigerian approach to same, which has not 
evolved up to the stage, where litigants like the Appellant can 
ventilate the sort of grievance couched in its Amended Statement of 
Claim. 730 
                                               
728 Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2013) 
LPELR-20075(CA). 
729 This is not a common remedy asked for in Nigerian courts, where often victims of pollution 
focus on compensation awards rather than clean up. 
730 Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2013) 
LPELR-20075(CA). This contradicts other statements made by justices and lawyers in Nigeria in 
terms of the persuasiveness of British precedent. While Nigerian courts are not bound by British 
precedent after 1900 due to S.32(1) of the Interpretation Act (Cap. 123 Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria 2004), in other instances, modern British law has been at least been regarded as 
persuasive. See Access Bank plc v Akingbola [2012] EWHC 2148 (Comm) at [10], “It is agreed 
between the experts that, although English decisions are not part of Nigerian law and not binding 
on Nigerian courts, they are nevertheless of highly persuasive value…” Additional research would 





Not only did the judge declare that she was not able to proactively open a gateway 
for PIEL in Nigeria, she did  so while acknowledging that many other parts of the 
world, Global South countries included, had already begun to shift their own 
understanding of locus standi to open the gateway for more PIEL. In an assenting 
opinion, Justice Saulawa made it clear he believed the Centre for Oil Pollution 
Watch did not have a standing, nor should they.731 
 
This is perhaps one of the most overt and explicit rejections of the possibility for 
PIEL in Nigeria, despite the fact that judges are recognising that other 
jurisdictions around the world are moving forward in an attempt to provide better 
gateways to justice for citizens. This line of reasoning is at odds with past practice 
of the Nigerian judiciary, which has relied on India’s interpretation of its 
Constitution’s Directives of State Policy in order to justify its stance toward the 





In India, the judiciary has led the way for public interest litigation to be an effective 
tool for redress from environmental harm. While acknowledging that the practice 
has become commonplace in other common law jurisdictions, Nigeria’s higher 
courts remain hesitant to open this gateway. The Gbemre case indicates that there 
may be judges trying to make decisions based on substantive grounds in favour of 
communities and individuals affected by oil pollution. However, a rigid system at 
higher levels of the courts does not allow for judicial activism for PIEL.  
 
At present, the key difference between the Indian and Nigerian jurisdictions is 
their interpretation of the relationship between fundamental objectives and 
                                               
I can at least state that from reading the cases cited in this research, there is an impression of a 
departure from British tort precedent. This departure is despite the fact that the evolution of 
British tort law may contain judgements that would support social justice objectives in the 
Nigerian courts during the Fourth Republic. 




directive principles and fundamental rights. India has made a progressive choice 
to view the non-justiciable objectives and principles as complementary and 
interlinked with fundamental rights, and thus justiciable. Nigerian jurisprudence 
continues to differentiate the two Chapters of its constitution (Chapter II and IV) 
in more adversarial terms.  Despite the introduction in 2009 of somewhat 
progressive Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, the right to a 
healthy environment will not be a viable line of argument in a Nigerian court of 
law until the relationship between Chapter II and Chapter IV rights is changed.732 
 
6.5 Common Law Approaches 
 
The dearth of PIEL does not mean, however, that there is a shortage of 
environmental litigation in Nigeria. It simply means that environmental litigation 
has taken a distinctive approach, and has been developed to suit a highly 
politicised context in which neither judicial activism, nor regulation, can be 
expected to provide redress for oil pollution victims. This section reviews cases that 
highlight the torts most frequently used by those seeking redress for 
environmental damage caused by the oil and gas sector, as well as the litigation 
strategies pursued by oil companies in their defence.  
 
6.5.1 The Use of Tort 
 
In Chapter 4, I showed that the current governance regime is not effectively 
providing redress procedures for oil spills, the reason in part being the 
government’s conflicting role as oil sector regulator and commercial operator. In 
Chapter 5, I further showed that oil-related legislation and regulations provide 
only a few mechanisms for A2EJ, partly due to the government’s historic interest 
in maximising the economic benefits of oil exploitation that accrue to the state. 
Given the perverse environment within which oil sector regulation exists in 
Nigeria, it is reasonable to assume agencies will not carry out enforcement of 
regulations in a way that would be to the benefit of those living closest to oil 
exploration and production activities. It is for these reasons that that victims of oil 
                                               
732 Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 is discussed further in the Section 
5.10 of Chapter 5. 
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pollution in Nigeria often resort to the use of tort law to seek oil pollution redress 
once an environmental harm has been committed.733 Tort litigation is a common 
law instrument concerned with redress for a civil wrong. As Shapo writes, “It is 
plain that tort law cleans up messes. It provides remedies to those injured by the 
activities of others that fit into various categories of culpability and analogous 
classifications.”734  
 
The torts used in oil pollution litigation in Nigeria today are derived from the 
English Common Law tradition. These solutions remain legally valid in Nigeria 
under Section 32 of the Interpretation Act, which stipulates that common law 
remedies, as they existed before 1900, remain in force.735 The three main torts used 
in oil-related environmental litigation in Nigeria are negligence (when the accused 
did not actively intend to cause harm, but may have done so by not being as vigilant 
as required), nuisance (where an activity of the accused caused harm, in the form 
of a disturbance to the status quo living or working conditions, by its very conduct 
                                               
733 It is reasonable to expect regulations to be concerned with setting standards and defining 
codes of practice. In a contextual vacuum, they are the preferred method for environmental 
protection, as regulations and legislation are preventative as well as being the product of elected 
officials purportedly making decisions in the public interest. In the debates about the merits of 
regulation over litigation for environmental protection, it is noted that tort litigation can only 
address problems brought forward by private groups and so the decisions that are made may not 
always be for the greater public benefit. However, legislation and regulation as a preferred 
mechanism becomes tenuous when the underlying assumption – that lawmakers make law in the 
public interest – is called into question. Brenner highlights legislation in nineteenth century 
industrialising England that was ineffective in protecting the environment due to the state 
imperative to develop the economy through industrialisation. He argued that “Such legislation as 
the Nuisance Removal and Sanitary Acts had no teeth as far as air pollution went. Terms were 
loose, exceptions were many, and fines were small enough so that large enterprises could treat 
them with contempt.” On the topic of regulation versus tort litigation, see Pamela Tolosa, 
“Advantages and Restrictions of Tort Law to Deal with Environmental Damages,”  Revue générale 
de droit 38, no. 1 (2008): 111-130 ;113; Christopher H. Schroeder, “Lost in Translation: What 
Environmental Regulation Does That Tort Cannot Duplicate,” Washington Law Journal 41 (2001-
2002): 583-606; 583, 589; and Joel Franklin Brenner, “Nuisance Law and the Industrial 
Revolution,” The Journal of Legal Studies 3, no. 2 (1974): 403-433; 424, 427.   
734 Marshall S. Shapo, “Tort Law and Environmental Risk,” Pace Environmental Law Review 14, 
no. 2 (1997): 531-544, 531. 
735 S.32(1). Interpretation Act (Cap. 123 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004), “Subject to the 
provisions of this section and except in so far as other provision is made by any Federal law, the 
common law of England and the doctrines of equity, together with the statutes of general 
application that were in force in England on the 1st day of January, 1900, shall, in so far as they 




of a given activity), and strict liability (where proof that an action took place is 
enough to find the accused guilty).736  
 
Of the three torts, negligence and strict liability were the most widely used in my 
1999-2015 Dataset, with nuisance only appearing as the prevailing tort in two 
cases.737 The following sections will review the main torts used in order of 
frequency, citing case law, including both historically significant cases, as cited by 
other literature, and the recent cases identified in my Dataset. As will be shown in 
Section 6.5.2 on oil company litigation strategies, despite clear litigation logic by 
oil communities, these tactics are rarely effective. This is particularly due to the 
challenges of unclear jurisdictional limits, which have changed over the course of 
the last two decades and introduced an additional layer of ambiguity to court 
proceedings. This means that while litigants have valid substantive claims, their 
suits are often dismissed on a procedural basis.738 
 
6.5.1.1  Negligence 
 
In Chevron & Anor. v. Omoregha & Ors.,739 Justice of the Court of Appeals 
Saulawa describes negligence as follows:740 
 
The term negligence denotes the failure to exercise the standard of 
care that a reasonably prudent person would normally have exercised 
in a similar situation. That's to say, any conduct falling below the 
legal standard established to protect others against unreasonable 
risk of harm, as against conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or 
wilfully disregardful of other's rights...I think, it was Patrick Devlin, 
who once aptly remarked that – “Negligence in law ranges from 
inadvertence that is hardly more than accidental to sinful disregard 
of the safety of others”.741 
                                               
736 Trespass also technically falls into the category of possible environmental torts; however, it did 
not feature significantly in the case law dataset developed for this research. See V. K. Beena 
Kumari,” Environmental Pollution and Common Law Remedies,” Cochin University Law Review 
(1984): 101-114; and Razzaque, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh, 199. 
737 Some cases cited more than one tort – the dataset only counts the tort upon which appellate 
judges identified as the most salient.  
738 See Chapter 7, Section 7.4 for more on the courts’ preference for process than substance in 
decision-making. 
739 Chevron & Anor v. Omoregha & Ors. (2015) LPELR-24516(CA). 
740 Ibid. 




In this section, I will discuss six cases where negligence was the prevailing tort 
used by litigants to seek damages against oil companies for harms caused in the 
course of industry activity. The first two cases were those that Frynas identified 
as significant in his research. The four cases after that are taken from my Dataset. 
 
6.2.2.2.1 Pre-1999 Cases 
 
In the case of Seismograph Service v. Mark,742 it could not be proven that 
damage caused to property by a seismic boat was due to any sort of behaviour that 
could be considered negligent (the judge noted that this damage did not take place 
because the boat was speeding, for example).743 The court made its decision based 
on the boat’s conduct in view of explicit rules for boat driving conduct. While taking 
a narrow view of negligence in that case, in Mon v. Shell-BP,744 a decision was 
taken that an oil spill was the fault of the oil company in question under the res 
ipsa loquitur principle. In this instance, the burden of proof was shifted to Shell-
BP to prove that they did not act negligently, a situation that is considerably more 
favourable to the litigant with fewer resources at its disposal.745 The judge made 
the claim that 
 
Negligence on the part of defendants has been pleaded, and there is 
no evidence of it. None in fact is needed, for they must naturally be 
held responsible for the results arising from an escape of oil which 
they should have under control.746 
 
 
6.2.2.2.2 Developments Since 1999 
 
The cases before 1999 paint an inconclusive picture of how negligence can be used 
successfully in oil-related cases. The following more recent cases, however, provide 
                                               
742 Cited in Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 191. 
743 Seismic boats can cause damage to building structures and other immovable assets due to the 
intense vibrations caused by sound waves sent through the water as a way of prospecting for oil. 
See “What are seismic surveys and their impacts?,” David Suzuki Foundation, 
http://www.davidsuzuki.org/issues/oceans/science/marine-planning-and-conservation/what-are-
seismic-surveys-and-their-impacts/ (accessed August 22, 2017).  
744 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 190.  
745 Ibid., 191.  
746 Ibid., 73. 
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support for the use of negligence in Nigerian courts in particular instances. For 
example, in Ikontia & Ors v SPDC747, negligence on the part of SPDC was proven 
in the trial court and upheld by the Court of Appeal. In this case, SPDC was being 
sued for a well the company dug in Uquo Ibeno Local Government Authority, Akwa 
Ibom State, which was not appropriately cordoned off with a fence or any other 
protection. The unprotected well resulted in the death of a seven-year old child who 
fell into the unmarked well and drowned. Not only had the community brought the 
uncovered well to the attention of Shell before the accident, they went so far as to 
publish a warning about it  in a local newspaper, calling on Shell to fix the well. 
Even after the precaution and warnings of the community, Shell had done nothing 
to fix the well, which neighboured the community’s land.748 
 
Despite losing in the trial court, Shell unsuccessfully appealed the decision in the 
Court of Appeal, raising a litany of issues, all of which the Court of Appeal 
eventually dismissed. The range of issues cited by Shell’s attorney’s in the suit 
suggest  that the company knew they were likely to lose the appeal, but were 
willing to attempt any and all tactics to seek a favourable judgment and delay 
payment in the event of a loss. Perhaps the most egregious of Shell’s issues raised 
on appeal took the form of an attempt to cast doubt on the reliability of the death 
certificate of the child who fell into the well as proof of the death.749  
 
Even when the courts decide against an oil company, the delayed decisions can 
have lingering effects on access to justice. In the Ikontia case, Shell appealed the 
trial court’s decision, originally filed in 1996, in 2005. The Court of Appeal 
judgment came down in 2010, almost 15 years after the original case was filed.  In 
other words, it took 15 years after the death of their seven-year-old for the Ikontia 
family to receive a favourable judgement. 
 
In the 2015 case of Chevron & Anor v. Omoregha & Ors.,750 the Court of Appeal 
upheld a trial court’s 2011 decision to award damages to a community for damage 
                                               
747 Ikontia & Ors v. SPDC (2010) LPELR-4910(CA). 
748 Ibid. 
749 Ibid. 
750 Chevron & Anor v. Omoregha & Ors . (2015) LPELR-24516(CA). 
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caused to its fishing nets, a key source of livelihood for riverine communities. 
Damage to the community’s nets was caused by oil company tugboats speeding 
through their community’s area without providing warning by ringing a bell or 
other alarm.   
 
Chevron tried to discredit the fishermen’s claim by questioning their ability to sue 
as a group, to which the Court of Appeal judge cited the Federal High Court Rules 
(Civil Procedure) 2009, 12(1): “Where there are numerous persons having the same 
interest in one suit, one or more of such persons may sue or be sued on behalf of or 
for the benefit of all persons so interested.”751 Chevron also attempted to take issue 
with the fishermen’s submissions to the court, by arguing that they did not comply 
with Federal High Court Rules 2009. Both the trial judge and appellate judge 
agreed that Chevron’s arguments did not apply, as the case was instituted in 1996. 
In the course of the trial, Chevron called witnesses to the stand to testify; however 
the Judge dismissed their testimony, as they were not actually physically at the 
scene of the incident the day it occurred and so could only recite the information 
given to them by the company. Though the case was ultimately successful, 
damages were awarded to the community 19 years after the original filing in the 
trial court. 
  
In Onyeemukwuru & Ors. v. NNPC, Onyeemukwuru and others sued in a 
representative capacity for the Umuoma Autonomous Community in 
Ihette/Uboma LGA in Imo State for damage to their land caused by an oil spill.752 
The Umuoma community rely on the riparian land for their livelihoods, growing 
crops like Cassava, and farming snails and fish. In 2003, the community found oil 
on their land and in the streams running through it. Water was undrinkable and 
unusable for farming. The community informed NNPC without effect and the spill 
continued for six months.753 In support of their suit, they presented witnesses and 
a Registered Estate Valuer estimate of damage, including photographs of damage 
and medical records of those whose health was affected by pollution.754 NNPC did 
                                               
751 Nigeria Fed. High Court CPR 2009. 
752 NNPC v. Onyeemukwuru & Ors. (2011) LPELR-8826(CA).  
753 Ibid. 
754 Ibid.  
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not cross examine witnesses nor did they provide any of their own evidence in the 
case, or ever appear in court. The hearing first took place in December 2006 and 
the oil company did not appear for the hearing. The trial judge made a decision in 
the case in 2008, without the presence of NNPC and in favour of the community. 
NNPC appealed the decision. Upon examining NNPC’s claims, the Court of 
Appeals dismissed NNPC’s grounds for appeal.755  
 
The case is interesting for several reasons. First and most importantly, the case is 
significant because the community was able to prove negligence on the part of the 
oil companies involved for oil pollution by using extensive evidence and a 
registered Estate Valuer to support their claim. Secondly, the trial judge who 
decided in favour of the community, Justice Nwokorie, had a reputation for being 
an activist judge, yet despite this reputation, the Appellate Justice’s upheld his 
decision. Finally, the case highlights tension between branches, particularly if 
NNPC (which sits under the Executive) does not respect the judiciary enough to 
appear before the court when called.756 
 
There are also other litigants that have used the tort of negligence at trial and 
have been successful in doing so. However, many of the cases are later thrown out 
on other grounds, often regarding jurisdiction, upon appeal. For example, in 
Goodluck & Ors. v. SPDC757, the trial judge awarded damages to a community 
whose lakes, creeks, and farmland were all damaged by the dumping of oil-
contaminated top-soil in Oshika City, despite preliminary objections from SPDC 
that the initial court, the Rivers State High Court, did not have jurisdiction. On 
appeal, the appellate judge acknowledged likely negligence on the part of SPDC 
but stated that he could do nothing due to lack of jurisdiction.758 This means that 
negligence may be easier for practitioners to prove moving forward, in the event 
they are able to premeditate and safeguard against other defences and grounds for 
appeal that oil companies may use in future. 
 
                                               
755 NNPC v. Onyeemukwuru & Ors. (2011) LPELR-8826(CA). 
756 See Section 6.4.2.2, above. 
757 SPDC v. Goodluck & Ors. 2008 14 NWLR Pt 1107 294 CA.  





The litigant experience using the tort of negligence has developed positively over 
the last 15 years and since Frynas’ research. While some positive precedent has 
developed, analysis shows that the tort of negligence will continue to be 
unsuccessful if oil companies invoke a few standard defences, such as jurisdiction.  
 
6.5.1.2 Strict Liability  
 
In the case of SPDC v. Anaro & Ors.759, Justice of the Supreme Court Ogunbiyi 
explains the strict liability tort based on the Rylands v. Fletcher rule, noting:760  
 
The principle laid down in Rylands V. Fletcher (supra) is to the effect 
that an occupier of land who brings and keeps upon it anything likely 
to do damage if it escapes is bound to take responsibility and prevent 
its escape. In the event of escape however, the occupier will be liable 
for all the direct consequences of its escape, even if he has been guilty 
of no negligence.761  
  
This late 1860s English judgment sets an important precedent for strict liability 
in the event of a person or a corporation chooses to engage with inherently 
dangerous substances on their property. Today in England and Wales, the 
principle of Rylands v. Fletcher is a subset of nuisance torts, due to a series of 
decisions in the 1990s and early 2000s, which limits its potency as a mechanism 
for redress for victims of certain environmental harms, in part by requiring 
claimants to hold property rights.762 However, in Nigeria the principle of strict 
liability under Rylands v. Fletcher remains a separate action, as it once was in 
England.763  
 
By preserving the original scope of Rylands v. Fletcher, Nigerian law does not 
define who may, or may not, use the tort to seek redress for damage caused by the 
escape of a dangerous substance stored on one’s property. This means that despite 
                                               
759 SPDC v. Anaro & Ors. (2015) LPELR-24750(SC). 
760 Ibid. 
761 Ibid, 59. 
762 John, Murphy, "The Merits of Rylands v Fletcher." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 24, no. 4 




the changes to land tenure introduced by the Land Use Act (discussed in Section 
5.6), those who have the right to occupancy on a piece of land affected by oil 
pollution have the right to seek compensation for the damage caused to crops, 
animals, buildings or other improvements on the property.  
 
Given the right of anyone occupying land affected by oil pollution to seek damages 
and the general nature of oil production, namely a private company holding a 
hazardous substance, strict liability torts is being used in Nigeria in certain types 
of oil-related pollution cases, because Rylands v. Fletcher764 imposes strict 
liability when something hazardous escapes from the area in which it was 
contained and causes harm.765 The application of strict liability is promising for 
those seeking redress, as it limits oil companies from using a third party 
interference defence to avoid liability. While an old legal principle dating back to 
1868, the utility of this principle as a gateway for environmental justice in the 
context of Nigerian oil pollution litigation is emerging, and being used successfully, 
in some modern tort cases. This section will discuss five cases where strict liability 




                                               




6.2.2.2.4 Pre-1999 Cases 
 
This strict liability principle has direct implications for the oil and gas sector, 
particularly in the Delta, where oil spills – understood here as a hazardous 
substance escaping the confines of a protected area (pipelines and associated 
equipment) – are a regular occurrence. Kodilinye’s tort law research in the 1980s 
noted that at the time of his analysis, “there appear so far to be very few cases in 
which the principle has been involved or discussed.”766 The one significant case 
named in Kodilinye’s analysis was Umudje v. Shell-BP.767 In this case, the 
litigant sued under the strict liability tort for damages following the altering of a 
waterway for the construction of a road. This inhibited fish from moving freely 
between two previously connected areas. While in the first instance, Umudje was 
awarded compensation under a strict liability ruling, the Supreme Court later 
overturned the decision, arguing that the alteration of water flow did not cause an 
escape of a substance that could cause harm (i.e. flooding), rather it caused a 
substance to cease its natural flow, which is not covered under Rylands v. Fletcher.  
 
According to Frynas, one of the most serious inhibitors to the development of strict 
liability tort law in Nigeria has been the exception of sabotage.768 Sabotage, 
bunkering, or pipeline vandalism, are all terms used to describe a type of third 
party inference; tampering with pipelines and other oil installations to either 
disrupt production or siphon off oil for illegal refining.769 Sabotage is also deemed 
an “act of God” under strict liability tort and so is an important defence for 
companies building a case to avoid liability.770 Their success in using sabotage to 
avoid strict liability has been mixed, however. Case law during Frynas’ window of 
analysis shows that judges were unsympathetic to the third party interference 
defence by companies in some cases, such as is evidenced in Shell v. Enoch771 and 
                                               
766 Kodilinye, Nigerian Law of Torts, 116.  
767 Ibid., 112, Umudje v. Shell-BP (1975) 8-11 S.C. 155. 
768 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 192. 
769 Freedom C Onuoha, “Oil pipeline sabotage in Nigeria: Dimensions, actors and implications for 
national security”, African Security Review 1, no. 3 (2008): 99-115.  
770 Christina Katsouris and Aaron Sayne, “Nigeria’s Criminal Crude: International Options to 
Combat the Export of Stolen Oil,” Chatham House, September 2013, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0913pr_nigeriaoil
.pdf (accessed July 2, 2017).  
771 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 196. Shell v. Enoch (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt. 259) 335 
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Shell v. Isaiah,772 but in other cases, such as Shell v. Otoko773, companies were 
able to use the defence successfully against communities.774   
 
6.2.2.2.5 Developments Since 1999 
 
Two relatively recent Supreme Court decisions show promise for the future of the 
strict liability defence for communities. One case clearly pushes back on the third 
party interference defence used by oil companies, while the other elaborates the 
ways in which communities can use this defence successfully, even when 
contending with sabotage allegations. In both instances, the Supreme Court 
delivered definitive judgements into the body of case law after multiple appeals 
from Shell. While ultimately victories for the communities seeking redress, both 
appeals processes delayed judgements for decades. 
 
In Supreme Court case Edamkue & Ors. v. SPDC,775 communities sued Shell 
under the strict liability and negligence torts for “damages each of them suffered 
as a result of a serious explosion and spillage of crude oil from the Appellant's Yorla 
Oil Field or station in the Khana Local Government Area of Ogoniland in Rivers 
State which occurred on the 31st July, 1994.”776 They won their suit on the basis 
of strict liability, and while Shell appealed the decision twice, they lost both times. 
The Supreme Court’s judgement focused on the fact that Shell had not done enough 
to prove that they had done everything they could to prevent such interference, if 
it had indeed occurred. The Court of Appeal Decision claimed that: 
 
The point is that if proper care is taken such a spillage would not have 
occurred. The onus was therefore on the appellant as defendant to 
prove that there was no negligence on its part. In an effort to 
discharge the onus placed on it to disprove that it was not negligent, 
the defendant alleged that the accident was caused by the hostile act 
of some people who caused the damage that resulted in the spillage. 
That allegation was however in conflict with the evidence of the 
                                               
772 Ibid. Shell v. Isaiah. (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt.508) 326 
773 Ibid. Shell v. Otoko (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 159) 693. 
774 Ibid.  
775 Edamkue & Ors. v. SPDC (2009) LPELR-3048(SC). 
776 Ibid.  
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policemen at the scene whose account was quite different from that 
given by the defendant.777 
 
The Supreme Court Justice Ogbuagu further emphasised the dismissal of Shell’s 
allegations of vandalism by stating that to make a criminal allegation, Shell would 
have to have proven beyond reasonable doubt that the act was committed to be 
relieved of the onus of the tort, which they were not able to do. Shell’s counsel also 
challenged the quality of the Estate Valuers called upon by community members; 
however, they never called their own Valuers to the stand to challenge their 
assessment. In the eyes of the court, this meant that Shell implicitly accepted the 
assessment of damage brought forward by the communities and therefore left Shell 
unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that vandalism could have been the cause 
of the spill.778 Both Shell’s inability to prove vandalism beyond a reasonable doubt 
and their liability under Rylands v. Fletcher and the res ipsa loquitor principle 
meant that this decision has set a clear precedent for future cases. 779 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in 2015 in SPDC v. Anaro780 was one such case 
that built on this precedent. In this case, Obotobo, Sokebolo, Ofogbene, and 
Ekeremor Zion communities sued Shell for damages caused by oil spills from 
pipelines that, if “well-maintained and fault-free...would not ordinarily burst, 
crack or rupture and spill their contents.”781 The trial judge and both subsequent 
appellate courts found Shell to be liable under the strict liability tort of Rylands 
v. Fletcher. The Supreme Court made its final decision in the case in June of 
2015, more than thirty years after the initial spill occurred, but has consolidated 
important precedent for future cases looking to use the Rylands v. Fletcher 
principle in oil pollution disputes. 
 
                                               
777 Ibid. Court of Appeal quoted in Supreme Court decision. 
778 Ibid. 
779 In India, the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, WP 12739/1985 (1986.12.20) (Oleum 
Gas Leak Case) simplifies this challenge by introducing a new legal principle. In this case, Chief 
Justice Bhagwati (one of the instigators of India’s PIEL movement), develops the concept of 
“absolute liability” in order to address industries that are inherently dangerous or pose risk to 
human health and safety. 






Recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that there is more certainty in using the 
strict liability tort in the Nigerian oil pollution context. The recent cases show that 
it is possible to get favourable judgements using the strict liability tort, notably at 
the Supreme Court level. Both recent cases were also significant because they 
explicitly dismissed Shell’s attempts to suggest that sabotage had caused the spill 
and thus they should not be held liable. In contrast to the unsuccessful Umudje 
v. Shell-BP waterway alteration case, both of these successful cases involved oil 
escaping a defined area and polluting the surrounding area. Moving forward, this 





In his research on nuisance law during the industrialisation of England, Brenner 
writes that “Nuisance law protects peace and quiet, clean air, sanitation, and good 
neighbourly relations in general.”782 The branch of environmental tort covers a 
“condition, activity, or situation (such as a loud noise or foul odour) that interferes 
with the use or enjoyment of property.”783 In the case of oil production in Nigeria, 
nuisance can be caused by a range of activities, from the air and sound pollution 
caused by gas flaring, to the damage caused by the activity of seismic boats, which 
emit strong vibrations in using seismic waves to test for optimal drilling locations 
throughout the Delta.  
 
While theoretically a tool for litigating against environmental wrongs, nuisance is 
the least commonly used environmental tort in the dataset, a finding which is 
consistent with Frynas’ research from the 1990s.784 Its lack of popularity among 
litigants could be for a range of reasons. To begin with, in the context of Nigeria, 
all references to the tort of nuisance must be considered as private nuisance 
following the promulgation of the 1979 Constitution. At this point, public nuisance 
                                               
782 Joel Franklin Brenner, “Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution,” The Journal of Legal 
Studies 3, no. 2 (1974): 403. 
783 497. 
784 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 193.   
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became a separate criminal offence contained in the Nigerian Penal Code Act 
1960.785 While not evidenced in the case law in this dataset, there is also the 
possibility that Rylands v Fletcher has become a more actively used tort 
following the promulgation of the Land Use Act due to the fact that it is less strict 
on property ownership requirements. Should this be the case, it would further 
bolster the logic behind keeping Rylands v Fletcher a separate action, as Nigeria 
has. Doing so means that those seeking redress do not have to prove land 
ownership to seek damages, while that may be required under private nuisance.  
 
Brenner’s study of tort law during English industrialisation found that in an era 
of aggressive development, judges exercised a double standard for nuisance; the 
nuisance tort was not permissible if targeted at large, economically significant, 
enterprises or public enterprises.786 Brenner’s research on nineteenth century 
England bears a striking resemblance to protections of NNPC in Nigeria. He 
argues, for example, that “Insofar as polluting enterprises were public and quasi-
public works, such as docks and railways, indictments were of course useless. 
There enterprises had statutory authorisation and were therefore protected from 
indictments.”787 While not wholly protected from indictments, NNPC does benefit 
from special treatment in the Nigerian legal system, for example by having a 
severely truncated statute of limitations.788 
 
As this section on nuisance will outline, the Nigerian experience with the use of 
nuisance to seek redress for harms caused by oil sector activity has been mixed. I 
illustrate this point with three cases for discussion. The case selection was 
determined by identifying cases in the dataset and the literature where nuisance 
was identified by appellate judges as a key area of law requiring further 
interrogation. It is worth noting that the three cases selected do not address oil 
                                               
785 See FN 730 for an explanation on Nigeria’s Interpretation Act, which explains how Nigerian 
precedent has been empowered to diverge from English precedent. 
786 Brenner writes that “what the Lords meant when they said that location was a factor to be 
weighed in evaluating the plaintiff’s complaint was that they were going to be more forthright in 
striking a balance between comfort and health on the one hand and economic interests on the 
other.” Brenner, “Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution,” 415. 
787 Ibid., 421.  
788 See Section 6.5.2.2 for more on this. 
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pollution specifically, rather they focus on other negative externalities of industry 
activity, such as flooding caused by oil company construction activities and 
structural damage caused by seismic boat activities. 
 
6.2.2.2.7 Pre-1999 Cases 
 
In Akporuovo v. Seismograph Service,789 the litigant sued for private nuisance 
for damages to personal property as a result of the use of seismic equipment. A 
judge initially ruled in Akpuruovo’s favour; however, following multiple appeals, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the initial judge hearing the case had failed to visit 
the site in question in order to confirm the damage, and thus his ruling had to be 
set aside.790 This insistence on a site visit was not common practice in the cases in 
the Dataset, and as such can be construed as procedurally arbitrary, proving 
detrimental to the individual seeking redress.  
 
In Amos v. Shell-BP,791 the company and a Nigerian subcontractor were sued by 
Amos on behalf of the Ogbia community for public nuisance when a project to build 
a bridge across a river was abandoned in favour of a dam that allegedly caused 
flooding in the area, resulting in negative knock-on effects for farming and other 
income generating activities. The case was eventually dismissed on the grounds 
that a group of individuals could not sue for public nuisance. Further, since the 
damage they each experienced was different, the court ruled that the group should 
have tried separate cases as individuals.792  
 
6.2.2.2.8 Developments Since 1999 
 
In Awillie-Odele-Okogbo & Ors. v. SPDC,793 a group of communities sued Shell 
for the activities of its contractor, Wilbros Nigeria Limited, which trespassed onto 
the communities’ land by building waste dump areas that extended onto their 
property and caused flooding of the communities’ farmland. The trial judge 
awarded the communities damages for the nuisance and Shell appealed, 
                                               
789 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 193.   
790 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 193.   
791 Ibid.  
792 Ibid.  
793 SPDC v. Awillie-Odele-Okogbo & Ors. (2011) LPELR-4951(CA) 
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appealing, in particular, its liability for the work of a contractor. The Court of 
Appeals leading judgement affirmed that: 
 
The liability of the defendant cannot be removed because he employed 
an independent contractor to perform the act. There is no doubt that 
the consequence of the dump i.e. the flooding of the farmland of the 
plaintiff (now respondents) was reasonably foreseeable by the 
appellants.794  
 
The Justice of the Court of Appeal Awotoye also highlighted that Shell had already 
paid some compensation to the communities for a similar incident and could not 
avoid the fact that it was liable for the contractors’ tort. In the appeal, Shell sought 
to dismiss the communities’ filing for special damages. While this is a key issue 
that has in the past lost communities nuisance cases on appeal, it did not apply to 
this case as Shell only raised this issue for the first time upon appeal. This made 
it a straightforward matter for the Appellate justice to ignore the issue, as it was 
first being raised in an appeal. 
 
Section Summary: Trends? 
The negligence case law analysed provides one development for the use of tort law 
more broadly. As a positive development, precedent has developed to hold oil 
companies to account for the activities of their sub-contractors. This is significant 
in an industry in which much of the production of oil can be carried out through 
various subcontractors.795 The actual viability of nuisance as a useful tort for oil 
pollution litigation remains unclear, however. This is largely due to a small sample 
size of cases analysed and is supported by Frynas’ findings from the 1990s.796  
 
6.2.2.3 The Use of Tort Summary 
 
This section has shown that there have been some developments in the way in 
which tort remedies are used in oil-related environmental disputes. For negligence 
                                               
794 Ibid. 
795 See the Deepwater Horizon case for more on the integral role sub-contractors play in oil field 
safety in John M. Broder, “U.S. Acts to Fine BP and Top Contractors for Gulf Oil Spill,” New York 
Times, October 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/us/us-cites-bp-and-contractors-for-
deepwater-horizon-spill.html (accessed August 22, 2017).  
796 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 193.   
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and strict liability torts, my analysis highlights instances of positive outcomes for 
oil communities that both consolidate and develop precedent. The use of nuisance 
in tort continues to produce mixed outcomes. However, as will be indicated below, 
a majority of cases are not decided on the substantive grounds of the initial tort 
filed. Instead my Dataset finds that in 60% of cases, judgements are decided in 
favour of oil companies based on procedural and technical issues. 
 
6.5.2 Oil Company Litigation Strategies 
 
Just as communities and their legal counsel have preferred litigation tactics, so too 
do oil companies in defending themselves from these claims. There are only a few 
tactics systematically used by oil companies to achieve a range of desirable 
outcomes such as extreme delay in court proceedings, remitting cases back to the 
original court, or dismissal of suits altogether.   
  
According to one legal practitioner: 
 
Whenever I see a case thrown out by technicalities, it tells me one of 
two things; this judge does not want to get involved or this judge has 
been bought not to get involved. Because technicality for me is the 
ultimate copout. There is injustice, there is a problem out there, 
somebody’s farm land has been flooded by crude oil and you telling 
me we shall file it on Monday file it on Tuesday, it’s like, are you 
kidding me. And somebody will say, because you didn’t come ten 
seconds earlier they can’t hear your case.797 
 
Employing my Dataset, this section identifies a set of tactics used by oil companies, 
and discusses the degree to which they remain to be effective. This section 
discusses the three most common defences in more detail – jurisdiction, statutes of 
limitation, and locus standi – providing case law examples of some of the ways in 
which the defences are used.  
 
6.5.2.1 Jurisdiction: The State and Federal High Courts  
 
                                               
797 Interview A1L1, July 13, 2014. 
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One of the most persistent legal challenges for litigants seeking to sue oil 
companies is the issue of jurisdiction. It is also the only legal defence in my Dataset 
that appears to have been deliberately designed so as to prevent communities from 
being able to seek redress for oil pollution disputes through the courts.798 Of the 
cases in my Dataset where judges made their decision based on Jurisdiction, 93% 
were decided in favour of oil companies. 
 
  
                                               
798 Jurisdiction on environmental issues need not be ambiguous. In 2010, India established the 
National Green Tribunal (NGT), a special environmental body with jurisdiction over “all civil 
cases which raise the substantial question of environment and arise from the implementation of 
the Acts stated in Schedule I of the NGT Act.” This includes providing relief and compensation for 
damage caused. This tribunal has proved to be a useful tool for continuing the precedent-setting 
decisions of the Indian Supreme court on environmental matters while also clearly delineating 
jurisdiction for a range of environmental issues. See Rosencranz and Sahu, “Assessing the 
National Green Tribunal after Four Years,” 199. Also see Gill, “The National Green Tribunal of 
India: A Sustainable Future through the Principles of International Environmental Law.” and 
Shrotria, “Environmental Justice: Is the National Green Tribunal of India Effective?”  
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6.2.2.3.1 The Evolution of Jurisdiction for Oil and Gas  
 
For the first thirty years of independence in Nigeria, individuals could file law suits 
in State or Federal courts on issues related to oil pollution.799 Concurrent 
jurisdiction meant that those living far from State capitals had easier access to 
courts both due to their proximity and the simple fact that there were more courts 
who could hear these kinds of cases. The number of courts able to hear oil-related 
disputes also spread the burden of these technically challenging and technicality-
intensive cases around many different court houses, preventing a backlog for 
judges and for those seeking redress.  
 
In SPDC v. Anaro & Ors.800, Supreme Court Justice Aka’ahs outlined a history 
of the courts’ jurisdiction to hear cases related to oil and gas. Aka’ahs asserts that 
Nigeria’s first Constitutions in 1960 and 1963 were crafted in a way so as to 
explicitly provide increased access to courts on Federal matters by empowering 
State and Magistrate courts to hear cases related to certain Federal issues.801 
Indeed, for more than a decade after independence, there were no Federal courts 
present in states at all. The first Federal courts in states were only created in 1973, 
through the Federal Revenue Court Decree (Decree No. 13 of 1973). The courts 
were then developed into the Federal High Courts with the introduction of the 1976 
Federal High Court Act.802 The introduction of the FHC was a signal that the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Courts was going to expand.  
 
Early on, the nascent courts were still sharing jurisdiction on Admiralty matters, 
which was broadly seen as the area of law most relevant to oil and gas pollution 
disputes, where spills might take place in creeks or other waterways.803 This 
practice continued until the early 1990s when the legislature took a clear 
departure from its previous liberal views of jurisdiction for oil and gas-related 
disputes. 
 
                                               







The Federal Military Government in 1991 imposed Decree 60 of 1991, which 
amended the High Court Act to give exclusive jurisdiction to Federal High Courts 
in matters relating to oil, gas and minerals.804 This was overturned not long after 
in 1992 with Decree 16 of 1992, which restored jurisdiction in these cases to State 
High Courts, only for it to return to the Federal High Courts again in 1993, through 
Decrees 60 and 107.805 This definitive change in 1993 was then enshrined in the 
1999 Constitution, “which include claims for liability incurred for oil pollution 
damage affecting fresh water creeks and fisheries.”806 
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Figure 8: Courts' Jurisdiction over oil, gas, and minerals cases 
 
 
The effect of these changes in jurisdiction is still being felt today by victims of oil 
sector activity. More than 30% of all cases in the Dataset were dismissed upon 
appeal on the grounds that they were filed in the incorrect court in the first 
instance, usually in the State High Courts. Some believe the change in jurisdiction 
was a direct result of lobbying from oil companies. One key informant who has 
been an oil and gas litigator in Nigeria for decades was a side-line observer to oil 
                                               
804 Rufus Akpofurere Mmadu, “Judicial Attitudes towards Environmental Litigation and Access to 
Environmental Justice in Nigeria: Lessons from Kiobel,” Journal of Sustainable Development 
Law and Policy 2, no.1 (2013): 153-174, 157. 
805 Ibid. 
806 SPDC v. Anaro & Ors. (2015) LPELR-24750(SC), 23-27.  
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company objections in the early nineties. He believes that oil companies have 
shaped how and where cases are currently heard.807 
 
This informant told me that the oil companies’ motivations in lobbying for sole 
federal jurisdiction were particularly in search of a more favourable audience in 
the courts. He said, “the oil companies believe that the State High Courts would 
be very sympathetic to the people of the state where they are established and 
manned by judges who are indigenes of that state and who from that, saw the 
tragedy and the degradation themselves so as to be more than likely to be 
sympathetic with the plaintiffs and award plenty damages.”808 
 
He further recounts: 
 
[The oil company’s] calculation is that there are many State High 
Courts so that several litigations can go on at the same time and there 
will be an avalanche of judgments against them. As against the 
Federal High Court, at a time in the whole of eastern Nigeria, there 
were only two federal….three federal high courts. One in Enugu, one 
in Port Harcourt and one in Calabar. Only three judges. And most of 
these judges are from areas that are not oil producing in Nigeria. So 
imagine that the judges will be so overwhelmed by too many cases, 
and they don’t stay more than three years in any station before they 
are transferred.809 
 
And so [oil companies] lobbied for everything related to oil, to be taken 
to the Federal High Court and that is how the military under the 
Decree 107 and Decree 60 took away the jurisdiction of State High 
Court, and put them in the Federal high court and proceeded to insert 
it in the Constitution.810 
 
A Nigerian litigator writes that the issue traces back to the military government 
of Ibrahim Babangida.811 During that administration, then-Attorney General 
Clement Akpamgbo usurped jurisdiction from state courts to hear civil matters 
                                               
807 Interview A1L4, August 15, 2014. 
808 Ibid. 
809 Ibid. 
810 Interview A1L4, August 15, 2014. 
811 Lucius Nwosu, “Chapter 8: Niger Delta Crisis: A Tragic Failure of the Legal Profession,” in 
Rethinking the Administration of Justice: Essays in Honour of Hon. Justice Abdullahi Mustapha, 
eds. Rickey Tarfa, Olanrewej Fagbohun and Gbolohan Gbadamosi, (Lagos: Book Company 
Limited, 2011) 143, 147. 
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related to oil, gas, and minerals, and gave exclusive jurisdiction to the federal 
courts812. Decrees No. 60 of 1991, No.107 of 1993 and then ultimately Section 
251(n) of the 1999 Constitution mean that considerably fewer courts in each state 
(about two per state) were now able to hear all cases related to the oil industry. In 
1993, when the Decree 107 was enacted, there were 12 Federal High Courts across 
Nigeria, versus 500 State High Courts.813   
 
One key informant said, “I didn’t see agitations from the people saying ‘no, no we 
are tired of what we have, so let’s get it there,’ so how did it now go into FHC?”814 
 
6.2.2.3.2 Developments Since 1999 
 
In the Dataset, there are fifteen cases where jurisdiction was called into question 
at some point in legal proceedings, mostly to the detriment of a community’s case. 
There are three broad categories under which these cases fall. There are a) clear 
cut cases in which communities simply filed in the wrong court, b) grey area cases 
where communities filed in the wrong court, but were close to cut off periods, and 
c) anomaly cases in which judges go against well-established precedent in order to 
make judgements in favour of oil companies. 
 
6.2.2.3.3 Clear Cut Cases 
 
In SPDC v. Ezeukwu815 the Court of Appeal allowed Shell’s appeal based on 
jurisdiction and struck out the compensation case, which was originally filed in the 
Imo State High Court in 2000. In Chevron Nigeria Ltd. v. Nwuche & Ors.,816 
the Court of Appeal allowed Chevron’s appeal based on jurisdiction and struck out 
the community’s compensation case, noting that the trial judge in the Imo State 
High Court never should have heard it in 2000 to begin with. In Seismograph 
Services Nigeria Ltd v. Meduoye817 the Court of Appeal allowed the seismic 
surveying company’s appeal based on jurisdiction, noting that Meduoye’s 
                                               
812 Ibid.  
813 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 129.  
814 Interview A1L2 – PH, January 12, 2015. 
815 SPDC v. Ezeukwu (2010) LPELR-4911(CA). 
816 Chevron Nigeria Ltd. v. Nwuche & Ors. LN-e-LR/2016/9 (CA). 
817 Seismograph Services Nigeria Ltd v. Meduoye (2013) LPELR-21973 (CA). 
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compensation claim from 1999 was filed in the Delta State High Court in Warri, 
rather than in a Federal Court. In SPDC v. Goodluck,818 the Court of Appeal 
allowed SPDC’s appeal, based on jurisdiction and struck out the case, which was 
originally filed in the Port Harcourt division of the Rivers State High Court in 
1998. All of the above cases are without ambiguity as they were much after the 
1993 Decree granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Courts for matters 
relating to oil and gas. 
 
In such cases, it is not easy to understand why the State High Courts would 
entertain a case for which they clearly do not have jurisdiction. In any of the cases 
that were filed after 1993, there should have been little uncertainty among State 
High Courts that oil-related cases should be heard in the Federal Courts, and yet 
there are repeated examples of judges taking on these cases anyway, often actively 
ignoring objections on jurisdictional grounds by oil companies. In the case of SPDC 
v. Anaro & Ors.,819 Supreme Court Justice Aka’ahs says of the phenomenon: 
“There is no atom of doubt about it, that courts of record jealously protect and 
guard against laws that tend to remove jurisdiction from them,” but it is difficult 
to get any further clarity of reasoning from the State High Courts as to why they 
keep jurisdiction when the lines have been drawn so clearly.820  
 
While in most instances jurisdiction defences have worked to the oil companies’ 
favour, there are examples of communities successfully leveraging this defence. 
For example, in SPDC v. Anaro & Ors., the Supreme Court dismissed SPDC’s 
appeal based on jurisdiction and stated that at the time of the original filing of the 
case, Bendel State High Court did have jurisdiction to hear it. This was a hard-
won victory for the community, who originally filed the case in 1983 and received 
their final judgement in 2015. More broadly, the new judicial precedent was 
significant for re-aligning the courts with general principles of predictability as a 
core pillar of the rule of law.821  
 
                                               
818 SPDC v. Goodluck 2008 14 NWLR Pt 1107 294 CA. 
819 SPDC v. Anaro & Ors. (2015) LPELR-24750(SC). 
820 Ibid. 
821 As will be shown below, Aka’ahs’ decision was reversing a string of bad precedent. 
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6.2.2.3.4 Cases in the Crosshairs 
 
Some cases were caught in the cross hairs between old and new jurisdiction rules 
by a matter of weeks, such as in NNPC & Anor. v. Sele & Ors.822. In this case, 
the Supreme Court decided in 2013 that a case that commenced in a State High 
Court in December of 1993 did not have jurisdiction in the first instance.  
 
In this case, Sele filed suit against the state-owned oil company for NGN 20 million 
in damages following an oil spill. Sele, representing his community, Ogbe-Udu, in 
Okpe Local Government Area of Delta State, was awarded NGN 15 million for 
special damages and NGN 3 million in general damages by the State High Court, 
but this was later overturned by the Supreme Court, which found that Sele had 
missed the deadline by less than three weeks to be considered under the old 
jurisdictional rules. The Supreme Court Justice Rhodes Vivour stated that, “[The] 
trial commenced for the first time on 1/12/93, i.e. after 17/11/93 when Decree 
No.107 of 1993 came into force. The Federal High Court had exclusive jurisdiction 
as at 17/11/93.”  This decision goes against the Court of Appeal’s judgement 
affirming the State High Court’s ruling.823  
 
6.2.2.3.5 The Dangerous Anomalies 
 
There has been a clear trend in precedent emerging that defines jurisdiction for oil 
and gas disputes; Federal Courts must hear cases related to oil and gas sector 
activity, from laying pipelines, addressing oil spills, and addressing damages 
caused by seismic activity. However, even as a trend emerges, there are still some 
anomalies in judicial decision-making that go against developing precedent, often 
to the advantage of oil companies.  
 
For example, in NNPC v. Zaria & Anor,824 the Court of Appeal allowed NNPC’s 
appeal based on jurisdiction, stating that Zaria and others should have filed their 
                                               
822 NNPC & Anor. v. Sele & Ors. (2013) LPELR-20341(SC). 
823 Before this Supreme Court decision was taken, the Sele case was seen as a positive 
development by the Court of Appeal in its favourable interpretation of suits in a representative 
capacity.  It is not yet clear if this has had an impact on litigants filing suit in a representative 
capacity. 
824 NNPC v. Zaria & Anor (2014) LPELR-22362(CA).  
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suit in a State Court because their claim that NNPC unlawfully occupied and 
polluted their land related to land matters, which is on the exclusive legislative 
list for State Courts. This particular decision is notable because in most other cases 
where the respondents are being sued because of their oil-related activities, judges 
have been quick to claim federal jurisdiction, often disadvantaging communities 
for filing in State courts. This case is a rare example where a community filed a 
dispute in a Federal Court, following precedent, but then were told that a State 
court was more appropriate. This case calls into question the motivations and 
incentives of the deciding Justice in going against precedent in order to provide a 
victory for an oil company. 
 
A year before NNPC v. Zaria, the Court of Appeals decided on a similar case, 
asserting that a claim related to damage of land from oil operations fell clearly to 
the Federal courts. In Alagoma & Ors. v. SPDC825, an oil community filed suit 
against SPDC for compensation following an oil spill on their communal lands, 
which caused injury to their property. The Federal High Court in this instance 
threw out the case based on Shell’s jurisdiction defence that the case was about a 
land dispute rather than about oil and should thus be heard in a State High Court, 
rather than the Federal High Court. The Court of Appeals found this line of 
reasoning to be inconsistent with the body of case law developed since SPDC v. 
Isaiah826 in 2001, which clearly delineates that anything to do with oil production 
would be heard exclusively in Federal Courts.827 The Court of Appeals remitted the 
case back to the Federal High Court to be heard again. What is particularly 
interesting is that SPDC’s counsel chose to argue against precedent in the trial 
court that has historically been in its favour (that FHCs should hear oil-related 
suits, not SHCs) in order to avoid a successful claim from oil communities. In this 
rare instance, the oil company was trapped by its own precedent and the Court of 
Appeals’ insistence on recognising that precedent. 
 
                                               
825 Alagoma & Ors. v. SPDC (2013) LPELR-21394(CA).  
826 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 94.  
827 Alagoma & Ors. v. SPDC (2013) LPELR-21394(CA).  
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The above cases show how, to varying degrees of success, oil companies manipulate 
basic legal principles, flouting precedent, to try and avoid a loss in court. However, 
SPDC v. Isaiah is probably the most detrimental case for the credibility of the 
courts as institutions that uphold the rule of law.828 In this suit, a landmark case 
cited as delineating federal jurisdiction for oil sector cases, the courts took a view 
that amounts to the application of retrospective law. 
 
In the original suit, Abel Isaiah filed a case in a State High Court, requesting NGN 
22 million in compensation following an oil spill caused by replacement of a 
pipeline on his property in 1988. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals 
decided in favour of Isaiah’s claim. However, despite the action occurring before 
new limits to states’ jurisdiction to hear oil-related cases, the Supreme Court ruled 
in 2001 that since the High Court judgement came down in 1994, after Decree 107 
of 1993, the trial court no longer held jurisdiction in the matter.829 Justice 
Mohammed stated that  
 
[f]rom that moment when the Decree was signed into Law the 
jurisdiction of the State High Court to determine any matter 
connected with or pertaining to mining and minerals, including oil 
fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas has been 
ousted.830 
 
This decision was detrimental to cases that were filed during this confusing time. 
It showed a Supreme Court justice proactively removing certainty, and de facto 
creating retrospective laws of jurisdiction. These plaintiffs unequivocally filed in 
the appropriate court at the time of filing. The legal reasoning behind this decision 
is in direct contrast to general notions of the rule of law, particularly that of 
predictability. 
 
The Isaiah case enabled judges to apply jurisdiction in unconventional ways, 
ultimately harming communities’ cases for justice. For example, in SPDC V. 
                                               
828 SPDC v. Isaiah (2001) LPELR-3205(SC). 
829 Mmadu, “Judicial Attitudes towards Environmental Litigation and Access to Environmental 
Justice in Nigeria,” 157. 
830 SPDC v. Isaiah (2001) LPELR-3205(SC). 
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Halleluja Fishermen Multi-Purpose Co-Operative Society831, the Court of 
Appeal in 2001 allowed Shell’s appeal based on jurisdiction because the State High 
Court of Rivers State gave judgment on July 10th, 1995, two years after the 
appellate judge said Decree No. 107 came into force on November 17, 1993, despite 
the fact that the case was first filed in the SHC in 1990, pre-dating changes to 
State’s jurisdiction to hear these cases.  
 
Justice of the Court of Appeal Ogebe said, 
 
There is no dispute whatsoever that a cause of action is governed by 
the prevailing law when the cause of action arose…Jurisdiction 
however has to do with the authority of the court to adjudicate on the 
matter. A plaintiff may have a very good cause of action supported by 
existing law and if he takes his case to a court which has no 
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or the cause of action, he cannot 
ventilate his claims before that court. Even if parties are before a 
court that has jurisdiction and a new law comes into existence which 
withdraws the jurisdiction of a court from hearing the case, that court 
automatically ceases to have jurisdiction to continue with the case.832  
 
This kind of reasoning created decades of delays for some seeking justice. It meant 
that cases were re-filed in Federal Courts to go through all of the same uncertainty 
again.  For example, in Agbara v. SPDC,833 a case previously dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds following the precedential decision of SPDC v. Isaiah, re-
filed in a Federal High Court. Nwosu recounts how  
 
[SPDC’s counsel] so busied himself with one preliminary objection or 
the other and petitions against trial judges until the case passed 
through three Federal Judges. The last judge called his bluff and 
proceeded to hearing. This was after a total of 27 interlocutory 
applications and 5 appeals…against adverse rulings.834  
 
 
                                               
831 SPDC v. Halleluja Fishermen Multi-Purpose Co-Operative Society (2001) LPELR-
5168(CA). 
832 SPDC v. Halleluja Fishermen Multi-Purpose Co-Operative Society (2001) LPELR-
5168(CA).  
833 Cited in SPDC v. Agbara (2015) LPELR-25987(SC). 
834 Nwosu, “Chapter 8: Niger Delta Crisis: A Tragic Failure of the Legal Profession,” 149. 
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Following a period of severe delays, Nwosu suggests “extra judicial pressure” was 
applied to the judge, causing him “like the one before him [to] remit the case file to 
his Chief Judge for further directives.”835 As of 2011, the case was not yet settled, 
more than 20 years later.836 
 
While the Isaiah case has proven to be detrimental to fundamental principles of 
the rule of law, its effect on litigation moving forward may be waning. In SPDC v. 
Anaro in 2015, Justice Aka’ahs clarified the Supreme Court’s position on 
retrospective law. He argued that 
 
There is a strong leaning against construing a statue so as to oust or 
restrict the jurisdiction of the superior courts. Where a cause of action 
accrued before the advent of an alteration of the law governing same, 
the applicable law is the one which was in operation at the time when 
the cause of action accrued unless the subsequent legislation 
manifestly and unambiguously provides that the altered law takes 
retrospective effect. Section 6(1) of the Interpretation Act clearly 
deals with such a situation. It provides: "6(1) The repeal of an 
enactment shall not- (a) affect anything not in force or existing at the 
time when the repeal takes place; (b) affect the previous operation of 




This section has analysed the way in which changes to jurisdiction for oil-related 
disputes have negatively affected A2EJ in Nigeria. Developments have restricted 
access to courts, due to the fact that there are simply fewer Federal High Courts 
and because judges have applied jurisdiction rules irregularly in some cases, 
reducing certainty for future litigants. 
 
Nwosu and other practitioners have argued that the changes in jurisdiction in the 
90s were directly a response to oil sector lobbying in order to get more favourable 
judgements. While claims such as these are never easy to prove, a simple 
calculation of the cases analysed for this research indicates that the change has 
had a direct and materially negative effect on communities trying to access the 
                                               
835 Ibid. 
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legal system for redress. Of the cases that were analysed where judges made their 
decision based on Jurisdiction, 93% (14 of the 15 total) were decided in favour of 
oil companies. 
 
Based on the 1999-2015 case law sample the change in jurisdiction has clearly been 
to the benefit of oil companies, but the frequency with which this defence can be 
successfully used against victims of oil pollution may be waning. The exclusive 
Federal jurisdiction for oil and gas related cases has been unambiguously 
enshrined in law for more than two decades and it is likely that the prevalence of 
cases being thrown out on jurisdictional grounds will begin to diminish as “legacy” 
cases make their way through the system. However, despite a clear increase in 
certainty in how judges will rule on jurisdictional defence claims, there are still 
anomalies that suggest that even if affected individuals or communities file in the 
correct court, jurisdiction may still be used against them in a court of law. 
 
 
6.5.2.2 Statutes of Limitation 
 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a text cited by Nigerian jurists, a statute of 
limitation is “A law that bars claims after a specified period.”838 This Dictionary 
stipulates that a statute of limitation is specifically “a statute establishing a time 
limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when 
the injury occurred or was discovered).”839 Statutes of limitation can be a valuable 
instrument for incentivising parties to resolve disputes in a timely manner – i.e. 
while evidence is still available and witnesses to the dispute still have the incident 
in question fresh in their minds. However, this defence does not always provide a 
clear gateway to justice for environmental disputes, as the lines are often blurred 
between when an incident occurs and when the effects of that incident might be 
felt. 
 
Limitation laws are particularly complicated in Nigeria, where each of the thirty-
six states has its own Limitation Law, though most cap statute of limitations in 
                                               
838 Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, (Minnesota: Thompson West, 2006), 
677.  
839 Ibid.  
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civil suits at six years.840 For cases in which NNPC is named, the limitation period 
is reduced to twelve months, based on specific limitations within the NNPC Act.841 
Analysis of my case law sample suggests that the largest barrier to environmental 
justice posed by Limitations Laws is the specific nature of oil pollution and the 
delayed effects it can have on both the environment and the health of individuals 
living near sites of pollution. 
 
The parameters around where a limitation begins and ends are not clear in 
Nigerian oil pollution case law. Oil spills can take place over a long period of time 
before anyone notices.842 This is because oil pipelines criss-cross the country over 
more than 1000 kilometres, often in remote areas. There can thus be a lag time 
between when a spill occurs and when it is discovered, at which point damage to 
land, water, and health may already be severe.843 Further, communities affected 
by oil sector activity may be illiterate and unaware that such statutes exist, putting 
into jeopardy their ability to seek legal recourse in the allowed timeframe.844 
 
This lack of clarity has been exploited by oil companies to bar claims relating to 
environmental damage, the effects of which often continue to plague communities 
long after the initial harm has taken place. This section will discuss why statutes 
of limitation are a complex defence, why oil spills can be difficult to litigate due to 
statutes of limitation, and highlight four cases in which oil companies invoked a 
statute of limitation as a defence. 
 
6.2.2.3.7 Pre-1999 Cases 
 
The case law has not been conclusive on how the courts approach the complicated 
matter of statutes of limitation and oil pollution. In Horsfall v. Shell-BP845, 
justices recognised the tension between the statute of limitations for claims and 
                                               
840 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 197-198.  
841 Ibid., 197. 
842 Ibid., 199.  
843 Even if the spill is discovered quickly, a community can spend a significant amount of time 
trying to negotiate an out-of-court settlement with an oil company. That settlement time does not 
stop the limitation clock from running. 
844 Ibid., 198. See Chapter 7 for more on barriers to filing suits in Section 7.3. 
845 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 199.  
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the realistic amount of time for the negative manifestations of pollution to take 
root. However, this did not ultimately affect their decision to rule in favour of Shell-
BP and dismiss the suit. Further, in Shell v. Farah,846 the case explicitly ruled 
out the possibility that illiteracy and ignorance of legal rights might be considered 
relevant when considering the fact that the statute of limitations on the case had 
run out.847  
 
6.2.2.3.8 Developments Since 1999 
 
Early case law in the Fourth Republic involving statutes of limitation continued to 
be to the detriment of affected individuals and communities. In 2002 in Gulf Oil 
Co. v. Oluba,848 the appellate judge decided that the lingering negative effects of 
an oil spill did not constitute a continuance of the action itself. In this case, the 
judge argued that it is reasonable to expect damages to remain from an action that 
causes permanent damage, but it is not the same as instituting a new action. This 
judgement means that a community would not be able to sue an oil company 
beyond the statute of limitations from when the spill occurred, even if their 
community continues to suffer from the pollution that the spill caused.  
 
There are, however, indications, as seen in the 2011 case of Amachere & Anor v. 
SPDC,849 that this stance may be changing. In this case, Mark Amachere and his 
community sued Shell for nuisance caused by 1,500 barrels of oil that was spilled 
into their community’s rivers, swamps, and ponds. The trial judge deemed the 
action statute barred, despite two arguments: a) that SPDC admitted liability in 
2001 and thus extended the statute of limitations, based on a provision in Rivers 
State Statute of Limitations Law, and b) that the oil spill from 1995 is still causing 
lingering and continuous damage, meaning that action did not end in 1995.  
 
Upon appeal, the Appellate Justice found fault with the way in which the trial 
judge made his decision to strike out the Communities’ suit before hearing more of 
                                               
846 Ibid., 198.  
847 Ibid.  
848 Gulf Oil Co. v. Oluba (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt.780) 92 at 112. 
849 Amachere & Anor. v. SPDC (2011) LPELR-4474(CA).  
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the case. He said the trial judge did not have enough information to determine 
whether or not there was indeed continuing damage to the environment from the 
spill and whether there was evidence that Shell had indeed admitted liability. The 
Appellate Justice noted that “Each spillage and pollution it caused 
thereafter…constitute a cause of action in tort. That is distinct from the first 
spillage and/or pollution.”850 This suggests that the Court of Appeals may be more 
open to liberalising their view of how continuing oil pollution might extend a 
limitation period. The Court of Appeals also argued that an admission of liability 
would restart the statute of limitations clock in some circumstances. In this 
instance, the appellate judge sent the case back to the Federal High Court to be 




In 1998 Frynas observed that “statutes of limitation in Nigeria do not take account 
of the delay between economic activities and their long-term effects.”851 The 2011 
Amachere decision may indicate that this view is changing in the Court of Appeals. 
The earlier Oluba case confirmed a long-held precedent that lingering damage did 
not constitute a fresh action. But the more recent Amachere case suggests that 
judges may be moving closer to trying to find a solution that keeps statutes of 
limitation in place, while broadening how they might be interpreted in cases of 
ongoing oil pollution.  
 
6.5.2.3 Locus Standi 
 
Locus Standi has historically been a barrier to justice in disputes in Nigeria where 
a group of people, or a representative of a group, file suit for damage caused to 
communal land.852 In Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v. NNPC, Justice of the 
Court of Appeal Saulawa defined locus standi as follows: "[t]he term locus standi 
in Latin simply denotes a party's right to make a legal claim, or seek judicial 
                                               
850 Ibid. 
851 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 199 and Peter Newell, “Access to Environmental Justice? Litigation 
against TNCs in the South,” IDS Bulletin 32, no. 1 (2001): 83-93. 
852 This is true of other jurisdictions as well. See Newell, “Access to Environmental Justice? 
Litigation against TNCs in the South,” 87.  
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enforcement of a duty or right.”853 Along with jurisdiction and statutes of 
limitation, it is an important first procedural step in establishing whether or not a 
case has merit to proceed in the courts. In early Nigerian case law on oil spills, 
locus standi arguments were made to discredit communities from filing suit in a 
way that was consistent with sociological constructs of their communities and the 
way in which those communities use land.854 However, this has changed over the 
past two decades, creating more opportunities for gateways to justice in the legal 
system.855 
 
Christman outlines three categories of courts’ stances toward locus standi across 
jurisdictions:  
 
1) legal rights standing (the most restrictive),  
2) Sufficient interest standing (a more flexible idea of who has been affected 
by the action filed),  
3) actio popularis (the most flexible stance, enabling any person to sue when 
there has been misconduct according to the law).856  
 
Nigeria is somewhere in the middle on this spectrum when it comes to oil pollution 
litigation. While standing is not as restrictive as it once was, Nigerian courts have 
still not fully embraced sufficient interest standing, as was seen in the Douglas v. 










                                               
853 Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v. NNPC (2013) LPELR-20075(CA). 
854 See Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 202-204. 
855 With notable limitations, discussed in Section 6.4. 
856Benjamin Christman, “The Poor Have No Lawyers: Scotland’s Non-Compliance with the Access 
to Environmental Justice ‘Pillar’ of the Aarhus Convention,” King’s Inn Student Law Review 
(2014): 105-132; 113.  
248 
 
6.2.2.3.10 Pre-1999 Cases 
 
The ruling in Adediran v. Interland Transport,857 a case unrelated to the oil 
sector, was considered a watershed decision in Nigerian case law for removing 
barriers to establishing locus standi for cases in which collectives tried to sue on 
the grounds of public nuisance.858 Previously, collective public nuisance claims 
were at the mercy of government, leaving it to the discretion of the Attorney 
General to try cases on behalf of Nigerian citizens.859 In the Adediran case, a group 
of residents formed a housing association. The association subsequently sued 
Interland Transport, whose offices were adjacent to the collectives’ homes, for 
nuisance from excessive noise, and won. This case opened a new potential gateway 
for collective action in other sectors, such as oil-related cases claims.   
 
6.2.2.3.11 Developments Since 1999 
 
As of the late nineties, there was some indication that filing suit on behalf of a 
community in oil-related disputes was a more viable option, building on precedent 
such as the Adediran case. While in Chinda v. Shell-BP860 in 1974, individuals 
attempting to sue on behalf of their community in Rivers State were told by the 
judge that they could only sue with regard to their particular individual damages, 
in Shell v. Tiebo & Ors.861 in 2005, the case was able to move forward on the 
basis that litigants were suing on behalf of their community in Peremabiri. In that 
case, Shell tried to appeal for a misjoinder of parties in the latter case, but the 
Court of Appeals upheld the original decision.862  
 
SPDC v. Edamkue & Ors.863 built on the momentum of this ruling in 2009. In 
the Edamkue case, two sets of plaintiffs filed suit following an explosion and oil 
spill from Shell’s Yorla Oil Field in Khana, a local government authority in 
Ogoniland in Rivers State. The original cases were filed in 1994 and joined together 
                                               
857 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 206.  
858 See Section 6.5.1.3. 
859 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 193.  
860 Ibid., 208.  
861 SPDC v. Tiebo & Ors.  (2005) LPELR-3203(SC).  
862 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 208.  
863  SPDC v. Edamkue & Ors. (2009) LPELR-3048(SC).  
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in 1995. The trial case was decided in 1999, in favour of Edamkue & Ors. Shell 
appealed the decision and in 2003, the Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s 
awards.864 Again, Shell appealed to the Supreme Court, asking for clarity on a 
range of issues, including the plaintiff’s ability to sue in a representative capacity. 
The Supreme Court justice presiding over the case made it clear that: 
 
a) Shell had no locus standi to object to Edamkue & Ors. suing in a 
representative capacity for their communities and families, as they are not 
members of either. 
b) Amendments can be made in a suit if a plaintiff did not file in a 
representative capacity, but then proceeded to carry out the case clearly in 
a representative capacity, being justified by evidence and the merits of the 
case. 
c) Even if the plaintiff does not file in a representative capacity, a judge can 
amend the suit and enter a decision on that basis, in a representative 
capacity for the plaintiff’s family and/or community.865 
 
In upholding the decision, Justice of the Supreme Court Ogbuagu made it clear 
that suing on behalf of one’s community or family in oil and gas disputes such as 
an oil spill should no longer be legitimate grounds for oil company appeal. Beyond 
affirming the more than USD 1.5 million already awarded to the plaintiffs, the 
Justice added, “I wish the Rules of this Court had given me a discretion in respect 
of award of costs as this is one of the appeals, where the costs to the 1st and 3rd 
sets of Respondents, should have been more in the circumstances of this case.” The 
Edamkue case is both an important development in the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of standing in oil-related cases, as well as its normative view of 
quantum of compensation for such claims. 
 
Section Summary: Trends 
This section has shown that there has been an evolution in the case law over the 
past two decades, in terms of how standing is viewed by the courts. This evolution 
is a departure from Frynas’ criticism that lawyers and judges have been reluctant 
                                               
864 Before proceeding, the Court of Appeal instructed Shell to take out a bank guarantee. If Shell 
lost the appeal, the bank would pay the plaintiffs who had suffered damages from the spill and 
explosion. Upon losing, the Bank released NGN 225,806,601.00 (roughly USD 1.5 million) to the 
respondents.  
865 SPDC v. Edamkue & Ors. (2009) LPELR-3048(SC).  
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to depart from conventional practice of the British Common Law tradition in terms 
of considering “communal issues.”866 The Edamkue decision consolidated the 
developing precedent that began in the 1990s that the misjoinder of parties defence 
would no longer be a suitable defence against communities negatively affected by 
oil pollution.  
 
6.2.2.4 Oil Company Litigation Strategy Summary  
 
This section has shown that oil companies use a predictable set of tactics in an 
attempt to win, or at least severely delay, cases. My analysis introduces one 
judgement that provides for new precedent in determining statutes of limitations 
that is advantageous for communities. My review of the case law also indicates 
that there have been some positive developments over the last two decades in 
liberalising standing. My analysis suggests that standing has evolved to account 
for “communal” issues, which means that cases that would otherwise have been 
set aside for misjoinder of parties or inability for someone to sue in a representative 
capacity are now able to proceed.867 As seen above, the expansion of standing has 
been positive for filing suits as communities, but remains ineffective for public 
interest environmental litigation. 
 
Perhaps most significantly, I showed that a change in jurisdiction in the early 
1990s has had long-run negative effects on access to environmental justice. There 
are now fewer courts for claimants to file their suits, and legacy cases caught in 
between two jurisdictions tend to only negatively affect outcomes for communities. 
In instances where cases are dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, communities 
face decades of uncertainty if they choose to re-file their suits in the appropriate 
courts. My key informant interviews suggest that the change in jurisdiction was 
pursued not to improve the justice system for citizens; rather, jurisdiction was 
restricted in order to centralise power to decide these cases in fewer courts that 
have a closer relationship to the federal executive branch. 
 
                                               
866 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 203.  
867 While a positive development, the Nigerian conception of standing is still not interpreted to 
the degree that public interest environmental litigation can be pursued. See Section 6.4, above. 
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6.6 If All Else Fails: Extra-Territorial Litigation 
Nigerian activists and concerned international actors have struggled to apply 
sustained pressure to the Nigerian Federal Government apparatus in order to 
improve the state of the environment in the Niger Delta.868 As Chapters 4 and 5 
have attested, there is a steep imbalance of power and misalignment of interests 
between those trying to restore the environment and provide redress to victims of 
oil pollution, and those that are interested in ensuring the Government continues 
to profit from the oil sector by sustaining current investment, as well as attracting 
future investment. The delay and uncertainty associated with domestic litigation 
has led many to believe that seeking fora outside of Nigeria is the only gateway to 
justice that remains for victims of oil pollution.  
 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) concerns one state using a variety of legal and 
policy tools in order to compel actors outside of its physical borders to behave in a 
certain way.869 ETJ can take the form of statutes or litigation (referred to as extra-
territorial litigation, or ETL), using courts to “adjudicate and resolve private 
disputes with a foreign element.”870  
 
The Nigerian legal professionals who I surveyed were broadly optimistic that ETL 
for oil pollution cases specifically allows for redress that would otherwise be 
unattainable in Nigeria’s domestic legal system. Forty-one percent of respondents 
from my 2014 survey feel that ETJ is the most effective institution for resolution 
of oil pollution conflict. This is compared to 26% who feel that litigation is best, 
19% who support mediation, and 7% who support out of court settlement. To probe 
whether this optimism is misplaced, the following sections analyse extra territorial 
                                               
868 For example, see: UNEP, “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland Report.”; “Home,” Stake 
Holder Democracy Network, http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/  (accessed August 1, 2017); 
“Nigeria Human Rights,” Amnesty International, https://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/nigeria/ 
(accessed August 1, 2017).  
869 Jennifer A. Zerk, “Extraterritorial jurisdiction: lessons for the business and human rights 
sphere from six regulatory areas,” Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 
59, Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2010, 13.  
870 Ibid.  
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cases from four different courts – two regional African courts and two courts in 
European countries.871 
 
6.6.1 SERAC & Anor v. Nigeria (African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights)872 
 
The Organization of African Unity (now, the African Union) adopted the African 
Charter in 1981, and with it, enshrined social, cultural, economic, civil and political 
rights into a regional human rights mechanism.873 Nigerian NGOs have tried to 
use the forum to put pressure on the Nigerian State and its joint venture partners 
to improve environmental conditions in the Niger Delta. 
 
6.6.1.1 The Commission  
 
The African Charter created the Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
which was inaugurated in 1987.874 The Commission has been given the power to 
hear “Communications” both from one state against another, and from individuals 
and groups against a State in order to “protect the rights and freedoms guaranteed 
in the Charter under conditions laid down therein.”875 The Commission encourages 
parties to reach “friendly settlements;” however if no such settlement is reached, 
the Commissioners will determine whether or not to hear a Communication on its 
own merits. Once a Communication is heard, the final judgement is referred to as 
a Recommendation, as a means of highlighting the non-binding nature of the 
decision. The Commission refers to its dispute resolution function as “quasi-
judicial,” as nothing decided by the Commission can be binding unless the African 
                                               
871 Interestingly, when respondents were asked the same question of other instances of non-oil 
related pollution, their answers changed significantly. Only 15% still support ETL as the most 
effective, while both mediation and litigation (30% each) are seen to be more viable avenues for 
redress. Out of court settlement is also seen to be more promising (19%). This implies that 
lawyers view legal proceedings in oil-related litigation to be substantively different from other 
kinds of litigation. 
872 SERAC and Anor. v. Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). 
873 “History” http://www.achpr.org/about/history/ accessed August 22, 2017). 
874 “Part II,” African (BANJUL) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,  
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf (accessed August 1, 2017).  
875 Art. 55, “Communications Procedure,” African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 
http://www.achpr.org/communications/procedure/ (accessed August 9, 2017).   
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Union heads of state agree to adopt the decision in their annual Activity Reports.876 
Even then, the Commission highlights its lack of monitoring and enforcement 
capabilities. 
 
6.6.1.2 The Case 
 
Two Nigerian NGOs filed a communication with the African Commission on 
Human Rights in 1996 on behalf of the Ogoni people, a group in Nigeria that has 
long been on the frontlines of oil exploitation in the country.877 The complaint 
alleged that Shell and NNPC, in their joint venture activities, had violated key 
provisions of the African Charter through the pervasive and ongoing oil 
contamination of Ogoniland, affecting access to safe drinking water, clean fishing 
waters, and uncontaminated farming land. Not only were commercial actors 
NNPC and Shell named in the complaint, but the Nigerian government itself was 
accused of using military force to ensure that oil company operations could 
continue despite local protest.878 
 
The African Commission first had to determine if the parties had exhausted all 
local remedies before bringing the case forward to the regional body, providing 
special consideration when domestic remedies may be “unduly prolonged.”879 In 
their decision to accept jurisdiction, a series of then-military government decrees 
were cited as preventing the possibility of domestic remedy. According to SERAC’s 
Communication, “domestic remedies do not bar the communication because of the 
futility of legal action in Nigeria resulting from the operation of ouster clauses 
contained in military decrees removing jurisdiction of the courts from entertaining 
human rights cases”.880  
 
                                               
876 “Communications Procedure,” African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 
http://www.achpr.org/communications/procedure/ (accessed August 9, 2017).   
877 Fons Coomans, “The Ogoni Case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2003): 749-760.  
878 “Communication” http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/africa/comcases/nigeriapetition2001.pdf (accessed 
September 1, 2017). 
879 “Communications Procedure,” African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, African 
(BANJUL) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, S.56(5). 
880 “Communication” http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/africa/comcases/nigeriapetition2001.pdf (accessed 
September 1, 2017). 
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The Commission then found in 2001 (five years after filing) that Nigeria had 
violated the Ogoni Peoples’ right to health and clean environment, their ability to 
use their wealth and natural resources, and that the State has the duty to protect 
its people, and was liable for the activity of private actors that were committing 
human rights abuses.881 The case compelled the Nigerian government to provide 
compensation to those negatively affected by oil operations and clean-up areas that 
had been polluted due to oil company activity.  
 
In the time between the filing and the Recommendation of the Commission, 
Nigeria underwent a period of regime change, making it less clear how the case 
would hold those accused accountable, particularly when, in late 2000, the new 
Obasanjo democratic government agreed with the assertions of wrongdoing in a 
Note Verbale, stating that “there is no denying that a lot of atrocities were and are 
still being committed by the oil companies in Ogoni Land and indeed in the Niger 
Delta area”.”882 Other than this Note Verbale, the Nigerian Government never 
participated in the proceedings. 
 
6.6.2 SERAP v. Nigeria (ECOWAS)883 
 
SERAP v. Nigeria is one in a series of cases that the Nigerian NGO, the Socio-
Economic Rights & Accountability Project (SERAP), brought against the Federal 
Government in international fora. In this case, and in a series of other disputes 
ranging in allegations from corruption in the education sector to mismanagement 
of public funds, SERAP accused the Government of breaching a range of 
fundamental rights laid out in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
SERAP says that its approach is to both win cases, but also to draw attention to 
important social issues in order to change opinions and influence policy.884 
 
  
                                               
881 SERAC and Anor. v. Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001), pt.57. 
882 Fons Coomans, “The Ogoni Case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights,” 749-760. 
883 SERAP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 14 December 2012, ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12.  
884 SERAP, Who we are, http://serap-nigeria.org/who-we-are/ (accessed September 1, 2017). 
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6.6.2.1 The ECOWAS Court 
 
SERAP has been increasing its use of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) court in the past decade for filing rights-based claims. While at 
first glance this may seem an unlikely platform for rights-based claims, the 
ECOWAS court has made a strategic choice in the past decade to expand its remit 
beyond purely trade and commercial disputes.885 The court has decided against the 
Gambia, Niger, and Nigeria in a variety of cases where private citizens have filed 
suit against countries for human rights violations.886  
 
The rules for accessing the Court are quite liberal, particularly when considering 
fora established earlier in Sub-Saharan Africa, like the AU’s Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. There is no requirement by the Court that litigants 
must prove they have exhausted all domestic remedies before approaching the 
court, and interpretation of locus standi is liberal.887 Though the Court has 
struggled to ensure that its judgements are complied with, it has taken a proactive 
stance to ensuring that its judgements are developed in a way that makes them 
more likely to be enforced in a given context.888 The court has also employed 
campaigns to pressurise member states into recognising their obligations through 
public information efforts, among other tactics.889 
 
6.6.2.2 The Case 
 
SERAP filed suit in the ECOWAS Court of Justice in 2009 against the Federal 
Government and the six main multinational oil companies in Nigeria (Nigerian 
National Petroleum Company, Shell Petroleum Development Company, ELF 
Petroleum Nigeria LTD, AGIP Nigeria PLC, Chevron Oil Nigeria PLC, Total 
Nigeria PLC and Exxon Mobil). Beyond the Federal Government of Nigeria and 
                                               
885 Ibid. 
886 The jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice was expanded in 2005 to allow the court to 
adjudicate human rights cases. See Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer and Jacqueline R. 
McAllister, “A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS community 
Court of Justice,” The American Journal of International Law 107, no. 4 (2013): 737-779.  
887 Alter, Helfer and McAllister, “A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa,” 737-
779.  
888 Ibid., 737. 
889 Ibid., 765-766. 
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the oil companies, SERAP also joined the Attorney General of Nigeria in the suit.890 
The grounds for the suit was that the Government and its commercial partners’ 
behaviour in the oil sector amounted to violations of basic human rights, such as 
the right to food, work, health, water, life, a healthy environment, and more.891 
Upon filing, all of the oil companies, including NNPC, raised preliminary 
objections to the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case, similar to litigation tactics in 
Nigerian courts. Taking into consideration these objections, the court decided that 
it had jurisdiction to hear the case, but did not have jurisdiction over the 
corporations, whose names were struck out of the suit.892  
 
Unlike previous attempts at using international mechanisms to hold the Nigerian 
government to account for poor governance of the oil sector, in this case both the 
Federal Government and the Attorney General participated in the hearing, filing 
a joint statement of defence.893 Their strategies for building their defence were 
similar to those employed by oil companies in Nigeria’s domestic courts, such as 
objecting to SERAP’s standing, invoking a statute of limitations, and questioning 
the ECOWAS Court’s jurisdiction.894 
 
The Court was quick to dispose of these defences, however. The court responded to 
the criticism that it did not have jurisdiction by citing Article 9(4) of the 
Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 of 19 January 2005, which enables the court 
to determine any case in a member state where there has been a violation of human 
rights, spanning a variety of international and regional human rights instruments 
that member states are signatory to.895  
 
In 2012, the ECOWAS Court of Justice ruled in favour of SERAP. The Court’s 
judgement found the Federal Government of Nigeria guilty of not protecting its 
citizens from company activities and violating articles of the African Charter on 
                                               
890 SERAP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 14 December 2012, ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12, pt.2. 
891 Ibid., pt.14. 
892 Ibid., pt. 8. 
893 Ibid., pt.10. 
894 Ibid., pt.103-105. 
895 Ibid, pt. 25. 
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Human Rights.896 According to the decision, the government’s inaction, both in 
terms of not creating an effective legal and regulatory framework, and its reticence 
to punish perpetrators of the current system, amount to breaches of many 
international obligations.897 However, having learned from previous judgements of 
the ECOWAS court that went unenforced, the court did not award the USD 1 
billion in damages that had been requested by SERAP.898 The Court said it would 
not be possible to pay out such a sum, as SERAP did not have specific victims 
named in their suit and that paying out such a sum would not be possible to execute 
equitably.899 In finding Nigeria guilty of SERAP’s accusations of misconduct, the 
Court compelled the Federal Government of Nigeria to ensure environmental 
clean-up and see to it that multi-national actors would be held accountable for 
misconduct.  It was never made clear how they might do this or what the 
consequences might be if they did not comply.900 
 
The SERAP v. Nigeria decision was a landmark case for regional litigation 
relating to oil pollution. Its significance lies in the Nigerian government choice to 
participate, which de facto provided some legitimacy to the proceedings and 
inferred that the government felt compelled to respond to SERAP’s claims. 
However, the lack of a meaningful award or enforcement mechanism in the ruling 
means that the case broadly amounts to a news story rather than ensuring lasting 
impact for those negatively affected by oil sector activity in the Delta.  
 
6.6.3 The Milieudefensie Cases, The Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands is home to the headquarters of the most influential and oldest oil 
producer in Nigeria, Royal Dutch Shell. Dutch jurisdiction is increasingly open to 
hearing civil ETL on a rather broad interpretation of liability, or the developing 
concept of “enterprise liability.” According to Zerk, “[t]his theory of liability is 
                                               
896 In Paragraph 33 of the ECOWAS judgement, the Court criticises the government for inaction 
when citizens’ well-being was threatened due to industry activity. 
897 SERAP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 14 December 2012, ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12, pt.105. 
898 Ibid., pt.115-117. 
899 Alter, Helfer, and McAllister, “A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa,” 
737-779. 
900 Ibid., 767.  
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based on the idea that multinational groups that are highly integrated ought to be 
held jointly and severally liable for wrongs committed by members of that 
group.”901 Enterprise liability, if successfully applied, could have implications for 
Royal Dutch Shell and its international operations in the future.  
 
6.6.3.1 The Dutch Courts 
 
The legal basis for the Dutch courts’ approach to hearing ETL on environmental 
wrongs rests on two EU regulations, the Brussels I Regulations and the Rome II 
Regulations.902 The Brussels I Regulations allow for EU courts to hear cases 
involving companies, of any nationality, which have a presence in the EU state. 
The Rome II Regulations allow the domestic law of the foreign state where the 
action occurred to be used in an EU court of law, referred to as the use of lex loci.903  
 
6.6.3.2 The Cases 
 
Below, I discuss a group of cases against SPDC and Royal Dutch Shell that were 
tried in the Netherlands for environmental damage caused by oil spills in Nigeria. 
The Dutch cases address a range of issues in transnational litigation, particularly 
with regards to how, or if, one state has jurisdiction over events that occurred in 
another country, and whether the laws of the forum’s state or the state where the 
action was instituted are applied.904  
 
In Oguru & Efanga v. RDS and SPDC, two farmers sued Royal Dutch Shell and 
SPDC in the Netherlands for the damage caused by a spill in Oruma, in Bayelsa 
State in 2005. In Dooh v. RDS and SPDC, one farmer in Goi, in Ogoniland, sued 
RDS and SPDC in the Netherlands for the damage caused by the spill on the land 
that Dooh occupies. 
 
                                               
901 Zerk, “Extraterritorial jurisdiction: lessons for the business and human rights sphere from six 
regulatory areas,” 171.  
902 Cedric Ryngaert, “Tort Litigation in Respect of Overseas Violations of Environmental Law 
Committed by Corporations: Lessons from the Akpan v Shell Litigation in the Netherlands,” 
McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law & Policy 8, no. 2 (2013): 249-250. 
903 Ibid., 245. 
904 Ibid., 248. 
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In both cases, the farmers, alongside the Dutch NGO, Milieudefensie (the Dutch 
branch of Friends of the Earth), were suing for: 
 
 compensation for damaged crops,  
 for an order for Shell to clean up the environment,  
 replace outdated pipelines that had been the source of the spill,  
 and for the oil company to be subject to steep penalties should they be found 
to be breaching any stipulations of the eventual judgment.905 
 
In a separate motion, SPDC asked the court to declare that it did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the case.906 The judge dismissed SPDC’s motion and accepted 
jurisdiction to hear the case under Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, Section 7, which 
stipulates that 
 
In the event that the Dutch court has jurisdiction over one of the 
defendants in matters that must be initiated by a writ of summons, 
the Dutch court also has jurisdiction over other defendants involved 
in the same proceedings, provided the claims against the various 
defendants are connected to such an extent that reasons of efficiency 
justify a joint hearing.907 
 
Joining Royal Dutch Shell to the suits and holding them liable for the same 
damages as SPDC meant that both parties had to be assessed.   
 
In affirming their jurisdiction in Oguru & Efanga v. RDS and SPDC, the Dutch 
court noted emerging international trends in extra-territorial jurisdiction that are 
developing to hold parent companies accountable for the actions of their 
subsidiaries. Justices Wien, Nijenhuis, and Bus stated that the very trend itself 
was enough for Royal Dutch Shell to foresee that they might be implicated in these 
kinds of proceedings.908  
 
                                               
905 Oguru and Efanga v. Royal Dutch Shell Hof Den Hague 30 January 2013 C/09/337058 / 
HA ZA 09-1581.  
906 Ibid., pt.4.2. 
907 S.7, DCCP. 
908 Oguru and Efanga v. Royal Dutch Shell Hof Den Hague 30 January 2013 C/09/337058 / 
HA ZA 09-1581, pt. 4.6. 
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The central substantive issue in these cases was the cause of the oil spills. 
Following a spill, it is standard practice for a multi-stakeholder team to visit the 
site in order to assess the damage and cause of the spill, the JIV, which is discussed 
in further detail in Chapter 4. The practice has been criticised as playing directly 
to oil company power dynamics, often using oil company resources to make the 
visits and having the oil companies themselves fill out the final reports that state 
the cause of the oil spill.909 
 
In both of the cases before the Dutch court, the communities had refused to sign 
the JIV reports because they disagreed with the oil company findings that sabotage 
had taken place. Despite not being signed by the communities, the reports were 
still accepted by the Dutch court and weighed as evidence in determining the cause 
of the oil spills.  
 
The farmers and the NGO Milieudefensie had expert testimony, in both cases that 
explained all of the plausible ways in which these ruptures could have been 
naturally occurring, due to the age of the pipelines and where they were physically 
buried. In both instances, SPDC insisted that the spills were caused by vandalism, 
which would absolve them of all liability. In weighing both arguments, the court 
stated that the evidence provided by Shell was much stronger than the more 
general doubts and scepticism raised by the plaintiffs. The judge’s decision to 
determine these pipeline ruptures as sabotage ultimately decided the outcome of 
the cases in favour of the oil companies.910  
 
The Oguru and Efanga case also confirmed that Nigerian courts have not before 
entertained environmental litigation on the ground of a breach of fundamental 
rights. In Oguru & Efanga v. RDS & SPDC, the judge said, “As far as the 
District Court was able to verify, to date there have been no Nigerian rulings 
(precedents) in which a reprehensible failure in horizontal relationships such as 
the one at issue and in the event of sabotage by third parties is considered to be an 
                                               
909 See Chapter 4, Section 4.4.2 for more on this. 
910 As shown in Section 6.5.1.2, Supreme Court justices in Nigeria are making more progressive 
judgements with regards to sabotage than this decision. 
261 
 
infringement of a human right. For this reason, the declaratory judgment 
demanded under II will be dismissed (Section 4.63).” The Nigerian courts’ 
interpretation of fundamental rights in this instance has also had a negative 
impact on the ability to use extra-territorial litigation to the advantage of litigants 
suing oil companies for environmental harms. 
 
The final judgments of the cases were heard in 2013, and found that neither SPDC 
nor Royal Dutch Shell were liable under torts of negligence, nuisance, trespass of 
chattel, or Rylands v. Fletcher. The judge also dismissed SPDC of any obligation 
to pay compensation to the affected individuals through the compensation 
mechanism stipulated in the Oil in Pipelines Act because of alleged sabotage. 
 
Despite these unsuccessful cases, the same District Court judges ruled differently 
in another case in the same year involving a Nigerian farmer and oil pollution 
caused by SPDC operations in the Niger Delta.911  
 
In 2006 and 2007, a series of oil spills took place near Ikot Ada Udo from the 
IBIBO-I well, a long-abandoned Shell exploratory well, fitted with what is termed 
a “Christmas tree” installation from 1959. The spills, it was reported, were the 
result of sabotage at the installation point. Good oil field practice dictates that 
these installations, an above-ground apparatus comprised of valves and spools, be 
removed and decommissioned entirely or filled in with cement.912 Instead, in the 
case of the IBIBO-I well, the installation remained intact and vulnerable to 
tampering. As a result of third party sabotage, more than 600 barrels of oil spilled 
on to Akpan’s land, affecting his livelihood and access to a healthy environment. 
Akpan and Milieudefensie filed suit against Royal Dutch Shell and SPDC in the 
Dutch court. 
 
                                               
911 Akpan v. Royal Dutch Shell Hof Den Hague 14 September 2011 337050 / HA ZA 09-1580. 
912 For example, see: BP, Don Field Decommissioning Programme 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp-




Figure 10: Example of a Christmas Tree wellhead in Northeastern BC, Canada 
 
 
The suit was filed in 2009, and in 2010 SPDC replaced the Christmas Tree 
wellhead with a concrete plug to seal the well and prevent further vandalism. Their 
actions were, however, too little, too late. Citing the Nigerian domestic case of 
Shell v. Otoko where the court found Shell to be negligent under a strict liability 
tort, the Dutch judge ruled that SPDC had indeed committed a tort of negligence 
by not securing the well head against sabotage.913 The key distinction made 
between this case and the other cases filed in the Dutch court was the wellhead 
installation and the length of time that it remained unprotected following well 
abandonment. 
 
6.2.2.5 Summary of Dutch Cases 
 
The judges’ decisions in the cases present emerging trends that may be used in 
future, both as litigation tactics in extra-territorial and domestic cases. There are 
two notable areas that emerge when looking at these cases as a whole: jurisdiction 
and sabotage.  
 
In the above cases, the Dutch court confirmed its jurisdiction over the cases, 
further establishing the court’s liberal interpretation of its jurisdiction over foreign 
entities that may only have a connection to the Netherlands through their 
relationship with a parent company based there. However, this liberal 
                                               
913 Shell v. Otoko (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 159). 
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interpretation that initially allows court’s to take jurisdiction over the case, does 
not translate into increased accountability for the parent entity. In all cases, Royal 
Dutch Shell was removed from the case once jurisdiction was established.  Thus, 
while these cases may provide an avenue for victims of oil pollution to have a 
means for redress, they do little to put pressure on the parent company to improve 
the practices of its subsidiaries. For example, in Dooh v. RDS & SPDC, the Court 
found that  
 
the special relation or proximity between a parent company and the 
employees of its subsidiary that operates in the same country cannot 
be unreservedly equated with the proximity between the parent 
company of an international group of oil companies and the people 
living in the vicinity of oil pipelines and oil facilities of its (sub-) 
subsidiaries in other countries.914 
 
The cases also draw out distinctions that exist in establishing liability for acts of 
vandalism, similar to case law developments in Nigeria. In two of these cases, 
sabotage allegedly occurred on parts of a pipeline that were deemed difficult to 
reach and so unnecessary to protect. In those cases, despite the communities 
disagreeing with the cause of the spill, the companies were not held liable for 
damage. In Dooh v. RDS & SPDC, the court said that 
 
the sabotage of the underground oil pipeline in October 2004 near Goi 
was not easy to carry out. After all, the oil pipeline was dug in so that 
it was necessary to first dig relatively deeply to reach the steel oil 
pipeline. Then the pipeline had to be damaged with a tool such that 
oil could start to leak. For this reason, in October 2004 near Goi there 
was no specific and/or exceptional risk of sabotage for people living in 
the vicinity such as Dooh, which was considerably larger or 
essentially different than the general risk of sabotage for all other 
people living in the vicinity of oil pipelines and oil facilities of SPDC 
in Ogoniland or elsewhere in Nigeria.915 
 
 
In the Akpan case, the Court applied similar reasoning used in the Nigerian Otoko 
v. Shell case from 1990, where the oil company was found negligent for not better 
protecting its exposed assets from vandalism. The difference between hard to reach 
                                               
914 Dooh v. Royal Dutch Shell Hof Den Hague 30 January 2013 C/09/337058 / HA ZA 09-1581. 
915 Dooh v. Royal Dutch Shell Hof Den Hague 30 January 2013 C/09/337058 / HA ZA 09-1581. 
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places where vandalism occurred (as in the Dooh and Oguru & Efanga cases), 
and easy to reach places subject to vandalism  (as in Akpan) is thus far the only 
clearly articulated delineation in determining corporate liability for vandalism in 
ETL and domestic litigation. 
 
6.6.4 The Bodo, Ogale, and Bille Cases (The English High Court) 
 
Two recent cases in the UK Courts further expose the limitations of ETL. These 
cases also demonstrate how interpreting law devoid of its socio-cultural context 
can be detrimental to A2EJ.  
 
In the UK, courts have historically been cautious about accepting jurisdiction for 
ETL cases.916 Where UK courts have decided to hear ETL cases, developments in 
UK domestic law since 1995 have meant that most cases are tried by applying the 
laws of the country where the action took place, lex loci.917 These “choice of law” 
rules, like those in the Netherlands, are meant to mitigate any misgivings that 
might exist between parties, or the perceptions of unfairness, by applying the law 
that parties would have been expecting to be bound by at the time of the action. 
There is an implication that by applying the local law, the judge is respecting local 
norms, while removing any extra-judicial pressures that might exist if the same 
law were to be applied in its home jurisdiction. As I will show below, alongside the 
merits of the lex loci approach, lie significant challenges for A2EJ.  
 
6.6.4.1 The Court 
The cases discussed in the below sections were heard by the Technology and 
Construction Court (TCC) in London. The Court hears cases involving a range of 
specialised issues, including everything from disputes arising from services 
rendered by engineers or surveyors to environmental issues caused by industry, 
                                               
916 Zerk, “Extraterritorial jurisdiction: lessons for the business and human rights sphere from six 
regulatory areas,”149.  
917 Ibid., 198.   
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including pollution.918 The specialist courts normally hear only high value cases (of 
more than GBP 250,000) and have a track record of hearing international cases.919  
 
6.6.4.2 The Bodo Litigation 
In the first case, a London-based personal injury and human rights law firm, Leigh 
Day, represented a community in its suit against Shell in London. The community 
was suing for compensation and clean up following two severe oil spills in 2008 in 
the Bodo community, Gokana LGA, Rivers State.920 The suit was filed on behalf of 
more than 15,000 members of the Bodo community. The community filed suit only 
after negotiations with Shell broke down over the low level of compensation Shell 
was willing to pay.921 In these preliminary negotiations, Shell admitted liability 
for the spills. The Bodo case is a landmark case for UK courts; it marks the first 
time an oil company had been sued for oil-related pollution within the jurisdiction.  
 
The 2008 spills, one caused by a pipeline leak and one from equipment failure, 
poured 600,000 barrels of oil into the Bodo Creek area, causing severe damage to 
local lands as well as damage to mangroves and waterways used for fishing.922 The 
case offered a unique opportunity for a foreign common law jurisdiction judge to 
hear a Nigerian oil pollution case and apply Nigerian law with an outsider’s 
perspective. As such, Justice Akenhead’s preliminary hearing judgement provides 
insight into what might occur when the Nigerian legal system is interpreted 
without cultural context. In research terms, this would mean the judge took a 
doctrinal approach to understanding the law, rather than a socio-legal approach, 
as is applied in this project.923  
 
                                               
918 “History,” Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/you-and-the-
judiciary/going-to-court/high-court/queens-bench-division/courts-of-the-queens-bench-
division/technology-and-construction-court/history/ (accessed August 22, 2017).  
919 Ibid.  
920 The Bodo Community and Ors. v. SPDC [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC).  
921 Ibid.  
922 Abigail Daisy Morgan. “Long-Term Effects of Oil Spills in Bodo, Nigeria.” Al Jazeera, July 28, 
2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2017/07/long-term-effects-oil-spills-bodo-
nigeria-170717090542648.htm (accessed September 3, 2017). 
923 In order provide some context for Nigerian jurisprudence, both parties were represented by 
expert testimony from retired Nigerian Supreme Court justices.  
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Before delving into the details of the preliminary judgement, it is important to note 
that this case took place between SPDC, Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary, and Nigerian 
claimants, without an “anchor defendant” to tie the case to British jurisdiction.924 
This was not the case when the suit was initially filed. Another UK TCC judge 
later noted that in the Bodo Case, “Claim forms were issued in this jurisdiction 
against RDS and SPDC in 2012, but the claims proceeded against SPDC alone on 
the basis of an agreement that it would voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction SPDC 
also admitted liability.”925  
 
The fact that RDS, the British holding company for all of Shell’s other companies, 
was removed from the case while the Nigerian subsidiary remained is significant; 
this suggests that the parent company was not willing to take the risk that they 
might have been found to be liable in the suit. At the same time, RDS was 
sufficiently influential that it was able to instruct the subsidiary to subject itself 
to the British jurisdiction. As was shown in the Dutch cases and as will be shown 
in the below Ogale-Bille case, Shell has invested a great deal of resources to ensure 
that its parent companies cannot be held liable in courts outside of Nigeria. 
 
Once defendants were agreed, the Bodo preliminary judgement mainly focused on 
which mechanism was appropriate for governing compensation claims in Nigeria. 
In his preliminary judgement, Justice Akenhead relied heavily on the Oil Pipelines 
Act deeming it the prevailing legal instrument that should govern compensation 
for oil spills in the sector. Justice Akenhead weighed the merits of statutory 
frameworks over the use of tort law remedies and found the Oil Pipelines Act 
compensation framework to be comprehensive enough so as to be considered the 
primary and preferred mechanism for deciding compensation cases related to oil 
pollution.926 However, as I have already argued, use of statutes to decide 
compensation rates for oil pollution is in direct contrast to praxis in the Nigerian 
courts.  
                                               
924 The Bodo Community and Ors. v. SPDC [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC).  
925 Okpabi and Ors. v. Royal Dutch Shell and SPDC 2017 EWHC 89 (TCC). 
926 Justice Akenhead does acknowledge, however, that the OPA does not exclude the use of 





Justice Akenhead’s argument that legislation should be used instead of tort to 
award compensation was supported primarily through English case law. He had 
to use English precedent to make his case, as so few cases in the Nigerian courts 
use legislation in environmental disputes, with a strong preference for tort 
litigation. Nigerian Supreme Court Justice Ayoola, provided expert testimony on 
behalf of Shell, and supported the view that the OPA should supersede common 
law remedies in cases of oil pollution.927 From Shell’s perspective, OPA is a useful 
tool as it has clear provisions for avoiding liability in the event of third party 
interference. Justice Akenhead’s reasoning is founded on the fact that the OPA is 
comprehensive in addressing compensation for spills and that it is “much more 
generous overall for the victims than common law in many respects.”928 He also 
finds that the statutory provisions provide a much wider scope for liability than 
common law remedies. Despite Justice Akenhead and Shell’s confidence in the 
“generosity” of the OPA’s compensation regime, Frynas finds that compensation 
rates are deemed much too low; this research finds that the quantum of 
compensation in tort litigation is improving, as shown in Chapter 7.929 
 
Following Justice Akenhead’s preliminary hearing, SPDC and the Bodo litigants 
settled out of court. In January 2015, The Guardian reported a GBP 55 million 
settlement between SPDC and 15,600 Bodo community farmers and fishermen.930 
Individuals received more than GBP 2,000 each and millions more was given to 
local health services facilities. The settlement was described as “several years’ 
earnings” by Martyn Day, whose firm represented the Bodo community in the legal 
proceedings against Shell.931 He said that “I don’t think I have ever seen a happier 
bunch of people. The minimum wage in Nigeria is NGN 18,000 a month and 70% 
of the Bodo population live below the poverty line.”932  The Guardian reported that 
                                               
927 Ibid., pt.34.  
928 The Bodo Community and Ors. v. SPDC [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC), pt.64. 
929 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 96. 
930 John Vidal, “Shell Announces £55m Payout for Nigeria Oil Spills.”  
931 John Vidal, “Shell Announces £55m Payout for Nigeria Oil Spills.” 
932 Ibid.  
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the initial offer to the community was GBP 4,000 in 2011, followed by GBP 18 
million in 2013.933 
 
One Nigerian oil and gas lawyer who I interviewed argues that the settlement is a 
partial victory for the Bodo Community. His opinion is that the settlement shows 
ETL can be “a civilised mode of getting justice” rather than previous alternative 
extra-legal avenues for recourse, which often took the form of barricading oil and 
gas installations and seizing equipment.934 In this instance, “getting justice” 
relates to receiving a level of compensation that is deemed to be fair by the parties 
involved. While he is optimistic for the future of ETL, he also finds that oil 
companies are proving that they will rely on adapting their domestic defence 
tactics to frustrate new legal developments. He shared, as an example, a case he 
was working on in 2014, where he approached a French law firm to support an 
ETL case in France against the French oil company Total. When the Nigerian 
lawyer informed Total that he was filing suit in France, the oil company retaliated 
by filing an application in Nigerian courts for an injunction, preventing the 
community from suing abroad. The lawyer acknowledges that the suit is frivolous, 
but it will still delay proceedings abroad.935 
 
6.6.4.3 The Ogale-Bille Claims 
 
Under similar circumstances to the above case, two sets of suits were filed 
separately and then joined together in the Technology and Construction Court in 
London in 2015. The first set of cases involved a group of 20 named claimants filing 
suit against RDS and SPDC in London on behalf of the Ogale community.936 The 
claim seeks damages for “serious and ongoing pollution and environmental damage 
caused by oil spills emanating from the Defendants’ oil pipelines and associated 
                                               
933 As of January 2017, the oil spill still had not been cleaned up, though compensation was paid 
to the community. The dynamics behind clean-up have proven complicated and indeed have 
raised questions about the community’s interest in having the spill cleaned up properly. See 
Emily Gosden, 
“Why Shell's Bodo oil spill still hasn't been cleaned up,” The Telegraph, January 8, 2017,  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/01/08/yet-clean-nigerian-oil-spills-two-years-
compensation-deal/ (accessed August 1, 2017). 
934 Interview A1L2 – PH, January 12, 2015. 
935 Ibid. 
936 Okpabi and Ors. v. Royal Dutch Shell and SPDC 2017 EWHC 89 (TCC). 
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infrastructure in and around the Ogale community in Nigeria.”937 The second claim 
is by a group of claimants representing the Bille Kingdom in Nigeria. Their claim 
concerns “damages arising as a result of serious and ongoing pollution and 
environmental damage caused by oil spills emanating from the Defendants’ oil 
pipelines and associated infrastructure in and around Bille Kingdom in 
Nigeria.”938 Once their suits were combined, they involved 42,500 people living in 
the Niger Delta.939 
 
Unlike the Bodo case, where SPDC volunteered to be bound by UK jurisdiction, in 
the Ogale-Bille case, SPDC contested jurisdiction in the UK. Justice Fraser notes 
that “SPDC ‘had no wish to repeat’ the experience of that litigation, and that was 
why the defendants in the two instant sets of proceedings had decided to insist on 
their strict legal rights so far as jurisdiction is concerned.”940 This meant that RDS’ 
validity as an anchor defendant had to be proved in order to proceed with the claim 
in the UK courts. On this point, the claimants were ultimately unsuccessful; their 
legal counsel (also Leigh Day, as in the Bodo case) could not prove that Royal Dutch 
Shell, the UK domiciled overarching holding company, was a legitimate anchor in 
the case.  A range of tests were applied to the holding company in the UK to 
determine if they could be held responsible for duty of care in Nigeria. One of the 
primary facts used by Justice Fraser in determining RDS’ role as a parent to SPDC 
was identifying the actual activities of the corporation that took place in the UK; 
in this case none. The company’s headquarters were in the Netherlands, and they 
had never held one board meeting in the UK.941 In addition, SPDC was not a direct 
subsidiary of RDS at all; it was a subsidiary of Shell Petroleum NV, in turn a 
subsidiary of RDS, which served to further estrange the relationship between RDS 
and SPDC. 
 
The above reasoning meant that the Ogale-Bille case would not proceed in British 
courts, but the judgement also provided useful insight into the British courts’ 
                                               
937 Ibid., 2. 
938 Ibid., 3. 
939 Ibid., 4. 
940 Ibid., 41. 
941 Okpabi and Ors. v. Royal Dutch Shell and SPDC 2017 EWHC 89 (TCC), 83. 
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perception of A2EJ in Nigeria. As in the Bodo case, the judge’s limited 
understanding of the Nigerian context served to weaken the justice’s authority in 
the matter rather than further bolstering it. Justice Fraser made it clear that the 
Nigeria cases were distinct from a Zambian environmental extra territorial claim 
where jurisdiction was accepted by the British court.942 
 
One of the ways in which Justice Fraser differentiated the cases was due to his 
perception of A2EJ in the respective jurisdictions. Justice Fraser noted that in 
Zambia, conditional fee agreements, a type of financial arrangement that provides 
claimants with access to legal counsel on a no-win no-fee basis, are illegal. He 
contrasted this to Nigeria where such arrangements are legal. Justice Fraser 
asserted that the ability to access legal counsel is sufficient for ensuring access to 
justice – a notion that is not supported by this research project.943 He notes in 
Paragraph thirty-three of his judgement that “As long as legal 
representatives…can be found to act on these CFA arrangements, access to justice 
is available to claimants with deserving cases but who have no financial means.”944 
 
Justice Fraser also found the Nigerian law sufficient for providing redress to 
victims of oil pollution based on limited evidence and which is heavily dependent 
on the potentially flawed logic of his fellow justice, Justice Akenhead.945 He notes 
in Paragraph 115 that “Nigeria has imposed a statutory framework upon the oil 
business in that country, with obligations upon companies that engage in such 
business to compensate for damage.”946 By using this logic to argue that sufficient 
legal remedy is available in the home jurisdiction, Justice Fraser argued that 
Nigerian law has “substantial similarity” to English common law, an assertion that 
Nigerian justices have distanced themselves from in oil pollution litigation more 
broadly.947 
                                               
942 He was referring specifically to a Zambian mining case also concerned with environmental 
harms caused by industry activity, see Lungowe & others v. Vedanta Resources plc and 
Konkola Copper Mines plc [2016] EWHC 292 (TCC), pt. 44. 
943 See Chapter 7, Section 7.3 on barriers to filing claims. 
944 Okpabi and Ors. v. Royal Dutch Shell and SPDC 2017 EWHC 89 (TCC), 33. 
945 Okpabi and Ors. v. Royal Dutch Shell and SPDC 2017 EWHC 89 (TCC), 43. 
946 Ibid.,115. 
947 Ibid., 55. See Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v. NNPC. In that case, Justice Nwokorie says 




Ultimately, Fraser asserted that “the evidence before the court is that access to 
justice in Nigeria would not be denied to the claimants if these proceedings were 
not to continue in London”948 This line of argument is both disadvantageous to 
those seeking redress for environmental harms caused by subsidiaries of large 
multi-national corporations as well as a persuasive example of why lex loci fails to 




The UK cases served as unique opportunities to have specialist judges outside of 
the Nigerian jurisdiction review the facts of cases between an oil company and 
communities. While the Bodo case ultimately settled out of court for a sum of GBP 
55 million, the preliminary judgement has shown that applying Nigerian law 
outside of the context of Nigeria is simply ineffective. Justice Akenhead’s assertion 
that the Oil Pipelines Act should be an adequate mechanism for awarding 
compensation for oil pollution cases is a clear departure from the practice in 
contemporary Nigeria and contrary to the findings of this research. 
 
Justice Fraser’s doctrinal approach to legal analysis produced a poorly informed 
view of A2EJ in the Nigerian context. This was illustrated by his interpretation of 
“access to justice” in the Bille and Ogale cases, where having access to financial 
means to pay for legal counsel is considered a substitute for a non-discriminatory 
legal framework. Ultimately, these cases do not show promise for the entertaining 
ETL in British courts specifically for Nigerian oil pollution claims, as other foreign 
environmental cases, such as the Zambian mining case, have proven more effective 
at showing an absence of A2EJ in the home jurisdiction.  
 
  
                                               
standi in jurisdictions like England; India; Australia, etc., and the Nigerian approach to same, 
which has not evolved up to the stage, where litigants like the Appellant can ventilate the sort of 
grievance couched in its Amended Statement of Claim.” 





Results from my 2014 survey show that more than 40% of practitioners felt that 
ETL was the best mechanism for redress for oil related disputes. However, as my 
analysis has indicated, these approaches are not without their challenges and 
constraints, many of which are connected to the deficiencies of the Nigerian legal 
framework. Piercing the corporate veil remains a challenge in all of the courts 
analysed, where courts have heard cases regarding oil pollution in Nigeria, but 




This Chapter reviewed the viability of gateways to environmental justice through 
the courts, both in Nigeria and abroad. Findings were drawn from available 
evidence, namely a dataset of forty-eight Nigerian court cases and a selection of 
key extra territorial litigation cases.  
 
I argued that the decision to change jurisdiction from SHC to FHC in the 1990s 
has had a negative effect on A2EJ for communities and individuals in the Niger 
Delta. This is due to the fact that the jurisdictional change limited the number of 
courts that were accessible to communities, while also introducing a new 
jurisdictional rule without clear transitional provisions. This caused confusion, 
which was further compounded by some higher court decisions that directly 
support the application of retrospective law, calling into question some of the basic 
tenets of the rule of law. While this has been a setback for A2EJ in the Nigerian 
context, challenges of jurisdiction will likely soon decline in prevalence once 
remaining appeals from the early and late 90s are dealt with by consolidating 
precedent. There have also been some gains in jurisprudence for those looking to 
use the courts for redress. For example, the cases considered in this Chapter show 
that it is possible to prove negligence and strict liability. 
 
I additionally found no evidence that suggests that Nigerian courts are prepared 
to entertain PIEL for cases related to the oil sector. While there have been 
developments in standing for communities, this has not been extended to civil 
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society and pressure groups working to hold government and its commercial 
partners to account for misconduct in the sector. Further, interpretation of the 
Constitution’s Chapter II on Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles 
remains constrained, despite significant developments in jurisprudence in India, a 
jurisdiction with a similar constitutional distinction between rights and principles 
as those of Nigeria. 
 
The final finding of this Chapter concerned the fact that there is dissonance 
between perceived utility of extra territorial litigation and its material benefits for 
access to environmental justice. My review of court cases from ECOWAS, the 
African Union, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom finds few indications of 
material success through extra territorial courts for victims of oil pollution or for 
holding parent companies to account for the actions of their subsidiaries. In the 
use of lex loci in the Netherlands and the UK, the barriers to justice that persist 
for ETL courts shadow the same constraints that prevent Nigerian courts from 
making decisions that would facilitate A2EJ.  
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The preceding Chapter took a judgement-focused approach to analysing litigation 
by interrogating reported case law. My analysis identified some substantive 
challenges to access to environmental justice in the Nigerian context. I argued that 
there is little prospect for public interest environmental litigation for oil sector 
cases. I also found that extra-territorial litigation is not as effective a mechanism 
for A2EJ as survey findings would suggest. The Chapter also showed that a few 
key defences used by oil companies, particularly jurisdiction, continue to prevent 
a large number of litigants’ suits against oil companies from succeeding.  
 
Building on these findings, the present Chapter provides the context for the case 
law in Chapter 6. I here draw on the insights of Nigerian legal practitioners 
provided by my 2014 survey, which are triangulated and illustrated by 
perspectives gleaned from interviews that I conducted with key informants.  
 
In general, Nigeria’s judiciary has been criticised as corrupt, inefficient, and ill-
equipped to respond to the needs of Nigerian citizens.949 A recent report ranked 
the judiciary as the second worst institution in Nigeria for eliciting bribes.950 
According to this study, more than 30% of the Nigerian adult population has been 
asked to pay a bribe to judges and magistrates.951 In addition to corruption, a 2006 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report on the integrity of the 
judiciary in three Nigerian states found that laws and regulations were not 
consistently interpreted, adjournments remain a persistent challenge to justice 
seekers, and the quality of services provided by the courts is generally poor.952 
                                               
949 Jibrin Ibrahim, “Nigeria: Our Critical Institutions Are the Most Corrupt,” Daily Trust (Abuja), 
August 18, 2017. http://allafrica.com/stories/201708180021.html (accessed August 22, 2017).  
950 “Corruption in Nigeria, Bribery: Public experience and response,” United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, July 2017, http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary (accessed September 1, 2017), 38. 
951 Ibid. 
952  “Assessment of the Integrity and capacity of the justice system in three Nigerian States: 
Technical Assessment Report,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/publications_nigeria_assessment.pdf, 18-23. 
(accessed August 20, 2017). 
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Nigeria’s current Vice President, Yemi Osinbajo, has made a range of comments 
about the need to improve the Nigerian judiciary, from reducing corruption to 
improving the efficiency and quality of decisions in order to appeal to investors.953 
 
Given the context of general frustration with the judiciary, the purpose of this 
Chapter is to understand to what effect and under what conditions the courts act 
as a gateway for those seeking justice specifically in environmental disputes 
related to oil sector activity. This is an approach consistent with socio-legal 
methodology. Simply interrogating the case law as it exists on paper can only 
provide an indication about who wins cases and what the judges’ reasoning was. 
In considering the experience of litigation, the social context of the courts 
contributes to a shared understanding of the drivers of those outcomes. 
 
My analysis is organised around three key moments in the litigation chain. I make 
use of an adaptation of Anderson’s schema of the litigation cycle, which draws 
heavily on the work of Felstiner et al, which classifies three stages of dispute 
formation: “Naming, Blaming and Claiming.”954 The premise of this framework is 
that first a litigant must know that they have been wronged and be able to identify 
the person or institution that has committed that wrong. This is referred to as 
“Naming” and “Blaming” in both Anderson and Felstiner et al’s schema. Following 
this process, a potential litigant would then decide how, if at all, to seek redress 
and articulate the claim in a way that it might be addressed. This stage is referred 
to as “Claiming” and can involve litigation or other non-judicial mechanisms, such 
as direct negotiation or advocacy.955 Relevant to this research, Anderson focuses 
                                               
953 “Osinbajo: Nigeria’s ‘crawling’ judicial process ‘nightmare for investors’,” The Cable, June 20, 
2017, https://www.thecable.ng/osinbajo-nigerias-crawling-judicial-process-nightmare-investors 
(accessed August 22, 2017) and “Justice System In Nigeria Is Under Siege, Osinbajo Laments,” 
Greenbarge Reporters, June 12, 2017, http://www.greenbreporters.com/home/national/justice-
system-nigeria-siege-osinbajo-laments.html (accessed August 22, 2017).  
954 The present use omits the Grievance and Naming stages of the cycle in order to make the 
frame of analysis more manageable. Felstiner et al and Anderson characterise the grievance 
stage as identifying that a wrong has been committed, which can be entangled in range of socio-
economic expectations and perceptions about wrongs. Naming moves from identifying a wrong to 
formulating that wrong in a way that can be a cause for action, another significant barrier, 
particularly in instances of environmental harms.  See Michael R. Anderson, “Access to justice 
and legal process: making legal institutions responsive to poor people in LDCs.”  
955William Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat, “The Emergence and Transformation of 
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . .” Law & Society Review 15, no. 3/4 (1980): 631–54.  
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specifically on litigation as a mechanism for dispute resolution. In his adaptation 
of Felstiner et al’s dispute schema, Anderson includes “Winning” and “Enforcing,” 
suggesting that specific barriers to justice persist at different stages of the 
litigation cycle.956 
 
In order to apply this framework to my analysis of the Nigerian context, this 
Chapter uses survey findings from a sample of twenty-seven legal practitioners 
with professional experience in oil sector environmental disputes. This data is an 
important contribution to the study of A2EJ in Nigeria’s oil sector in that it is the 
first time a repeated survey has been conducted using Frynas’ work as a 
baseline.957 I have made some changes to his survey design and administration to 
accommodate progress in available technology and in order to frame the survey as 
more explicitly concerned with A2EJ. Despite these alterations, the repeated 
survey instrument proves a powerful tool for analysis.958 I also augment these 
survey findings with additional insights from other experienced practitioners who 
participated in interviews in order to triangulate findings and explore topics in 
further depth than the survey allows.959 
 
First, in Section 7.2, I discuss court delays – a challenge that cuts across the 
litigation cycle.960 In Section 7.3, I then interrogate the challenge of accessing the 
courts (translating Blaming to Claiming) with particular focus on the barriers to 
filing a claim. Section 7.4 will focus on lawyers’ perceptions of judicial decision-
making and the challenges that may occur at trial for oil-related disputes 
(Winning). According to Anderson, the Winning stage in the litigation cycle is 
where concepts such as “judicial independence” and “procedural fairness” are to be 
assessed.961 Section 7.5 will discuss the final stage of the litigation cycle – 
                                               
956 Anderson, “Access to justice and legal process,” 17. The approach is also informed by the work 
of Marc Galanter who set out a framework for analysing litigation by considering “the different 
kinds of parties and the effect these differences might have on the way the system works”. See 
also Marc Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change,” Law & Society Review 9, no. 1 (1974): 95–160; 97.  
957 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1.  
958 Ibid. 
959 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2. 
960 See Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2.2 for more on delays. 
961 These are both factors that Anderson highlights as potential barriers to justice. See Anderson, 
“Access to justice and legal process.” 
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enforcement. This section assesses how, even if a litigant is successful in a claim 
against an oil company, they might still face challenges accessing justice. From 
Blaming and Claiming to Enforcing, each section will highlight relevant literature 
and provide survey findings alongside relevant data from interviews. Given the 
findings throughout this Chapter, I will conclude in Section 7.6 by asking whether 




Across the Blaming to Claiming, Winning, and Enforcing cycle, delay is 
highlighted as a persistent barrier to justice. This is a particular challenge in 
Nigeria, as was first shown in Chapter 6.962 On the World Just Project’s Rule of 
Law Index in 2016, Nigeria scored significantly lower than the average for Sub-
Saharan Africa on “no unreasonable delay” in civil justice matters.963 In a UNODC 
assessment of the integrity and capacity of the Nigerian judiciary in 2004, 
researchers found that Delta State, one of the oil-producing states in the Niger 
Delta region, performed worse on “timeliness” than the national average.964 A 
range of studies on the Nigerian judiciary suggest delays most often are driven by 
adjournments and interlocutory appeals.965   
 
My survey findings (further elucidated in Section 7.3) show that the expectation of 
delay is so severe that it acts as a deterrent for claimants to file suits in the first 
place, thus impacting the transition from Blaming to Claiming. The UNODC study 
                                               
962 See Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2. 
963 “Rule of Law Index,” World Justice Project, http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#/groups/NGA 
(accessed August 1, 2017).  
964 “Assessment of the Integrity and capacity of the justice system in three Nigerian States: 
Technical Assessment Report,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/publications_nigeria_assessment.pdf  (accessed 
August 20, 2017) 18-23. 
965 See “Assessment of the Integrity and capacity of the justice system in three Nigerian States”; 
John Agbonika and Alewo Musa, “Delay in the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria: 
Issues from a Nigerian Viewpoint,” Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization 26, no. 0 (2014): 
130–38; “Dealing with delayed justice syndrome,” The Daily Post,  
http://dailypost.ng/2014/01/30/dealing-delayed-justice-syndrome/ (accessed August 22, 2017);  
“Human Rights Report,” Nigerian State, 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265500.pdf (accessed August 22, 2017); Iruoma, 
“Eradicating delay in the administration of justice in African Courts: A comparative analysis of 
South African and Nigerian Courts,” 41. 
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confirms that experiencing court delays can have a direct negative impact on 
citizens’ public trust.966 This is also consistent with Tyler’s assertion, discussed 
further below, that a previous experience in court can negatively affect the way in 
which citizens view the legal system as a whole.967  
 
Then, at the trial stage, delay actively impacts a litigant’s experience in the courts 
with seemingly endless adjournments and delays through interlocutory appeals. 
Agbonika and Musa note that adjournments can be instigated by a range of actors 
involved in litigation.968 They suggest lawyers have financial incentives to receive 
adjournments for two reasons. Firstly, lawyers may get paid for each appearance 
in court, which incentivises more court appearances. Secondly, lawyers often work 
in small or sole proprietor firms, and thus have conflicting obligations that require 
them to request different court dates.969  
 
Agbonika and Musa suggest that judges are also responsible for unnecessary 
adjournments for a range of reasons, from perceived work ethic (i.e. not wanting to 
work hard), to personal reasons (i.e. picking up a child from school) and due to lack 
of professional qualification (i.e. adjourning court to do further research on an issue 
of elementary law raised in the course of a trial).970 Court staff can also be the 
source of adjournments in the event that they misplace files or do not provide the 
information needed by the judge to continue proceedings.971 The UNODC and 
Iruoma studies suggest that such frivolity might be related to corruption and 
external influence rather than incompetence.972 This relationship is supported in 
findings in Section 7.4 where survey respondents suggest that judges and other 
                                               
966 “Assessment of the Integrity and capacity of the justice system in three Nigerian States: 
Technical Assessment Report,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/publications_nigeria_assessment.pdf, 18-23. 
(accessed August 20, 2017). 
967 Tom Tyler. “Procedural Justice and the Courts.” Court Review: The Journal of the American 
Judges Association 44, no. 1 and 2 (2007), 26-31. 
968 Agbonika and Musa. “Delay in the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria,” 130–38. 
969 “Assessment of the Integrity and capacity of the justice system in three Nigerian States: 
Technical Assessment Report,” 18-23.  
970 Agbonika and Musa. “Delay in the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria,” 132 – 133.  
971 Ibid., 133.   
972 Iruoma, “Eradicating delay in the administration of justice in African Courts,” 137. UNODC 
found a correlation between low judicial independence and slow and inefficient courts 
proceedings. They also found a correlation between corruption and delay. See “Assessment of the 
Integrity and capacity of the justice system in three Nigerian States.” 
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judicial officers are subject to external pressure. At trial, delay can run up legal 
fees, while also delaying compensation and the potential remediation of 
environmental harms. The UNODC report finds that delays at this stage also 
disproportionately negatively impact the poor.973 
 
Finally, at the enforcing stage, delay prevents claimants from receiving timely 
compensation – often for loss of livelihood or damage to property. A USAID report 
on corruption in Nigeria’s judiciary found that delay at the enforcement stage is 
common. The report notes that there are clear incentives for a losing party to delay 
proceedings because “delay may provide an opportunity to conceal or transfer 
assets; the rate of interest on an unpaid judgment may be below the market 
rate.”974 Oil company motivation may also be delayed to introduce a sense of 
litigation fatigue in the opposing party in order to force an out-of-court settlement, 
which would be much lower than the amount which might be awarded in court. 
Delay at the enforcement stage can have a materially negative effect on the quality 
of a litigant’s life, especially for those who have been out of work due to 
environmental harm done to their property.  
 
Now that delay has been established as a recurring theme throughout the 
litigation cycle, the remainder of this Chapter will discuss in further detail the 
other barriers to justice that present themselves as a litigant moves from Blaming 
to Enforcing.  
 
7.3 Accessing the Courts – Blaming and Claiming   
 
Anderson argues that moving between the Blaming and Claiming stage – the stage 
in which claimants access the courts to pursue a legal claim – “presents the most 
formidable challenges because it entails involvement with the legal system.”975 The 
challenge is so complex and intimidating that many with valid claims never make 
it to this stage. A seminal study on access to courts for civil claims in the United 
                                               
973 Ibid.  
974 “Reducing Corruption in the Judiciary,” USAID, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadq106.pdf 
(accessed August 22, 2017).  
975 Anderson, “Access to Justice and Legal Process,” 17. 
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States found, for example, that “many more potential legal disputes existed than 
researchers had anticipated, and the vast majority never reached a lawyer or 
courthouse, let alone a judge.”976  
 
The Civil Litigation Research Project (CLRP) has shown that there are many 
factors that affect a person’s decision whether or not to use the courts.977 Indeed, 
the CLRP  noted that “Not only resources (e.g., time, money, and lawyers), but also 
social meaning affected whether a potentially legal problem came to be perceived 
as such or reached a legal institution for resolution.”978 In order to better 
understand this complexity, this section explores to what extent those with valid 
claims in Nigeria are translating grievances into legal claims against another 
party, thus moving from the Blaming to Claiming stage through to the litigation 
stage. I then analyse some of the factors that might prevent litigants from filing 
claims, considering, in particular, to what extent these factors differ in cases 




As I have discussed above, people choose, for a variety of reasons, to not use the 
courts, even when they have a valid legal claim. In Nigeria, it may be that those 
with valid legal claims are not fully using the courts because they feel dissuaded 
from doing so (as distinct from claimants having an intrinsic sense that there are 
better avenues for redress). More than 78% of Frynas’ survey respondents had 
experiences where potential litigants were discouraged from taking legal recourse 
                                               
976 This finding was significant in the context of assertions that there was a litigation boom in the 
United States at the time the research was conducted. Indeed, the Civil Litigation Research 
Project suggested that perhaps the courts were only addressing a small number of the possible 
claims that could be pursued in courts. See Catherine R. Albiston and Rebecca L. Sandefur, 
“Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice,” Wisconsin Law Review 101 (2013): 103 – 
120; 103.  
977 Anderson, “Access to Justice and Legal Process,” 17. 
978 Albiston and Sandefur, “Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice,” 104. Another 
study finds that a potential litigant’s past experience with the legal system will affect their 
willingness to file suit. In Greene’s study, she found poor people who had negative experiences 
with the criminal justice system were less likely to file civil claims, even if they had a valid claim. 




in instances where they had a valid legal claim.979 Sixteen years later, 74% of my 
survey respondents reported instances in which potential litigants had been 
discouraged from legal action although they had a valid claim to compensation, an 
injunction, or another form of legal recourse.980 The margin between the two survey 
findings is small, given differences in survey administration and sampling that 
were discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
 
Figure 11: Q31, 2014 Survey: Have you experienced instances in which potential 
litigants have been discouraged from legal action although they had a 




The finding is significant. It means that the shift to a democratic regime in 1999 
with the establishment of the Fourth Republic has not improved basic perceptions 
about access to courts. The findings of both Frynas and my own survey and confirm 
the view of the Civil Litigation Research Project that there are more claims that 
could be filed in courts than what dockets reflect. 
 
Barriers to Filing a Claim 
 
There are in other words more people and groups in Nigeria with valid claims than 
those that are using the courts. In this section, I seek to understand the particular 
                                               
979 The above is in regards to general disputes, not oil and gas disputes specifically. However, the 
number of potential litigants for oil-related disputes is particularly an unknowable number due to 
the scale and prevalence of oil spills, the nature of communal land use arrangements, and 
relatively poor documentation of both. 
980 Given that there is less than a 4% difference between Frynas’ findings and the 2014 survey, 
and that this is a repeated survey rather than longitudinal, it is important to colour any sort of 
analysis of the decrease with some trepidation. A repeated survey uses different individuals in 
the same population whereas longitudinal studies follow the exact same individuals over time.  
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barriers to filing, while keeping in mind CLRP’s findings that these barriers can 
be complex and heavily dependent on social context.  
 
Identifying barriers to filling a claim is an important part of access to justice 
research, and a subject that has been approached by scholars in a range of 
contexts.981 Case studies from India, Indonesia, China, Pakistan, Malaysia, 
Thailand from the A2EJ/SOAS Project all highlight that the reasons people do not 
file suits are varied and contextually bound. 982 For example, Perry- Kessaris finds 
that in Bangalore, deterrents to filing suits include cost and awareness of legal 
rights, but also “psychological limitations,” including the pressure of personal 
attacks and damage to professional credibility for lawyers involved.983 Lau 
similarly found intimidation by outsiders as a deterrent to filing claims.984 In 
Indonesia, Bedner suggests that trust in the judiciary is a barrier preventing 
people from using the courts for environmental litigation.985 In China, argues 
Palmer, social norms and cultural practices are seen as barriers to the use of 
courts.986 
 
In order to understand what kinds of barriers litigants face in accessing courts in 
the Nigerian context, both surveys asked respondents, “How important are the 
                                               
981 Anderson, “Access to Justice and Legal Process;” Amanda Perry-Kessaris, “Access to 
Environmental Justice in India’s Garden City (Bangalore),” in Access to Environmental Justice : A 
Comparative Study, ed. Andrew Harding (Boston: BRILL); Adrian Bedner, “Access to 
Environmental Justice in Indonesia,” in Access to Environmental Justice : A Comparative Study; 
Andrew Harding and Azmi Sharom, “Access to Environmental Justice in Malaysia (Kuala 
Lumpur),” ),” in Access to Environmental Justice : A Comparative Study; Martin Lau, “Access to 
Environmental Justice: Karachi’s Urban Poor and the Law,” in Access to Environmental Justice : 
A Comparative Study; Michael Palmer, “Towards a Greener China? Accessing Environmental 
Justice in the People’s Republic of China,” in Access to Environmental Justice : A Comparative 
Study; Thawilwadee Bureekul, “Access to Environmental Justice and Public Participation in 
Thailand,”  in Access to Environmental Justice : A Comparative Study and “Coalition for Access to 
Justice for the Environment,” Friends Of the Earth,  
https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/caje_general_briefing.pdf (accessed August 12, 
2017). 
982 Harding, Andrew, ed., Access to Environmental Justice: A Comparative Study. (Boston: 
BRILL). 
983 See Perry-Kessaris, “Access to Environmental Justice in India's Garden City (Bangalore),” 60-
87.  
984 Lau, “Access to Environmental Justice, Karachi’s Urban Poor and the Law,” 178-204. 
985 Bedner, “Access to Environmental Justice in Indonesia,” 121.   
986 Palmer, “Toward a Greener China? Assessing Environmental Justice in the People’s Republic 
of China,” 218-223.  
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following reasons in explaining why potential litigants might not seek legal 
recourse?” The surveys then gave the following options for respondents to score:  
 
 Ignorance of legal rights 
 Lack of funds 
 Lack of general education 
 Geographical distance to courts 
 Intimidation by tortfeasors 
 Intimidation by public bodies 
 Organisational structure of villages 
 Uncertainty about the potential success of the suit 
 Delay in the disposal of cases by courts 
 Ethnic origin 
 Living in rural areas 
 Being a woman 
 Being a young age.987  
 
These dimensions broadly map onto the barriers identified in the literature. 
Keeping categories consistent with the Frynas questionnaire allowed for the best 
opportunity to analyse findings in their historical context.988 
 
Table 5: Responses to Q33 of 2014 survey. How important are the following reasons 
in explaining why potential litigants might not seek legal recourse? 
  
% of 1998 Respondents 
'Very important' and 
'Important' 
% of 2014 Respondents 
'Very important' and 
'Important' 
Lack of funds 88.90% 100.00% 




Lack of general 
education 
81.80% 81.48% 
Uncertainty 76.60% 77.78% 
 
                                               
987 These options were based on the original survey administered by Frynas in 1998 in order to 
maintain the opportunity for a baseline comparison. Frynas does not provide insight into how he 
drafted his survey and why he chose to include certain variables. To compensate for this lack of 
evidence in the initial survey design, this analysis uses additional literature to provide a basis for 
triangulating findings with the broader literature on access to justice. 
988 UNDP has identified a range of barriers that try to encapsulate the complexity that the 
literature illustrates. See Appendix III for the full list. 
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Frynas found that lack of funds and ignorance of legal rights, followed by a 
deficiency in general education and expectations of delay were the top deterrents 
for those with valid claims to access the courts.989 In my survey, lack of funds was 
top deterrent, followed by concerns about delays. These were then followed to a 
lesser extent by a lack of general education, ignorance of legal rights, and 
uncertainty about the potential success of the suit. These findings, along with the 
findings of the section below, contrast with Perry-Kessaris’ and Lau’s case studies, 
as they show that intimidation by outside actors is not a major deterrent to 
litigants accessing the legal system. This is an interesting finding when taken into 
consideration with the trial experience, discussed in Section 7.4, where judges and 
other judicial officers face significant pressure from external actors in the course 
of doing their work. 
 
Barriers to Filing Oil-Related Disputes 
 
The section above provides insight into the general deterrents to filing suits in the 
Nigerian context. This section uses those findings as a baseline in order to 
interrogate if there are particular deterrents that are more pronounced in the case 
of oil-related disputes. Any differences may be attributed to the particular qualities 
of oil in the Nigerian context, as outlined in the petro-state literature in Chapter 
3. 
 
Frynas’ survey found that 48% of respondents believe barriers are more 
pronounced in oil-related litigation and 40% believe they are the same.990 This 
finding is important because it shows that litigants filing suits related to the oil 
sector may not face particular challenges due to the nature of the suit.991 However, 
it should be noted that Frynas did not ask his respondents to respond to each 
barrier to accessing courts in oil-related litigation, making it impossible to use his 
data to gain a granular understanding of how barriers might differ between oil and 
general cases.  
                                               
989 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 107.  
990 Frynas did not disaggregate his follow up question and instead asked if these issues were more 
or less severe in oil-related litigation as a blanket statement. This means findings cannot be 
directly compared. 




Given the particular properties of oil, I wanted to test which specific barriers were 
more or less of a barrier in oil-related cases. Doing so allowed me to test the 
hypothesis that litigation involving the oil sector faces challenges that are more 
pronounced than the general deterrents a potential litigant might encounter. In 
taking this approach, I found that ‘lack of funds’ was perceived by approximately 
40% of respondents to be a more severe barrier to the courts than in other types of 
litigation. This is consistent, though not overwhelmingly, with Frynas’ assertion 
that the sheer scale of finances available to an oil company means that an 
individual suing would likely have to have access to more funds to respond to a 
higher investment in defending against claims than may otherwise be the case.992 
One key informant who works closely with communities noted that “the perception 
among communities is that the oil companies are better able to get the best lawyers 
[compared to what litigants] are able to, so there is already, if you like, structural 
inequality in access to legal services.”993  
 
Table 6: Q34: Are these problems more or less severe in oil litigation? (Excluding 
‘Less Severe’ and ‘I don’t know’) 
  
More severe Same 
Lack of funds 40.74% 48.15% 
Uncertainty 40.74% 25.93% 
Living in rural areas 25.93% 40.74% 
Delay 37.04% 44.44% 
Ignorance of legal rights 33.33% 59.26% 
Intimidation by tortfeasor 33.33% 40.74% 
Intimidation by public body 29.63% 40.74% 
Lack of general education 18.52% 66.67% 
 
‘Uncertainty’ was the only other barrier where at least 40% of respondents believed 
that conditions in oil sector litigation were more severe than in other types of 
litigation. This could be due to a range of factors, but this is likely related to 
                                               
992 Frynas, Oil in Nigerian, 108.  
993 Interview A1D1, August 18, 2014. 
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concerns about judicial independence, as well as a universal right to appeal and 




This section considered to what extent Nigerians with valid legal claims follow 
these through into legal action. Felstiner et al and the CLRP study emphasise that 
there are a range of complex sociological reasons that may prevent people from 
translating grievances into formal disputes. Anderson explicitly notes that for the 
poor in least developed countries barriers to filing a legal claim are particularly 
onerous.995 
 
The section showed that a large majority of respondents in both 1998 and 2014 
reported that they knew of potential litigants with valid claims that were deterred 
from filing suits in Nigerian courts. The barriers to entry were similar across time. 
While lack of funds is a deterrent, the survey findings suggest concerns about 
delays in the courts, ignorance of legal rights, lack of general education, and 
uncertainty of the success of the suit are also significant barriers for those who 
might otherwise access the formal legal system. Further, survey findings show that 
there may be some barriers that are more severe for those seeking to access the 
Nigerian legal system for oil-related disputes, but not overwhelmingly so. In 
particular, lack of funds and uncertainty of the success of a suit, may be more 
pronounced barriers for oil-related litigation than in normal suits. These findings 
support the hypothesis that “democratising” the legal system with the 
establishment of the Fourth Republic has yet to have an impact on access to courts 
in Nigeria.  
 
  
                                               
994 This is particularly true on the issue of jurisdiction, where certainty has not yet been well-
established. See Chapter 6, Section 6.5.2.1. 
995 Anderson, “Access to Justice and Legal Process,” 17.  
287 
 
7.4 The Trial – Winning 
 
Once in the courtroom, litigants are confronted with a new set of barriers.996 At 
this stage, litigants turn to judges to ensure fairness of the proceedings.997  For a 
judge to execute this task, they must rely heavily on their ability to make decisions 
that are not overly restrictive and which are free from external pressure or 
intimidation. 
 
Anderson argues that, “independence of the judiciary and the fairness of legal 
procedures can…be fatal at [the trial] stage, even if the case is well founded.”998 
However, Anderson does not define what is meant by fairness of legal procedures 
nor of judicial independence. In order to define these terms, this section draws on 
the work of Tyler and Rottman. Rottman summarises procedural fairness as 
having four components. He argues that litigation would be considered 
procedurally fair if litigants felt that they experienced: 
  
Respect: Treated with dignity and one’s rights respected.  
Neutrality: Honest and impartial decision-makers who base 
decisions on facts.  
Participation: An opportunity to express one’s viewpoint to the 
decision-maker.  
Trustworthiness: Decision-makers who are benevolent, caring, 




Perceived fairness at the trial stage matters because it is an important component 
of people accepting decisions made by courts. If a litigant has an experience they 
deem to be unfair, this can negatively affect their overall view of the courts and 
undermine their respect for the rule of law.1000 Thus, understanding the different 
                                               
996 Anderson, “Access to Justice and Legal Process,” 17. 
997 Ibid.  
998 See Anderson, “Access to Justice and Legal Process” for a historical analysis of judicial 
interpretation. See also Obinna B. Okere, “Judicial Activism or Passivity in Interpreting the 
Nigerian Constitution.”  
999 David Rottman, “Adhere to Procedural Fairness in the Justice System,” Criminology & Public 
Policy 6, no. 4 (2007): 835–42; 835. 
1000 Tom Tyler, “Procedural Justice and the Courts.” Court Review: The Journal of the American 
Judges Association, 44, no. 1 & 2 (2007), 26-31. See also Tom Tyler, “What Is Procedural Justice?: 
Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures,” Law & Society Review 22, 
no. 1 (1988): 103–35. 
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dimensions of fairness at trial in the Nigerian context is critical to understanding 
the legitimacy of courts in Nigeria as a gateway for environmental justice in oil 
pollution litigation.   
 
The remainder of this section discusses survey findings that interrogate a litigant’s 
ability to use court proceedings to access justice, focusing specifically on oil-related 
disputes in Nigeria. For the purposes of this research, Rottman’s “respect” and 
“participation” components are covered by survey questions relating to fair 
treatment and fair compensation awards. “Neutrality” and “trustworthiness” are 




This section discusses a group of findings drawn from my survey that relate to 
fairness of outcome and process, as well as perceptions of judicial independence at 
trial. First, I analyse findings on perception of unfair treatment of litigants filing 
suit against oil companies and perceived fairness of compensation awards. Then, I 
discuss findings related to other dimensions of fairness, specifically, fairness of 
decision-making (restrictive or liberal interpretation), fairness of outcome (court 




Findings from 2014 suggest that oil companies are perceived to be treated more 
fairly than the communities and individuals that file suit against them. A majority 
(67%) of respondents agreed to some extent that oil companies are treated fairly in 
oil pollution disputes, while a minority (37%) felt the same to be true of individuals’ 
and communities’ treatment by the courts.1001 This finding is significant because 
it establishes the premise that the trial experience is not perceived as universally 
fair for all litigants in oil pollution cases. Given that 63% of respondents in my 
survey have acted as counsel for an oil company, I assume that responses are not 
prejudiced by those who have only worked in opposition to oil company interests. 
 
                                               




Figure 12 Top: "Oil companies are treated fairly in court cases involving 
communities/individuals affected by oil pollution." Do you agree or disagree with 
this statement?" Bottom: "Litigants (communities/individuals affected by oil 
pollution) are treated fairly in court cases involving oil companies." Do you agree 






Understanding legal practitioners’ views of judicial decision-making is important 
for contextualising how those lawyers choose to engage with the litigation process. 
It follows logically that if a lawyer believes judges only make decisions on technical 
procedural points, the lawyer would have little incentive to pursue substantive 
arguments that require a more liberal interpretation of the law. To probe 
perceptions of the courts’ decision-making, survey respondents were asked to agree 
or disagree with the statement, “The Nigerian legal system is more concerned with 
process than outcome.” Respondents were then asked the converse. I used the term 
“process-driven” to test arbitrary “technicality-driven” decision-making without 




Seventy four percent of respondents agree to some extent with the statement that 
“The Nigerian legal system is more concerned with process than outcome.” When 
asked the converse, only 41% responded that the legal system was more concerned 
with outcome rather than process. In order to gain an understanding of how being 
procedurally-oriented, rather than outcome-oriented decisions, might have an 
impact on how judges make judgements, respondents were asked if they consider 
“oil-related court decisions” to be interpreted liberally, conservatively, or 
appropriately. In response, only 19% of respondents found oil-related court 
decisions to be appropriate. Sixty seven percent found them to be restrictive to 
some degree.  
 
The notion that judges make procedure-focused, restrictive, decisions is further 
supported by key informants who suggest that both lawyers and the judiciary focus 
on technicalities, such as jurisdiction, rather than the salient facts of a given 
case.1002 Case law also supports this view.1003 For example, NNPC v. Sele is a case 
where a restrictive interpretation of statute meant that communities lost the 
opportunity for substantive justice. In that case, the Supreme Court dismissed the 
case of the Ogbe-Udu community representative for missing the jurisdiction 
change deadline by three weeks.1004 Restrictive decision-making that is applied 
primarily against one litigant group (communities) is a dangerous signal that the 




Fairness is central to compensation awards’ role in providing access to justice. 
Without fair compensation awards, communities may be dissatisfied with their 
experience in the court and seek alternative, extra-judicial, pathways to justice, 
such as violence or obstruction of oil facilities.1005 This is particularly true in the 
                                               
1002 Interviews A1L5, August 12, 2014; O1A2-PH, July 18, 2014; A1L1, July 13, 2014; A1G4, July 
18, 2014;  A1L4, August 15, 2014. 
1003 See Chapter 6. 
1004 See Chapter 6. 
1005 For example, see Emman Ovuakporie, “Ikara spill: Reps order NPDC to pay community 
N100m,” Vanguard, June 15, 2017,  
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case of oil pollution claims in Nigeria, where many claims only make it to courts 
once direct negotiations with oil companies have already broken down due to 
inadequate compensation offers.1006  
 
In 1998, Frynas found that almost 80% of his sample reported that compensation 
paid by oil companies was unfair to litigants going up against oil companies. The 
finding was significant in the sense that the overwhelming response includes a 
majority of oil company lawyers themselves, who in other instances in the survey 
had viewed their clients as at a disadvantage.  
 
While Frynas notes that perceptions about compensation are negative, he also 
found that since the Shell v. Farah case in 1995, awards have increased for 
communities seeking compensation from oil companies.1007 The judge in that case 
found that compensation claims under tort law should be calculated in a way that 
is specific to the circumstances of that tort rather than relying on one-size-fits-all 
legislated compensation schemes.1008  
 
Table 7: Selected cases where oil communities won compensation in trial courts 




Award value at 
time of trial 
(USD) 
SPDC v. ANARO & ORS 1997 358,446 
SPDC v. EDAMKUE & ORS. 1999 2,346,040 
SPDC v. IKONTIA & ORS  2002 6,498 
SPDC v. ORUAMBO & ORS 2003 791,506 
NIGERIA AGIP v. OGINI & ORS 2008 1,558,750 
                                               
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/06/ikara-spill-reps-order-npdc-pay-community-n100m/ 
(accessed August 22, 2017).  
1006 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 184.  
1007 Ibid., 213. See also Chapter 6.  
1008 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, 213.  
1009 One key informant, PH1L3, notes that it is common practice for plaintiffs who win damages 
in the trial court to request that the judgement award be placed in an interest yielding account 
while awaiting the final decision of an appeals process. Interview PH1L3, June 29, 2017. 
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OMOREGHA & ORS 
2011 33,091 
 
As the above table shows, this development may have led to larger awards for 
communities, which in turn may be shifting perceptions of award fairness. While 
respondents still overwhelmingly believe that compensation for damages is too 
low, that number has increased by almost twenty percent since Frynas’ survey.  
 
Figure 13: Q:27 
 
The section has established that when oil companies are ordered to pay 
compensation, the amount awarded is still perceived to be too low. It also showed 
that perceptions may be changing as judgements that award higher compensation 
for communities increase. Despite what appears to be progress toward fairness in 
compensation awards, enforcing court order remains a challenge, discussed later 
in this section. 
 
Neutrality of Judges – Judicial Independence  
 
Anderson argues that without judicial independence, or what Rottman classifies 
as “neutrality,” court proceedings cannot provide access to justice.1010 An 
                                               
1010 Anderson, “Access to Justice and Legal Process,” 17.  
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independent judiciary is a critical component of procedural fairness. Larkins 
defines judicial independence as:  
 
the existence of judges who are not manipulated for political gain, 
who are impartial toward the parties of a dispute, and who form a 
judicial branch which has the power as an institution to regulate the 
legality of government behavior, enact "neutral" justice, and 
determine significant constitutional and legal values.1011  
 
 
Larkins notes that there are a range of factors that might compromise 
independence, such as social beliefs and political pressure.1012  
 
In Nigeria, questions of judicial independence are tied up in the evolution of the 
courts across regime types; a relatively new judiciary under democratic rule is 
struggling to find its own voice following a long tradition of executive co-option of 
the institution. 1013 Aka’s review of judicial independence in Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic finds that “While one would expect improvements in judicial 
independence under the Fourth Republic from 1999 to the present period, this is 
not the case.”1014 In order to illustrate his point, Aka notes four separate reports 
from the Nigeria report of United States State Department Country Report on 
Human Rights Practices which, in the years 1999, 2003, 2012, and 2013, 
essentially all conclude similarly that “the Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however in practice, the judicial branch remains 
                                               
1011 Christopher Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization,” The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 44, no. 4 (1996): 605-626 
1012 Assessing the degree to which a court is independent is difficult and requires a range of 
approaches. Larkins finds that while analysing “judicial workloads, case backlogs, the public's 
impression of the courts, and the judiciary's own perception of its role can lend themselves to 
interpretation, which may eventually lead to a better understanding of the courts' independence 
as an institution in the larger political process,” it will never fully be able to provide a complete 
picture of judicial independence in practice. This is in large part due to the sensitive nature of 
judicial independence – it is not in the judiciary’s interest to admit any degree of partiality, nor 
does it serve democratic governments to admit that they assert pressure and influence to achieve 
certain outcomes in the courts. See Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization,” 614, 
618. 
1013 Larkins notes that in order to become truly independent, judiciaries need to be 
institutionalised into their roles as “preserv[ers] of the rule of law.” See Larkins, “Judicial 
Independence and Democratization,” 620. 
1014 See more on this in Chapter 6, Section 6.2; and Aka, “Judicial Independence Under Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic,” 33. 
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susceptible to executive and legislative branch pressure, influence by political 
leaders at both the state and federal levels, and suffers from corruption and 
inefficiency.”1015 
 
Figure 14: Q:22 
 
Survey findings from 1998 and 2014 provide further evidence to Aka’s assertion 
that Nigeria’s judiciary is not independent. In both surveys, respondents were 
asked “Would you say that courts are biased in favour of the oil company or the 
opposing litigant?” Almost half of all respondents found courts to be biased in 
favour of oil companies and less than 20% found courts to be in favour of opposing 
litigants. This suggests that regime change has had no positive impact on the 
credibility of the courts for providing A2EJ in democratic Nigeria. 
 
One of the drivers of bias is external pressure exerted on key actors involved in 
litigation. In Oko’s analysis of the judiciary, he notes that “Pressures exerted on 
judges by the executive profoundly inhibit their ability to approach their duties 
with the level of objectivity and independence necessary to secure a fair trial.”1016 
Pressure can come in different forms, and while in some instances justices may be 
exploiting a system for personal gain, Oko also notes that these judges are in the 
difficult position of relying on the Executive for certain allowances that directly 
                                               
1015 Ibid., 33-34.  
1016 Okechukwu Oko, “Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies,” 38. 
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impact their personal lives, such as the provision of housing.1017 In addition to 
reliance on the executive for benefits, judges also face serious intimidation by the 
powerful elite, both in and out of government. Oko cites a range of examples where 
judges either refused to take on cases or continue hearing cases due to 
intimidation, in many instances fearing for their personal safety.1018 
 
In my survey, I asked respondents if they thought judges and other judicial officers 
faced external pressure in the course of carrying out their duties. Eighty-nine 
percent of survey respondents believed that lawyers, judges, or other judicial 
officers encounter outside pressures from private or public institutions in their 
work. A large majority, 59%, of lawyers felt this to be the same for oil-related 
litigation, while 37% found there to be more outside pressure in oil related 
litigation. Coupled with a strong sense that courts are biased in favour of oil 
companies, the fact that respondents also believe that judges and others experience 
external pressure in the course of legal proceedings suggests that courts are 
compromised and that there may be heightened pressure in oil-related cases. 
 
Figure 15:  Left: "In your professional opinion, would you say lawyers, judges, or other 
judicial officers encounter outside pressures from private or public 





In a short answer module of my survey, almost a third of respondents elaborated 
on external pressure on judges and other key actors in oil pollution litigation. Some 
respondents suggested that pressure comes from the importance of oil to the 
national economy. For example, one respondent said, “the judiciary in Nigeria 
                                               
1017 Ibid., 38.  
1018 Okechukwu Oko, “Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies,” 34–35.  
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choose to take a conservative approach to oil industry cases tending to weigh the 
‘common good’, that is, oil industry revenue, as vital for the country over individual 
inconvenience.”1019 This approach would be in line with what Brenner observed in 
his review of nineteenth century English case law where he argued that judges 
chose to rule in favour of industrialisation when the imperative of economic 
development outweighed that of individual rights.1020 Other respondents focused 
more on illicit behaviour. One respondent said:  
 
The oil companies at times exert some undue influence through 
“improper friendship” gestures with members of the bench. They also 
sponsor some judicial activities like workshops, etc., which ostensibly 




To this end, a key informant noted a common practice where lawyers are used as 
intermediaries to pay bribes on behalf of oil companies. In an interview, he told me 
that:  
 
One of the tricks they [oil companies] use is the one they call un-
inclusive fees payable to their lawyers. And so some of these lawyers, 
very old lawyers, exploit old relationships and contacts with such 






This section discussed perceived fairness at trial. Using survey findings, I 
established that oil-related litigation in Nigeria does not meet Rottman’s criteria 
for procedural fairness. In particular, results from my survey illustrated that oil 
companies are perceived to be treated more fairly than their opposing litigants, 
while judges continue to make restrictive judgements that focus more on 
                                               
1019 Survey Respondent 13:30:45, 2014. 
1020 Brenner, “Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution,” 428. Of the trade-off, Brenner said, 
“to conclude that the decision to industrialise was economically right, and that the courts were 
right not to obstruct it, is not however to conclude that the process of industrialisation was 
equitable. Nor need one conclude that industrial defendants required the extent of protection that 
was given to them.” 
1021 Survey Respondent 19:38:17, 2014.  
1022 Interview A1L4, August 15, 2014. 
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technicalities than substance. However, when comparing findings from both 
surveys, it becomes clear that as compensation awards for communities increase 
in value, so might perceptions of compensation award fairness. Finally, this section 
showed that many lawyers believe that the courts are biased in favour of 
companies over communities, which may be a by-product of the outside pressures 
exerted on them. Taken together, these findings suggest that it is unlikely that a 
victim of oil pollution would be able to access justice through a domestic trial in 
Nigeria. 
 
7.5 Enforcing Court Orders 
 
Anderson notes that there are a range of benefits to the enforcement of court 
orders, particularly for compensation for environmental harms. He writes: 
 
If the compensation is properly assessed and awarded, then the 
following benefits should accrue. First, the injured party is 
compensated directly for injury while funds can be made available for 
environmental remediation. Second, the tortfeasor is forced to make 
payment for the environmentally degrading activities, thereby 
incorporating negative externalities directly into the costs of 
conducting the polluting or degrading activity. Third, the award of 
damages should send out what are effectively price signals to deter or 
discourage similar polluting or degrading activities by other actors in 
the market.1023 
 
However, the importance of ensuring that compensation is successfully awarded, 
or other court orders are successfully carried out (such as injunctive relief), cannot 
be taken for granted. Harding notes that enforcement is a recurring challenge in 
using legal gateways for environmental justice across contexts.1024 Without such 
enforcement, any judgement in court is a hollow victory.  
 
  
                                               
1023  Michael Anderson, “Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law 
the Answer,” Washburn Law Journal 41 (2002 2001): 399–426; 408-409. 
1024 Andrew Harding, “A Note on Environmental Law Enforcement Duties” in Access to 





Poor enforcement of judgements is a severe barrier to justice in Nigeria, and one 
that has not improved over time or regime change. In 1998, under a military 
regime, 96% of Frynas’ respondents identified significant challenges in enforcing 
court orders.1025 In 2014, survey respondents found the situation to be similarly 
challenging, with 89% of respondents reporting that there are difficulties in 
enforcing court orders, rulings and/or judgements in independent Nigeria. This 
indicates that respect for court judgements under the Fourth Republic may be at 
similar levels to those that obtained under military dictatorship. 
 
Figure 16: Q:14 & Q:15 
 
                                               
1025 More than half found those difficulties to be severe. See Frynas. Oil in Nigeria, 123.  
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Given that perceptions of enforcement of court judgements have historically been 
poor, it should be of little surprise that about half of respondents in 1998 and 2014 
felt that enforcing court orders for oil-related litigation was the same as trying to 
enforce any other judgement (which is already deemed to be difficult). In both 
surveys, more than 35% of responses suggest that there are particular challenges 
related to enforcing court orders for oil-related litigation. 
 
Short answers from some survey respondents shed light on why oil-related 
judgements might face different, if not more severe, obstacles in enforcement. 
Fourteen respondents reported that oil companies can afford, both politically and 
financially, to frustrate and delay enforcement of compensation awards.1026 Some 
respondents stated that the oil industry’s economic significance for the Federal 
Government meant that government may be fearful that enforcing judgements 
may upset the country’s most important investors. This strong aversion to the 
payment of compensation awards may be further compounded by government 
institutions that share incentives to delay or prevent compensation payments. One 
government lawyer questioned regulators’ level of motivation for enforcing court 
orders when ultimately the Government will have to pay a percentage of the bill. 
He said,  
 
The government owns an aggregate of about 57 % in the joint venture 
and so if for instance, there is an accident in the industry, it means 
that in compensation, government must be able to provide a fund to 
that effect. So it is an issue. And whether the regulatory body will 
have wherewithal to pursue, that is also another question that has to 
be answered.1027 
 
In addition to government’s misaligned incentives, one survey respondent told me 
that “The multinational oil companies make it a point of duty to frustrate judgment 
creditors from enforcing judgments obtained against such multinational oil 
companies by filing frivolous appeals.”1028 This is consistent with Galanter’s 
analysis of “repeated players” in the courts, who have a stake not just in the 
                                               
1026 Survey Respondents 19:38:17; 12:38:15; 15:49:38; 22:27:47; 18:06:08; 9:32:27; 15:27:09; 
14:33:42; 13:30:45; 12:58:03; 13:59:23; 8:52:39; 12:25:15, 2014. 
1027 Interview A1G5, July 23, 2014.  
1028 Survey Respondent 12:25:15, 2014. 
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present litigation outcome, but also in setting a favourable precedent for future 
litigation.1029 
 
Key informants illustrate that companies are adept at preventing enforcement of 
compensation awards. One respondent recalled the case of Zenith Bank v. Chief 
Arthur John & Ors. as an example1030 In this case, Shell lost the suit in the trial 
court and was ordered to pay NGN 1.8 billion to the community for damages. 
Before paying the compensation award, Shell appealed the decision and, as a 
condition of appeal, was ordered to take out a bank guarantee. This was done to 
prevent undue delay in payment of the award should they lose on appeal, a 
common practice developed in order to improve enforcement. Shell subsequently 
took out a bank guarantee with Zenith Bank. Once Shell lost their appeal, Shell 
applied to the lower court to prevent Zenith Bank from paying the bank guarantee 
to the community.1031 At the same time, the community filed proceedings in the 
same court to compel Zenith to pay the bank guarantee. In the Supreme Court 
decision, Supreme Court Justice Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili admonished Shell for 
their clear efforts to delay payment to the injured community. She said: 
 
I have to state at least to decry the practice that has unfolded before 
this court in this application, documents and arguments seeking to 
persuade the Court to go along is that of a deployment of tricks of a 
trade to frustrate or stultify through seductive arguments the right 
properly inuring to a party. This practice has to stop and a party has 
to know where to pull the brakes and fulfil obligations it has a duty 
to do and to comply with Court orders such as the Garnishee Order 
Absolute. The administration of justice has no room for the dribbling 
as usually seen in football fields of play while a successful party is 
made to suffer when justice is on its side.1032 
 
 
One lawyer told me that he has dealt with multiple cases in recent years that pose 
a similar problem: 
The banks for fear of losing the custom of the oil companies, their 
business, agree with them. They have even penetrated the Nigerian 
central bank, the regulatory authority, that the Nigerian central 
                                               
1029 Marc Galanter, “Why the Haves Come Out Ahead,” 100. 
1030 Interview A1L4, August 15, 2014. 




bank will be hiring lawyers to resist the payment on a guarantee by 
a bank in a case that does not concern them.1033 
 
Poor enforcement of court awards and judgements may be leading to desperation 
on the part of communities for some semblance of redress by any means necessary. 
One interview subject said he had experienced cases where communities would 
prevent clean ups until compensation was paid.1034 According to him, “[t]here have 
been cases, and the oil companies will tell you this clearly, where communities 
themselves have actually stopped remediation efforts until their compensation is 
stated.”1035 
 
7.5.2 Enforcement Summary 
 
This section finds that there has been no substantive improvement in the 
enforcement of judgements since the Fourth Republic. While there was not an 
overwhelming sentiment that the situation was worse in oil-related litigation, 
respondents did provide views on the particular challenges in enforcing oil-related 
judgements by stating that the vast financial resources available to oil companies 
made it easier to avoid payment. They also stated that government is in a 
conflicted position, as enforcing court judgements may not be in the government’s 




This Chapter built on the findings of Chapter 6 by focusing on the experience, 
rather than simply the outcomes, of litigation. I employed the insights of Nigerian 
legal practitioners from a survey and key informant interviews to understand the 
extent to which Nigerian courts serve as an effective gateway for environmental 
justice in the Nigerian oil sector. In taking this approach, I made a unique 
                                               
1033 Interview A1L4, August 15, 2014. There is at least one documented case in my dataset which 
suggests a bank did go through with making such a payment. In SPDC v. Edamkue & Ors., the 
Supreme Court justice notes that Shell’s Bank did pay the judgement debt of NGN 225.8 million 
to community respondents after the Court of Appeals decision. 
1034 A1D1 Interview, August 18, 2014. 
1035 Ibid.  
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contribution to the literature on access to environmental justice in the oil sector in 
Nigeria.  
 
This Chapter afforded a further opportunity to answer the central question of this 
research project: is A2EJ possible for victims of oil pollution in Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic? The findings of this Chapter provide nuance and detailed evidence to 
support one of my overarching arguments, that the Nigerian court system excludes 
certain avenues for redress for oil-related pollution. My findings suggest that the 
overall climate for access to justice in Nigeria is poor and those seeking redress for 
oil-related grievances may experience an exacerbation of already present 
challenges rather than entirely new difficulties. This Chapter also supports my 
overarching claim that regime change has had little impact on the effectiveness of 
courts in providing access to environmental justice.  
 
My first set of findings cut across the stages of Blaming to Claiming, Winning and 
Enforcing, and relate to the issue of delays. Chapter 6 found that delays in the case 
law dataset were significant, with most litigants waiting on average ten years until 
a final judgement was made. This Chapter provided context to those delays, largely 
based on secondary literature and survey questions, in order to understand how 
delay affects the key stages of the litigation cycle.  I showed  that even the 
expectation of delays was viewed as a significant deterrent to potential litigants 
filing a suit in the first place, which in turn may undermine their perception of the 
legal system as a whole. At trial, delays were driven by a range of key actors with 
different incentives to slow or halt proceedings; a majority of these delays came in 
the form of adjournments and interlocutory appeals. Finally, I illustrated that, at 
the enforcement stage, delays were driven by the losing party’s unwillingness to 
pay, as they may experience positive benefits in delaying enforcement. 
 
The next set of findings related to the challenges of moving from the Blaming to 
the Claiming stage for a valid dispute. A vast majority of respondents in my survey 
were aware of potential litigants with valid grievances that chose not to file claims 
in Nigerian courts, a finding that is consistent with Frynas’ own. Survey responses 
also suggested that people do not translate valid grievances into legal claims for a 
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range of reasons. While cost is a key consideration, parties also do not file claims 
in Nigeria for reasons such as concern about extensive delays, ignorance of legal 
rights, lack of education, and uncertainty of the outcome of their case. For oil-
related litigation specifically, lack of funds and uncertainty of outcome were the 
top deterrents in 2014. This indicates that there are some differences between oil-
related and other cases, but not to an overwhelming extent. Contrary to 
expectations, intimidation did not feature as one of the main reasons that litigants 
avoided filing claims. 
 
The findings related to the Winning stage of the litigation cycle were centred on 
the notion of perceived fairness at trial. A majority of respondents reported that 
oil companies were treated more fairly in disputes than the opposing party. Though 
respondents believed oil companies were treated more fairly, only 20% found 
judgements to be appropriate, with a large majority reporting that judgements 
were too restrictive and procedurally focused. These findings suggest that what is 
considered in the survey as “fair treatment” of oil companies is actually oil 
company bias. This was confirmed by respondents who reported that they believed 
courts were biased in favour of oil companies. This bias was further explained by 
the finding that judges may be subject to external pressure. And finally, while 
awards might be improving in terms of quantum of compensation, a majority of 
respondents still believed compensation levels for victims of oil pollution are too 
low. 
 
The final set of findings concerned the enforcement of judgements. Perceptions of 
enforcement have not improved significantly since the establishment of the Fourth 
Republic. Given that the overall perception of enforcement is poor, many 
respondents found that oil-related judgements were not any more difficult to 
enforce than what is usually the case. Some key informants and survey 
respondents suggested that the difficulties in enforcing oil-related judgements 
were due to the vast financial resources at the disposal of companies to delay court 
proceedings, as well as a lack of government incentive to compel companies to pay 
compensation to claimants. One respondent identified an emergent tactic for 
delaying payment, illustrating that oil companies may be inventing new means to 
304 
 
ensure delay in payment alongside attempts that have been made to improve 
enforcement. 
 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the courts are not effective institutions 
for providing access to justice, both in general, and for oil-related litigation, despite 
some of the modest gains identified in the case law in Chapter 6. The ‘Winning,’ or 
trial, stage of litigation appears to be the point in the litigation cycle that is most 
affected by the particular dynamics of oil.  
 
In light of these findings, it is of extreme importance that the courts be questioned 
as the appropriate forum for oil sector environmental litigation. I asked this 
question in my survey, and survey respondents answered predominantly in the 
negative. Only 26% of survey respondents in 2014 felt that litigation is the most 
effective institution for resolution of oil pollution conflict. A relatively large 
minority, 19%, supported mediation, and 7% supported out of court settlement as 
the most effective means for conflict resolution in the oil sector.  
 
In contrast, and as discussed in Chapter 6, a large group of respondents believed 
that courts in other jurisdictions (through ETL) may be more effective at resolving 
disputes related to the oil sector.  This, in and of itself, emphasises lawyers’ lack of 
confidence in their own legal system to fairly adjudicate disputes. This finding is 
made all the more stark when considering findings from Chapter 6 that show an 
extremely limited number of cases that have attempted ETL, let alone successfully.  
  
This Chapter has interrogated the degree to which litigation is an effective legal 
gateway for environmental justice in Nigeria. Coupled with findings from Chapter 
6 that focused on litigation through the lens of case law, it is evident that 
improvements to the effectiveness of the courts under a democratic regime are 
negligible. Noting Tyler’s assertion that a litigant’s experience in court can impact 
their overall perception of the justice system, such a poorly performing court 
system may have serious implications for the legitimacy of the rule of law in the 
Nigerian context.1036  
                                               





The objective of this dissertation was to identify and assess legal gateways to 
environmental justice for victims of environmental pollution from the oil sector in 
Nigeria. The importance of this issue cannot be overstated given the 30 million 
people living in the Niger Delta that are affected by oil sector operations in the 
area. In terms of the rest of Nigeria, almost 190 million people suffer from the 
instability that poor governance of the oil sector has fomented. This concern has 
sustained this dissertation, which has sought to engage with legal gateways to 
environmental justice in order to advance an academic line of argument, while also 
contributing to an evidence-base that can support those working to reform A2EJ 
in Nigeria.      
 
This thesis used a substantial case law dataset, survey data, key informant 
interviews, as well as laws and regulations that were collected during fieldwork. 
In doing so, the thesis identified two prevailing constraints to access to 
environmental justice. The first constraint pertained to the historical legacy of 
previous regimes’ focus on commercial interests, as expressed through legislation, 
institutional setup and mandate, and precedent in the case law. Through analysis 
of the legal and regulatory framework, interviews, case law, and results of the 
repeated survey, I found that instead of using regime change as an opportunity to 
drastically re-imagine Nigeria’s approach to A2EJ, each new ruling regime chose 
instead to adopt the previous regime’s flawed laws and practices.   
 
The second constraint to A2EJ was the scale of funds derived from the oil sector. 
This was both the case in terms of the impact that oil has had on government 
decision-making (e.g. legislation that favours the interests of commercial actors 
and grants vast discretion to the political elite) and the scale of oil company 
financial resources, which distort the power dynamic with regulators (e.g. the 
process for assessing the scale and cause of oil spills), courts (e.g. the ability of oil 
companies to delay cases for decades and exploit a judicial tradition of restrictive 
interpretation), and victims of oil pollution (e.g. victims’ reluctance to file suits 




This second constraint confirms that there is a need to further develop a theoretical 
framework specifically for addressing A2EJ in Rentier State contexts, and it is here 
where my dissertation’s intervention lies.   
 
8.1 Chapter Findings 
 
The findings of this dissertation provide a nuanced picture of the environmental 
justice landscape in Nigeria’s oil sector. While previous research has confirmed 
that legal gateways are inadequate, there is a dearth of evidence to elucidate the 
drivers of that inadequacy. 
 
The framing of my research in Chapter 2 and 3 identified gaps in the A2EJ 
literature and in the research on Nigeria’s oil industry since 1999. As I argued in 
Chapter 2, while the A2EJ literature has identified politics as a constraint to 
providing access to justice, there has not yet been an adoption of a theoretical 
framework that could address this lacuna. This research has thus contributed to 
filling this gap in the A2EJ literature by introducing a specific sub-set of A2EJ 
research that focuses on A2EJ in a Rentier State context – an approach that has 
not been taken before. As set out in Chapter 2 and addressed in Chapter 3, my 
research also made an intervention in the recent Nigerian environmental law 
literature by  bringing new methods to bear on an oft-studied problem, while at the 
same time applying a socio-legal lens to my analysis. 
 
Chapter 2 set the theoretical framework for a socio-legal study of A2EJ in Nigeria’s 
oil sector that was informed by the Rentier State literature. Chapter 4 applied this 
framing to a key dimension of sector governance – oil spill detection and response. 
This Chapter focused on oil sector governance, in part by comparing Nigeria’s 
governance regime to that of Norway, and also by focusing on Nigeria’s “Joint 
Investigation Visit” mechanism for determining the cause of oil spills.  
 
I also analysed governance of the oil sector in the context of Nigeria’s Rentier State 
qualities. I did this in Chapter 4 in particular, which illustrated the flow of 
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revenues to the different institutions that are required to carry out governance 
functions, and then compared the scale of those funds to that of the oil sector actors 
they are meant to regulate. The Chapter found that the flow and scale of oil 
revenue has an impact on A2EJ by creating an environment of dependence. I 
argued that government actors cannot afford to fulfil their mandates, such as 
responding to oil spills, without financial support from oil companies. I argued that 
this creates an asymmetric power structure that negatively impacts regulation.  
 
Chapter 4 also makes clear the influence of history on present-day institutions. I 
illustrated how the regulator, due to the Department of Petroleum Resources’ 
historically close relationship with the Nigerian National Petroleum Company and 
the oil companies themselves, has gained a reputation as being technically 
competent, but compromised. I showed how the National Oil Spills Detection and 
Response Agency, a newer body set up to comply with an international agreement, 
is perceived as a well-intentioned newcomer, but is ultimately seen as an outsider 
without industry expertise. The reputations of these regulatory institutions affect 
their ability to fulfil their environmental protection mandates.  
 
Chapter 5 analysed the legal and regulatory framework underpinning these 
institutions and Nigeria’s wider governance regime. Here I used survey responses 
and interviews with private sector actors and stakeholders from key government 
institutions to assess the effectiveness of the eleven pieces of legislation that 
govern environmental protection and access to environmental justice in the oil 
sector.  
 
As was the case in Chapter 4, I argued in Chapter 5, that history plays an 
important role in understanding why these laws remain ineffective as far as access 
to environmental justice is concerned. In assessing the historical development of 
legislation governing the oil sector, I found that the legal framework governing the 
commercial dimension of the oil sector was considered to be somewhat effective 
and functioning as intended. This is because there is an economic imperative for 
legislation, such as the Petroleum Act, to be enforced. Conversely, I found that 
legislation not primarily concerned with commercial aspects of the sector had been 
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developed as political responses to either domestic or international pressure with 
little incentive for enforcement. Arguably, even the Constitution of 1999 could be 
placed in this latter category. Upon reviewing the developments that led to the 
adoption of 1999 Constitution, I demonstrated that the Nigerian Constitution does 
not, in fact, function as a mechanism for social justice, especially not for victims of 
environmental harms. Rather, the Constitution serves to more deeply entrench 
and legitimise vested economic interests in the oil sector without public 
consultation. 
 
Additionally, Chapter 5 found that the way in which statutes have developed over 
time has had a disproportionately negative effect on those harmed by oil sector 
activity. The degree of these imbalances is so severe that these legislative 
instruments, such as the Oil Pipelines Act, often go unused as tools for redress. As 
I demonstrated, it is the ineffectiveness of Nigeria’s environmental laws that 
compels victims to rely more heavily on tort law in order to obtain compensation 
for loss caused by oil pollution.  
 
Chapter 6 turned to an assessment of the effectiveness of tort litigation as a legal 
gateway to environmental justice and a means to compensate victims of oil 
pollution, both in the Nigerian context and also for extra territorial cases. The 
findings of Chapter 6 are based on a substantial dataset of Nigerian oil pollution 
cases created specifically for this research.  
 
The overarching finding after analysing forty-eight Nigerian cases between oil 
companies and communities is that a majority of cases fail to deliver justice to 
victims of oil sector activity. There are a few key reasons why cases fail to deliver 
justice. Firstly, the cases I analysed show that the culture of unconditional appeal 
is more likely to negatively affect those filing suit against an oil company. Despite 
the fact that most trial courts decide in favour of oil pollution victims, only 27% of 





Furthermore, cases decided in favour of victims of oil pollution in the appellate 
courts face delays of an average of ten years, with some judgements being delayed 
for decades. These delays were predominantly caused by a suite of oil company 
tactics, such as adjournments, interlocutory appeals, combined with companies 
simply not appearing in court on a specified date. While, in some instances, 
communities were ultimately successful, it was often at a great personal cost to 
individuals with limited financial resources. Finally, analysis of the case law 
provides evidence to suggest that in some instances, judges will apply precedent 
inconsistently in order to achieve a pre-determined desired outcome, such as in 
NNPC v. Mallam Idi Zaria & Anor, where a judge went against well-established 
precedent that Federal High Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over oil-related 
cases in order to rule in favour of the state-owned oil company. 
  
Many of the obstructions to the effectiveness of tort litigation discussed above have 
also been identified by other A2EJ research, as outlined by Harding and discussed 
in Chapter 2. However, Chapter 6 identified one barrier to access to environmental 
justice that was unique to Nigeria – that is, the issue of jurisdiction.  I found that 
changes in jurisdiction in the 1990s that removed State High Courts’ ability to hear 
oil-related cases has had a negative effect specifically on oil pollution cases. The 
harm done by this single barrier outweighs the gains made by other developments 
in oil pollution litigation, such as increases to the quantum of compensation paid 
to the few litigants that do manage to gain a favourable judgement.  
 
In addition to analysing a range of variables related to the tort cases, Chapter 6 
also assessed the viability of public interest environmental litigation and extra-
territorial litigation. Both mechanisms are frequently celebrated for providing 
redress to victims of environmental pollution in contexts and countries where 
accessing environmental justice through the legal system has been otherwise 
fraught.  I argued that, unlike the significant developments and success of 
environmental PIEL in India, a jurisdiction with a similar constitutional 
framework of fundamental rights, Nigerian courts have remained unwilling to 
expand their interpretation of the Constitution to equate the fundamental “right 
to life” to a “right to a clean and healthy environment.” This reluctance persists 
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despite some developments that have made it easier for Nigerian courts to 
otherwise entertain public interest litigation related to enforcing the 
Constitution’s Chapter IV on Fundamental Rights.  
 
Another finding of Chapter 6 concerned the fact that extra-territorial litigation, 
which has been heralded by many Nigerian lawyers as an alternative to impotent 
domestic litigation for oil pollution disputes, has not proven to be an effective and 
accessible legal gateway to environmental justice. This is due to factors unique to 
African regional courts and courts in Europe. In African regional courts, there is a 
lack of state participation in judicial proceedings and no stringent enforcement 
capability following judgements. In the case of ETL in courts of European 
countries, specifically the UK and the Netherlands,  ETL is ineffective because 
judges apply  Nigerian law to cases, which means that litigation abroad will mirror 
the same deficiencies of jurisprudence and legislation that is experienced in 
Nigeria. 
 
ETL in European courts is further constrained by the challenge of lifting the 
corporate veil between parent company and subsidiary. I found this to be 
particularly egregious in the Okpabi & Ors v. Royal Dutch Shell and SPDC 
case before the Technology and Construction Court in London, where the Court 
accepted the submission that Shell UK could not be joined to the suit because it is 
only a holding company.  
 
Chapter 7, the penultimate Chapter in this dissertation, used the results of a 
survey of twenty-seven Nigerian oil and gas lawyers to gain a deeper 
understanding of the factors that made litigation an ineffective gateway to 
environmental justice for oil pollution victims.  
 
While the overall poor perception of civil litigation is similar in oil and non-oil 
cases, Chapter 7 found that the reasons for poor performance may differ, or are 
exacerbated, in the case of oil-related litigation. A recurring theme throughout the 
survey results was the impact of the sheer scale of oil sector financial resources. In 
particular, I showed that lack of funds can act as a deterrent to victims filing a suit 
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in the first place. Further, financial resources of companies and the oil sector’s 
contribution to the economy were seen by many survey participants as reasons 
why judges and other judicial officers might be biased in their decision-making or 
face pressure to rule in favour of oil companies in the course of hearing oil-related 
disputes. Finally, financial resources were seen as a reason why enforcement of 
judgements was so poor; oil companies could simply afford to engage in frivolous 
and indefinite delaying tactics in order to avoid a judgement or its enforcement. 
This finding, that the scale of financial resources of commercial actors in the oil 
sector adversely impacts legal gateways to environmental justice, bolsters the case 
I have made for studying A2EJ in Rentier States within a defined theoretical 
framework. 
 
8.2 Areas for Future Research 
 
This thesis’ findings have opened up several areas for future research in the field 
of A2EJ. Below, I outline one possible additional study that may be conducted in 
Nigeria, and one study that could be conducted in another jurisdiction in the wake 
of the research undertaken here. 
 
My research makes the claim that some of the challenges related to A2EJ in the 
oil-sector are unique due to the State’s economic dependence on oil revenues. In 
light of this, it would be worthwhile for future researchers to conduct similar 
studies on other polluting, less economically-influential industries in Nigeria, such 
as the manufacturing sector, as a means of testing whether other environmentally-
impactful industries pose similar challenges for A2EJ. 
 
Secondly, while this research argues that resource dependence can affect the 
viability of legal gateways to environmental justice, there is nothing to suggest 
that this is an issue unique to Nigeria, or the Global South. The findings presented 
by my Nigerian case study may be a useful framework for investigating similarly 
fraught contexts, such as oil sector activities within the United States. This is 
particularly relevant today as the current administration in Washington has been 
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antagonistic toward environmental protection.1037 Salient here is that there is a 
growing body of investigative journalism covering oil sector practices in both North 
Dakota and Louisiana, which suggests there may be substantial parallels between 
environmental justice challenges faced in these parts of the US and in Nigeria.1038 
Applying the theoretical framework I employed here would be a valuable way of 
testing these parallels, and, in doing so, build a broader theory of A2EJ in oil 
dependent contexts. 
 
8.3 Policy and Practical Implications: The Road Ahead 
 
My research also has significant policy and practical implications. This section 
highlights several possible ways to improve access to justice and environmental 
protection in Nigeria in the short-to-medium term.  
 
Firstly, the findings of this research suggest that it would be unwise for those in, 
or advising, government to recommend new legislation or institutions as a means 
of solving the entrenched oil sector governance challenges that persist in 
contemporary Nigeria. Incremental changes to existing regulations and laws will 
be more effective than wholesale reform. This is due to the highly politicised nature 
of oil sector reform, which is controlled closely by a small group of stakeholders 
with entrenched interests in maintaining the status quo. Making smaller changes 
that are less obviously perceptible over time provides an opportunity to nudge 
reform forward without alienating too many stakeholders at once. Should 
amendments be pursued, such amendments should amount to more than simply 
                                               
1037 Coral Davenport and Eric Lipton, “Scott Pruitt Is Carrying Out His E.P.A. Agenda in Secret, 
Critics Say,” The New York Times, August 11, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/us/politics/scott-pruitt-epa.html?_r=0 (accessed September 
10, 2017); Hiroko Tabuchi, “What’s at Stake in Trump’s Proposed E.P.A Cuts,” The New York 
Times, April 10, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/climate/trump-epa-budget-cuts.html 
(accessed September 10, 2017); and Justin Worland, “President Trump Says He Wants 'Energy 
Dominance.' What Does He Mean?,” Time, June 29, 2017, http://time.com/4839884/energy-
dominance-energy-independence-donald-trump/ (accessed September 10, 2017).  
1038 Deborah Sontag and Robert Gebeloff, “The Downside of the Boom,” The New York Time, 
November 22, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/23/us/north-dakota-oil-boom-
downside.html (accessed September 10, 2017) and Nathaniel Rich, “The Most Ambitious 
Environmental Lawsuit Ever,” The New York Times, October 14, 2014, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/02/magazine/mag-oil-lawsuit.html?_r=0 (accessed 




imposing new financial penalties or creating new institutions, because these are 
ineffective mechanisms for reform (as illustrated with the Associated Gas Re-
Injection Act and the Niger Delta Development Commission Act). Rather, 
amendments and marginal changes to oil sector governance should be made in 
ways that incentivise reluctant actors, such as NNPC and international oil 
companies, to modify their behaviour. The most promising example of this 
approach to date is the work done in recent years on gas flaring, which has focused 
on developing a policy framework for encouraging gas flaring companies to sell 
associated gas to a domestic power market.1039  
 
Secondly, for those lawyers and activists representing individuals and 
communities that have been affected by oil pollution, this research suggests that 
there are some practices that can be adopted to improve litigation outcomes, and 
some practices that should be avoided altogether. For example, it would be prudent 
for legal practitioners to ensure that their clients understand that extra-territorial 
litigation is still an experimental legal gateway and has shown only limited success 
for victims of oil pollution. In particular, ETL in the UK will not be conducive to 
successful Nigerian oil pollution litigation. This means that oil pollution victims 
should only enter into such extra-territorial disputes with the expectation of 
bringing international attention to their cause, and perhaps forcing a settlement, 
rather than achieving a precedent-setting successful case.  
 
The future of ETL for Nigerian cases over the next few decades is uncertain, and 
not altogether promising. Nigeria’s rising economic and political prominence 
globally may make it increasingly diplomatically untenable for other jurisdictions 
to take on Nigerian claims. For example, the UK cases explored in Chapter 6  - 
where jurisdiction was denied on account of perceived sufficient A2J in Nigeria – 
show how a country’s global standing and prominence in the global economy may 
influence extra-territorial justices’ perceptions of Nigeria’s court system, despite 
limited credible evidence.  
                                               
1039 “Nigeria’s Flaring Reduction Target: 2020,” World Bank, March 10, 2017, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/03/10/nigerias-flaring-reduction-target-2020 




There are opportunities and drawbacks to closing avenues for redress 
internationally. The drawbacks are clear: some litigants will no longer be able to 
pursue claims in courts perceived as less partial. However, that avenue for redress 
has never feasibly been a long term solution; courts can only hear so many cases 
from other jurisdictions and any favourable decisions would not then be enshrined 
in Nigerian case law, limiting its ability to contribute to the evolution of Nigerian 
jurisprudence. The opportunity lies in what this could mean for the Nigerian legal 
system longer term; if no other avenues are available, a case could be made that 
the pressure within the domestic legal system will grow to a point where it can no 
longer be ignored by the judiciary and lawmakers.  
 
At present, the political economy of oil litigation does not seem to suggest that the 
legal system is prepared to make the necessary changes to restore trust and 
certainty in Nigerian courts. However, time is running out on Nigeria’s oil reserves 
and so the dynamic may shift in the next three decades when there is less 
economically at stake for enforcing individual and community rights against oil 
companies. Nigeria’s global climate change commitments to reduce gas flaring and 
increase energy efficiency may be an indication that this dynamic is already 
starting to shift.  
 
In addition to the implications of a potentially waning oil sector, the argument 
presented in this dissertation concerning the oil sector in Nigeria may have 
important parallels for other sectors as Nigeria diversifies its economy. My 
findings strongly suggest that the donor community and those advising 
government should be extremely cautious about future recommendations for the 
diversification and growth of the Nigerian economy – especially if these 
recommendations predominantly rely on other extractive sectors for 
development.1040 Such findings are particularly urgent in light of the recent 
exploration for oil, as well as discussions about developing the mining sector, that 
                                               
1040 “Nigeria: World Bank Approves $150 Million to Enhance Mining Sector Contribution and 
Support Economic Diversification,” World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2017/04/14/nigeria-world-bank-approves-150-million-to-enhance-mining-sector-
contribution-and-support-economic-diversification (accessed August 22, 2017). 
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have taken place in northern Nigeria.1041 As the situation in the Niger Delta has 
shown, economic growth based on extractive practices in the Nigerian context leads 
to severe environmental damage, violent conflict, and lagging development. It 
would be a great tragedy to repeat the same mistakes in the north – where Boko 
Haram actively operates, and where water scarcity, draught and famine are 
everyday battles. It is likely that mineral deposits and petroleum reserves will 
continue to be exploited as long as there is a demand for them, but the current 
context of low commodity prices presents an opportunity to develop better practices 
when the stakes are not as high.  
 
8.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
This project has contributed substantive findings to the field of A2EJ in Nigeria, 
and developed a framework for A2EJ in oil dependent contexts.  
 
While I do not intend to suggest that my findings are generally applicable, I do 
wish to emphasise the value in using shared theoretical and methodological 
frameworks to interrogate similar questions in different contexts. Further, this 
research has proffered a great deal of worrying findings for the state of A2EJ in 
Nigeria’s oil sector, but this does not mean that my research has been informed by 
cynicism. Rather, my hope is that the findings presented here, which are grounded 
in empirics, can move research and policy discussions away from what should be 
done (indeed, many of the “shoulds” have been tested and failed) in order to focus 
on what can be done given the unique political economy of the oil dependence.   
 
While many things have remained constant in Nigeria’s political economy since 
independence, the world around the country has changed rapidly. Recent financial 
shocks precipitated by a dramatic drop in oil prices have at least offered a glimpse 
into what a Nigerian national budget may look like post oil. In the present case, 
policymakers have proven that when required, they can make difficult decisions 
and impose some discipline over governance regimes. 
                                               
1041 Agence France-Presse, “Boko Haram Attack on Nigeria Oil Team ‘Killed More than 50,’” The 
Telegraph, July 28, 2017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/28/boko-haram-attack-
nigeria-oil-team-killed-50/ (accessed August 22, 2017). 
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In addition to financial pressure, Nigeria’s prominence as the largest economy in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and a significant contributor to greenhouse gas emissions 
means that the country is coming under increasing global scrutiny about the policy 
choices it makes. While Nigeria’s Paris Agreement commitments do not require 
the country to address the alarming rate of oil spills explicitly, the country’s 
participation in the climate agreement may create new pressure, forcing 
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Appendix I: Gas Flaring: A brief introduction 
 
Where there are oil deposits, there is also gas, referred to as “associated gas.” The 
gas must be disposed of in some way – i.e. used for energy, re-injected to build 
pressure in the oil well, or burned off through large towers that emit flames and 
debris at high temperatures. The latter practice is referred to as gas flaring.1042 In 
some instances, gas flaring is the most cost-effective method for disposing of gas, 





Photo Credit: Creative Commons User Chebyshev1983 
Figure 17: Gas flaring in the Niger Delta 
 
The detrimental effects of flaring are well-documented. These include air, noise, 
and land pollution, causing acid rain, respiratory diseases, and making some areas 
                                               
1042Zoheir Ebrahim and Jörg Friedrichs, “Gas Flaring: the burning issue,” Resilience, September 
2, 2013, http://www.resilience.org/stories/2013-09-03/gas-flaring-the-burning-issue/ (accessed 
August 1, 2017).  




uninhabitable due to severe noise.1044 The practice is also a serious contributor to 
greenhouse gas emissions. As of 2014, Nigeria was the second largest gas flarer in 
the world, behind Russia.1045 As of November 11th 2015, Nigeria had flared 
270,579,860.16 Mscf1046 of associated gas, foregoing 23,378.1028 GWh1047 of power 
generation potential, while emitting 14,266,201.0112 tonnes of CO2 emissions and 
also forgoing more than USD 675 million in revenue from selling the flared gas.1048 
This is equivalent to all of the current power production in Nigeria. 
 
 
                                               
1044 “About Gas Flaring,” Gas Flare Tracker, http://gasflaretracker.ng/about.html (accessed 
November 11, 2015).  
1045 Ebrahim and Friedrichs, “Gas Flaring: the burning issue.”  
1046 Ibid.  
1047 Ibid. 
1048 Ibid.  
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Appendix III: UNDP Barriers to Justice in the Legal System 
 
The following excerpt is taken from UNDP’s “Access to Justice Practice Note” and 
provides UNDP’s classification of barriers to justice in a legal system: 
 
1. Long delays; prohibitive costs of using the system; 
lack of available and affordable legal representation, 
that is reliable and has integrity; abuse of authority 
and powers, resulting in unlawful searches, seizures, 
detention and imprisonment; and weak enforcement 
of laws and implementation of orders and decrees.  
2. Severe limitations in existing remedies provided 
either by law or in practice. Most legal systems fail to 
provide remedies that are preventive, timely, non-
discriminatory, adequate, just and deterrent.  
3. Gender bias and other barriers in the law and legal 
systems: inadequacies in existing laws effectively fail 
to protect women, children, poor and other 
disadvantaged people, including those with 
disabilities and low levels of literacy.  
4. Lack of de facto protection, especially for women, 
children, and men in prisons or centres of detention.  
5. Lack of adequate information about what is supposed 
to exist under the law, what prevails in practice, and 
limited popular knowledge of rights.  
6. Lack of adequate legal aid systems.  
7. Limited public participation in reform programmes.  
8. Excessive number of laws.  
9. Formalistic and expensive legal procedures (in 
criminal and civil litigation and in administrative 
board procedures).  
10. Avoidance of the legal system due to economic 
reasons, fear, or a sense of futility of purpose.  
 
Source: “Access to Justice Practice Note,” UNDP, 2004: 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-
governance/dg-publications-for-website/access-to-justice-practice-
note/Justice_PN_En.pdf, 4. 
